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Introduction: Worlds of Labour Turned  
Upside Down
Revolutions and Labour Relations in Global Historical Perspective
Pepijn Brandon, Peyman Jafari and Stefan Müller
Revolutions are relatively new, rare and extraordinary events in history, which 
is perhaps one reason why historians and social scientists alike continue to be 
surprised and fascinated by them. Although this interest goes back to at least 
the early modern revolutions in England (1640– 1660) and the Netherlands 
(1568– 1648),1 it was what Eric Hobsbawm calls the “age of revolutions” that 
inspired the study of the subject in the nineteenth century. The revolutions 
of this period included the American (1765– 1783), the French (1789– 1799), the 
Haitian (1791– 1804) and the Irish (1798) revolutions, in addition to the Latin 
American wars of independence and the revolutions that swept Europe in 
1848.2 The next upsurge of studies emerged in the second half of the twentieth 
century, examining the paths of the Russian (1917), German (1918– 1919), Chi-
nese (1911 and 1949), Cuban (1953– 1959), Hungarian (1956), Portuguese (1974) 
and Iranian (1979) revolutions. To this list, one should add the anti- colonial 
revolutions, such as in Algeria (1954– 1962), and the revolutions that toppled 
the Stalinist regimes in 1989.
During the 1990s, the study of revolutions became confined to specialists, 
but a number of events in the twenty- first century have put it back under the 
spotlight. The revolution that toppled Suharto’s three- decade rule in Indonesia 
in 1998 came as a reminder that the end of the twentieth century might not 
have heralded the end of revolutions. Then came the wave of “colour revolu-
tions” in Eurasia, starting with the overthrow of Slobodan Milošević in Yugo-
slavia in 2000, and followed by the Rose Revolution in Georgia (2003), the Or-
ange Revolution in Ukraine (2004– 2005), the Tulip Revolution in Kyrgyzistan 
(2005) and the Jeans Revolution in Belarus (2006).3 Despite their names, histo-
rians and social scientists might find it difficult to define these as revolutions, 
as they represented regime breakdowns and regime transitions without being 
 1 Charles Tilly, European revolutions, 1492– 1992 (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993).
 2 E. J. Hobsbawm, The age of revolution, 1789– 1848 (New York: Vintage Books, 1996).
 3 Lucan Way, “The real causes of the color revolutions”, Journal of Democracy 19, no. 3 (2008); 
Lincoln Abraham Mitchell, The color revolutions (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania 
Press, 2012).
© Pepijn Brandon, Peyman Jafari and Stefan Müller, 2021 | DOI:10.1163/9789004440395_002
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2 Brandon, Jafari and Müller
accompanied by the long period of social ferment or the structural transforma-
tions of political, social and cultural life usually associated with the term. They 
did, however, revive the debate on the nature of revolution.
A similar impetus came from two other developments. First, in the West, mass 
movements emerged in the twenty- first century as a reaction to neoliberal global-
ization, war, austerity politics and environmental degradation. These movements 
have been far from revolutionary, but they have signalled the return of conten-
tious politics on a mass scale and revitalized political imaginaries of radical social 
change.4 Second, mass uprisings did reach a revolutionary scale in a number of 
Arab countries in 2011, including Tunisia, Egypt, Bahrain, Yemen, Libya and Syria. 
These events too, led to a debate about revolution and its changing character in 
the twenty- first century, as some stressed their revolutionary dynamics,5 others 
their “leaderless” aspect and the role of social media,6 while yet others defined 
them as “refolutions”, conceptualizing them as movements that have transcend-
ed the historical divide between reform and revolution and combine elements 
of both.7 While the “colour revolutions” of the early 2000s seemed to open up 
the possibility of rethinking revolution as a largely non- violent, but relatively 
controlled and limited phenomenon,8 the Arab Spring and its violent repression 
seemed to reaffirm more traditional scenarios, in which revolutions comprise sev-
eral distinct phases of the rise and fall of mass mobilization, intense battles over 
the political direction of protest, the active dismantling of existing power struc-
tures and the threat or actuality of brutal counter- revolution.9
Last, a number of anniversaries have fuelled the renewed interest in revo-
lutions. These include the centennial in 2017 of the two Russian revolutions – 
arguably among, if not the most momentous events of the twentieth century – 
and of the German Revolution in 2018.10 The same year saw the bicentennial 
 4 Paul Mason, Why it’s kicking off everywhere: the new global revolutions (London: Verso, 2012).
 5 Gilbert Achcar, The people want: a radical exploration of the Arab Uprising (London: Saqi 
Books, 2013).
 6 Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, “Arabs are democracy’s new pioneers”, The Guardian, 
24 February, 2011.
 7 Asef Bayat, Revolution without revolutionaries: making sense of the Arab Spring (Stanford, 
California: Stanford University Press, 2017).
 8 Julia Gerlach, Color Revolutions in Eurasia (Cham etc.: Springer, 2014).
 9 Brecht De Smet, Gramsci on Tahrir:  Revolution and counter- revolution in Egypt (Lon-
don: Pluto Press, 2016).
 10 See also the fourth edition of Sheila Fitzpatrick, The Russian Revolution (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2017); Yuri Slezkine, House of Government:  A Saga of the Russian 
Revolution (Princeton:  Princeton University Press, 2017); Stephen A.  Smith, Russia in 
Revolution: An Empire in Crisis, 1890 to 1928 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017). With 
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Introduction 3
of Karl Marx, the most famous theorist and advocate of revolution, followed in 
2019 by the fortieth anniversary of the Iranian Revolution.11
1 Historiographical Approaches to Revolution
Along with the ebb and flow of the revolutionary tide, the historiographical 
and theoretical approaches to revolutions have also changed. As mentioned 
above, one change concerns the very definition of revolution and the debate 
about whether particular events can be conceptualized as such. Most histori-
ans and social scientists have now shaken off the inclination to measure rev-
olutionary events by the yardstick of the “great” English, French, Russian and 
Chinese revolutions, and are more prone to understand the modality of revolu-
tions in their changing historical context. As Fred Halliday aptly notes:
Definitions of revolution are, like all definitions in social sciences, con-
ventional: revolutions are not – any more than are nations, classes, even 
events or dates – objectively given “things” waiting to be unearthed or 
identified like objects of natural science. They are phenomena which hu-
man subjects choose to group, on the basis of criteria of significance and 
recurrence, into one category rather than another.12
It is therefore not surprising that approaches to revolutions have changed 
when new events have presented themselves as possible candidates and new 
theoretical and methodological insights have emerged. This has been reflect-
ed, for instance, in the endeavours to analyse revolutions as processes rather 
than as single events in time. With regard to Russia, it is now common for his-
torians to speak not only of the two revolutions of 1917, but to situate them 
in a revolutionary process running from 1905 to at least the end of the Civil 
War.13 Another change in the study of revolutions has been the shift from a 
Weinhauer, Anthony McElligott and Kirsten Heinsohn (Bielefeld:  Transcript/ Columbia 
University Press, 2015).
 11 See among others the biography on Marx by Gareth Stedman Jones, Karl Marx: Greatness 
and Illusion (London: Allan Lane, 2016), and the conference “The Iranian Revolution as a 
World Event”, organized at the University of Amsterdam in December 2018.
 12 Fred Halliday, Revolution and world politics:  the rise and fall of the Sixth Great Power 
(Houndmills England/ Durham, NC: Macmillan Press/ Duke University Press, 1999).
 13 Laura Engelstein, Russia in Flames: War, Revolution, Civil War, 1914– 1921 (Oxford: Oxford 
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narrow focus on their causes, to their dynamics and outcomes. The closer at-
tention paid to the dynamics of mobilization has created the intellectual space 
to include, in addition to class, the role of other factors such as ideology, or-
ganization, repertoires, networks, strategy, leadership, culture, emotions, and 
gender and ethnic relations.14 One of the consequences has been a shift in the 
treatment of revolutionaries themselves, and of revolutionary ideas such as 
Marxism. Current historiography tends to treat them less as “organic” expres-
sions or representatives of particular classes, tendencies or interests within the 
revolutionary process, but also less as the all- powerful shapers of revolutionary 
events than was once fashionable.15 Although such approaches have certainly 
not disappeared entirely from public narratives on revolution, it is interesting 
to note that even authors who assign great importance to leaders and their 
ideologies in the unfolding of revolutionary processes, nowadays tend to ap-
proach their actions as a complex outcome of contingencies, dilemmas and in-
fluences, rather than as the straightforward application of a “right” or “wrong” 
set of revolutionary recipes.16
The divergent outcome of revolutions has also come under closer scruti-
ny.17 Some of these theoretical and historiographical shifts were well described 
by one of the eminent scholars of revolutions, Jack Goldstone, who has dis-
tinguished four generations in the studies of revolutions.18 While the first 
 14 See for example Charles Tilly and Sidney G.  Tarrow, Contentious politics (Boulder, 
CO: Paradigm Publishers, 2007); Michelle Chase, Revolution within the revolution: women 
and gender politics in Cuba, 1952– 1962 (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 
2015); Jean- Pierre Reed, “Emotions in context:  Revolutionary accelerators, hope, moral 
outrage, and other emotions in the making of Nicaragua’s revolution”, Theory and Society 
33, no. 6 (2004); John Foran, Theorizing revolutions (London: Routledge, 1997).
 15 While the former approach was of course favoured by many Marxist historians, the latter 
was very fashionable among Cold War opponents to the very notion of revolution as any-
thing but an ideology- driven scheme devised by minoritarian leaders. For an example of 
the first approach, see Christopher Hill, Lenin and the Russian Revolution (London: The 
English Universities Press, 1949), for an example of the second, see Bertram D.  Wolfe, 
Three who made a revolution: A biographical history (New York: The Dial Press, 1948).
 16 For example, Tariq Ali, The dilemmas of Lenin:  Terrorism, war, empire, love, revolution 
(London and New York: Verso, 2017).
 17 Jack A. Goldstone, “Rethinking revolutions: Integrating origins, processes, and outcomes”, 
Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East 29, no. 1 (2009); Jeff Carter, 
Michael Bernhard and Glenn Palmer, “Social revolution, the state, and war: How revo-
lutions affect war- making capacity and interstate war outcomes”, Journal of Conflict 
Resolution 56, no. 3 (2012).
 18 Jack A. Goldstone, “Toward a Fourth Generation of Revolutionary Theory”, Annual Review 
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Introduction 5
generation of theories about revolutions were mainly descriptive,19 the second 
generation focused on causal factors through various approaches (psycholog-
ical, structural- functionalist and a combination of both that emphasizes the 
unevenness caused by rapid modernization). The third generation of revolu-
tion theories started to emerge in the 1960s and 1970s. They drew intellectual 
inspiration from a structuralist interpretation of Karl Marx’ writings on the 
mode of production and class struggle, but also on De Tocqueville’s views con-
cerning the French Revolution.20 The pioneering work of Barrington Moore 
stressed the changing relations among peasants, the state, landlords and a na-
scent bourgeoisie during the transition to capitalist agriculture.21 A decade lat-
er, one of Moore’s students, Theda Skocpol, modified his structural approach 
and underpinned it with Weberian notions of state autonomy and multicau-
sality. Following a comparative historical analysis, Skocpol’s States and Social 
Revolutions argues that “social revolutions should be analysed from a struc-
tural perspective, with special attention devoted to international contexts and 
to developments at home and abroad that affect the breakdown of the state 
organizations of old regimes and the build- up of new, revolutionary state or-
ganizations”.22
In reaction to this structuralist turn, and the inadequacies of States and So-
cial Revolutions, which Skocpol conceded in relation to the Iranian Revolution, 
scholars moved in new directions, calling for greater attention to be paid to 
the roles of agency, ideology and culture in shaping revolutionary mobilization 
and objectives, and emphasizing the role of contingency in the course and out-
come of revolutions. This ushered in the fourth generation of revolution the-
ories, which has been in the making for the last two decades. In this strand of 
literature, structural causality is replaced by a more complex understanding in 
terms of multiple causalities that involve structural and agency- driven factors. 
As a result, research about revolutions has entered into a dialogue with social 
 19 See for example Lyford Paterson Edwards, The natural history of revolution (Chicago, IL: 
The University of Chicago Press, 1927); Clarence Crane Brinton, The anatomy of revolu-
tion (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1938); George Sawyer Pettee, The process of revolu-
tion: Studies in systematic political science and comparative government, vol. V (New York: 
Harper, 1938).
 20 Alexis de Tocqueville, The Old Regime and the Revolution, trans. John Bonner 
(New York: Harper & Brothers, 1856), http:// hdl.loc.gov/ loc.gdc/ scd0001.00004399286 [11 
November 2019].
 21 Barrington Moore, Social origins of dictatorship and democracy:  lord and peasant in the 
making of the modern world (Boston: Beacon Press, 1993 [1966]).
 22 Theda Skocpol, States and social revolutions: a comparative analysis of France, Russia and 
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movement studies, which are concerned with similar processes such as mobi-
lization, ideological contestation and confrontation with authorities.23 Anoth-
er development that has had a marked influence on the newer generations of 
studies of the history of revolutions has been the “global turn”, through various 
trajectories. One of these has been the increasing attention paid to the inter-
national context since the late 1970s. The international system, for instance, 
looms large in Theda Skocpol’s classic work, States and Social Revolutions.24 
A more recent trend has postulated an “intersocietal” approach that views the 
international factors as a constituent part of revolutions.25 Others have opted 
for a transnational approach to revolutions in order to explore the circulation 
of ideas, people, commodities, practices, etc., as well as the connections be-
tween different locations. This approach has produced an impressive body of 
literature on, for instance, the revolutionary Atlantic in early modern times 
and studies on particular revolutions from a transnational perspective.26
2 Revolutions and Labour Relations: A Lens to Reconnect Structure 
and Agency
A strict division of the theoretical and historiographical approaches to revo-
lutions, such as the four- generational approach, is of course somewhat crude. 
It would be hard to argue, for example, that attention paid to the complex dy-
namic between structural processes and collective and individual agency, or 
to the intricacies of ideology, contingency and revolutionary cultures, are ab-
sent from such classical accounts of revolution and counter- revolution as Karl 
Marx’s writings on France in 1848– 1851 and 1871, or Leon Trotsky’s History of the 
 23 Goldstone, “Toward a Fourth Generation”, 141– 142.
 24 Skocpol, States and social revolutions.
 25 Alexander Anievas and Kamran Matin, Historical Sociology and World History:  Uneven 
and Combined Development Over the Longue Durée (London and New  York:  Rowman 
& Littlefield International, 2016); George Lawson, “Revolutions and the international”, 
Theory and Society 44, no. 4 (2015), 299– 319. For an application of this approach in a his-
torical study, see Peyman Jafari, “Oil, labour and revolution: a social history of labour in 
the Iranian oil industry, 1973– 1983” (PhD diss., Leiden University, 2018).
 26 Peter Linebaugh and Marcus Rediker, The Many- Headed Hydra: Sailors, Slaves, Commoners 
and the Hidden History of the Revolutionary Atlantic (Boston:  Beacon Press, 2001). See 
in continuation, Janet Polasky, Revolutions Without Borders:  The Call to Liberty in the 
Atlantic World (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2015); Christian Helm, Botschafter der 
Revolution: Das transnationale Kommunikationsnetzwerk zwischen der Frente Sandinista 
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Russian Revolution.27 The separation into four generations might also conceal 
some of the ways in which these older accounts continue to inform present 
studies. It was a serious engagement with his notorious predecessors that led 
Charles Tilly, for instance, to develop his own ideas on revolutions, which are 
difficult to fit into the four described generations. Tilly’s analysis of collective 
action in From Mobilization to Revolution is explicitly linked to the dynamics of 
capitalism, for which he drew heavily on Marx: “Over the long run, the reorga-
nization of production creates the chief historical actors, the major constella-
tions of interests, the basic threats to those interests, and principal conditions 
for transfers of power [that is, revolutions]”.28 Tilly stresses the importance of 
interests, organizational resources and opportunity in the conflicts between 
different groups (states, elites and challengers).
In his later writings, Tilly studied revolutions as specific instances of “con-
tentious politics”. Through the works of many scholars, this approach has come 
to encompass various concepts, such as mobilization structures, political op-
portunity, framing, protest cycles and repertoires of contention.29 From this 
perspective, a revolution is a specific form of “contentious politics”, in which 
contenders advance exclusive competing claims to control of the state, a sig-
nificant segment of the population is committed to those claims, and the rul-
ers are unable or unwilling to suppress the contenders.30 This definition is in-
spired by Lenin’s classic formulation about revolutionary situations, of course. 
According to Lenin, such a situation arises under three conditions:
(1) When it is impossible for the ruling classes to maintain their rule with-
out any change; when there is a crisis, in one form or another, among the 
“upper classes”, a crisis in the policy of the ruling class, leading to a fissure 
through which the discontent and indignation of the oppressed classes 
burst forth. For a revolution to take place, it is usually insufficient for “the 
lower classes not to want” to live in the old way; it is also necessary that 
“the upper classes should be unable” to live in the old way; (2) when the 
 27 For recent editions of these classical texts in English, Karl Marx, The Political Writings 
(London and New  York:  Verso, 2019); Leon Trotsky, History of the Russian Revolution 
(Chicago: Haymarket Books, 2008).
 28 Charles Tilly, From mobilization to revolution (Reading, MA: Addison- Wesley Publishing 
Co., 1978), 194.
 29 Doug McAdam, Political process and the development of Black insurgency, 1930– 1970 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982). Sidney G. Tarrow, Power in movement: social 
movements, collective action and politics (Cambridge, England and New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1994); Tilly and Tarrow, Contentious politics.
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suffering and want of the oppressed classes have grown more acute than 
usual; (3) when, as a consequence of the above causes, there is a consid-
erable increase in the activity of the masses … [who] are drawn both by 
all the circumstances of the crisis and by the “upper classes” themselves 
into independent historical action.31
For Marxist revolutionaries like Lenin, the core subject of this book – the re-
lationship between revolution and labour relations – might have seemed per-
fectly self- evident. A  strong connection would have been assumed between 
all three conditions for revolution that he outlined, as well as profound dis-
turbances in the world of labour. In fact, determining the nature of this rela-
tionship became central to some of the defining debates between proponents 
and opponents of a directly revolutionary strategy within the confines of the 
second, socialist International of that period. The famous controversy over the 
“breakdown of capitalism”, for example, was predicated on the notion that fis-
sures within the ruling class could only have truly revolutionary consequenc-
es if they sprang from deep, potentially existential crises within the capitalist 
mode of production itself. In the same way, Marxist writers and activists of this 
period tended to take for granted that the self- activity of the working masses 
during revolution would lead to a transformation of labour relations by, or at 
least in favour of, these working masses as the logical outcome of revolution. 
The experience of the twentieth century has cast doubt on the notion of such 
straightforward connections between revolution and (shifts in) labour rela-
tions. The reasons and potential implications for this are discussed at length, 
and far better than the editors are able to, in the opening essay by Marcel van 
der Linden. Here, suffice it to say that this doubt concerned each of the times 
at which a relationship could be traced between labour relations and revolu-
tion. At the level of preconditions, for a long period until the very recent return 
of discussions about the “end of capitalism”, to talk about the “impossibility” 
for the rulers or the ruled to continue living in the old way seemed fanciful, 
at least in the Western world. At the level of activity, revolutions in which the 
“independent historical action” of the masses acted as the prime mover of the 
entire process, not just particular episodes, were the exception rather than the 
rule. In terms of leadership and ideas, even many of the twentieth- century rev-
olutions carried out under Marxist banners that loudly proclaimed the cen-
trality of the industrial working class, were in practice led by, and infused by 
 31 V. I.  Lenin, “The Collapse of the Second International”, cited from the version on the 
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the desires and prejudices of groups ranging from poor peasants and guerril-
la forces to army officers and segments of the existing state apparatus. Lastly, 
at the level of outcomes, political regimes claiming their basis in revolution, 
such as those in Eastern Europe or China, more often than not did manage 
to accomplish changes in labour relations, without fundamentally reducing 
exploitation, repression and alienation at the point of production or in society 
as a whole.32
The apparent lack of a clear relationship between labour relations and rev-
olution in twentieth- century practice, combined with the deep scepticism of 
grand narratives and structural explanations beyond the structures of lan-
guage and imaginations promulgated across fields by the cultural turn, and fi-
nally the declining influence of Marxism within academia as well as within ac-
tual revolutionary events, all contributed to the marginalization of the “social 
question” in revolution studies. The essays in this volume, however, are part of 
reinstating its centrality. The chapters cover a wide range of revolutions of an 
equally wide range of types: “classical” cases such as the Finnish Revolution of 
1918 (an extension of the Russian Revolution) and the Iranian Revolution of 
1979, as well as anti- colonial struggles in South America in the nineteenth cen-
tury and Africa in the twentieth century; revolutions from above (such as the 
immediate post- war Eastern European experience) as well as revolutions from 
below (such as the Hungarian Revolution of 1956); near revolutions or “revo-
lutions that did not happen”, such as the negotiated transition from Apartheid 
in South Africa and the East German transition of 1989– 1990; and “revolutions 
within the revolution”, such as the workers’ uprising against the Bolsheviks in 
Izhevsk in 1918 or the Cultural Revolution in China. All of them in their own 
way illustrate that the lack of a straightforward relationship between labour re-
lations and revolution does not signify the lack of any meaningful and endur-
ing relationship between the two. Further, all of them also show how bringing 
the issue of labour relations to the fore, by necessity involves both questions of 
structure (from the chokepoints in pre- revolutionary forms of industrial orga-
nization to the impact of demography on revolutionary warfare) and agency 
(from the role of individual militants in single workplaces to the impact of the 
presence or absence of a revolutionary programme on the possible horizons of 
the transformation of work).
 32 Interestingly, there are significant parallels and overlaps here with the notion of an imme-
diate link between social structures and revolution in another historical timeframe, that 
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3 This Volume
This volume comes out of the 53rd International Conference of Labour and 
Social History (ith) that was held in Linz, Austria, in September 2017. The or-
ganizers of that conference were of course well aware of the significance of 
discussing the question of labour relations and revolution on the occasion of 
the centenary of the Russian Revolution. Nevertheless, as both the proceedings 
of the conference and this volume that emerged from it show, their inclina-
tion from the start was to problematize this relationship rather than to take it 
for granted. This requires taking on challenging questions. For example, how 
to explain the apparent mismatch between aims and outcomes in cases such 
as the Russian Revolution and the revolutions in the (later) satellites, where 
the “emancipation of labour” was inscribed on revolutionary banners, but the 
new state soon turned to promoting new forms of (Taylorist) work discipline. 
When does revolution – in the process of state- led transformations in labour 
relations  – end and when does the central dynamic become one of post- 
revolutionary consolidation or even counter- revolution? What is the role of 
larger, perhaps even global cycles of change, such as the one instigated by the 
eighteenth- century Age of Revolution that saw the spread of both revolution-
ary and moderate variants of abolitionism, or the global critique of Fordism 
and Taylorism that emerged around the year 1968? And how do working- class 
politics during revolutions reflect such wider cycles?
The conference, in the same way as the current volume does, took an expan-
sive view of where to look for connections between labour relations and rev-
olution. Accepting the main thrust of the programme of “Global Labour His-
tory” as pursued by the International Institute of Social History in Amsterdam 
among others, it did not assume that the question of labour’s role in revolu-
tionary processes is confined to that of industrial wage workers, or tends to be-
come confined to that of the advance of global capitalism.33 For instance, the 
revolution of the slaves of Saint- Domingue in 1804 has to be seen as a prime 
example of a directly labour- related upheaval (figuring as the iconic example 
of so many revolts and attempted revolutions by those bound by commercial 
slavery).34 Equally, the importance of labour relations can also be found in the 
 33 See among others, Towards a Global History of Domestic and Caregiving Workers, ed. Dirk 
Hoerder, Elise van Nederveen Meerkerk and Silke Neunsinger (Leiden: Brill, 2015); Karl 
Heinz Roth (ed.), On the Road to Global Labour History. A Festschrift for Marcel van der 
Linden (Leiden: Brill, 2017).
 34 For the huge amount of literature on Saint Domingue/ Haiti, see Paul Cheney, Cul de 








Downloaded from Brill.com10/09/2020 11:57:52AM
via free access
Introduction 11
Arab Spring, including both the rising level of militancy of traditional groups 
of industrial workers in countries such as Egypt in the course of the 2000s, and 
the struggles of informal or precarious labourers and those working in civil 
service jobs.35
Given the origins of the volume and the timing of the conference from which 
it sprang, it might appear strange that the Russian Revolution itself is only fea-
tured through two events at its periphery. Exploring the possibilities of rein-
troducing labour relations as a key factor in the study of revolutions, requires 
in our view a relatively broad approach to both what constitutes a revolution 
and to what counts as a connection between revolutions and labour relations. 
In selecting the chapters for this volume, we have not restricted ourselves to 
those “classical” cases in which revolutions demonstrably comprised the entire 
gamut of a deep social crisis preceding the revolution, sustained mass involve-
ment during the revolution, and large scale social changes as an outcome of 
the revolution. For example, the French Revolution of the eighteenth century 
with its deep impact on landed property and rural social relations, the Haitian 
Revolution that abolished slavery or the Russian Revolution as seen from the 
factory. Focusing on those events would certainly have created the opportunity 
to re- envision one particular mode of the relationship between political and 
social revolution. The limits of such an enterprise, however, are made clear by 
Van der Linden’s introductory essay. A far greater number of revolutions and 
semi- revolutions in the twentieth century and beyond include some elements, 
but not all. By including discussions of a wide- ranging selection of successful 
and unsuccessful attempts to challenge existing political regimes, and by in-
cluding connections with changes in labour relations – both at a very profound 
and at a more limited level – the volume suggests the many ways in which a 
focus on labour relations can bridge questions of structure and agency in rev-
olutionary processes. This wide selection of cases also means that the volume 
is less concerned with The Social Revolution than it is with instances of the 
social in revolutions.
The chapters that follow Van der Linden’s introductory essay are not primar-
ily theoretical or historiographical in nature, but present particular revolutions 
for which rigorous study of class dynamics is combined with attention paid to 
one or more aspects of the relationship between political events and labour 
relations highlighted above. Rather than summing up the content of each of 
the chapters here in the same order, we will let them speak for themselves and 
 35 See Joel Beinin and Frédéric Vairel, Social Movements, Mobilization, and Contestation in 
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merely stress the findings in them that are most surprising or challenging for 
the overall theme of the volume. Gabriel Di Meglio discusses the relationship 
of popular classes, revolution and labour relations in the Argentine war of in-
dependence during the first decades of the nineteenth century. It is remark-
able that although the Argentine War of Independence would not frequently 
figure in a general overview of labour- relations driven revolutions, in fact Di 
Meglio’s overview of the revolution most explicitly deals with the “classical” 
question of the role of contending social classes in political upheaval. Howev-
er, as he shows, support for the revolution and support for emancipation from 
oppressive labour relations were not at all aligned in a simple or direct way. 
In fact, he stresses that it was often the Argentine elites who pushed for the 
transformation of labour relations in order to exploit economic opportunities 
for the new state in the making. The labourers on the other hand could some-
times use this for their own interests, as was the case with slaves who used the 
army as a road to emancipation, but more often people were opposed to these 
changes due to the detrimental effects they had on their living conditions and 
autonomy.
In the case of Argentina, therefore, revolutionary war was connected quite 
centrally to transformations in labour relations, but this was to an important 
extent a vector of the activity of employers, not just the workers, who some-
times resisted. The activity of workers with the aim of changing labour rela-
tions in their own favour is represented most explicitly in the two chapters that 
deal with events immediately following the 1917 revolution. Although there is 
ample literature showing the role of workers in that revolutionary year, the two 
chapters shift the focus to a very different location. In a highly engaging chap-
ter written originally in Russian by Dmitriy Churakov, and translated and re-
worked for the purpose of this volume, the author deals with the largest revolt 
of industrial workers against the Bolsheviks, which took place in Izhevsk in the 
summer of 1918. The chapter describes in great detail how workers responded 
to the contradiction between the high hopes created by the revolution and 
the dire circumstances that the new regime soon found itself in. Workers 
were certainly not the passive instruments in a power struggle between Bol-
sheviks, oppositional socialists and the Whites. Instead, as Churakov shows, 
their disenchantment was the real cause of the temporary loss of power by the 
Bolsheviks in Izhevsk, but ironically for very similar reasons to the defeat of 
their adversaries that followed. Tiina Lintunen and Kimmo Elo also focus on 
workers fighting in the frontlines of a revolution, this time in Finland, which 
up to 1918 had been part of the Russian Empire. Their chapter is particularly 
important for highlighting the role of networks of committed socialist women, 
inside and outside the workforce, in recruiting the “workforce of revolution” 
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itself, namely the women working mostly behind the frontlines of the red bat-
talions. Interestingly, although the sources for this chapter originate from the 
trials in the aftermath of a bloody civil war, Lintunen and Elo manage to bring 
out how strongly the creation of the red army’s female component relied on 
pre- revolutionary everyday organizing, and how much supporting the labour 
of revolution during the civil war consisted of mundane tasks, sometimes per-
formed out of high ideals and sometimes just as a job.
While acknowledging that the working class is not limited to industrial work-
ers in factories, and therefore that labour- related struggles have many venues 
outside the main industrial centres, most chapters in this volume still focus on 
precisely that social setting. Even in the chapter by Lintunen and Elo, which 
focuses more on family relations, the shape of these networks was still in large 
part moulded by factory work and trade union activity. However, in their chap-
ter on the Portuguese Carnation Revolution of 1974– 1975, Raquel Varela and 
João Carlos Louçã consciously shift away from this terrain. They argue that the 
revolution started not in the Lisbon of the early 1970s, but in the Portuguese 
colonies of the 1960s. Instead of treating the history of the Portuguese Revolu-
tion on the one hand and the anti- colonial wars on the other hand as separate, 
the authors emphasize an entanglement that went deeper than simply the fact 
that defeat overseas led to demoralization in the army. Varela and Louçã pay 
much attention to forced labour as one of the core grievances leading to pro-
longed contestation against the regime. With their question about the impact 
of resistance against coerced labour on the revolutionary movement, they wid-
en the historiographical perspective on Portuguese and colonial history.
Partly as a result of the centrality of the Eastern European experience in re-
thinking the history of socialism, workers and revolution, and partly due to the 
more contingent reason that historically, ith has brought together historical 
researchers from across the Iron Curtain, the complicated legacy of state so-
cialism when trying to connect labour relations and revolutions features very 
prominently in this volume. Adrian Grama opens his essay with what perhaps 
is the fundamental question in this respect: “How might the experience of East 
European workers between 1945 and 1989 fit into a general history of the left in 
the twentieth century?” His own contribution to answering this question is a 
wide overview of the conflicting tendencies in Eastern European labour man-
agement, which included both substantial autonomy for skilled workers in the 
production process and the use of wage incentives as a means of subjecting 
them to the rationale of centralized plans. His nuanced reading of the conflicts 
arising out of the particular forms of organizing industrial work under Eastern 
European state socialism connect remarkably well with the detailed case study 
presented in the chapter by Zsombor Bódy. In his chapter on the Hungarian 
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Revolution of 1956, Bódy analyses the events in a single Hungarian plant before, 
during and after the revolution: the Ikarus bus factory. He examines the conflicts 
that escalated in the plant during the revolution from the perspective of the 
careers of the main leaders of the Ikarus workers’ council and the tensions be-
tween different groups among the workers, technical employees and managers 
of the enterprise. Bódy concludes that the conflicts that came to the fore during 
the revolution grew in part out of earlier tensions between the management 
and the workforce, the potential and limits of the production technology in use, 
and the work culture (and Eigensinn) of the skilled labourers and engineers.
Felix Wemheuer’s lively sketch of the massive changes in labour relations in 
China during the Maoist epoch shed light on another communist country, but 
also a country that was still in the grip of semi- colonial conditions. Wemheuer 
deals with a historical experience that included transformations in the world 
of work at a scale that no other case study in this volume comes close to. The 
sevenfold rise of the workforce in state enterprises alone gives an impression 
of the social mobility that was intended, but that was also feared by the Com-
munist Party for its potentially destabilizing effects. The resulting rifts led to 
the mass mobilizations and strikes of the late 1960s and early 1970s, accompa-
nying the so- called Cultural Revolution. Wemheuer argues (against the dom-
inant narrative) that the rebellion of temporary workers was to some extent 
a success, and that the workers were not merely an instrument of the Party’s 
left- wing faction. In that respect, the Chinese dynamics differed markedly from 
those of Eastern European labour policies before 1989.
All the chapters that deal with state socialism have to grapple with the con-
tradictions of the regimes’ ideological claims to represent working- class in-
terests, or even workers’ power, and the starkly different realities of workers’ 
disenfranchisement in the factories. However, that such contradictions are not 
entirely unique to socialist regimes is shown by Peyman Jafari in his chapter on 
the Iranian Revolution. Jafari traces the history of the rise and fall of the Show-
ras (workers’ councils in the oil industry) as an organizational expression of 
workers’ influence on the political conjecture opened by the fall of the Shah. At 
one level, this seems to represent a somewhat traditional example of workers’ 
self- activity as a revolutionary force, and its defeat at the hands of a counter- 
revolution in the form of the consolidation of the Islamic state. However, this 
account is given greater depth by Jafari’s multi- level treatment of the compli-
cated relationship between different tendencies within the Islamic state and 
the workers, which often included claims about both overlapping and conflict-
ing interests between the oil workers and the state.
In general, the chapters described so far illustrate the difficulty in strictly 
separating phases of revolution, post- revolutionary consolidation and even 
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counter- revolution, which in many historical examples has been dressed up 
as an extension and deepening of the very processes that in practice were cut 
short or derailed by them. In his chapter, Knud Andresen adds a further layer to 
this, by asking whether the developments in South Africa can be described as a 
negotiated revolution. Andresen examines the relations between trade unions 
and multinational companies in the process of dismantling Apartheid. He ar-
gues that as a result of the internal and external crisis of the regime, the exclu-
sion of black workers gradually became an economic problem, and demands 
for reforms were made by these multinational employers. In parallel with this 
process, non- racist trade unions emerged and their negotiating position grew 
significantly. Andresen posits that in a similar way to many other revolutions, 
change in South Africa was not reached simply by the activity of the most sup-
pressed or desperate groups of workers, but that a very large role was played 
by those groups of workers who, because of their position of strength, man-
aged to achieve some social gains, but at the same time remained excluded 
from power.
While Andresen’s chapter deals with a situation in which the factors fa-
vouring revolutionary action by workers were strongly present, but were chan-
nelled into a more negotiated trajectory of change, Renate Hürtgen’s chapter 
illustrates a case of political revolution in which the potential for the working 
class to enter the revolutionary stage in an organized and independent form re-
mained largely latent. Focusing on the experience of workers’ self- organization 
in the 1989– 1990 revolutionary transition in the gdr, she highlights the or-
ganization and demands of workers’ committees in the German Wende, in 
which the language of class was sidelined as belonging to the old regime. Thus, 
the analysed independent shop floor initiatives were not successful and did 
not survive beyond a brief period in the autumn and winter of 1989– 1990. So 
strong was the process of reframing workers’ demands of this period into the 
safe, non- revolutionary direction of a longing for more consumer choice and 
of their organization into the structures of West German trade unionism, that 
all memory of workers’ activity during this period has largely faded.
The final point, drawn from Hürtgen’s contribution, raises an important is-
sue for all the chapters in this volume. Workers’ self- activity as a driving force 
of revolution, and as potentially the most powerful challenger of prevailing 
social conditions, has historically been repressed in a double way. The first is in 
the actual history of revolution, either by direct defeat at the hand of counter- 
revolution or through a more complicated and mediated process in which 
post- revolutionary regimes create new oppressive labour relations or resurrect 
old ones. The second is in writing the history of revolution, in which the agen-
cy of workers – waged or otherwise – is often belittled or denied. The aim of 
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this volume is to contribute to the resurrection of the notion that labour rela-
tions, and the struggles that swirled around them, are crucial in understanding 
the phenomenon of revolution in all its complexity.
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The concept of “revolution”, which derives from astrology and astronomy, be-
came more widely known after Copernicus published De revolutionibus orbium 
coelestium in 1543, in which he used the term to describe both the rotation of 
the planets around the sun and that of the Earth around its axis.1 In the three 
centuries that followed, huge social changes became increasingly described 
as revolutions.2 Often, such changes encompassed all aspects of life and were 
supposed to lead to a better future.3 Distinguishing different aspects of revolu-
tions easily followed from this: economic, political or social. The term “social 
revolution” first appeared in a book titled Considérations sur la révolution so-
ciale, published by the Comte de Ferrand in 1794.4 In this period, revolution 
was regarded mainly as a conflict between the aristocracy and the increasingly 
class- conscious bourgeoisie.5
Between 1831 and 1848, German intellectuals comparing recent develop-
ments in different parts of Western Europe then discovered that the working 
classes could also figure in revolutions. In 1842, the economist Lorenz von Stein 
published his book The Socialism and Communism of Contemporary France, 
in which he argued that the rising industrial society either made workers ob-
stinate and malicious or transformed them into dull instruments and servile 
 1 I would like to thank Pepijn Brandon and Peyman Jafari for their helpful comments on this 
article’s first draft.
 2 The first transition identified as a “revolution” was probably the upheaval in the North Ger-
man town of Emden in 1595. See Die “Emder Revolution” von 1595, ed. Hajo van Lengen (Au-
rich: Ostfriesische Landschaft, 1995).
 3 Reinhart Koselleck et  al., “Revolution. Rebellion, Aufruhr, Bürgerkrieg”, in Geschichtliche 
Grundbegriffe. Historisches Lexikon zur politisch- sozialen Sprache in Deutschland, vol. 5, ed. 
Otto Brunner, Werner Conze and Reinhart Koselleck (Stuttgart: Klett- Cotta, 1984), 653– 788, 
esp. 655.
 4 Antoine François Claude Comte de Ferrand, Considérations sur la révolution sociale (Lon-
don: no publisher, 1794).
 5 See e.g. Ralph Miliband, “Barnave: A Case of Bourgeois Class Consciousness”, in Aspects of 
History and Class Consciousness, ed. István Mészáros (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 
1971), 22– 48.
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subordinates. He considered personal and hereditary property to be the root 
cause of this decline of the working classes, since it resulted in the dominant 
power of some and the unfreedom of others. However, a proletarian revolution 
was not inexorable. Von Stein proposed a reformist political strategy in which 
the state guides the redistribution of economic resources so as to prevent class 
polarization.6
In late 1843 or early 1844, Karl Marx characterized the proletariat as: “a class 
with radical chains, a class in civil society which is not a class of civil society, 
an estate which is the dissolution of all estates, a sphere which has a universal 
character by its universal suffering and claims no particular right because no 
particular wrong, but wrong generally, is perpetrated against it”. The proletariat 
was the “all- round antithesis” to existing society, which is “the complete loss of 
man and hence can win itself only through the complete re- winning of man”.7 
Gradually, the nature of this proletarian self- emancipation became clearer to 
Marx. In a fragment from around 1845, written jointly with Friedrich Engels, 
he asserted that the abolition of bourgeois society would require the collective 
appropriation of all productive forces. This could be effected only through “a 
revolution, in which, on the one hand, the power of the earlier mode of produc-
tion and intercourse and social organisation is overthrown, and, on the other 
hand, there develops the universal character and the energy of the proletariat, 
which are required to accomplish the appropriation, and the proletariat more-
over rids itself of everything that still clings to it from its previous position in 
society”.8 Moses Hess, the philosopher who together with Karl Marx, Friedrich 
Engels and others worked on The German Ideology, wrote in 1847 about the 
“Consequences of a Revolution of the Proletariat”.9 Engels noted in Principles 
of Communism, published the same year:  “In all probability, the proletarian 
revolution will transform existing society gradually and will be able to abolish 
private property only when the means of production are available in sufficient 
quantity”.10
 6 Lorenz von Stein, Der Socialismus und Communismus des heutigen Frankreichs: Ein Beitrag 
zur Zeitgeschichte (Leipzig: Wigand, 1842); Joachim Singelmann and Peter Singelmann, 
“Lorenz von Stein and the Paradigmatic Bifurcation of Social Theory in the Nineteenth 
Century”, British Journal of Sociology 37, no. 3 (1986): 431– 452.
 7 Karl Marx, “A Contribution to the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right”, in Marx Engels 
Collected Works [hereafter mecw], vol. 3 (1975), 186, translation corrected.
 8 Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, “The German Ideology”, mecw, vol. 5 (1976), 88.
 9 Moses Hess, “Consequences of a Revolution of the Proletariat”, in The Holy History of 
Mankind and Other Writings, Moses Hess, translated and edited by Shlomo Avineri (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 128– 135.
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The discovery of radical labour struggle of course related directly to its 
growing visibility in the three most important countries in Western Europe. 
Between 1831 and 1834 the uprising by silk workers in Lyon had instigated a 
general strike, unique for that era, as well as two very bloody confrontations 
with the authorities.11 In England, the proletarian Chartist movement for po-
litical reform had an enormous impact from 1838 onwards,12 and in 1844, the 
rebellion of weavers in Peterswaldau and Langenbielau (Silesia) revealed that 
the working class was also starting to awaken in Germany.13
1 The Marx- Hess- Engels Hypothesis
Marx, Hess, Engels and others believed that the rise of capitalism would bring 
about continuous expansion of the working class in the decades ahead. Labour 
would therefore become ever more important in future revolutions, which 
would soon result in the subversion of capitalist relations. This view seemed to 
find resounding confirmation in the revolutions of 1848– 1849 in France, Cen-
tral Europe and other regions, which explicitly shifted the focus to the working 
class as an emergent – albeit not yet dominant – vector in the social and polit-
ical field of forces.14 Was this perception accurate?
 11 Fernand Rude, Les Révoltes des canuts, novembre 1831- avril 1834 (Paris:  Maspero, 1982); 
Maurice Moissonnier, La Révolte des canuts, Lyon, novembre 1831 (Paris:  ed. Sociales 
Messidor, 1958). The best monograph in English is Robert J. Bezucha, The Lyon Uprising 
of 1834: Social and Political Conflict in the Early July Monarchy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1974).
 12 The body of literature about the Chartists is vast. See e.g., Dorothy Thompson, The 
Chartists:  Popular Politics in the Industrial Revolution (London:  Temple Smith, 1984); 
Malcolm Chase, Chartism:  A New History (Manchester:  Manchester University Press, 
2007). Marx and Engels were in contact with a few Chartist leaders. See e.g. Peter 
Cadogan, “Harney and Engels”, International Review of Social History 10, no. 1 (1965): 66– 
104; Henry Collins and Chimen Abramsky, Karl Marx and the British Labour Movement 
(London: Macmillan, 1965).
 13 Lutz Kroneberg and Rolf Schloesser, Weber- Revolte 1844:  Der schlesische Weberaufstand 
im Spiegel der zeitgenössischen Publizistik und Literatur (Cologne:  C. W.  Leske, 1979); 
Christina von Hodenberg, Aufstand der Weber: Die Revolte von 1844 und ihr Aufstieg zum 
Mythos (Bonn: Dietz, 1997).
 14 Extensive information appears in the journal La révolution de 1848, published in France 
since 1904. Bulletin de la Société d’Histoire de la Révolution de 1848, later renamed Revue 
d’histoire du xixe siècle. Studies focusing explicitly on the role of the workers in 1848 
include Rémi Gossez, Les ouvriers de Paris. Vol. 1:  L’organisation, 1848– 1851. Preface by 
Jacques Godechot (La Roche- sur- Yon:  Imprimerie Centrale de l’Ouest, 1968); Maria 
Grazia Meriggi, L’invenzione della classe operaia:  Conflitti di lavoro, organizzazione del 
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In answering this question, I apply the broad concept of the working class 
as elaborated in Global Labour History in recent years. In this perception, the 
history of capitalist labour must encompass all forms of physically or eco-
nomically coerced commodification of labour power: wage labourers, slaves, 
sharecroppers, convict labourers, and so on – plus all the labour that creates 
such commodified labour or regenerates it; that is, parental labour, household 
labour, care labour and subsistence labour. This broad description enables us 
to acknowledge the role of housewives (for example as instigators of the Feb-
ruary Revolution in Russia in 1917), as well as the actions by cottage labourers 
or chattel slaves.
The rise of the working class according to this broad perception was of 
course largely in parallel with the rise of capitalism. After all, capitalism is 
merely a progressively self- reinforcing commodification of consumer goods, 
natural resources, means of production and labour power. Labour power com-
modification became widespread early on in certain urban industries, such as 
porcelain production in the Chinese city of Jingdezhen, where several hun-
dreds of thousands of workers were employed during the Qing Dynasty.15 Only 
a small proportion of this industry was capitalist, because most production 
was not for the market but for the imperial household. Nevertheless, many 
conflicts arose here as well:
Disputes, which sometimes led to death … broke out between workers 
and kiln owners on the issue of working conditions and wages. The town 
therefore was often in riot. Indeed, the local gazetteer of Fuliang County 
Organization and Revolution. Working- Class Associations in the German Revolutions 
1848– 1849 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1966); Stanley Z. Pech, “The Czech 
Working Class in 1848”, Canadian Slavonic Papers 9, no. 1 (1967): 60– 73; Gyula Mérei, “Le 
mouvement ouvrier en Hongrie pendant la révolution de 1848”, Le Mouvement Social 50 
(1965): 71– 80; Kåre Tønnesson, “Popular Protest and Organization: The Thrane Movement 
in Pre‐industrial Norway, 1849– 55”, Scandinavian Journal of History 13, no. 2– 3 (1988): 121– 
139. See also the online encyclopaedia “Encyclopedia of 1848 Revolutions”, https:// www.
ohio.edu/ chastain/ index.htm [11 November 2019].
 15 See the eyewitness reports from the Jesuit Francis d’Entrecolles, written between 1712 and 
1722. He noted, for example: “The establishments of some of the larger tradesmen occupy 
a vast area and contain an enormous number of workers. It is generally said that there 
are more than a million souls here and that ten thousand loads of rice and a thousand 
pigs are consumed daily. It is over a league long on the banks of a beautiful river and 
not a heap of houses as you might imagine; the streets are as straight as a bowstring and 
intersect at regular intervals. All the land is occupied and the houses are too close and 
the streets too narrow”. Quoted in Michael Dillon, “A History of the Porcelain Industry in 
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attests to this last characteristic, saying that “all kinds of people from 
across the country were taking refuge in Jingdezhen. One intrigue would 
cause the whole town to react. This town is difficult to govern”.16
Labour concentrations in European textile cities in Flanders and Italy were 
more clearly capitalist from the fourteenth century onwards. From the seven-
teenth century, relatively large proletarian concentrations also existed in the 
Caribbean, where entire islands were based on slave labour.
The formation of proletarian concentrations was conducive to rebellious 
sentiment. John Millar, one of the leading intellectuals of the Scottish Enlight-
enment, had already observed the consequences of economic growth towards 
the end of the eighteenth century:
As the advancement of commerce and manufactures in Britain has pro-
duced a state of property highly favourable to liberty, so it has contributed 
to collect and arrange the inhabitants in a manner which enables them, 
with great facility, to combine in asserting their privileges. … Villages are 
enlarged into towns; and these are often swelled into populous cities. In 
all those places of resort, there arise large bands of labourers or artificers, 
who by following the same employment, and by constant intercourse, 
are enabled, with great rapidity, to communicate all their sentiments and 
passions. Among these there spring up leaders, who give a tone and di-
rection to their companions . … In this situation, a great proportion of the 
people are easily aroused by every popular discontent, and can unite with 
no less facility in demanding a redress of grievances. The least ground of 
complaint, in a town, becomes the occasion of a riot; and the flames of 
sedition spreading from one city to another, are blown up into a general 
insurrection.17
The first radical proletarian uprisings remained local, as the capitalist concen-
trations were also local. Nevertheless, such rebellions could acquire a revolu-
tionary logic. Tuscany in the late fourteenth century was a case in point. In those 
 16 Hsu Wen- Chin, “Social and Economic Factors in the Chinese Porcelain Industry in 
Jingdezhen during the Late Ming and Early Ching Period, ca. 1620– 1683”, The Journal of 
the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland, no. 1 (1988): 135– 159, esp. 146.
 17 John Millar, “The Advancement of Manufacture, Commerce, and the Arts, since the Reign 
of William III and the Tendency of this Advancement to diffuse a Spirit of Liberty and 
Independence”, [c.  1800], in John Millar of Glasgow, 1735– 1801, ed. William C.  Lehmann 
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days, Florence was a very important city with large- scale textile production, 
ruled by the aristocracy and the popolo grasso (the “fat people”: wealthy mer-
chants and bankers). The city had a population of about 55,000. There were 21 
guilds, with a total male membership of 4,000 to 5,000. The other working- age 
males – numbering about 10,000 or 11,000 – never organized; they belonged 
to the lower strata of the working class, with the wool carders (the unskilled 
ciompi) in the bottom tier. Political tensions existed in the region between fac-
tions of the elite, and a large proportion of the working population became 
increasingly dissatisfied about taxes, debt and irregular employment. The “un-
organized” (the popolo minuto) were strictly prohibited from convening their 
own gatherings or forming organizations. Nevertheless, over the course of June 
and July 1378, they convened secret meetings, where workers took ritual oaths 
to support each other for as long as they lived, in the struggle against anyone 
who intended to cause them harm. The resulting underground network was to 
be decisive in the subsequent course of events.
On 21 July, a crowd of about 7,000 workers and guildsmen (from all except 
the elitist wool guild, which was in fact an employers’ organization) marched 
to the city palace, the Bargello. While some of the insurgents on the lower 
floors destroyed the records of investigations and convictions of workers, oth-
ers hung the flag of the blacksmith’s guild from the tower. This flag depicted 
tongs, intentionally symbolizing violence. The flags of all the guilds (except the 
wool guild) were hung from a lower floor. The message was clear: the revolu-
tion was the work of the community as a whole.
Three new guilds were formed for all those who had not yet organized, 
thereby ensuring that the entire working population was represented on the 
city council. During the weeks that followed, the new administration took 
forceful measures. For the next two years, nobody was any longer to be impris-
oned for indebtedness, the flour tax was abolished and the salt price reduced. 
To stabilize employment, the industry as a whole was required to produce at 
least 2,000 wool cloths (panni) a month, “whether they wanted to or not, or 
suffer great penalties”. In addition, needy families were to receive a bushel of 
grain per head, and money was to be provided to those in need who resided 
within a three- mile radius of the city limits.
These measures were less effective than envisaged, however, because em-
ployers undermined them at every opportunity. The ciompi in particular urged 
a tougher approach. Their ongoing criticism led the other guilds – when a large 
crowd of ciompi gathered in the Piazza della Signoria on 31 August – to vio-
lently chase them from the city and disband their association. The other two 
recently founded guilds of dyers and doublet makers continued to exist, and 
formed a Government of the Minor Guilds that lasted for a few more years. 
- 978-90-04-44039-5
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Their rule ended on 19 January 1382, when the soldiers of the wool guild and 
patricians toppled the administration.18
The revolt in Florence could certainly be considered as an attempt at a pro-
letarian revolution. Nevertheless, other cases of rebellious workers are known, 
and in at least one other instance they achieved lasting change. I mean the 
slave uprising in Saint Domingue (present- day Haiti) between 1791 and 1804. 
The island was among the most profitable colonies in the world, and accom-
modated a great many lucrative sugar cane plantations, based on slave labour. 
Of the total population (about 640,000), nearly 570,000 were enslaved. The 
other inhabitants were white people and free blacks. Inspired by the French 
Revolution, many slaves staged an uprising. They drove out the plantation 
owners and withstood French and British invasions. Their uprising was, as Pe-
ter Linebaugh and Marcus Rediker aptly described it, “the first successful work-
ers’ revolt in modern history”.19
In both Florence and Saint Domingue, these were true social revolutions 
driven by large numbers of workers; wage workers in Florence and enslaved 
labourers in Saint Domingue. The revolution in Florence was defeated, but the 
one in Saint Domingue prevailed, despite very lengthy and strong opposition 
by foreign powers. Social revolutions are here understood as historical situa-
tions in which (i) fundamental contrasts exist between social classes that (ii) 
lead to a revolt by subordinate classes aimed at seizing political and economic 
power, in order to (iii) achieve a dramatic change in social relations. This de-
scription does not necessarily mean that a successful change leads the subordi-
nate classes to be the main beneficiaries of such change. Alvin Gouldner even 
argued that this process followed a general pattern:
 18 This description is based on a compilation of data from “Diario dello Squittinatore”, 
in I ciompi  – cronache e documenti. Con notizie intorno alla vita di Michele di Lando, 
ed. Giuseppe Odoardo Corazzini (Florence:  G. C.  Sansoni, 1887), 19– 92; Alfred Doren, 
Die Florentiner Wollentuchindustrie vom vierzehnten bis zum sechzehnten Jahrhundert. 
Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte des modernen Kapitalismus (Stuttgart:  J. G.  Cotta’sche 
Buchhandlung Nachf., 1901), 241– 242; Richard C.  Trexler, “Follow the Flag:  The Ciompi 
Revolt Seen from the Streets”, in Power and Dependence in Renaissance Florence, vol. 
3: The Workers of Renaissance Florence, ed. Richard C. Trexler (Binghamton, NY: Medieval 
and Renaissance Texts & Studies, 1993), 30– 60; Samuel Kline Cohn, Lust for Liberty: The 
Politics of Social Revolt in Medieval Europe, 1200– 1425 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 2006), 59– 62; John M. Najemy, A History of Florence 1200– 1575 (Oxford: Blackwell, 
2008), 160– 165.
 19 Peter Linebaugh and Marcus Rediker, The Many- Headed Hydra: The Hidden History of the 
Revolutionary Atlantic (Boston: Beacon Press, 2000), 319. While much has been written 
about the slave rebellion of Saint Domingue, the best book on the event remains C. L. 
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The Communist Manifesto had held that the history of all hitherto exist-
ing society was the history of class struggles:  freeman and slave, patri-
cian and plebeian, lord and serf, guildmaster and journeyman, and, then, 
bourgeoisie and proletariat. In this series, however, there was one unspo-
ken regularity: the slaves did not succeed the masters, the plebeians did 
not vanquish the patricians, the serfs did not overthrow the lords, and 
the journeymen did not triumph over the guildmasters. The lowliest class 
never came to power.20
This argument seems overly adamant. In Saint Domingue the slaves achieved 
abolition, although it must be admitted that they did not fully seize societal 
control. Nonetheless, Gouldner’s position contains some truth. Revolutions 
moreover normally follow a complicated course, and there is hardly ever a 
“clear- cut” situation where two classes (for example the aristocracy and the 
bourgeoisie) diametrically oppose one another in closed ranks. There will al-
ways be more than two classes, and ordinarily (temporary) multi- class blocs 
arise. In addition, classes are dynamic relationships, and oppositions will also 
exist within separate classes; a section of the struggling classes will consistently 
stay outside the conflict. Revolution may even come about “from above”, in 
that a part of the elite wants radical change, such as in Japan during the Meiji 
Restauration from 1868.21
 20 Alvin W.  Gouldner, The Future of Intellectuals and the Rise of the New Class (London 
and Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1979), 93. This seems to relate in part to the thesis of Alex 
Callinicos that bourgeois revolutions need not be achieved by the bourgeoisie: “Bourgeois 
revolutions should not be conceived as revolutions which are made consciously by capi-
talists, but as revolutions which promote capitalism. The emphasis should not be placed 
on the class which makes the bourgeois revolution, but on the implications of such a 
revolution – for the class that benefits from it. More particularly, a bourgeois revolution 
is a political transformation, a change in state power, which is a condition for large scale 
capital accumulation and the establishment of the bourgeoisie as dominant class. This 
definition therefore requires a political change with definite consequences. It does not 
say anything about the social forces which carry through the revolution”. Alex Callinicos, 
“Bourgeois Revolutions and Historical Materialism”, International Socialism, Second 
Series, no. 43 (1989), 113– 171, esp. 124.
 21 Ellen Kay Trimberger, “State Power and Modes of Production:  Implications of the 
Japanese Transition to Capitalism”, The Insurgent Sociologist 7, no. 2 (Spring 1977): 85– 98; 
Jamie C. Allinson and Alexander Anievas, “The Uneven and Combined Development of 
the Meiji Restoration: A Passive Revolutionary Road to Capitalist Modernity”, Capital and 
Class 34, no. 3 (October 2010): 469– 490; Mark Cohen, “Historical Sociology’s Puzzle of the 
Missing Transitions: A Case Study of Early Modern Japan”, American Sociological Review 
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2 Workers as Auxiliaries
The relentless capitalist expansion never led to proletarian concentrations 
that were as dense nationally as they had become in the smaller settings in 
Florence or Saint Domingue. Large local proletarian uprisings continued to 
occur until well into the twentieth century, for example in France (Paris, 1871), 
Argentina (Cordoba, 1969) and Pakistan (Karachi, 1972).22
Our knowledge of the social aspects of revolutions has increased consider-
ably in recent decades. For a long time, historians paid little attention to the 
lowest classes or greatly relativized their role. Even in 1972, Lawrence Stone 
had argued with respect to the English Revolution that “the labouring poor, 
both rural and urban, played no part whatever in the Revolution except as 
cannon- fodder”. Very recently, Boris Mironov also defended a similar argument 
about the Russian Revolution of 1917.23 However, the work of scholars such as 
Gregor Benton, Norah Carlin, Daniel Guérin, Dirk Hoerder, Erich Kuttner, Bri-
an Manning, Alexander Rabinowitch and many others has demonstrated that 
such views are untenable. Let us consider some major revolutions.
The Peasants’ Wars in Central Europe in 1524– 1526 were, as the name suggests, 
waged by rebellious agriculturalists, but were on occasion supported by the 
miners in the Erz Mountains, Bohemia, North Tyrol and elsewhere.
Influenced by the revolutionary peasant movement, sections of the min-
er class sporadically joined forces with the peasants in many places, with 
the former supporting the latter in most cases. Nowhere – except perhaps 
in the special case of Salzburg – did a broad alliance come about, where 
the mutual aid societies or the entire community of the miners, respec-
tively, express solidarity or engaged in joint actions with the peasants in 
a place or mining region.24
 22 See e.g. Roger V. Gould, “Trade Cohesion, Class Unity, and Urban Insurrection: Artisanal 
Activism in the Paris Commune”, American Journal of Sociology 98, no.  4 (January 
1993): 721– 754; James P. Brennan, El cordobazo. Las guerras obreras en Cordoba, 1955– 1976 
(Buenos Aires, 1984); Kamran Asdar Ali, “The Strength of the Street Meets the Strength of 
the State: The 1972 Labor Struggle in Karachi”, International Journal of Middle East Studies 
37, no. 1 (February 2005): 83–  107.
 23 Lawrence Stone, The Causes of the English Revolution, 1529– 1642 (New York: Harper & Row, 
1972), 145; Boris Mironov, “Cannon Fodder for the Revolution: The Russian Proletariat in 
1917”, Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History 18, no. 2 (Spring 2017): 351– 370.
 24 Adolf Laube, “Zum Problem des Bündnisses von Bergarbeitern und Bauern im deutschen 
Bauernkrieg”, in Der Bauer im Klassenkampf. Studien zur Geschichte des deutschen 
Bauernkrieges und der bäuerlichen Klassenkämpfe im Spätfeudalismus, ed. Gerhard Heitz, 
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The Dutch Revolt against Spanish rule (1566– 1609) started as a revolutionary 
movement, in which workers, mainly from the textile industry, played a major 
part. Despite their very strident disposition, their influence remained limited. 
Erich Kuttner, who was the first to study this revolution from a social- historical 
perspective, observed:
True class- consciousness is rare among the masses. They tend to submit 
to any leadership from above: the aristocracy or the wealthy bourgeoisie. 
Still, the class instinct is penetrating the masses in a purely elementary 
sense, primitive communist slogans … surface, and we constantly ob-
serve an unfathomable hatred of the poor for the rich, without the poor 
having been indoctrinated about the class struggle. Back in the sixteenth 
century, only the material power of the authorities withheld the masses 
from murdering and pillaging the wealthy, whom they regard as “blood-
suckers” – as the moment such power diminishes, that passionate long-
ing consistently resurfaces. Based on this example, we may conclude that 
class hatred considerably predates its discovery by scholars or even its 
propagation by political parties.25
In the run- up to the English Revolution of 1642– 1660, the popular classes fig-
ured prominently, both the “middling sort”, consisting of social groups ranging 
from “the larger farmers (called ‘yeomen’) and the substantial tradesmen, to 
the mass of land- holding peasants (called ‘husbandmen’) and self- employed 
craftsmen”, and the “poorer sort” (wage- labourers and paupers).26
Popular disorders in 1640– 42 were heterogeneous in causes and aims, 
sometimes they united the “middling sort” with the “poorer sort”, 
Adolf Laube, “Der Aufstand der Schwazer Bergarbeiter 1525 und ihre Haltung im Tiroler 
Bauernkrieg. Mit einem Quellenanhang”, Jahrbuch für Geschichte des Feudalismus 2 
(1978): 225– 258.
 25 Erich Kuttner, Het Hongerjaar 1566 (Amsterdam:  Amsterdamsche Boek- en 
Courantmaatschappij, 1949), 425. Kuttner’s work was inspired by an essay by the Marxist 
Sam de Wolff, “Het proletariaat in de beginjaren van den strijd tegen Spanje”, De Nieuwe 
Tijd 9 (1906): 378– 388.
 26 Brian Manning, “Introduction to the Second Edition”, in The English People and the 
English Revolution, ed. Brian Manning (2nd edition, London:  Bookmarks, 1991), 7– 8, 
230– 241. See also James Holstun, Ehud’s Dagger: Class Struggle in the English Revolution 
(London: Verso, 2000). For a different perspective, see David Underdown, Revel, Riot and 
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sometimes they involved only the “poorer sort”. These disorders ushered 
in the civil war because they influenced many nobles and gentlemen to 
rally to the king’s cause. But the popular support which enabled parlia-
ment to fight and win the civil war came from amongst the “middling 
sort”.27
At no point, however, does an independent workers’ movement appear to 
have crystallized; the craftsmen and peasants were in charge. “Many of those 
who took part in the revolt of 1640– 42, in the New Model Army during the war 
and in radical movements later, were indeed independent small producers”.28 
Moreover, “the radical ideas of the Levellers, Diggers, and Ranters failed to gel 
with popular grievances and experiences”.29
The American Revolution of 1765– 1783 was in some respects comparable with 
the earlier Dutch Revolt, as it was a relatively decentralized process, occurring 
mainly in the cities on the East coast and varying depending on the place. Gary 
B. Nash has nevertheless noted that,
the American Revolution could not have unfolded when or in the manner 
it did without the self- conscious action of urban laboring people – both 
those at the bottom and those in the middle – who became convinced 
that they must create power where none had existed before or else watch 
their position deteriorate, both in absolute terms and relative to that of 
others. Thus, the history of the Revolution is in part the history of popular 
collective action and the puncturing of the gentry’s claim that their rule 
was legitimized by custom, law, and divine will. Ordinary people some-
times violently took over power and the procedures of the constituted 
authorities.30
Nevertheless, no social revolution occurred in America in the 1770s. Daniel 
Guérin has stated that during the French Revolution of 1789– 1799, it was the pro-
letarian bras nus who – by marching to Versailles on 5 October 1789 – forced the 
 27 Manning, “Introduction”, 25.
 28 Norah Carlin, “Marxism and the English Civil War”, International Socialism Journal, 
Second Series 10 (1983): 114.
 29 John Walter, “The English People and the English Revolution Revisited”, History Workshop 
Journal 61 (Spring 2006): 180.
 30 Gary B. Nash, The Urban Crucible: Social Change, Political Consciousness, and the Origins 
of the American Revolution (Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University Press, 1979), 
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assembly to adopt the Declaration of the Rights of Man, which would probably 
not have happened without such action. Nor would the expropriation without 
compensation of feudal dues on 10 August 1792 have come about without pres-
sure from the masses. More generally, however:
Whenever the course of the revolution intensifies one finds the bour-
geois equivocating, or stopping half- way, and each time it is the pressure 
from the bras nus that forces them to push the bourgeois revolution to 
its conclusion. Even insofar as it was a bourgeois revolution, bringing the 
bourgeoisie to power in the end rather than the proletariat, the French 
revolution was a mass revolution.… But this revolution was not a revo-
lution in which the masses worked on behalf of the bourgeoisie without 
realising it. It was also, to a certain degree, a revolution that the masses 
were making for themselves and nobody else. … They rose up in the hope 
that it would alleviate their poverty and misery and throw off an age- old 
yoke, not just that of the feudal lords, the clergy and the agents of royalist 
absolutism, but the yoke of the bourgeoisie as well.31
Basically, in the bourgeois revolutions during the sixteenth to eighteenth 
centuries, the role of the working class gradually became more visible and 
at some times even substantial, but it was never decisive with regard to the 
outcome.
The same holds true for the Mexican Revolution of 1910– 1920. It was driven 
mainly by peasant communities, who were supported by disaffected urban in-
tellectuals. Many workers also embraced this cause, such as the cowboys of 
the northern cattle ranches and labourers on sugar plantations, in addition 
to trade unions. Their role remained subordinate, however, in part because 
of their relatively small number. “Some of its struggles were important and 
its class organization moved forward, but its policy and leadership did not 
 31 Daniel Guérin, “Preface to the English Edition”, in Daniel Guérin, Class Struggle in the First 
French Republic. Bourgeois and Bras Nus 1793– 1795, trans. Ian Patterson (London:  Pluto 
Press, 1973), 2– 3.  Guérin’s book was originally published in French in 1946. Works 
elaborating on this premise, but without admitting it explicitly, are Albert Soboul, Les 
Sans- culottes parisiens en l’an II  : Mouvement populaire et gouvernement révolutionnaire, 
2 juin 1793– 9 (Paris:  Librairie Clavreuil, 1958); Richard Cobb, Les armées révolution-
naires: Instrument de la terreur dans les départements. Avril 1793 – Floréal An II. Two vol-
umes (Paris: Mouton, 1961, 1963). Compare Daniel Guérin, “D’une nouvelle interprétation 
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attain independence of the state and the leading bourgeois tendencies of the 
revolution”.32
3 Workers at Centre Stage
During the twentieth century, workers started to figure more prominently in 
revolutions. At the same time, the complexity of proletarian action became 
more manifest.
Because class conflict is experienced as uneven, discontinuous, and par-
tial, its organisational expressions normally reflect this. The working class 
is sectionalised and fragmented. One section is fighting while others are 
not. Workers are opposing the symptoms rather than the root causes of 
exploitation and oppression. The overall level of conflict – measured, say 
in the pattern of strikes – rises and falls in intensity and extent. Particular 
kinds of organisation, with definite kinds of politics, are erected to ex-
press this contradictory pattern of consciousness and struggle.33
Even in the “new” proletarian type of revolutions, however, workers were never 
the sole drivers of the revolutionary process. The best- known case of a change 
often described as “proletarian” is the Russian Revolution of October 1917. This 
revolution was in fact a combination of three factors: the struggle of the work-
ers, the struggle of the peasants and the struggle of the oppressed nationalities. 
The industrial working class was not very large – possibly two million people 
in 1917 – but its strike movements achieved an enormous impact; in Trotsky’s 
words, they became “the battering ram which the awakening nation directs 
against the walls of absolutism”.34 At the same time, the proletariat could never 
 32 Adolfo Gilly, The Mexican Revolution, trans. Patrick Camiller (London: Verso, 1983), 329. 
See also Rodney D.  Anderson, “Mexican Workers and the Politics of Revolution, 1906– 
1911”, The Hispanic American Historical Review 54, no. 1 (February 1974): 112: “Working or 
fighting, the Mexican proletariat were not engaged in an ‘anti- capitalist revolution,’ as 
some maintain, though they certainly would have identified the foreign and domestic 
industrialists as their enemies. Rather, they viewed the struggle from the perspective of 
Mexican patriots, fighting the conservative, ultramontane forces gathering anew, this 
time under the banner of ‘Progress and Order.’ ”
 33 Colin Barker, “Perspectives”, in Revolutionary Rehearsals, ed. Colin Barker (London: 
Bookmarks, 1987), 221.
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have brought about the downfall of the Tsarist Regime on its own. The very 
position of the working class as a minority of the nation suggests that “it could 
not have given its struggle a sufficient scope – certainly not enough to take its 
place at the head of the state – if it had not found a mighty support in the thick 
of the people. Such a support was guaranteed to it by the agrarian problem”.35
Nonetheless, the action by the workers had such an immense impact that 
the October Revolution became the prototype of a “proletarian revolution”. As 
Georges Haupt observed:
Those were the years of the radicalization of Europe, coming after the 
First World War. There was a tremendous anticapitalist, antibourgeois 
feeling. People were looking for a social force able to bring about the rev-
olution, and that social force was going to be the proletariat. … If one 
looks at the cultural history of the Soviet Union in the years 1918– 1924, 
one discovers a fantastically interesting phenomenon. Everyone would 
like to be a worker. This is the mode in the Soviet Union. Everyone wears 
working clothes. The reference group is the working class, which is the 
center of the whole self- understanding of the revolution in the future 
 society.36
The October Revolution of 1917 ushered in a series of upheavals, in which 
workers had an essential role. Their actions brought about the demise of the 
ancien régimes, because they immobilized key industries.
During the Bolivian Revolution of 1952, the peasants were initially passive, 
whereas the action by the tin miners proved decisive: together with their wives 
they defeated the demoralized armed forces and opened the door to massive 
economic and social changes.
The tin magnates, who had created a state within a state, un superestado, 
manipulating Bolivian presidents and legislators at will, lost their lucra-
tive mines and power. The Army, which had largely functioned as an in-
strument of suppression and political manipulation, and as protector of 
the established social order, was abolished. The Indians, who comprised 
an overwhelming majority of the population of Bolivia, gained for the 
first time full civil and political rights. The mnr [Revolutionary National-
ist Movement] instituted a radical program of land reform through which 
 35 Trotsky, History of the Russian Revolution, vol. 2, 32.
 36 Georges Haupt, “In What Sense and to What Degree Was the Russian Revolution a 
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the Indian won property rights. The educational system was re- organized 
along more democratic lines.37
Despite their crucial role, the workers did not achieve a lasting victory. The 
mnr accommodated only some of their demands, and after the military coup 
in 1964, their unions and parties were destroyed in violent clashes.38
The course of events in the Cuban Revolution of 1953– 1959 was entirely dif-
ferent. Fidel Castro’s 26 July Movement was a declassed populist movement; 
Castro had initially supported the left wing of the Orthodoxo party, the liberal- 
bourgeois opposition. The struggle of his guerilleros (possibly amounting to 
one thousand members at its peak) was supported by spontaneous popular 
uprisings and strikes, with broad participation by parts of the vast labour 
movement (sugar workers, railway workers, etc.) between August 1957 and 
January 1959. As a social force, the working class contributed substantially to 
the victory. Politically, however, it held less importance in Castro’s initially lib-
eral policy. The first government formed by Castro was therefore still liberal- 
bourgeois. Only during the subsequent two years did the regime radicalize.39
In the Iranian Revolution of 1978– 1979, workers were not intrinsically pivotal. 
Until mid- 1978, the main operators were “students and intellectuals, the urban 
poor, and the modern and traditional middle classes” who agitated against the 
regime of the Shah.40 Only later on did proletarian resistance increase. The 
participation of the oil workers in the autumn was decisive. They deactivated 
the most important source of state income, and the battle soon ended. In Jan-
uary 1979 the Shah fled the country.41
 37 Charles W.  Arnade, “Bolivia’s Social Revolution, 1952– 1959:  A Discussion of Sources”, 
Journal of Inter- American Studies 1, no. 3 (July 1959): 341– 342.
 38 Guillermo Lora, Historia del movimiento obrero boliviano:  4 volumes (La Paz, 
Cochabamba: Editorial “Los Amigos del Libro”, 1967– 1980), esp. vol. 4, covering the period 
1933– 1952. A summary is to be found in Lora’s A History of the Bolivian Labour Movement, 
1848– 1971, edited and abridged by Laurence Whitehead, trans. Christine Whitehead 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977).
 39 Opinions vary on the relative importance of the labour movement in the Cuban revo-
lution. Steve Cushion, A Hidden History of the Cuban Revolution: How the Working Class 
Shaped the Guerrillas’ Victory (New York: Monthly Review Press, 2016) argues that workers 
carried more weight than for example is suggested by Samuel Farber, The Origins of the 
Cuban Revolution Reconsidered (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2006).
 40 Maryam Poya, “Iran 1979:  Long live Revolution!… Long live Islam?” in Revolutionary 
Rehearsals, ed. Colin Bakers (London, Chicago and Melbourne: Haymarket Books), 139.
 41 Peyman Jafari, “Oil, Labour and Revolution in Iran:  A Social History of Labour in the 
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The Polish Revolution of 1980– 1981 was largely driven by proletarian rebel-
liousness. The revolt began in mid- 1980 as a wave of strikes, soon spreading 
throughout much of the country and reaching its peak in mid- August in the 
port cities of Gdansk, Gdynia and Szczecin. With support from the previously 
founded Workers’ Defence Committee (Komitet Obrony Robotników; kor), it 
evolved into a national counterweight organization (Solidarność), gradually 
bringing about the start of “dual power”, with many farmers also supporting 
the protest. The power and authority of the state visibly declined, and only in 
December 1981 did the situation change, when “order” was restored via a mili-
tary coup. Solidarność was suspended and martial law introduced.42
Looking back at the developments over the past five centuries clearly re-
veals that from 1917, workers figured more prominently in national revolutions 
than they had previously. Nevertheless, during the twentieth century their role 
was never as great as the Marx- Hess- Engels hypothesis would have led us to 
believe. Nowhere did a revolution culminate in a stable society that revolved 
around the interests of workers. Admittedly, the “lowliest class” – contrary to 
what Gouldner argued – sometimes did rise to power (for example in Russia), 
but it never managed to retain this power for long.
4 Two Complications
The analysis now becomes still more complicated. The first complication is 
that even in the twentieth century there were revolutions in which workers 
remained entirely subordinate. These uprisings were led by communist par-
ties that believed in the Stalinist two- stage theory: first a bourgeois- democratic 
change was necessary and subsequently a socialist (proletarian) change. The 
most important example of this process is the Chinese Revolution of 1927– 1949. 
In 1927 the Kuomintang (The Chinese Nationalist Party) had achieved a crush-
ing defeat of the labour movement in Shanghai, suppressing it through mass 
terror. A few years later, the Japanese occupation forces dismantled part of the 
city’s industry, thereby reducing the numbers of the working class. These de-
velopments turned the Chinese Communist Party progressively from a prole-
tarian concern into a military organization of peasants demanding massive 
agricultural reform. They built an expanding territorial counterforce that 
 42 Colin Barker and Kara Weber, Solidarność: from Gdansk to Military Repression (London: 
International Socialism, 1982); Roman Laba, The Roots of Solidarity: A Political Sociology 
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ultimately defeated the Kuomintang and established a state. Workers were 
completely ignored as a social force, and when the People’s Liberation Army 
entered the cities, they urged workers not to strike or demonstrate. The follow-
ing eight points formed the basis of their propaganda:
 1) People’s lives and property will be protected. Maintain order and 
don’t listen to rumours. Looting and killing are strictly forbidden.
 2) Chinese individual commercial and industrial property will be pro-
tected. Private factories, banks, godowns [warehouses], etc., will not 
be touched and can continue to operate.
 3) Bureaucratic capital, including factories, shops, banks, godowns, 
railways, post offices, telephone and telegraph installations, power 
plants, etc., will be taken over by the Liberation Army, although pri-
vate shares will be respected. Those working in these organizations 
should work peacefully and wait for the takeover. Rewards will be giv-
en to those who protect property and documents; those who strike or 
who destroy will be punished. Those wishing to continue serving will 
be employed.
 4) Schools, hospitals, and public institutions will be protected. Students, 
teachers and all workers should protect their records. Anyone with 
the ability to work will be employed.
 5) Except for a few major war criminals and notorious reactionaries, all 
Kuomintang officials, police and Pao- Chia workers of the Provincial, 
Municipal, and Hsien Governments will be pardoned, if they do not 
offer armed resistance. They should protect their records. Anyone 
with the ability to work will be employed.
 6) As soon as a city is liberated, displaced soldiers should report imme-
diately to the new garrison headquarters, the police bureau, or army 
authorities. Anyone surrendering his weapons will not be questioned. 
Those who hide will be punished.
 7) The lives and property of all foreigners will be protected. They must 
obey the laws of the Liberation Army and Democratic Government. 
No espionage or illegal actions will be allowed. No war criminals 
should be sheltered. They will be subject to military or civilian trial 
for violations.
 8) People in general should protect all public property and maintain or-
der.43
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Only after 1949 did the social and political importance of the working class 
start to grow again.44
In several respects, the revolution in Vietnam in August 1945 was a harbinger 
of the Chinese Revolution. In the years following its establishment in 1930, the 
Indochinese Communist Party had given extensive consideration to workers 
and their struggle, but over the course of the 1930s, interest had shifted to mo-
bilizing peasants. By the time of its Eighth Conference in May 1941, the party 
definitively changed course.
It considered that “the preparation for insurrection is the central respon-
sibility of our Party in the present period”. It called for a “national lib-
eration revolution” and temporary postponement of the class struggle. 
… On May 19, 1941, at the conclusion of the conference, the Alliance for 
Vietnamese Independence (Viet nam Doc lap Dong minh Hoi), or the Viet 
Minh Front, was created. It was the organizational expression of the unit-
ed front proposed by the Resolution of the Conference.45
The coup three months later focused on reforming land ownership, rather 
than on the liberation of wage labour.
The second complication was that the revolutions of the twentieth century 
all took place in pre- industrial or industrializing countries, and never in fully 
developed capitalist societies. Some may consider this a coincidence, but the 
systematic non- arrival of working- class revolutions from below within devel-
oped capitalism suggests a structural reason. Although the working class (in 
the broad sense described) became very large in the course of the twentieth 
century, under the advanced conditions it never again behaved as radically 
anywhere as it had in Russia in 1917 or in Bolivia in 1952. Consider the events in 
France in May to June 1968. Research reveals that the revolutionary students 
were vastly different from the considerably less revolutionary workers.
Ironically enough, Maoists, Trotskyites, and Les Temps Modernes have 
rather uncritically accepted pcf [French Communist Party] claims to 
 44 As the Sinologist Andrew Walder has observed: “It is commonly remarked, and with obvi-
ous justification, that the working class did not make the Chinese revolution. An equally 
justified remark is rarely heard: that the revolution, on the contrary, has made the Chinese 
working class”. Andrew G. Walder, “The Remaking of the Chinese Working Class, 1949– 
1981”, Modern China 10, no. 1 (January 1984): 4.
 45 Huynh Kim Khanh, “The Vietnamese August Revolution Reinterpreted”, The Journal of 
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represent the working class. They assumed that the party controlled the 
workers and could have made revolution. It is doubtful, though, that 
even a revolutionary pcf would have been able to convince wage earn-
ers to take power. … Wage earners might have desired to limit the “arbi-
trary” authority of supervisory personnel and to slow down production 
rhythms, but little evidence exists to suggest that workers wanted to take 
over their factories. Instead, they demanded higher pay (especially for 
lower- paid personnel), a further reduction of work time, total (and not 
half) payment for days lost to strikes, a nominal recuperation of strike 
time, and – for the activists – a union presence in the factory.46
Another symptom of the non- arrival of revolutions in advanced capitalist so-
cieties seems to be manifest in the fact noted by Perry Anderson that counter- 
institutions of dual power have never arisen in consolidated parliamentary 
democracies: “all the examples of soviets or councils so far have emerged out 
of disintegrating autocracies (Russia, Hungary, Austria), defeated military re-
gimes (Germany), ascendant or overturned fascist states (Spain, Portugal)”.47
5 The Paradox and Its Possible Explanation
The latter complication gives rise to a paradox:  the “purest” proletarian rev-
olutions  – with absolute dominance by the proletariat  – occurred early on 
in capitalism. However, under advanced capitalism, with circumstances that 
according to the Marx- Hess- Engels hypothesis are supposed to be the most 
conducive to a proletarian revolution, they do not take place. Why is this the 
case? A  convincing answer will require much additional research and here, 
I can merely speculate. I suspect that three factors come into play: the transi-
tion dip, deflection and incorporation.
5.1 The Transition Dip
The transition dip idea elaborates on the work of Charles Tilly and Adam 
Przeworski. Tilly has mentioned that in advanced capitalist countries, the 
state functions very differently than in less advanced equivalents.48 Into the 
 46 Michael Seidman, The Imaginary Revolution:  Parisian Students and Workers in 1968 
(New York and Oxford: Berghahn, 2004), 197.
 47 Perry Anderson, Arguments within English Marxism (London: Verso, 1980), 196.
 48 See also the discussion of Tilly’s vast oeuvre in Marcel van der Linden, “Charles Tilly’s 
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nineteenth century in Europe and North America (as in many less- developed 
capitalist countries nowadays), states were not clearly visible to ordinary peo-
ple, and the occasions where their presence was apparent tended to be de-
cidedly unpleasant. In those “pre- advanced” days, states usually maintained 
a system of indirect rule. They hardly ever intervened in the lives of ordinary 
people directly, but instead had relatively autonomous local representatives. 
On the rare occasions that states did penetrate everyday lives, their main pur-
pose was to take (money, goods or people) and almost never to give. In these 
circumstances, workers hoping to halt deteriorating conditions or even to im-
prove their fate did not think first, and probably not at all, of the state. Un-
der “pre- advanced” conditions, groups of workers therefore primarily devised 
alternatives without a significant role for the state. In the North Atlantic re-
gion, trade unions, journeymen’s associations and the like were “transnation-
al” avant la lettre, and in many cases coordinated operations across national 
borders. Alternative concepts were based on autonomous cooperatives and on 
anarchist and liberal experiments.49 For “pre- advanced” populations, the idea 
of social revolution often exuded a broad appeal as well, as the state tended to 
be regarded as a hostile military and tax- collecting apparatus that had to be 
eliminated.
This stage ended  – at least in the North Atlantic region  – during the ex-
tended nineteenth century, as a consequence of the Napoleonic wars and their 
aftermath. The immense citizens’ armies of post- revolutionary France and of 
many other countries that followed the French example, as well as the rise of 
relatively comprehensive tax systems, resulted in qualitatively stronger state 
interference in everyday social relations. This change coincided with the tran-
sition to direct rule, in which the central government started to interfere far 
more directly with the population than it had in the past. Direct rule, in turn, 
led to a rapid expansion of the purview of involvement. Non- military state ex-
penditure increased exponentially. States “began to monitor industrial conflict 
and working conditions, install and regulate national systems of education, 
 49 Perhaps views oblivious to the state depend on first, workers’ suffrage and second, the rel-
ative size of the working class. As suffrage becomes less favourable and the working class 
proportionately smaller, the working class becomes politically powerless. It may choose 
either (i) to ignore the state, or (ii) to try to “conquer” the state, by (a) struggling to expand 
suffrage and/ or (b) expanding the working class (e.g. socialist diatribes against contra-
ception). Presumably, the transition from (i) to (iia) and/ or (iib) would require a certain 
threshold value. Below this threshold value, the working class does not consider conquer-
ing the state as feasible; above it, this objective becomes more realistic. This threshold is 
obviously not absolute but depends in part on reports from abroad (have workers man-
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organize aid to the poor and disabled, build and maintain communication 
lines, impose tariffs for the benefit of home industries”.50 Somewhat in parallel 
with this process, systems of surveillance were devised in order to block the 
emergence of forms of protest and resistance that might threaten states and 
their clients.
As states began to demand more from their subjects and became more 
closely involved with them, their subjects started to expect something in re-
turn. Modern citizenship, which in the past had sometimes existed at the mu-
nicipal level, became a national phenomenon concurrent with the rise of di-
rect rule. It was precisely during this stage, as “subjects” became “citizens”, that 
national trade unions and other national labour organizations gradually con-
solidated. No longer in a position to ignore the state and no longer interested in 
immediately destroying it, they sought primarily to influence or even conquer 
it (possibly with the intention of destroying it at a later stage). “In the process, 
organized claimants including workers and capitalists found themselves em-
bedding their rights and privileges in the state. Establishing the right to strike, 
for example, not only defined a number of previously common worker actions 
(such as attacks on nonstrikers and scabs) as illegal, but also made the state the 
prime adjudicator of that right”.51
This in essence meant an enormous increase “in the importance of the [col-
lectively useful] functions, and therefore of the functioning, of public admin-
istration in the daily life of the people”.52 A revolution would therefore com-
pletely disrupt daily life. The changed role of the state considerably drove up 
the “costs” of attempts to overthrow capitalist society. As Adam Przeworski 
remarked:
Suppose that socialism is potentially superior to capitalism at any mo-
ment of capitalist development (or at least after some threshold, if one 
believes that conditions must be “ripe”) but that immediate steps toward 
socialism leave workers worse off than they would have been had they 
advanced along the capitalist path. … Between the capitalist path and the 
socialist one there is a valley that must be traversed if workers move at 
any time toward socialism. If such conditions indeed exist and if workers 
 50 Charles Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990– 1990 (Cambridge, MA and 
Oxford: Blackwell, 1990), 115.
 51 Charles Tilly, “Futures of European States”, Social Research 59 (1992): 711.
 52 Richard Löwenthal, “The ‘Missing Revolution’ in Industrial Societies:  Comparative 
Reflections on a German Problem”, in Germany in the Age of Total War, ed. Volker 
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are interested in a continual improvement of their material welfare, then 
this descent will not be undertaken or, if it is undertaken, will not be 
completed by workers under democratic conditions. At any time workers 
would thus face a choice between climbing upward toward the best situ-
ation they could obtain under capitalism and a temporary deterioration 
of their conditions on the road to socialism.53
The period of direct rule may thus have attenuated any revolutionary influ-
ences in the working class and stimulated the rise of movements that aimed to 
achieve reforms via the state; as a prelude to social revolution or as a cumula-
tive strategy of small steps.
It seems likely that this observation depends on long periods of improving 
living standards and a stable state apparatus. The transition dip would prob-
ably lose much of its relevance if states were to get into crisis (for example, 
a war) and/ or if the material conditions of the population were to notably 
deteriorate.
 53 Adam Przeworski, Capitalism and Social Democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University 











 figure 1.1  Przeworski’s visualization of the trajectory of workers’ welfare under capitalism, 
under socialism and under influence of a revolution
  Source: Adam Przeworski, Capitalism and Social Democracy 
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5.2 Deflection
I describe the second possible factor as deflection. By this, I  mean that the 
state – even in the stage of direct rule – is not regarded as playing a major part 
in causing social, economic, political or cultural injustice. There are at least 
three probable causes. First, under capitalism the economic sphere becomes 
separated from the political sphere. Class conflicts are therefore initially situ-
ated at workplaces, and are thus local and particularistic.
In this respect, the organization of capitalist production itself resists the 
working class unity which capitalism is supposed to encourage. On the 
one hand, the nature of the capitalist economy – its national, even supra- 
national, character, the interdependence of its constituent parts, the ho-
mogenization of work produced by the capitalist labour- process – makes 
both necessary and possible a working class consciousness and class or-
ganization on a mass scale. This is the aspect of capitalism’s effects on 
class- consciousness that Marxist theory has so often emphasized. On the 
other hand, the development of this consciousness and this organization 
must take place against the centrifugal force of capitalist production and 
its “privatization” of political issues.54
Even very militant workers’ struggles may become detracted from their politi-
cal and general character.
Second, many intermediary institutions and organizations emerge, and to 
some extent perform the functions of the state, although they do not pertain to 
the state or otherwise qualify as “semi- state” apparatuses. These would include 
what Louis Althusser described as “ideological state apparatuses”, such as 
schools, the family, religions and religious institutions, and the mass media.55 
They also include public transport, ngo s and other non- profit organizations.56 
 54 Ellen Meiksins Wood, “The Separation of the Economic and the Political in Capitalism”, 
New Left Review, I/ 127 (May– June 1981): 93.
 55 Louis Althusser, On the Reproduction of Capitalism:  Ideology and Ideological State 
Apparatuses (London: Verso, 2014 [1970]).
 56 Ulrich Brand et al., ed., Nichtregierungsorganisationen in der Transformation des Staates 
(Münster:  Das Westfälische Dampfboot, 2003). This deflection results in part from the 
activities by the working classes. Sanford Jacoby has for example argued that trade union 
opposition to managerial discretionary power has furthered the bureaucratization of 
American industrial firms. Sanford M. Jacoby, Employing Bureaucracy: Managers, Unions, 
and the Transformation of Work in American Industry, 1900– 1945 (New  York:  Columbia 
University Press, 1985). While being an important achievement, at the same time it made 
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Third, racist, sexist and nationalist influences may further undermine working- 
class unity and combativity.57
5.3 Incorporation
The Marx- Hess- Engels hypothesis underestimated capitalism’s ability to incor-
porate the proletariat. Marx, as we have seen, considered the proletariat as “a 
class in civil society which is not a class of civil society”.58 Gradually, however, 
the proletariat has become a part of civil society. At least two influences have 
probably played a role in this process. First, the political incorporation of the 
proletariat, partly also resulting from the efforts of labour movements. For the 
British case, Bert Moorhouse has argued that
the majority of the ruling class believed that incorporation was necessary 
to bind the masses to the prevailing system but also wanted such integra-
tion to be constrained and channeled so that, though institutional forms 
might change, and could be promoted as having changed, the differential 
distribution of power in society would remain unaltered.59
Second, the incorporation of proletarians as consumers. It is true that Marx 
in his manuscript Grundrisse has drawn our attention to the attempts of 
capitalists to spur the workers “on to consumption, to endow his commod-
ities with new attractions, to talk the workers into feeling new needs, etc”. 
but nowhere does he evince to have understood the huge implications of 
the proletariat’s golden chains.60 Consumption’s seductive power culmi-
nated in the relations of production and consumption (sometimes called 
“Fordist”), whereby working- class families not only produce and reproduce 
labour power to be hired out, but operate simultaneously as units of individ-
ualized mass consumption, purchasing many of the consumer goods they 
produce within a system that permits capital to expand and the workers’ 
material standards of living to improve. The ideology of consumerism made 
 57 With regard to the interconnectedness of these discriminatory practices, see Avtar 
Brah, “Re- Framing Europe:  En- Gendered Racisms, Ethnicities and Nationalisms in 
Contemporary Western Europe”, Feminist Review 45 (Autumn 1993): 9– 29.
 58 Karl Marx, “A Contribution to the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right (1843– 44)”, in 
mecw, vol. 3, 186.
 59 H. F.  Moorhouse, “The Political Incorporation of the British Working Class:  An 
Interpretation”, Sociology 7 (1973): 346.
 60 mecw, vol. 28, 217; Michael A.  Lebowitz, Following Marx:  Method, Critique and Crisis 
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them (partly) consumption driven. As Richard Wolff wrote about the United 
States:
They had to define themselves as above all “consumers” who willingly 
suffered the “disutility” of labor to acquire the “utilities” embodied in 
consumption. … The advertising that pervades every aspect of life relent-
lessly popularizes this interpellation. … The “manipulation” of the mass-
es entailed in such consumerism was possible because it “latched onto” 
something real enough in workers’ lives:  the need for a compensation, 
rationale, and justification for … their alienated and exhausting labor.61
The combined effect of the transition dip, deflection and incorporation prob-
ably explains why revolutions have not occurred in advanced capitalist coun-
tries. Deflection and incorporation were considerably less important in the so- 
called “socialist” societies of Eastern Europe. This may explain why revolutions 
in which workers were sometimes pivotal did occur in those regions; there was 
no separation of the political and the economic spheres, intermediary institu-
tions and organizations were mostly absent, and so were political incorpora-
tion and the possibilities for consumerism.
All in all, “workers’ revolutions” are much more complicated than is often 
assumed. One gets the impression that Karl Marx, Moses Hess and Friedrich 
Engels  – impressed by the West European workers’ revolts of the 1830s and 
1840s  – first proclaimed the wage- labouring class as a revolutionary subject 
on philosophical grounds, and then collected arguments that were partly of 
an ad hoc nature.62 The outcome was a theory of the working class that has 
been partly refuted by historical experience. The Marx- Hess- Engels hypothe-
sis clearly did not anticipate the seductive and deceptive powers of advanced 
capitalism. My own exploration of these powers remains highly speculative. In 
defence, I can only share the insight of Pierre Bourdieu that “an obvious fault 
is better than a hidden error”.63
 61 Richard D.  Wolff, “Ideological State Apparatuses, Consumerism, and U.S. Capitalism: 
Lessons for the Left”, Rethinking Marxism 17, no.  2 (2005):  230– 231. See also Wolfgang 
Fritz Haug, Critique of Commodity Aesthetics:  Appearance, Sexuality, and Advertising in 
Capitalist Society, trans. Robert Bock (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986).
 62 I have explored this more fully in “O conceito marxiano de proletariado:  uma crítica”, 
Revista de Sociologia & Antropologia [Rio de Janeiro] 6, no. 1 (April 2016): 87– 110.
 63 Pierre Bourdieu, On the State. Lectures at the College de France, 1989– 1992, ed. Patrick 
Champagne, Remi Lenoir, Franck Poupeau and Marie- Christine Riviere, trans. David 
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 chapter 2
Popular Classes, Revolution and Labour Relations 
in Nineteenth- Century Argentina
Gabriel Di Meglio
After the Napoleonic invasion of Spain in 1808, several revolutions erupted in 
Hispanic America. They involved a fight to achieve self- government, and even-
tually led to the independence of several republics of the former Spanish Em-
pire. These revolutions were led by sections of the local elites, but in many of 
them the popular classes – urban plebeians, artisans, slaves, peasants and oth-
er rural labourers – also played a key role. This chapter focuses on their actions 
during the revolutionary process in the territories that would later become one 
of the new countries born as a result: Argentina.1
The revolutionary period has always been a central topic in Argentine histo-
riography. Since the 1970s, traditional narratives about a struggle between pro-
to- nationalist Criollos (American- born Spaniards) and the Spanish monarchy 
have been challenged by revisionist readings in the fields of political, cultural, 
conceptual, economic and social history.2 Nowadays, researchers argue that it 
is impossible to study Spanish American independence through a retrospec-
tive view of the present national borders.3 Instead, the emergence of Argenti-
na as an independent nation can only be understood in connection with the 
 1 At the beginning of the nineteenth century, a large proportion of present- day Argentine terri-
tories were part of the Viceroyalty of the Río de la Plata, while other areas were not included 
in the Spanish jurisdiction and were controlled by indigenous sovereign groups. The destruc-
tion of the Viceroyalty in the 1820s led to the making of four different countries: Argentina, 
Uruguay, Paraguay and Bolivia.
 2 The revision started with Tulio Halperin Donghi, Politics, Economics and Society in Argentina 
in the Revolutionary Period, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1975), first published in 
Spanish in 1972. The vast body of literature on the political history of the revolutionary period 
since then is too large to be described here. For a complete review, see Noemí Goldman and 
Fabio Wasserman “Un balance de la historia política y de la construcción de identidades en 
el proceso de independencia”, Investigaciones y Ensayos 62 (2016): 23– 46.
 3 Especially after the work of José Carlos Chiaramonte. See mainly his Ciudades, provincias, 
Estados: Orígenes de la Nación Argentina (1800– 1846) (Buenos Aires: Editora Espasa Calpe Ar-
gentina, 1998)  and Fundamentos intelectuales y políticos de las independencias. Notas para 
una nueva historia intelectual de Iberoamérica (Buenos Aires: Teseo, 2010).
© Gabriel Di Meglio, 2021 | DOI:10.1163/9789004440395_004










Downloaded from Brill.com10/09/2020 11:57:52AM
via free access
Classes, Revolution & Labour in Nineteenth-Century Argentina 51
broader Spanish Empire.4 Historians also show that when the revolution start-
ed in 1810, independence was not planned or even desired except by a very 
few. Instead, most revolutionaries wanted to secure self- government within a 
new federal Spanish monarchy.5 It is now clear that prior to the revolution, no 
Argentine national identity existed. Instead, this was slowly constructed in the 
following decades.6 Researchers have demonstrated that the revolution was 
not only carried out by a small group of wealthy white men, but also by many 
other crucial actors. This changing historiography has thus highlighted the im-
portance of popular classes with regard to the revolution, and has examined 
how social and racial tensions were politicized during this period.7
Students of workers and labour relations had their own separate agendas, 
which only occasionally overlapped with studies of the revolution. From the 
1940s to the 1970s, a variety of Marxist intellectuals in Argentina – as in many 
Latin American countries – debated whether the productive structure of colo-
nial America had been feudal or capitalist. In this discussion, the two systems 
were thought of as rigidly separated. The diversity and mobility of workers in 
the continent seemed far removed from the European feudal model of masters 
exerting coercion to obtain a surplus from the landed peasantry. In most cases, 
 4 Tulio Halperin Donghi, Reforma y Disolución de los Imperios Ibéricos, 1750– 1850, (Ma-
drid: Alianza editorial, 1985); François- Xavier Guerra, Modernidad e independencias: Ensayos 
sobre las revoluciones hispánicas (Madrid: Ediciones Encuentro, 1992). Guerra’s book was very 
influential all around Latin America.
 5 José María Portillo Valdés, Crisis Atlántica. Autonomía e independencia en la crisis de la 
monarquía hispana (Madrid:  Marcial Pons Ediciones de Historia, 2006); Noemí Goldman, 
“Buenos Aires, 1810: la ‘revolución’, el dilema de la legitimidad y de las representaciones de 
la soberanía del pueblo”, Historia y política: Ideas, procesos y movimientos sociales 24 (2010): 
47– 69.
 6 José Carlos Chiaramonte, “Formas de identidad en el Río de la Plata luego de 1810”, Boletín 
del Instituto de Historia Argentina y Americana “Dr. Emilio Ravignani” no. 1 (1989): 71– 92. His 
perspective was discussed by Pilar González Bernaldo, “La ‘identidad nacional’ en el Río de 
la Plata postcolonial: Continuidades y rupturas con el Antiguo Régimen”, Anuario IEHS 12 
(1997): 109– 122, and also Jorge Myers, “Una cuestión de identidades: La búsqueda de los orí-
genes de la Nación Argentina y sus aporías”, Prismas 3 (1999): 275– 284.
 7 Gabriel Di Meglio, ¡Viva el bajo pueblo! La plebe urbana de Buenos Aires y la política entre la 
Revolución de Mayo y el rosismo (Buenos Aires: Prometeo Libros, 2006); Ana Frega, Pueblos 
y soberanía en la revolución artiguista: La región de Santo Domingo Soriano desde fines de la 
colonia hasta la ocupación portuguesa (Montevideo: Ediciones de la Banda Oriental, 2007); 
Sara Mata, Los gauchos de Güemes: Guerras de independencia y conflicto social (Buenos Ai-
res: Sudamericana, 2008); Raúl Fradkin, ¿Y el pueblo dónde está? Contribuciones para una his-
toria popular de la Revolución de independencia en el Río de la Plata (Buenos Aires: Prometeo 
Libros, 2008); Raúl Fradkin, “La revolución en los pueblos del litoral rioplatense”, Estudios 
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indebtedness had been ineffective to tie the workforce to a property in colonial 
Hispanic America. Moreover, in the area covered in this chapter, instead of try-
ing to tie the peasantry to their land, many landowners pressured the state to 
evict occupiers, and coercion was mostly exercised by state authorities rather 
than by landowners. However, while clearly not feudal, colonial society was 
not classically capitalist either. For a long time, most people were not forced 
to sell their labour power on the market in order to subsist. Undoubtedly there 
were wage workers, but in most places they had alternatives to the market to 
make a living. Apart from wage labourers, there were also many slaves, an ex-
tensive and heterogeneous independent peasantry, and a large group of small 
business owners, such as artisans. Some historians have therefore proposed 
an alternative definition of capitalism as a profit- driven system that produced 
commodities for large markets, and which could contain diverse relations of 
production. This definition was rejected by those who took proletarianization 
to be capitalism’s central feature and who emphasized that Latin America had 
a specific economic and social organization. The revolution of the 1810s was 
not central to this debate, as many scholars considered that it had not changed 
the mode of production. Some Marxists did think of the revolution as a chal-
lenge to the social structure, but as a failed one: in the end, labour relations 
remained the same.8
The debate had not been settled, but it was more or less abandoned after 
the 1980s. The number of studies into labour relations grew remarkably, but 
without engaging in a debate about the modes of production. Some scholars 
studied general aspects of the development of “agrarian capitalism” through 
the nineteenth century,9 some looked for its origins, either in the late colonial 
 8 A clear synthesis of the arguments is found in Steve Stern, “Feudalism, Capitalism, and 
the World- System in the Perspective of Latin America and the Caribbean”, AHR 93, no.  4 
(1988): 829– 872. With regard to the history of the debate, see José Carlos Chiaramonte, For-
mas de sociedad y economía en Hispanoamérica (Buenos Aires: Grijalbo, 1984). The proposal 
of capitalism as a profit- driven system is in Andre Gunder Frank, Capitalism and Underde-
velopment in Latin America: Historical Studies of Chile and Brazil (New York: Monthly Review 
Press, 1967), and the main critics of it (by Ernesto Laclau and Carlos Assadourian) in Carlos 
Sempat Assadourian, et al., Modos de producción en América Latina (México: Pasado y Pre-
sente, 1973). It was Rodolfo Puiggrós who talked about a failed democratic- bourgeois revolu-
tion, in Rodolfo Puiggrós, De la colonia a la revolución (Buenos Aires: Retórica, 1940).
 9 For example Osvaldo Barsky and Julio Djenderedjian, Historia del capitalismo agrario pam-
peano:  La expansión ganadera hasta 1895 (Buenos Aires:  Universidad de Belgrano, 2003). 
A recent review of this strand of research can be found in Eduardo Míguez, “Del feudalismo 
al capitalismo agrario: ¿el fin de la historia … agraria?” Boletín del Instituto de Historia Argen-
tina y Americana “Dr. Emilio Ravignani” 46 (2017): 180– 204. The current debates about Cap-
italism, the “Global South” and “Slavery Capitalism” have not yet influenced the Argentine 
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period or in the mid- 1850s,10 while others focused on the process of prole-
tarianization, which they considered had become prevalent in the late nine-
teenth century.11 In all these lines of research, the revolution was considered a 
major break, because it was followed by a re- orientation of the economy of the 
region. Yet few scholars have attempted to connect popular actions during the 
revolution with the transformations in the world of labour.
That is precisely the goal of this chapter. By creating a “conversation” be-
tween the historiographies of revolution and of labour in Argentina, I aim to 
analyse how labour relations were affected by the political actions of the pop-
ular classes.12
1 Labour Relations at the Beginning of the Nineteenth Century
The chapter explores the relationship between revolution and labour in a re-
gion of what was the Viceroyalty of the Rio de la Plata: the Pampas; a broad 
and fertile plain that included the present- day Argentine provinces of Buenos 
Aires, Entre Ríos, Santa Fe and also the Banda Oriental. The last of these is now 
another country: Uruguay.13 The focus here is mostly on Buenos Aires, which 
 10 Respectively Samuel Amaral, The Rise of capitalism on the Pampas:  The Estancias of 
Buenos Aires, 1785– 1870 (Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press, 1998); Hilda Sabato, 
Capitalismo y ganadería en Buenos Aires:  la fiebre del lanar (Buenos Aires:  Editorial 
Sudamericana, 1989).
 11 For example Ricardo Salvatore, “Reclutamiento militar, disciplinamiento y  proletar-
ización  en la era de Rosas”, Boletín del Instituto de Historia Argentina y Americana 
“Dr. Emilio Ravignnani” 5 (1992): 25– 47; Juan Carlos Garavaglia, “De Caseros a la guerra del 
Paraguay: el disciplinamiento de la población campesina en el Buenos Aires postrosista 
(1852– 1865)”, Illes i Imperis, no. 5 (2001): 53– 80; Daniel Campi, “Trabajo, azúcar, disciplin-
amiento y resistencia: El caso de Tucumán, Argentina (segunda mitad del siglo XIX)”, in 
Historia do Açúcar: Fiscalidade, metrologia, vida material e patrimonio, ed. Alberto Viera 
et al. (Funchal: CeHa, 2006).
 12 Naturally, I  have included texts about Argentina written in other countries, and I  also 
take from Uruguayan historiography. The chapter is based on a secondary bibliography, 
although a few primary sources are used to provide examples. I have translated all the 
citations from Spanish into English.
 13 Roughly speaking, the area was geographically and historically different from the rest of 
what today is Argentina, the “interior” provinces more closely resembling of other Andean 
regions. There were also huge plains in which different indigenous groups resisted the 
Spanish conquest and kept their sovereignty, their languages and their religion until the 
last quarter of the nineteenth century: Chaco in the North and Patagonia in the South. 
There is a vast bibliography on the indigenous groups of both regions. For a general sum-
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in the 1810s experienced a significant popular mobilization in support of the 
struggle against the colonial authorities. The mobilization was  more urban 
than rural. Labour relations were not at the heart of the political disputes of 
that agitated period, but they were affected by the consequences of the revo-
lutionary process. On the other hand, the uprising in the Banda Oriental and 
Entre Ríos was mainly rural, and openly took issue with many aspects of the 
agrarian relations. Some of these disputes concerned pre- existing conditions. 
In order to make sense of this, the current section provides a brief overview of 
labour relations in the area in colonial times.
In this vast and scarcely- populated plain, most people lived in the coun-
tryside and worked in rural activities. They produced wheat and fruit for the 
urban markets and hides for export, and raised mules to be sent to the distant 
mines of Potosí. Many rural workers were peasants, who worked small and 
medium- sized plots and were generally engaged in a combination of agricul-
ture and livestock breeding. A few of them owned their land, but most were 
settled on others’ properties. Many were tenants, who paid their rent in various 
ways: in money, in wheat or in animals. Others were sharecroppers. There were 
also the so- called “aggregates”, who exchanged work for land, but in contrast 
to the tenants, lived in the same residence as the owner or another tenant, or 
next to it. In addition, there was still another alternative for members of the 
popular classes to access the land: to occupy it without permission from the 
owners. Land was not fenced, and large “empty” spaces that were not used for 
production existed all around. The repressive capacity of the state was low, and 
many landowners had little control of their holdings, some of which were not 
actually occupied by them. They often complained about intruders, but some-
times ended up negotiating some form of collaboration with the occupants, 
such as demanding their help to control herds or employing them as casual 
labourers.14
The other main form of rural labour was related to the haciendas or es-
tancias:  large landholdings dedicated to producing cattle, mules and some-
times crops. Many haciendas had tenants who paid part of their rent in the 
 14 There is a vast bibliography on this topic. Three indispensable books are Jorge Gelman, 
Campesinos y estancieros: Una región del Rio de la Plata a fines de la época colonial (Buenos 
Aires:  Editorial Los Libros del Riel, 1998); Juan Carlos Garavaglia, Pastores y labradores 
de Buenos Aires:  una historia agraria de la campaña bonaerense 1700– 1830 (Buenos 
Aires: Ediciones de la Flor, 1999); Carlos Mayo, Estancia y sociedad en la Pampa (1740– 1820) 
(Buenos Aires:  Biblos, 2010). Also see José Mateo, Población, parentesco y red social en 
la frontera. Lobos (provincia de Buenos Aires) en el siglo XIX (Mar del Plata: Universidad 
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form of labour. Further, given the shortage of workers and the irregularity of 
demand for labour in cattle raising – which was concentrated in short periods 
each year devoted to livestock branding and slaughtering  – the hacendados 
employed temporary labourers for those months and kept a group of slaves in 
charge of the permanent tasks. These slaves were the only people working at 
the hacienda for the entire year, and because of that some of them were even 
able to become bosses of free labourers,15 who were hired in high season, both 
per month and per day (journeymen). They were paid in currency and in kind, 
and while they were working they were given lodging and food. Wages in the 
Pampas were significantly higher than in other parts of the Viceroyalty. How-
ever, though the area attracted many migrants – seasonally or permanently – 
in- migration was not great enough to supply all the labour required by the ha-
ciendas. Many workers would leave one hacienda for another if they disagreed 
with the bosses or were paid after the due date, which was common. Labour 
mobility was high.16
Most of the labourers were not fully dependent on wages alone. Subsistence 
alternatives continued to exist, such as hunting wild animals, including otters, 
rodents and rheas, fishing or killing someone else’s cow. Many entered and left 
the market, and therefore were not necessarily full- time labourers. At the same 
time, patterns of employment changed over a lifetime. Men from other regions 
went to the Pampas to get money, and then returned to their homes, where 
they became peasants again. Others remained in a proletarian position or lived 
on the margins of society. In the eighteenth century, the latter were called gau-
chos, but as decades went by, that word started to be used to denominate ev-
ery poor man in the countryside. Another option for labourers was to form a 
family, obtain some seeds and tools or some cows, and start a small herd. Thus, 
they could become peasants; a route that was made possible because land was 
quite easy to obtain.17
 15 Carlos Mayo, “Patricio Belén: nada menos que un capataz”, Hispanic American Historical 
Review 77, no. 4 (1997): 597– 617.
 16 Mariana Canedo, Propietarios, ocupantes y pobladores: San Nicolás de los Arroyos, 1600– 
1860 (Mar del Plata:  Universidad Nacional de Mar del Plata, 2000). See also Roy Hora, 
Historia económica de la Argentina en el siglo XIX (Buenos Aires:  Siglo xxi/ Fundación 
osde, 2010).
 17 An early and useful synthesis of these topics in English is Juan Carlos Garavaglia and Jorge 
Gelman, “Rural History of the Rio de la Plata, 1600– 1850:  results of a historiographical 
renaissance”, Latin American Research Review 30, no. 3 (1995): 75– 105. A recent balance 
can be found in Jorge Gelman, “De la historia agraria a la historia de las desigualdades. 
Un recorrido y varios homenajes”, Anuario IEHS 32, no. 2 (2017): 47– 58. See also Míguez, 
“Del feudalismo al capitalismo agrario” and the comments on the text in the same issue 
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Another fundamental aspect of rural life was the importance of customary 
notions that sanctioned access to resources. People from the popular classes 
considered that stones or firewood could be taken from others’ land because 
they were scarce goods; that they could take their own livestock to graze in any 
surrounding field; that wild animals could be hunted for food; and that killing 
a cow was acceptable if it was done to meet a need. Custom established that 
a person who lived for a long time in a given place had the right to stay there. 
From the late eighteenth century onwards, the authorities and the major land-
owners tried unsuccessfully to stop these practices. Attempts to secure rights 
over their possessions were made in various places around the end of that cen-
tury, generating tensions and disputes.18
Thus, the scarcity of population, and the availability of land and of food 
alternatives without becoming fully dependent on the market  allowed the 
popular classes to negotiate their social position and working condition (in 
Buenos Aires there was also the possibility of crossing the frontier and joining 
independent indigenous groups). These factors also partly curbed the pres-
sures from the elites, who always complained about workers “abandoning” 
their tasks after receiving a salary advance; one of the practices used to retain 
them and stop their mobility. Laws against “vagrants” were introduced during 
the eighteenth century, sending any man without a steady job into the army, 
but the goal was not easy to achieve. Even if coercion was occasionally able to 
make workers stay in a given place, it failed to generate a steady flow of labour 
to the market. Migrants were the ones who suffered most from the pressure of 
the authorities, because they had no local connections to defend themselves.19
There was one region in which rural relations were more tense before the 
revolution: the Banda Oriental and part of Entre Ríos. In the late eighteenth 
century, some rich people from Buenos Aires and Montevideo began obtain-
ing land grants for cattle raising in the Banda Oriental, an area with a lower 
population because it had been colonized much later than Buenos Aires. The 
new owners started to clash with the untitled occupants who were already 
there, and who the owners tried to expel from their lands. These attempts were 
 18 Raúl Fradkin, “Entre la ley y la práctica:  la costumbre en la campaña bonaerense de la 
primera mitad del siglo XIX”, Anuario IEHS 12 (1997): 141– 156.
 19 María Elena Barral, Raúl Fradkin, Gladys Perri and Fabián Alonso, “Los vagos de la cam-
paña bonaerense:  la construcción histórica de una figura delictiva (1780– 1830)”, in El 
poder y la vara. Estudios sobre la justicia y la construcción del Estado en el Buenos Aires 
rural, comp. Raúl Fradkin (Buenos Aires: Prometeo Libros Editorial, 2007). Another per-
spective appears in Gabriela Martínez Dougnac, “Justicia colonial, orden social y peonaje 
obligatorio”, in Poder Terrateniente, relaciones de producción y orden colonial, ed. Azcuy 
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sometimes resisted judicially by appealing to custom, but at other times they 
had a drastic ending: evictions and the destruction of homes. At the same time, 
the new landowners tended to control the best sources of water and to take for 
themselves the cattle that went to drink there. These situations and the lack of 
an adequate demarcation of the farms led to the tense situation in the region 
that arose during the revolutionary years.20
The cities in the area were small, except for Buenos Aires, which had more 
than 60,000 inhabitants by 1810, a significant number by South American stan-
dards of that time.21 Artisans dominated the urban workforce. At the beginning 
of the nineteenth century, about 60 per cent of craft activities in Buenos Aires 
were performed by Afro- descendants, who were the clear majority among the 
shoemakers and tailors. For a free black, being a craftsman offered the possi-
bility of social advancement. Racial disputes arose among artisans, however. 
In the 1790s, some black and mulatto shoemakers tried to separate themselves 
from the recently formed Guild of Shoemakers and create a different one. They 
even sent a petition to the king. In the debates and mobilizations around con-
testing the framework of guilds, they acquired some political experience.
 20 José Pedro Barrán y Benjamín Nahum, Bases económicas de la revolución artiguista 
(Montevideo: Ediciones de la Banda Oriental, 2007); Lucía Sala de Touron, Nelson de la Torre 
and Julio Rodríguez, Estructura  económico- social de la  colonia (Montevideo:  Ediciones 
Pueblos Unidos, 1967). Outside the area considered in this chapter, in various parts of 
what is present- day North- West Argentina, several indigenous communities worked 
their lands collectively and the chief then used that production to pay the tribute to the 
Crown. The mines of Potosí, in present- day Bolivia, had a special labour system: the mita, 
indigenous mandatory service that several communities had to cover every year. In what 
today is North- East Argentina, then the area of the former Jesuit missions – the Order 
had been ousted from the Spanish territories in 1767 – the Guaraní indigenous groups 
continued producing yerba mate and hides in communal lands as they had done before 
with the priests, but under the supervision of a secular administrator. See Julia Sarreal, 
The Guaraní and Their Missions: A Socioeconomic History (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 2014). With regard to the indigenous villages, see a synthesis in Gabriela Sica, “Las 
sociedades indígenas del Tucumán colonial: una breve historia en larga duración. Siglos 
XVI a XIX”, in La historia nacional en perspectiva regional. Nuevas investigaciones para 
viejos problemas, ed. Susana Bandieri and Sandra Fernández (Buenos Aires: Teseo, 2017), 
41– 82. For the mita, see Enrique Tandeter, Coacción y mercado. La minería de la plata en el 
Potosí Colonial, 1692– 1826 (Buenos Aires: Siglo xxi Editores, 1992). For examples of labour 
relations in other parts of present- day Argentina see Guillermo Madrazo, Hacienda 
y encomienda en los Andes. La puna argentina bajo el marquesado de Tojo. Siglos XVII a 
XIX (Buenos Aires:  Fondo Editorial, 1982); Sara Mata, “Estructura agraria, la propiedad 
de la tierra en el Valle de Lerma, Valle Calchaquí y la Frontera Este (1750– 1800)”, Andes. 
Antropología e Historia, no. 1 (1990): 47– 88.
 21 According to new calculations made by Lyman Johnson, Workshop of Revolution: Plebeian 
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Many of the artisans were slaves, since it was often cheaper for masters to 
teach the craft to someone who could not leave. Other slaves learned a craft 
and exercised it independently, giving what they earned to their owners, who 
were not necessarily artisans.22 Slavery was crucial in the cities. In Buenos Ai-
res, slaves accounted for more than 25 per cent of the population by 1810. The 
women were seamstresses, ironers, washerwomen or wet nurses, and could 
even be forced by their masters to engage in prostitution. Brickyards, construc-
tion sites and bakeries – important not only for the local market but also for 
the crews of the ships docked in the port – used slave labour. Of course, a large 
number of slaves were also engaged in domestic activities.23
Apart from the slaves, Buenos Aires, Montevideo and smaller cities had a 
heterogeneous plebeian population. This included street vendors, wage work-
ers, sailors, and in the ports, personnel responsible for maintaining the ships 
that arrived after the long transatlantic voyage. There were many people who 
did not have a fixed occupation and took employment in what they could find 
daily or periodically, from obtaining some goods and exchanging them for oth-
er things, to digging wells or tying firewood. They could also be beggars.24
All these people were massively mobilized by the British army’s occupa-
tion of Buenos Aires in July 1806, and the subsequent reconquest of the city, 
aided by troops sent from Montevideo. Soon after the British defeat, a crowd 
pressed the city council (Cabildo) to forbid the return of Viceroy Sobremonte 
to the capital, which he had left when the invaders attacked. At the same time, 
a voluntary militia was organized, including most male adults in the city and 
its outskirts. Militiamen were inhabitants who were armed for the defence of 
the city. They were not regular soldiers, but were paid when on active service. 
Thus, the militia became a steady job for many plebeians.25 Officers were vot-
ed in by the soldiers, and the new organization became a channel of contact 
 22 Johnson, Workshop of Revolution; Miguel Ángel Rosal, Africanos y afrodescendientes en el 
Río de la Plata. Siglos XVII– XIX (Buenos Aires: 2009).
 23 Alex Borucki, From Shipmates to Soldiers. Emerging Black Identities in the Río de la Plata, 
(Albuquerque:  University of New Mexico Press, 2015); Juan Carlos Garavaglia, “El pan 
de cada día:  el mercado del trigo en Buenos Aires, 1700– 1820”, Boletín del Instituto de 
Historia Argentina y Americana, “Dr. Emilio Ravignani” no. 4, (1991): 7– 29; Marta Goldberg 
y Silvia Mallo, “La población africana en Buenos Aires y su campaña. Formas de vida y 
subsistencia, 1750– 1850”, Temas de Asia y África, no.  2 (1994):  15– 69; Rosal, Africanos y 
afrodescendientes.
 24 César García Belsunce, Buenos Aires. Su gente. 1800– 1830, 3 Vols. (Buenos Aires:  Emecé 
Distribuidora, 1976).
 25 Tulio Halperin Donghi, “Revolutionary Militarization in Buenos Aires, 1806– 1815”, Past & 
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between the local elite and the plebeians, not mediated by the imperial order. 
The new units subsequently played a key role, intervening in local disputes in 
the midst of the Spanish imperial crisis.26
The revolution that was soon to start in the Viceroyalty of the Rio de la Plata 
was not the result of inner tensions, but a consequence of the collapse of the 
centre of the monarchy under the French offensive. However, when the pro-
cess began, many local grievances became political, and that would also affect 
labour relations.
2 Revolution
In May 1810, the arrival in Buenos Aires of news about the fall of Spain at 
Bonaparte’s hands led to the organization of a movement that removed the 
viceroy from power and created a junta to replace his position. This was a col-
lective local government, similar to those created in several Spanish cities on 
behalf of the captive Ferdinand vii, and was initially supposed to rule until 
the return of the legitimate king. However, the junta wanted more than that. 
The aspiration for self- government was strong among the elites in Spanish 
America. They wanted to maintain their resources and elect their own au-
thorities, cutting off the dependence on Spain, even though their desire was 
to remain within the monarchy.27 Many cities of the viceroyalty accepted the 
new government of Buenos Aires, while a few others did not, and declared 
their loyalty to a new and fragile regency council in Spain. Among them was 
Montevideo, in the Banda Oriental. The junta sent troops against the loyalists, 
starting a civil war that would eventually turn into a war of independence 
lasting for 15 years.
From the beginning, the junta tried to ensure the adhesion of the plebeians 
to the revolution in Buenos Aires. The support of militia officers and a large 
proportion of the secular clergy was especially useful. Mariano Moreno, the 
secretary of the  junta, started to publish a journal and forced the priests to 
read it aloud before mass, addressing the illiterates. The government and the 
 26 Pilar González Bernaldo, “Producción de una nueva legitimidad:  ejército y sociedades 
patrióticas en Buenos Aires entre 1810 y 1813”, in aavv, Imagen y recepción de la Revolución 
Francesa en la Argentina (1990): 27– 51; Johnson, Workshop of Revolution.
 27 Similar movements occurred in Caracas, Cartagena, Bogotá, Santiago de Chile and Quito. 
For Buenos Aires, see Noemí Goldman, “Buenos Aires, 1810”. For the general process in 
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city council decided to organize public celebrations whenever good news for 
the cause arrived, which would lead in May 1811 to the creation of the most im-
portant festive occasion of that time: the anniversary of the revolution. These 
meetings had a massive attendance.28
Although at the beginning the leaders of the revolution promoted the con-
trolled participation of common people, the politicization of the plebeians in-
creased when a factional struggle broke out within the junta towards the end 
of 1810. While the moderate faction – gathered around the figure of President 
Cornelio Saavedra – had the aim of achieving self- government while remain-
ing within the monarchy, the radicals – followers of Mariano Moreno – sought 
total independence and wanted to change many hierarchical aspects of soci-
ety.29 To settle the conflict, the moderates counted on the support of most of 
the military units, but if the military units acted alone, they could have been 
accused of forcing a change through violence. Therefore, they found another 
solution: on the night of April 5, 1811, they organized a massive mobilization 
to displace their rivals from the junta. One of the radicals later wrote that the 
moderates went “from the city to the suburbs in search of machines to exe-
cute the movement, or, as it was said then, they appealed to the men of pon-
cho and chiripá [plebeian garments] to confront the men of cloak and frock 
coat”.30 Around fifteen hundred people, most of them plebeians, attended the 
demonstration. The troops showed up too, but remained as silent support. The 
mobilization was coordinated by the petty authorities of the urban quarters, 
appointed by the city council.31 However, beyond their influence, they had to 
find a popular cause, shared by those who followed them; they found it under 
the claim that Spaniards should be banished from Buenos Aires. This was the 
first requirement of the petition they presented, while the eviction of the rad-
ical deputies from the junta appeared under this in the list. All the demands 
were approved (although the measure against the Spaniards was not later im-
plemented).32
 28 With regard to the celebrations, see mainly Lía Munilla, Celebrar y Gobernar. Un estudio 
de las fiestas cívicas en Buenos Aires, 1810– 1835 (Buenos Aires: Miño Dávila Editores, 2013); 
Fernando Gómez, “Las Fiestas Mayas y la construcción de legitimidad en Buenos Aires 
(1811– 1836)”, Prohistoria 19 (2013): 73– 93.
 29 For a recent approach to this classical topic, see Noemí Goldman, Mariano Moreno. De 
reformista a insurgente (Buenos Aires: Edhasa, 2016).
 30 Ignacio Núñez, “Noticias históricas”, Biblioteca de Mayo, 25 Vols. (Buenos Aires, 1960), 
I, 453.
 31 Di Meglio, ¡Viva el bajo pueblo!, 101.
 32 The petition was reproduced entirely in the press on 15 April 1811. Gaceta de Buenos Aires 
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This event was a turning point in the revolution. First, the petition was 
made in the name of a single actor:  “the People of Buenos Aires”. An oppo-
nent of the movement wrote in his diary that the “plebe” had been erroneously 
considered as the people (pueblo). Instead, “whether the President had called 
the true People, he would not have achieved his plans”.33 Only a small number 
of neighbours, and not the plebeians of the suburbs, were the “people” in the 
colonial period. Now, the concept had been expanded to include any man (not 
women, although many of them participated in this new political life). In a 
revolution justified from the beginning in the name of “the people”, this was a 
transformation.
Second, the leaders needed a topic that would be popular enough to drive 
plebeians into action. Thus, in every subsequent mobilization, the leaders had 
to include popular mottos to gain support, which meant a way of including 
popular demands in the political struggle. That happened on 5 April 1811: the 
moderate deputies had never spoken against the Spaniards, but this mobi-
lization was mainly against them. In 1810, the revolutionaries had protested 
against the colonial authorities and the abuses of the metropolis, while rec-
ognizing Ferdinand vii as the legitimate king. Now things had changed: every 
Spaniard was an enemy. This was the third change on that crucial day, caused 
by the plebeian intervention. Resentment against the Europeans, as they were 
called, was common among the plebeians, given the better conditions they 
generally enjoyed when they migrated to Buenos Aires, such as communitar-
ian aid, availability of credit, better opportunities from marriage (marrying a 
Spaniard was more prestigious for a woman) and different legal punishments 
for the same offence. None of this led to the revolution, but when it started, the 
small complaints became politicized.
There was a fourth lesson from the movement of April 1811: it was successful. 
All the political groups learnt that the combination of plebeians and troops in 
the Plaza de la Victoria amounted to a winning formula. In September 1811, a 
new faction dissolved the junta and created a triumvirate instead, using the 
same political practice: “Plebe in the Plaza and troops supporting it”, as a con-
temporary put it.34 Similar movements occurred in October 1812, when the 
radicals seized power, and in April 1815, when they lost it. There is not enough 
space here to describe all these events, but it is clear that plebeian mobiliza-
tion became a feature of Buenos Aires’ politics.35
 33 Juan Manuel Beruti, Memorias curiosas (Buenos Aires: Emecé Editores, 2001), 166.
 34 “Instrucción de Saavedra a Juan de la Rosa Alba”, Biblioteca de Mayo, ii, vol. 1 (1960): 1122.
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Those who had been in subaltern positions in colonial times found an op-
portunity to rise socially through supporting the new cause; a new place in the 
community. Through their struggle in the revolution, they were symbolically 
levelled: they now were more valuable than those who had opposed it, even if 
the latter had held a higher social status. Social and racial tensions were sub-
sumed in the opposition to the Spaniards. In a society based on the notion of 
juridical inequality by colour and place of birth, the possibility of changing 
this, and at the same time overpowering the enemies of the cause, was a pow-
erful motive for plebeians. Therefore, they were the main denouncers of “ene-
mies of the system”, mostly Spaniards, to a “Tribunal of Public Safety” created 
after the movement of April 1811.36
The differences between autonomists and independentists were resolved by 
the defeat of Napoleon in Europe and the return of Ferdinand vii to the throne 
in 1814. The king was not willing to negotiate over autonomy. Instead, he sent 
troops, enabling local loyalists to prevail in most of the continent. By 1816, the 
only insurgent territory still standing was the Rio de la Plata. Therefore, when a 
congress was called that year, independence was declared without hesitation. 
The war against the loyalists – in Chile and in the Upper Peru – nevertheless 
lasted for years, and in addition, there were military clashes between two dif-
ferent revolutionary blocks after 1814. The Banda Oriental, Entre Ríos, Santa Fe 
and two other provinces created a confederation against the central revolu-
tionary government located in Buenos Aires.37
Although in the latter, labour relations were not openly contested, the po-
litical disputes and military mobilizations had an impact on them. First, there 
was plebeian pressure to ensure that every job was given to the “sons of the 
country”. Second, slavery was contested.38 Both radical and moderate branches 
maintained their position against slavery, and decided to gradually put an end 
to it. They avoided direct emancipation, claiming that slaves were not prepared 
for sudden freedom, and thereby protecting property rights. They started with 
the slave traffic. In May 1812, the official journal proclaimed:
How long shall we give shelter in our ports to these ships, loaded with 
parents, with children, with husbands who, traitorously wrenched from 
the bosom of their families, come to satisfy with their sad existence the 
 36 Ibid.
 37 For a synthesis of this, see Gabriela Tio Vallejo, “Rupturas precoces y legalidades proviso-
rias: el fin del poder español en el Río de la Plata”, Ayer 74 (2009): 133– 162.
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greed, and the caprices of their barbarous robbers? Shame on a free peo-
ple, if it is indifferent to these excesses.39
The triumvirate banned the traffic. Any new slave who landed in what now was 
called the United Provinces of the Rio de la Plata would be freed. This decision 
reinforced the slaves’ support for the revolution. Shortly after the measure was 
put in place, a slave called Ventura denounced a counterrevolutionary conspir-
acy by Spaniards, many of whom were executed after a short trial. During the 
agitation of these days, another slave called Valerio said to his master that he 
thought Criollos, Blacks and Indians were equal.40
A few months later, under a new government, the 1813 Constituent Assembly 
enacted a Free Womb Act, under which any new- born child of a slave moth-
er was to be born free. The idea was that by abolishing slavery and the slave 
trade by inheritance, the institution would eventually disappear when the last 
person enslaved before 1813 died, all without interfering with the owners’ in-
terests. However, slaves did not want to wait for freedom any longer. Many be-
lieved abolition was close: a black “poor journeyman” named Hilarión Gómez 
declared “everything breathes banishing slavery”.41
For men, the revolutionary war itself opened up a direct route out of slav-
ery. If they became soldiers, they were promised that they would be set free by 
the end of the conflict, and many wanted to go into the army. In 1816, a wom-
an demanded that the authorities pay her the value of a “mulatto” she owned, 
who had escaped and enlisted. Another owner stated that he had a young 
slave, who showed “a strong desire to pursue a military career”, so the owner 
wanted to be paid for him by the state.42 Cases like these were common, and 
many slaves were bought by the authorities. Thirty per cent of the soldiers in 
the decisive Army of the Andes led by General José de San Martín in 1817 were 
 39 15 May 1812. Gaceta de Buenos Aires (1810– 1821), T. iii (Buenos Aires, 1910), 192– 193.
 40 All the information comes from the Archivo General de la Nación [agn, Argentine 
National Archive], sala X, legajo 6- 7- 4, Conspiración de Álzaga. See also Mariana Pérez, 
“¡Viva España y mueran los patricios! La conspiración de Álzaga de 1812”, Americanía, no. 3 
(2013): 21– 55.
 41 agn, x, 8- 9- 4, Solicitudes Civiles y Militares, 1815. For the judicial fights of slaves in the 
1810s, see Gladys Perri, “Los esclavos frente a la justicia. Resistencia y adaptación en 
Buenos Aires, 1780– 1830”, in La ley es tela de araña. Ley, justicia y sociedad rural en Buenos 
Aires, 1780– 1830, ed. Raúl Fradkin (Buenos Aires: Prometeo libros, 2009), 51– 82; Magdalena 
Candioti, “Altaneros y libertinos. Transformaciones de la condición jurídica de los afro-
porteños en la Buenos Aires revolucionaria (1810– 1820)”, Desarrollo Económico 50, no. 198 
(2010): 271– 296.
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former slaves.43 Becoming a soldier gave Afro- descendants a strong identifi-
cation with the homeland (Patria). It gave them freedom and respectability, 
or at least they expected it to. In 1820, a drunken white officer insulted one 
of his subalterns and called him “black”. He replied loudly that the officer 
had no right to offend him: “I am black but I am a corporal of the Patria”. His 
fellow soldiers were so angry that they almost rebelled against the officer.44 
One consequence of this military manumission was that after the war there 
were more slave women than men. Greatly weakened, slavery continued to 
exist until its abolition by the 1853 National Constitution, but it could no lon-
ger supply the labour power for rural production and the domestic labour 
required.45
Another substantial change came with the sanctioning of free trade by 
the revolutionary governments, a measure that had enduring consequences. 
While it made foreign goods cheaper, and thus available to workers, it was also 
contested by artisans, whose workshops were threatened by the entry of those 
manufactures. However, these criticisms did not change the artisans’ support 
for the revolutionary cause.46
In the Banda Oriental and Entre Ríos – as we have already seen, an area with 
many conflicts concerning land – peasants and labourers mobilized for revolu-
tion. Loyalist forces had been sent from Montevideo to control the rural areas 
in 1810, but in February 1811 a massive uprising started there in support of the 
Buenos Aires’ junta. The rebels were successful, obliging the counterrevolu-
tionary troops to abandon the countryside and look for shelter in Montevideo 
(which remained a loyalist stronghold until it fell in 1814).47
 43 San Martín’s army crossed the Andes and defeated the royalist forces in Chile, securing its 
independence. Later San Martín led his troops to Perú, centre of the royal power in South 
America.
 44 agn, x, 29- 10- 2, Sumarios Militares, 146.
 45 See George Reid Andrews, The Afro- Argentines of Buenos Aires, 1800– 1900 (Madison: 
University of Wisconsin Press, 1980). See also the works published in “Negros de la 
patria”: Los afrodescendientes en las luchas por la independencia en el antiguo Virreinato 
del Río de la Plata, ed. Silvia Mallo and Ignacio Telesca (Buenos Aires: Sb editorial, 2010); 
Peter Blanchard, Under the Flags of Freedom: Slave Soldiers and the Wars of Independence 
in Spanish South America (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2008); Di Meglio, 
¡Viva el bajo pueblo!
 46 See Jonathan Brown, A Socioeconomic History of Argentina, 1776– 1860 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1979). Also, Di Meglio, ¡Viva el bajo pueblo! This is a topic that 
deserves further research.
 47 Ana Frega, Pueblos y soberanía en la revolución artiguista:  La región de Santo Domingo 
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This rural movement was led by José Artigas, and took the most radical po-
sitions in the whole area. Many peasants and labourers fought for liberty and 
egalitarianism, first against Spaniards and local loyalists, and subsequently – 
after 1814 – against the Buenos Aires central government. The motto of these 
Artiguists was “nadie es más que nadie” (“nobody is more than nobody”). They 
demanded land reform and affirmed their traditional common rights should 
be respected. In 1815, Artigas sanctioned a land reform, confiscating the prop-
erties of loyalist landowners and dividing it among poor families, whom he 
called “the unhappy ones”. The decision was not just a benevolent gesture from 
Artigas: his troops had pressed him to be given some benefit for having fought 
without pause under his command. With the new measures, some of these 
peasants and labourers would become landowners.48
Many members of the elites saw Artiguism as a menace. Nicolás Herrera, a 
well- to- do politician from Montevideo, wrote to the Portuguese Court in Bra-
zil, promoting action against Artigas:
The white caste occupied in America the same place the nobility did in 
the states of Europe, and it produced the same effect. But the revolution 
divided whites. The Spanish Europeans and their Party were presented as 
criminals, inept, cowards, and barbarians to the Creoles. Indians, blacks 
and mulattos became used to mistreat their masters and employers. … 
The dogma of equality moves the crowd against all government and has 
established a war between the poor and the rich, master and lord; those 
who command and those who obey.49
The Portuguese invasion of the Banda Oriental began in 1816. The Artiguists 
resisted for four years, but they were ultimately defeated and the process of 
land reform was interrupted. In that same year, 1820, the central government 
created in 1810 collapsed in Buenos Aires. For a while, provinces governed 
themselves without any authority from above.
Some important changes had taken place by then. The monarchy had been 
abolished and the former subjects now lived in republics. Some liberal reforms 
had also been made, such as sweeping away noble titles, the Inquisition, judi-
cial torture and the indigenous tribute that had existed in colonial times out-
side the region considered here. Soon, the properties of the Catholic regular 
 48 Ana Frega, “El Reglamento de Tierras de 1815: justicia revolucionaria y virtud republicana”, 
in Tierras, reglamento y revolución: Reflexiones a doscientos años del reglamento artiguista 
de 1815, ed. Gerardo Caetano y Ana Ribeiro (Montevideo: Planeta, 2015).
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orders were secularized in Buenos Aires. The “caste system” was also ended 
with the revolution, putting an end to juridical racial inequality (although rac-
ism persisted). However, most popular expectations of an egalitarian transfor-
mation were not achieved.
The demise of revolutionary enthusiasm can be adequately traced through 
the literature of the time. One of the innovations of that agitated period was 
the appearance of a new literary genre, strongly political, in which some writ-
ers used the language of the people of the countryside and placed them as 
central historical actors. In a poem written in 1821, two gauchos complain 
about justice. One says that a wealthy man who steals public money is quickly 
released, while any peasant who steals something for eating is hit and impris-
oned by the police. “And they call this Equality?”50
3 Labour Relations after the Revolution
The War of Independence triggered a remarkable destruction of wealth and 
trading networks. Potosí remained in loyalist hands until the end of the con-
flict in 1825, and it also experienced a crisis in mining, partially caused by the 
refusal of the indigenous communities of that area to continue with the co-
ercive mita system after the revolution. Thus, silver stopped being the main 
commodity exported from Buenos Aires, as it had been before 1810, and Potosí 
ceased to be a hub of demand for different goods. The new situation had dire 
consequences in the interior of present- day Argentina. However, in the Pam-
pas region, with good fluvial connections with the Atlantic, free trade provided 
new opportunities.51
In colonial times, commerce had been the most profitable activity in Bue-
nos Aires,52 but after the revolution, the new transatlantic trade was mainly 
in the hands of British merchants. Therefore, former Buenos Aires merchants, 
 50 It is a poem called “Diálogo patriótico interesante entre Jacinto Chano, capataz de una 
estancia en las Islas del Tordillo, y el gaucho de la guardia del Monte”, by Bartolomé 
Hidalgo. In Bartolomé Hidalgo, Cielitos y diálogos patrióticos (Buenos Aires:  Editorial 
Huemul, 1967). See Josefina Ludmer, The gaucho genre:  A treatise on the motherland 
(Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2002).
 51 Carlos Sempat Assadourian, “El sector exportador de una economía regional del inte-
rior argentino. Córdoba, 1800  – 1860”, in El sistema de la economía colonial, ed. Carlos 
Sempat Assadourian (México: Editorial Nueva Imagen, 1983), 18– 55; Tandeter, Coacción y 
mercado.










Downloaded from Brill.com10/09/2020 11:57:52AM
via free access
Classes, Revolution & Labour in Nineteenth-Century Argentina 67
who could not compete with the British, moved their capital to cattle raising, 
which required low initial investment. Hides and salted meat became the main 
commodities. The Banda Oriental, Entre Ríos and Santa Fe were the main pro-
ducers of hides before 1810, but their livestock staple was seriously diminished 
during the war. By contrast, Buenos Aires had suffered little combat in its ter-
ritory in the previous years and was ready to take advantage.53 Thanks to rapid 
economic growth, Buenos Aires consolidated its privileged situation among 
the rest of the provinces. Trade was far more extensive than in other regions, 
and this was the activity through which the provincial states were financed. 
The annual budget of Buenos Aires often surpassed that of all the other prov-
inces combined.54
To ensure economic expansion, the government of Buenos Aires started to 
put pressure on the frontier to gain land controlled by the indigenous sover-
eign groups, which had never been conquered by the Spaniards. As the War of 
Independence was over, it could use its military forces in the frontier region. 
At the same time, the state rented out huge expanses of public land at very 
low prices, allowing many members of the elite to acquire large landholdings 
for exploitation. The province tripled the area of arable land, and a powerful 
landowning class with large landholdings quickly formed, particularly in the 
southern areas taken from the indigenous population.55
If land was not a problem for these now powerful cattle ranchers, labour 
was. There was a chronic shortage, not only because of the scarcity of popula-
tion but also due to the persistence of a large number of small and medium- 
size producers. Many peasants produced for the market and did not need 
wages. In addition, the growing engagement with international markets led to 
the emergence of a group of relatively prosperous new agricultural tenants.56 
Because the scarce population of the Pampas combined with the high demand 
for labour led to high wages, constant migration from the interior provinces 
provided new workers. However, migration alone was not enough to cover 
the increased demands of the major estancias. On the one hand, militariza-
tion brought about by the previous war and the continuing conflicts in the 
 53 Tulio Halperin Donghi, “La Expansión Ganadera en la Campaña de Buenos Aires (1810 – 
1852)”, Desarrollo Económico 3, no. 1– 2 (1963): 57– 110.
 54 Jorge Gelman, “La gran divergencia. Las economías regionales en Argentina después de 
la independencia”, in La historia económica y los procesos de independencia en la América 
hispana, ed. Susana Bandieri (Buenos Aires: Prometeo Libros, 2010), 105– 129.
 55 Halperin Donghi, “La Expansión Ganadera”.
 56 Julio Djenderedjian, Historia del capitalismo agrario pampeano: la agricultura pampeana 
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following years meant that soldiers were required. On the other hand, as land 
was still accessible for these migrants, they could become peasants, as had 
been the case in colonial times. Thus, the persistence of small landholding act-
ed as a barrier to proletarianization.57
In the 1820s, cattle ranchers therefore aspired to put an end to the opportu-
nities to create small farms, at the same time trying to secure their own proper-
ty rights, which were challenged by the occupation of land and by customary 
rural practices. Most tenants had verbal contracts. Custom sanctioned that 
those staying on a piece of land acquired rights of possession over it, at the 
same time having the first option to purchase. The owners encouraged new 
written contracts, without regard to the previous occupants. Although the pro-
vincial state protected landowners, at a lower level of jurisdiction the two con-
tradictory concepts of entitlement to the land often collided, since members 
of the community would recognize continuous possession over time, if held 
with “honesty” and without generating conflicts, as equivalent to the access 
to property. At the same time, those who had been tenants for an extended 
period became neighbours of the community, which provided protection and 
allowed them to defend themselves.58
Major cattle ranchers and the state faced great difficulties when confronting 
pre- existing forms of land occupancy that had unintentionally been reinforced 
by the revolution. They were also unable to fully achieve their goals regarding 
wage labourers. The pressure on “vagrants” increased in every province: any 
man without papers showing he had a contract could be sent into the army. 
At the same time, the authorities tried to eliminate the extended forms of 
subsistence that were alternatives to wage labour. A list of instructions for the 
administrators of estancias written in 1819 emphasized two important points. 
First, families had to be prevented from settling on a property, thus making it 
impossible for them to become peasants. Second, the hunting of otters, rheas 
and rodents by wage workers for personal consumption had to be stopped.59 
However, the scarcity of workers and the easy access to land, combined with 
 57 Garavaglia, Pastores y labradores; Tulio Halperin Donghi, “Clase terrateniente y poder 
político en Buenos Aires (1820– 1930)”, Cuadernos de Historia Regional 15 (1995): 11– 46.
 58 Raúl Fradkin, “La experiencia de la justicia:  Estado, propietarios y arrendatarios en la 
frontera bonaerense (1800– 1830)”, in La ley es tela de araña, comp. Raúl Fradkin; Jorge 
Gelman, “Derechos de propiedad, crecimiento económico y desigualdad en la región 
pampeana, siglos XVIII y XIX”, Historia Agraria 37 (2005): 467– 488.
 59 Juan Manuel de Rosas, Instrucciones a los mayordomos de estancias (Buenos 
Aires: Claridad, 2010). Before entering politics, Rosas, who was to become a key figure in 
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the low repressive capacity of the state, allowed members of the popular class-
es to continue these customary practices for decades. Therefore, wage workers 
retained much of their autonomy and could leave once they had acquired a 
sum that seemed sufficient, or if they were discontent with their employer.60 
Strikes, described at the time as “mutinies” or “uprisings”, also occurred. Such 
actions were not created by the revolution, but the political experience of 
the previous years allowed the popular classes to deal better with the attacks 
from above.
The pressure of the authorities on behalf of the landowners’ interests was 
greater after the revolution than before in Buenos Aires, and similar to the late 
colonial situation in the Banda Oriental. However, the popular mobilization 
that had started in the 1810s strengthened the possibilities of defying the of-
fensives by the ruling classes and the state. Hence, by holding on to notions of 
justice carried over from colonial times, many tenants, farmers and small cattle 
ranchers could successfully resist the advance of property rights and maintain 
their holdings. In addition, they could fall back on forms of collective action 
related to the new political circumstances and the militarization brought by 
the revolution.
For example, in 1822, in the northern part of the province of Buenos Aires, 
a landowner wanted to evict what he called a group of “vagrants”. The judge 
who took the case held a different view: he considered the occupants “a mul-
titude of militiamen”, who were from Santa Fe and whose services during the 
War of Independence had been rewarded by the government by granting them 
access to those lands, without title and without paying a fee. The occupants in 
turn delayed the eviction and continued sowing. They designated one of their 
own to be their representative and proposed paying a lease, but did not accept 
they had to leave. Neighbours of the land recommended that the violent evic-
tion should not go ahead, because “we fear montonera”, referring to a group of 
armed riders that had played an important role in the War of Independence 
in the region. Four years later, the dispute had still not been resolved and the 
judge declared: “I have not proceeded by force because I do not have it and it 
could bring fatal consequences”, given that “there are more than fifty men with 
their respective families and all are armed, because they are soldiers of the 
active State Militia”. Thus, being part of the militia allowed the occupants to 
 60 Garavaglia, Pastores y labradores; Jorge Gelman, “Un gigante con pies de barro: Rosas y 
los pobladores de la campaña”, in Caudillismos rioplatenses:  Nuevas miradas a un viejo 
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maintain their position as peasants, a status they had won in the revolutionary 
years.61
The long war had brought changes in the whole area, affecting labour rela-
tions. Peasants, labourers and other plebeians entered the ranks of the army 
and the militia, which became major employers of the soldiers and wage work-
ers. Military experience gave them new knowledge, which nourished their ca-
pacity for protest and prepared them for political intervention. Desertions and 
mutinies were common practice among the troops, with wages, food, clothing 
and mistreatment by officers being the causes of discontent. What was in dis-
pute included the work performed by the soldiers, their remuneration and the 
conditions of service.62
However, the main transformation in labour relations in the region brought 
about by the revolution was the serious weakening of slavery. The large es-
tancias had to deal with the need to replace slaves, who had been used to 
perform fundamental tasks before the revolution. Some attempted to replace 
them with other forms of forced labour. The establishments of Juan Manuel 
de Rosas – who was also a key political figure from the 1820s to the 1850s – are 
an excellent example. In the 1830s, he tried to replace former slaves by captive 
Indians, who suffered similar conditions to those previously experienced by 
slaves. They did not receive a salary but were given food, and this “payment” 
was much lower than that received by wage workers. However, by the end of 
the decade, the captives had managed to renegotiate their situation and had 
obtained conditions similar to those of wage earners. In the 1840s, Rosas there-
fore turned to the use of indentured labourers from Galicia, in Spain. He would 
pay for their expensive Atlantic travel, and this money was then deducted from 
their salaries until the debt had been fully settled, when they became free la-
bourers. Cattle ranchers were able to pay these immigrants much lower salaries 
than the locals. Like slaves and captives, Galicians carried out the permanent 
tasks on the estancias, but within a short period they were able to renegotiate 
their working conditions. The attempt to replace slavery with other forms of 
coerced labour thus had little success. Major cattle ranchers became entirely 
dependent on free wage labour and the small producers managed to preserve 
their place in the productive system and even to expand it.63
 61 Raúl Fradkin, “¿‘Facinerosos’ contra ‘cajetillas’? La conflictividad rural en Buenos Aires 
durante la década de 1820 y las montoneras federales”, Illes i Imperis, no. 4 (2001): 5– 34.
 62 Gabriel Di Meglio, Raúl Fradkin and Florencia Thul, “¿Huelgas antes de los sindicatos? 
Notas para una historia larga de las luchas de los trabajadores en Argentina y Uruguay”, 
Archivos de historia del movimiento obrero y la izquierda, no. 14 (2019): 11– 31.
 63 Jorge Gelman, “El fracaso de los sistemas de trabajo coactivo rural en Buenos Aires bajo el 
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The revolutionary legacy for the popular classes in the region was not only 
that they could act collectively on certain occasions, but also that they had 
become important actors in the new republican politics. From the 1820s on-
wards, every province organized elections to choose the members of its leg-
islature, which appointed the governor. Male suffrage was extended after the 
revolution: in Buenos Aires every free man could vote once he had passed the 
age of 21, without any other requirement.64 This political system, and the prac-
tice of mobilization of the urban and rural population after the 1810s, made 
many leaders attentive to popular claims in order to gain support. They had 
to take into account the interests of rural peasants, urban artisans and the 
Afro- descendant community, organized in the 1820s in the so- called “Afri-
can Societies”. With some nuances, the situation was similar throughout the 
whole region.
4 Conclusions
Most historiography on the Latin American revolutions of the early nineteenth 
century has understood them primarily as political events that led to the cre-
ation of new independent countries. Recent studies have shifted the focus to 
the social aspects of those revolutions, as this chapter has done for the case of 
the Pampas, in present- day Argentina. Meanwhile, students of labour relations 
have adopted a long- term perspective to explore the development of “agrarian 
capitalism”.
This chapter has created a conversation between the two lines of inquiry. 
One evident conclusion from this is that there is still much research to be done. 
For example, we know very little about what the world of artisans’ workshops 
was like after the 1810s. Yet from what we know so far, labour relations seem 
not to have been seriously transformed by the revolution in the short term, 
with one major exception: slavery. Much weakened during the revolutionary 
years, slavery never recovered, and the attempts to replace it with other forms 
of coercive labour failed.
While slavery was openly contested during the revolutionary years, other la-
bour relations were not. Instead, the popular classes seem to have had a differ-
ent agenda. In the Banda Oriental, peasants and labourers aimed to maintain 
their customary use of resources and access to land. Elsewhere in the region, 
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members of the popular classes challenged social and racial hierarchies – tac-
itly contesting the colonial caste system and advocating for every man to have 
political rights. It was not the popular classes but the elites who tried to change 
labour relations. They wanted to strengthen their control over the rural and the 
urban poor, and to be able to have access to fluid and cheaper labour. Starting 
in the 1820s, cattle ranchers and the provincial state aspired to reinforce prop-
erty rights in Buenos Aires. However, to a great extent they failed, due to the 
resistance of many peasants.
That was the legacy of the political and military mobilization of the revolu-
tionary years: it strengthened workers and allowed them to withstand the at-
tacks that the new order directed at them. After the revolutionary years, lead-
ers had to take some of their demands and opinions into account. The popular 
classes thus managed to maintain some customary practices for decades and 
to negotiate their labour conditions, taking advantage of structural factors, 
such as the scarcity of the labour force and the existence of an open frontier.65 
Some of the key features of the development of the Argentine “agrarian capi-
talism” – such as high wages and limited proletarianization – were shaped by 
the politicization of the popular classes in the 1810s.
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The “Third Force” in Power from August to November 1918
Dimitrii Churakov
In the Russian Federation, an active search for historical precedents for the 
new structure of power has been ongoing ever since the abolition of the Soviet 
state.1 However, the current period is not the first decade in which Russian 
historians have studied the alternative regimes to Bolshevik political power; a 
power that existed in the country during the Russian revolution and the Civ-
il War of 1917– 1922. Among the state entities of this period, historians have 
shown a particular interest in regimes that were ruled by leftist parties, but 
that were opposed to the Bolsheviks. One of the attempts of right- wing social-
ists to propose their own version of the revolution took place in 1918 in the very 
heart of Russia – Ural – and grew into the largest anti- Bolshevik workers’ upris-
ing in Soviet history. At the heart of this uprising was Izhevsk – one of the most 
important industrial centres in the country. The study of the anti- Bolshevik 
workers’ uprising in Izhevsk sheds light on both the nature of political forces 
that came into power in this particular town and general patterns in the devel-
opment of the Russian Civil War.
Interest in the events that shook Izhevsk and the nearby town of Votkinsk 
has not faded in Russian historiography. On the contrary, interest has only 
grown over the years. This is no coincidence, as it was the working class – the 
proletariat  – that Soviet ideology proclaimed to be the social foundation of 
the Bolshevik Party and its state. In the early period of the development of 
historical science in the ussr, the Izhevsk uprising was studied in the context 
of the workers’ mass protests in Ural. In this region, the establishment of So-
viet power was a very arduous process. The front between the White and Red 
armies shifted several times from west to east. Remaining at the epicentre of 
 1 Parts of this chapter have been translated from an essay that was published in German as 
“Der antibolschewistische Arbeiteraufstand in Iževsk. Probleme der Etablierung ziviler 
Machtorgane August bis November 1918”, Arbeit - Bewegung – Geschichte. Zeitschrift für his-
torische Studien 7, no. 2 (2018): 139– 160. We are grateful to the editors of abg for their permis-
sion for this translation. The editors thank Gijs Kessler and Kevin Murphy for their help with 
matters of transliteration.
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the civil war, the Ural region saw many attempts by the local population to 
independently choose its own future.2 In the years of the formation of Soviet 
historiography, the events in Izhevsk from August to November 1918 had al-
ready attracted the most attention among the various instances of working 
class protest.3
In the studies by Soviet historians from the 1920s, some questions were 
quite boldly raised and discussed that were not entirely convenient for the rul-
ing party. This was possible because at that time, a single ideology and unified 
view of the 1917 revolution did not yet exist in the ussr. Among these funda-
mental questions was that of the reasons for the uprising. It was common to 
emphasize the influence of the Socialist Revolutionaries and Mensheviks on 
the development of events in Prikamye (the Kama region in Ural) that led to 
a split among workers.4 At the same time, in the 1920s it was still possible to 
find references to the mistakes made by the Soviet authorities themselves that 
potentially caused the Izhevsk uprising.
Among the problems discussed by Soviet historians were the inability of 
the local Bolshevik organization to appeal to the majority of Izhevsk workers, 
and its inability to work with mass proletarian organizations (such as trade 
unions), which ultimately resulted in their shift towards an anti- Soviet posi-
tion. Furthermore, there were the harsh “ultra- left” measures by the Bolsheviks 
and their closest allies, in particular the Socialists- Revolutionaries Maximalists 
(sr s Maximalists). One example of the harsh actions by the Bolsheviks was 
their attempt at solving the food problem through the creation of prodotryads 
(food- requisitioning groups). There were numerous examples of the local au-
thorities’ incompetence, which was at the time highly likely to fuel the growing 
discontent of workers. For instance, Soviet historian A. I. Anishev linked the 
uprisings in the Ural and Volga region not to the activity of kombeds (com-
mittees of poor peasants) or the anti- Bolshevik propaganda of the right- wing 
socialists, but largely to the mass conscription for the Red Army that began in 
1918.5 However, other historians of the epoch did not agree with Anishev’s con-
clusions. Among these was A. P. Kuchkin, a participant in the Izhevsk events 
 2 N. Solonitsyin, ed., Oktyabr i grazhdanskaya voyna v Vyatskoy gubernii (Vyatka: Istpart Vi͡atsk-
ogo gubkoma vkp(b), 1927).
 3 N. Sapozhnikov, “Izhevsko- Votkinskoe vosstanie”, Proletarskaya revolyutsiya, no.  8– 9 
(1924): 5– 42.
 4 For example, Izhevsk v ogne grazhdanskoy voynyi, 1917– 1918: Iz istorii revoliutsionnogo dvizheni-
ia izhevskikh rabochikh (Izhevsk: Izd. Obl. komissii po provedenii︠u︡ desi︠a︡toĭ godovshchiny Ok-
ti︠a︡brʺskoĭ revoliu︡︠t︠s︡ii, 1927).
 5 A. I. Anishev, Ocherki istorii grazhdanskoy voynyi. 1917– 1920 (Leningrad: Voenno- polit. akad. 
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and a prominent figure in the Soviet Union at the time, who wrote even more 
boldly about the reasons behind the uprising. He noted that in some Ural 
plants, certain Soviet leaders behaved in a way that completely discredited the 
Soviet government. They shot people left, right and centre, took bribes and in-
terpreted the party programme “like criminals”. Such circumstances, Kuchkin 
believed, made workers look forward to the arrival of the White Army.6
The next stage in the development of Soviet historical science began at the 
start of the 1930s and ended during the second half of the 1950s. The political 
situation in these years negatively affected studies concerning the history of 
the workers’ movements. As the conventional state- sanctioned version of the 
October Revolution crystallized, work on and objective study of the history 
of the working class diminished. The general tendencies in the development 
of historical science also affected the study of the history of workers’ protest 
movements in the first months of the Soviet state’s existence. Apart from a 
reduction in the number of publications about the history of trade unions, 
the number of works discussing the political struggle within them was also 
substantially reduced, as was serious discussion of the desire of certain trade 
unions to take the lead in anti- Bolshevik workers’ protests. The works pub-
lished about this issue were more propagandistic than academic. In those 
times, the official point of view was finally consolidated, and it suggested 
that any manifestation of opposition sentiments in the workers’ movement 
was the result of petit bourgeois influence or the “subversive” and “coun-
terrevolutionary” activity of the Mensheviks and Socialist Revolutionaries 
among workers.7 The same approach also dominated the historiography of 
the Izhevsk uprising.8 Its final evaluation was contained in the History of the 
All- Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks): Short Course, in which the uprising 
in Izhevsk was declared as having been a revolt by “Socialist Revolutionary 
oriented workers”.9
This development in the Soviet historiography of the workers’ movement 
continued until the mid- 1950s. At this time, mentions of the Izhevsk uprising 
were very rare and more often than not, superficial. In Soviet historiography 
the point of view was firmly consolidated that the Izhevsk uprising was a result 
of the propaganda of the petit bourgeois parties of the sr s and Mensheviks, as 
 6 A. P. Kuchkin, “K istorii Izhevskogo vosstaniya”, Proletarskaya revolyutsiya, no. 6 (1929): 153– 162.
 7 For example, A. Kazakov, I s’ezd i IV konferentsiya professionalnyih soyuzov (Moscow: Profis-
dat, 1933).
 8 V. A. Maksimov, Kulatskaya kontrrevolyutsiya i Izhevskoe vosstanie (Izhevsk: Udpartizdat, 1932).
 9 Istoriya Vsesoyuznoy Kommunisticheskoy Partii (bolshevikov). Kratkiy kurs. Pod redaktsiey 
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well as the supposed petit bourgeois nature of the majority of the local work-
ers themselves.10 In a monograph published in 1967 in Izhevsk on the history 
of the revolution and civil war in the city, the workers’ uprising was defined 
as an armed counter- revolutionary insurrection.11 In this publication, it was 
also noted that Constituent Assembly proponents in Prikamye were closely 
connected with the bourgeoisie and “leaned on the bayonets of the Czecho-
slovaks”.12 Neither of these “facts” corresponded to the true events of the rev-
olution: the Izhevsk plant was state owned, thus there was no high industrial 
bourgeoisie, and the Czechoslovak troops were very far away from Izhevsk and 
never entered the city.
At the same time, the discussion was resumed about the social specifics of 
Izhevsk workers in comparison with workers in other regions of Russia. A grad-
ual formation of the working class was taking place in the Kama region, and 
its social profile combined modern industrial features and a strong sense of 
connectedness with the land in conjunction with forms of peasant farming. 
These factors were considered by Soviet historians as the reasons why work-
ers in Izhevsk rose up to rebel against the Bolsheviks.13 However, Soviet histo-
riography exaggerated the uniqueness of this phenomenon. The Izhevsk and 
Votkinsk workers’ connection to the land was not something unique that dis-
tinguished them from the workers in other regions of the country; it was a uni-
versal phenomenon. There were continuous discussions among Soviet histori-
ans of the New Economic Policy about the social profile of the Ural workers, 
almost half of whom remained peasants; a trend that only ceased with the es-
tablishment of the Stalinist regime.14 A significant connectedness with peasant 
roots was a general characteristic of the Russian proletariat, even the workers 
in the Central Industrial Region that included Moscow and several neighbour-
ing provinces of Central Russia. The characteristic features of the development 
of the Central Industrial Region were considered by one of the doyens of the 
Soviet historical school, A. M. Pankratova.15 Some other historians, such as V. Y. 
 10 For example, E. A. Ryabuhin, V bor’be s kontrrevolyutsiey (Pomosch trudyaschihsya Vyatskoy 
gubernii Vostochnomu frontu v 1918– 1919 gg.) (Kirov: Kirovskoe knizhnoe izdatel’stvo, 1959).
 11 S. P. Zubarev, Prikamye v ogne (Izhevsk: Udmurtiia, 1967), 62, 64.
 12 This refers to the Czechoslovak troops who were in Russian territory at the time of the 
October Revolution and who mutinied against Soviet power in the spring and summer 
of 1918.
 13 S. P. Zubarev, Za respubliku Sovetov (Izhevsk: Udmurti︠ia,︡ 1970), 125– 126.
 14 Istorik i vremya. 20– 50- e gody XX veka: A.M. Pankratova (Moscow, 2000), 40– 54.
 15 A. M.  Pankratova, “Tekstilschiki v revolyutsii 1905– 1907 gg”, in Rabochiy klass Rossii: 
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Laverychev, also noted these specific features with regard to the development 
of capitalist relations and classes in Russia.16
One of the key indicators showing the workers’ continued relationship with 
the villages is the plots of land that many of them owned. This phenomenon 
is shown, for example, by published data from the professional census of 1918. 
After analysing its results, historian A. G. Rashin proved that just prior to the 
revolution, on average 31.3 per cent of the workers in 31 provinces of Russia 
owned their own or their family’s land. Another 20.9 per cent not only owned 
land, but also supported their household from it by themselves or with the 
help of their family.17 If for some reason workers lost their economic connect-
edness with the land, they often kept the personal connection, which included 
transferring part of their earnings to their relatives in the village. In particular, 
as the researcher O. Solovyov emphasizes, 94 per cent of the workers in Tsinde-
levskaya’s manufacturing sector were peasants by origin, even by 1917.18
As we can see, the social profile of Izhevsk workers was little different from 
that of their counterparts in the rest of Russia; a strong connectedness with the 
peasantry and small- scale land ownership. For the official Soviet ideology, the 
peasantry was a very conservative and even counter- revolutionary class. How-
ever, that begs the question of why there were no similar protests by workers 
against the Bolsheviks in the overwhelming majority of other Russian cities, 
where the connections between the workers and the peasantry were much 
stronger than in Izhevsk. Soviet historiography has been unable to answer this 
question.
1 Emigrant Historiography and Historiography in Russia since 
Perestroika
The historical scholarship produced by Russian emigrants was also far from 
objective in its study of the Izhevsk uprising. In the works of emigrant histori-
ans, the uprising became a symbol of the people’s resistance to Bolshevism.19 
 16 V. Ya. Laveryichev, Monopolisticheskiy kapital v tekstilnoy promyishlennosti Rossii (1900– 
1917 gg.) (Moscow: Izd- vo Mosk. un- ta, 1963).
 17 A. G.  Rashin, Formirovanie promyishlennogo proletariata v Rossii (Moscow:  Izd- vo 
sot︠si︡alʹno- e﻿̇kon. lit- ry, 1940), 414– 415.
 18 O. A.  Solovyov, “K voprosu o reaktsii Moskovskogo proletariata na fevralskie sobyitiya 
v Moskve”, 1917 god v istoricheskih sudbah Rossii. Problemyi istorii Fevralskoy revolyutsii 
(Moscow: Izd- vo Prometey, 1922): 114.
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The contemporary historiographer from the Ural region, A. S. Vereschagin, em-
phasized in this regard that despite its many dissimilar approaches and assess-
ments, the emigrant historiography was as much characterized by a politicized 
interpretation of the issue as its Soviet counterparts were.20
Nevertheless, emigrant authors with different political views contributed 
to the interpretation of the Izhevsk uprising. In addition to socialists, conser-
vative authors – who were also often eyewitnesses and direct participants in 
the events – gave their assessments of what took place in the Kama region in 
1918. Because of their direct role, one of the most important issues facing the 
emigrant historiography was the search for those responsible for the defeat of 
the uprising; a search often ending in mutual reproaches and accusations. The 
nature of the movement was interpreted in different ways. For Menshevik his-
torians and memoirists, the Izhevsk uprising was seen as a continuation of the 
struggle for the Constituent Assembly and democracy.21 However, their oppo-
nents on the political right sought to emphasize the broad, all- encompassing 
character of the uprising, denying the leading role of socialists in its prepa-
ration.22 At the same time, the disagreements of various emigrant historians 
disappeared when it came to the anti- Bolshevik orientation of the Izhevsk 
workers’ protest.
During and after the years of Gorbachev’s perestroika, several new publi-
cations about the Izhevsk uprising appeared. Among the most recent works 
specifically focusing on the question of workers’ protests at the birth of the 
Soviet regime, the monograph by the Izhevsk historians P. N. Dmitriev and K. I. 
Kulikova deserves a mention, as it provides a wide overview of the Izhevsk- 
Votkinsk uprising.23 However, this work still contains many of the same myths 
inherent in earlier Soviet historiography, despite being based on sources in 
several local archives, primarily from Izhevsk. Nevertheless, the range of prob-
lems highlighted is much broader than any others from earlier historiography, 
whether Soviet or emigrant. In particular, these two Izhevsk historians raised 
more boldly than before the issue of harsh “ultra- left” measures inherent in the 
policies of the Soviet government, as well as the problem of the heterogeneity 
 20 A. S. Vereschagin, “Paradoksyi istoriografii Izhevsko- Votkinskogo vosstaniya”, in Akademik 
P.V. Volobuev. Neopublikovannyie rabotyi. Vospominaniya. Stati, ed. P. V. Volobuev, (Moscow: 
Ross. akad. nauk, 2000), 389.
 21 I. G.  Upovalov, “Rabochee vosstanie protiv sovetskoy vlasti”, in Ural i Prikame (Noyabr 
1917 – yanvar 1919). Dokumentyi i materialyi, ed. M. S. Bernshtam (Paris: ymca Press, 1982), 
396– 421.
 22 S. P. Melgunov, Tragediya admirala Kolchaka (Belgrade: Russkaia tipografia, 1930), 108.
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of political forces that supported Soviet power in Izhevsk. This issue was cov-
ered in greater detail in a book by an Izhevsk historian, S. L. Bekhterev. He was 
especially interested in the role of a small but very radical party, the Socialist- 
Revolutionaries Maximalists, in the history of the Kama region during the Rus-
sian revolution. Bekhterev’s work was produced at a time when the opportu-
nity to write more objectively about the so- called “petit bourgeois parties” had 
grown, a notion that the previous generations of Soviet historians had used 
to identify not only Mensheviks and right- wing Socialist- Revolutionaries, but 
also left- wing Socialist- Revolutionaries and sr s Maximalists.24
The beginning of the twenty- first century was marked by the publication 
of several other works on the history of Izhevsk, including the events that 
took place in the region during the civil war. Despite the fact that more than 
a century has passed since the studied events, the works of contemporary au-
thors are still not free from political sympathies for certain participants in the 
revolution in Prikamye. At the same time, it should be said that this does not 
prevent further study of the events of the uprising in 1918, and of their causes 
and consequences. In fact, it may even prompt these inquiries further. Another 
important step towards restoring an accurate image of the political process in 
Izhevsk and the whole Kama region in 1918 was the recent publication of the 
book by A.  V. Korobeynikov, Participants of the Izhevsk uprising from August 
to November 1918.25 Korobeynikov is also the author of some earlier works on 
the topic.26 Another Izhevsk historian already mentioned above, P.  N. Dmi-
triev, is actively continuing his research. His post- Soviet works are perhaps the 
most informative and objective of all the studies that have been published in 
Izhevsk this century. Issues that previously remained outside the field of vi-
sion of Russian historians have been covered by him, based on new archival 
material.27
 24 S. L. Behterev, Esero- maksimalistskoe dvizhenie v Udmurtii (Izhevsk: Udmurtskii institut 
istorii, iazyka i literatury UrO ran, 1997).
 25 A. V. Korobeynikov, Uchastniki Izhevskogo vosstaniya avgusta – noyabrya 1918 g.:  ih sud-
byi i spiski po arhivnyim fondam Sovetskoy militsii (Institut kompyuternyih issledovaniy, 
Izhevsk, 2016).
 26 A. V.  Korobeynikov, Volzhskaya flotiliya protiv narodnoy armii (osen’ 1918 g.) (Idnakar, 
Izhevsk, 2012). A.  V. Korobeynikov, Votkinskaya narodnaya armiya v 1918 g. (Idnakar, 
Izhevsk, 2013).
 27 P. N.  Dmitriev, “Partiyno- politicheskaya sistema Udmurtii v usloviyah stanovleniya 
sovetskoy gosudarstvennosti (oktyabr 1917  – vesna 1918 gg.),” Rossiyskaya gosudarstven-
nost: urovni vlasti. Istoricheskaya dinamika. Materialyi Vserossiyskoy nauchno- prakticheskoy 
konferentsii (Izhevsk:  Izdatelskii dom “Udmurdskii universitet”, 2001). P.  N. Dmitriev, 
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Studies by other authors have been published in recent years. They have 
raised issues such as the role of the Izhevsk uprising among the various work-
ers’ protests of 1918,28 the particularities of the Soviet account of the Izhevsk 
uprising’s social nature,29 the role of the so- called “third force”30 in the events 
of the revolution in the east of Russia,31 the role of Izhevsk rebels in the Kolcha-
kov army after their retreat to the East in the fall of 1918,32 and the production 
of weapons in rebel- occupied plants in the city of Izhevsk.33 In addition, col-
lections of documents also started to be published in Russia, including archival 
documents dedicated to the Izhevsk uprising and the preceding period.34 The 
most important recent documentary publication is a voluminous work written 
by Izhevsk historians and archivists to mark the 100th anniversary of the Rus-
sian Revolution. This group of authors set themselves the task of presenting, 
as far as possible, a complete and objective picture of the events of 1917, with 
much wider coverage of the socio- political, economic and cultural life of the 
Udmurt Krai during this period. About 80 per cent of the documentary mate-
rial in the collection has never been published before.35
This array of recent publications allows for serious advances to be made 
with regard to many issues concerning the history of the Izhevsk uprising. It 
also allows us to more carefully address the questions already posed in earlier 
proizvodstvennyie, politicheskie aspektyi”, in Rabochie Rossii. Istoricheskiy opyit i sovre-
mennoe polozhenie, ed. D. O. Churakov (Moscow: E﻿̇ditorial urss, 2004), 149– 164.
 28 N. A.  Zayats, “O fenomenalnosti Izhevsko- Votkinskogo vosstaniya”, Idnakar:  metodyi 
istoriko- kulturnoy rekonstruktsii, no. 1 (2013): 34– 48.
 29 A. V. Ivanov, “Sotsialno- politicheskie aspektyi Izhevsko- Votkinskogo vosstaniya 1918 goda 
v trudah sovetskih istorikov 1920– 30- h godov”, Vestnik Udmurtskogo universiteta, no.  3 
(2012): 47– 54.
 30 Neither Bolsheviks nor Whites, but usually right- wing socialists.
 31 I. P. Klimov, “Deyatelnost pravitelstv ‘demokraticheskoy kontrrevolyutsii’ Sibiri i Urala na 
zheleznodorozhnom i vodnom transporte vesnoy- osenyu 1918 goda”, Noveyshaya istoriya 
Rossii, no.  2 (19), (2017):  53– 67. I.  V. Shvets, Grazhdanskaya voyna v Sibiri i na dalnem 
Vostoke Rossii:  borba respublikanskoy i monarhicheskoy tendentsiy (1917– 1922 gg.), 
(Dissertatija, Chabarovsk, 2007).
 32 A. V. Posadskiy, “Izhevskaya brigada v boyu 9 maya 1919 g. glazami belyih i krasnyih”, Sibirskiy 
istoricheskiy almanah. Tom 2.  Sibir na perelome epoh. Nachalo HH veka (Krasnoyarsk: 
Verso, 2012), 134– 137. E.  G. Renyov, “Vospominaniya D.I. Fedichkina kak istochnik po 
izucheniyu Izhevskogo antibolshevistskogo vosstaniya (8 avgusta - 8 noyabrya 1918 g.)”, 
Vestnik Udmurtskogo universiteta, no. 3– 5 (2011): 158– 161.
 33 “Bezoruzhnoe vooruzhyonnoe vosstanie:  proizvodstvo vintovok na izhevskih zavodah 
vo vremya antibolshevistskogo vyistupleniya”, Vestnik Rossiyskogo universiteta druzhbyi 
narodov. Seriya: Istoriya Rossii, no. 1 (2013): 32– 48.
 34 Izhevsko- Votkinskoe vosstanie, ed. V. Zh. Tsvetkov (Moscow: Posev, 2000).

















Downloaded from Brill.com10/09/2020 11:57:52AM
via free access
86 Churakov
historiography, and to identify new problems that were invisible to historians 
in the past. In particular, it is possible to examine in a more detailed and ob-
jective way the development of the political situation in Izhevsk from May to 
November 1918, the evolution of the rebellion’s authorities, the main aspects of 
their internal policies, and the causes of instability and the defeat of the anti- 
Bolshevik forces.
As a result of the ongoing political struggle, disputes and compromises in 
the spring and summer of 1918, two political blocs finally formed in Izhevsk. 
The Mensheviks and right- wing sr constituted the right- wing coalition, 
which opposed the power of the Soviets. In the Soviets, they saw not the 
embodiment of state power, but only the social- class agents of proletarian 
self- organization and elements of civil society. The slogan of the right- wing 
socialists was the re- establishment of the Constituent Assembly and self- gov-
ernance through zemstvos (local councils for rural self- government), which 
had existed before the revolution. The left- wing coalition mainly consisted 
of the Bolsheviks and the sr s Maximalists, with both standing firmly on a 
platform of Soviet power.36 However, the differences in their understanding 
of the further goals of the revolution and the ways to achieve them made the 
left- wing bloc fragile. There were conflicts between the Bolsheviks and the 
sr s Maximalists at times, sometimes even in the form of armed confronta-
tion between the two parties. Furthermore, an alliance with the even more 
radical sr s Maximalists prompted Izhevsk Bolsheviks to enact many radical 
measures that were unpopular among the workers and inhabitants of the vil-
lages around Izhevsk.
2 “Power to the Soviets, Not the Party!”
By May 1918, the right- wing socialists had finally managed to seize the initia-
tive. The bloc of right- wing sr s and Mensheviks sharply intensified their crit-
icism of the Bolsheviks’ policy after the Eighth Party Council of the Party of 
Socialist Revolutionaries in Moscow in mid- May 1918. The decision was taken 
to launch an armed struggle against the Bolsheviks.37 Emissaries of the Central 
Committee of the Party of Socialist Revolutionaries rushed to different cities 
in the east of the country, and Izhevsk did not escape their attention. In the 
summer of 1918, two members of the sr s Central Committee, N. N. Ivanov and 
 36 S. L. Behterev, Esero- maksimalistskoe dvizhenie v Udmurtii, 52, 57.
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I.  I. Teterkin, arrived there.38 The positions of the opponents of Soviet pow-
er in Izhevsk were significantly strengthened as a result of the Urban Union 
of Front- Line Soldiers joining their ranks, which brought together soldiers, 
officers and other veterans of the First World War.39 Initially, the union was 
concerned with social support for its members, but gradually it also became 
involved in the political struggle on the side of the Socialist- Revolutionaries 
and Menshevik bloc. Although formally the leadership of the union includ-
ed ordinary soldiers and non- commissioned officers, in reality its activity was 
controlled by an active officer core, which was even more hostile to the Bol-
sheviks than the official right- wing socialist opposition.40 In the re- election 
of the Izhevsk Council, the Bolsheviks were defeated twice: at the end of May 
and at the end of June. While in May they had managed to resolve the situation 
peacefully, in June, with the help of reinforcements arriving from Kazan, they 
dispersed the council. Arrests began, and in total, about one hundred people 
were detained, including deputies of the new council and leaders of opposi-
tion parties and organizations.41 Power was initially put into the hands of a 
new executive committee, in which the Bolsheviks and the sr s Maximalists 
prevailed, and subsequently the Izhevsk Military Revolutionary Command 
Staff, headed by the Bolshevik, S. I. Kholmogorov.42
Izhevsk Bolsheviks repeatedly informed people in the capital about the sit-
uation in the city. In particular, S.  I. Kholmogorov, who in his report to the 
People’s Commissariat of Internal Affairs, stressed that if the Izhevsk plants 
were not paid the most serious attention, they would very soon turn into a 
major threat to the Soviet republic. After all, Izhevsk was a city with an arms 
industry, and the weapons produced there could have fallen into the hands of 
anti- Soviet forces.43 However, the warnings from the Izhevsk Bolsheviks were 
dismissed. Indeed, after the fall of Kazan following attacks by the Czechoslo-
vak Legion of the French Army, the high command carried out a full mobili-
zation in Izhevsk and sent the remaining forces of the Izhevsk communists to 
the front. Together with the Bolsheviks, the main forces of the sr s Maximalists 
 38 Tsentralnyiy gosudarstvennyiy arhiv Udmurtskoy Respubliki (TsGA UR), F. r- 1061. Op. 1. 
D. 17. L. 11.
 39 P. N. Dmitriev, Soldatskie soyuzyi v Udmurtii. Kanun grazhdanskoy voynyi ( formirovanie, 
sotsialnyiy sostav, otnoshenie s partiyami) (Izhevsk:  Muzey  – Istoriya i sovremennost, 
2000), 232– 248.
 40 Tsentr dokumentatsii noveyshey istorii Udmurtskoy respubliki (TsDNI UR), F. 350. Op. 49. 
D. 6. L. 1.
 41 TsDNI UR. F. 350. Op. 3. D. 14. L. 13– 14.
 42 Izhevskiy zaschitnik, 23 August 1918.
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were also dispatched to fight the mutiny by the Czechoslovaks. Only a few doz-
en Red Army soldiers and policemen remained in the city. This moment was 
used by the anti- Soviet opposition for a coup attempt.44
The Union of Front- Line Soldiers took up the role of the main force of the 
revolt. With about four thousand members, many with hidden weapons, the 
union was a real political force. However, the uprising could hardly have suc-
ceeded if the factory workers had joined the other side. Most of the workers 
showed passivity, while a number of them not only supported the uprising, but 
took an active part in it. Long before the Kronstadt uprising of 1921, the Izhevsk 
workers had raised their flag with a slogan that would become a symbol of 
democratic resistance to Bolshevism: “Power to the Soviets, not the party”.45 
On 8 August 1918, power in the city was seized by the rebels.46 Soon after, on 17 
August, forces from Izhevsk occupied Votkinsk, where they were also support-
ed by local workers and the Votkinsk Union of Front- line Soldiers, and on 30 
August the county (uezd) centre, Sarapul, also fell.47
3 Evolution of the Rebellion’s Statehood
The first issue the rebels faced after their victory was the need to organize pow-
er. One of the rebel military leaders, Colonel D. I. Fedichkin, described the first 
steps: “At the end of the shootings [the mass shooting of Bolsheviks on the day 
of the uprising], silence settled over Izhevsk. Civil authority, which had pre-
viously belonged to the Bolsheviks, now passed into the hands of the Izhevsk 
Soviet of Workers’ Deputies”.48 Fedichkin refers here to the re- establishment 
of the city council, which had been disbanded by the Bolsheviks and the sr s 
Maximalists just three weeks before.
In accordance with the outlined plan and the agreements that had been 
reached, the executive committee of the Izhevsk Council and its presidium 
were renewed. The members of the new presidium included the Menshevik 
B. N. Kutsenko and local merchants Tyulkin, Sannikov and Gorev. Along with 
them, the presidium was joined by a former member of the Constituent As-
sembly from the Vyatka province, right- wing Socialist- Revolutionary V. I. Bu-
zanov, as well as Soldatov, chairman of the Union of Front- line Soldiers of 
 44 TsDNI UR. F. 350. Op. 49. D. 6. L. 2.
 45 TsDNI UR. F. 350. Op. 49. D. 6. L. 2.
 46 TsGA UR. F. R- 1061. Op. 1. D. 13. L. 1.
 47 TsGA UR. F. R- 1061. Op. 1. D. 13. L. 5.
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Izhevsk.49 Buzanov was involved in the work of the council at the insistence of 
the executive committee, and also the Command Staff of the Union of Front- 
Line Soldiers.50 Later, a new election for the council was announced. Needless 
to say, the Bolsheviks, the Socialist- Revolutionaries Maximalists and the anar-
chists were not allowed to stand in the elections, which were held according to 
the well- known system of trehvostka (three- tail)51; the same way as elections to 
the Constituent Assembly.52
It should be noted that the restoration of the council’s power in Izhevsk took 
place after the pre- October institutions of power had been restored in oth-
er anti- Bolshevik territories. The power of the Izhevsk council was, of course, 
far from absolute: from the very beginning, the Command Staff of the Union 
of Front- Line Soldiers and of the People’s Army stood behind it. The Votkinsk 
council became even more dependent on the military authorities; its executive 
committee taking many decisions based on the instructions of the head of the 
Votkinsk Command Staff, G. N. Yuriev, as shown by documents.53 Nevertheless, 
the reliance of the revolt’s leadership on the workers’ demand “Power to the 
Soviet, not the party!” should be recognized as the key feature of the events 
of the summer of 1918 in Prikamye. Almost everywhere throughout the rest of 
Russia at that time, the overthrow of the Bolsheviks was accompanied by the 
overthrow of Soviet power, whereas by contrast, in Izhevsk the overthrow of 
the Bolsheviks led to a brief revival of the Soviet power.
Such a situation was of course temporary, because the existence of a cen-
tral anti- Bolshevik government in Samara implied the unification of state 
structures in the regions under its control. Therefore, the period for which the 
power of the democratically- elected workers’ council was restored in Izhevsk 
turned out to be extremely short. On the day when the city of Votkinsk joined 
the revolt on 17 August, civil authority was handed over by the Izhevsk Coun-
cil to the so- called Committee of the Members of the Constituent Assembly 
in Prikamye, or Prikomuch. A  lot is unclear about the handover of power to 
the Prikomuch, but the general outline of the events can be based on available 
circumstantial evidence. In the period when the new Soviet was formed, there 
 49 N. Solonitsyin, “About the history of the Civil War in the province”, in Oktyabr i grazh-
danskaya voyna v Vyatskoy gubernii. Sbornik statey i materialov, ed. N.  Solonitsyin 
(Vyatka: Istpart Vi͡atskogo gubkoma vkp(b), 1927), 40.
 50 Izhevskiy zaschitnik, 23 August 1918.
 51 TsGA UR. F. R- 1061. 0p. 1. D. 17. L. 20– 21.
 52 V. G.  Lekomtsev. K istorii Votkinskogo zavoda:  Mezhdousobnaya voyna (1918– 1919 godyi) 
(Votkinsk: Russkai͡a gazeta Udmurtiimurtii, 1998), 45.
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were negotiations between the revolt’s commanding staff and Buzanov  – a 
member of the constituent assembly of the Vyatka Krai – about the creation 
of a firmly anti- Bolshevik government. Colonel A. A. Vlasov and captain N. Y. 
Tsyganov offered Buzanov the opportunity to form a committee of the constit-
uent assembly, similar to the one in Samara, or to take supreme authority as 
the only member of the constituent assembly in the territory of the revolt. Bu-
zanov flatly refused to take personal responsibility for the uprising, but prom-
ised to raise the issue of creating a particular collegiate authority at a meeting 
of the city committee of the sr s. The meeting between Vlasov, Tsygankov and 
Buzanov was private and was not recorded anywhere. However, the meeting 
of the sr s’ city committee promised by Buzanov failed to take place. Buzanov 
did manage to speak personally with some members of the committee and 
gain their consent.54
The Prikomuch was practically the same as it was in Samara, and considered 
itself as the local power structure. It was announced that the city of Izhevsk 
was a territory under the “power of the Committee of the All- Russian Con-
stituent Assembly, temporarily located in the city of Samara”. It was declared 
that “all civil and military authorities in Izhevsk recognize the Committee as 
the sole and legitimate Supreme Power in Russia and consider themselves to 
be completely subordinate to it”. It was also decided that the seat of the com-
mittee should be in Izhevsk. In Votkinsk and Sarapul, also under the control of 
the rebels, special commissioners were appointed as commissars. An agitation 
and education bureau was formed under the committee, immediately calling 
on the population to rise up in defence of the “gains of the February revolution 
and the Constituent Assembly”. It was proclaimed that the local government 
in Izhevsk would act “to defend all civil liberties and true democracy of the 
people”.55
New authorities were also forming in other settlements occupied by the 
rebels. For example, in Votkinsk the handover of power to the Prikomuch was 
carried out with the support of public opinion. A special meeting of citizens 
was held in the city, where the question of the organization of power was dis-
cussed. At the meeting, people agreed about the violent nature of the estab-
lishment of the Soviets’ omnipotence in October 1917, emphasizing that all 
anti- Bolshevik uprisings in the country were under the banner of the Constit-
uent Assembly. Based on this, the assembly concluded that “the Committee 
of Members of the Constituent Assembly, temporarily staying in Samara, is in 
 54 TsGA UR. F. R- 1061. 0p. 1. D. 17. L. 22.
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this particular situation the most acceptable and obvious source of power for 
the masses”. Following the discussion, a resolution was adopted in which it was 
stated in the most unequivocal manner that “the power of the Soviets is over”. 
Further, the resolution stated that in Votkinsk itself, as well as in Izhevsk and 
the surrounding areas, full power would be temporarily handed over to the 
Prikomuch, the local representative of the all- Russian authority of the Samara 
Committee to Save the Constituent Assembly.
At that time, questions about the organization of power were also being 
discussed in the town of Sarapul in the same district. After the beginning of 
the uprising, Sarapul lost its former significance as the local administrative 
centre, and political decisions were by then being dictated from Izhevsk. Thus, 
on 2 September, the recreated City Duma gathered in Sarapul. Chairman P. P. 
Mikhailov, who had been appointed from Izhevsk, delivered a speech to the 
members of the duma. At his suggestion, a decision was made that the su-
preme power in the city should be temporarily handed over to the executive 
body of the city administration, the Uprava (City Council). All the funds re-
ceived for the maintenance of the People’s Army in Sarapul were to be at its 
disposal. However, at the first request from the Command Staff of the People’s 
Army, the city Uprava was obliged to transfer any required funds, with the army 
acknowledging the receipt of the transferred amount. Under the Uprava, a spe-
cial body was created to raise funds:  the Financial Commission. The elected 
members of this commission were two members of the city duma (K. G. Solov 
and G. E. Kulikov), the chairman of the Sarapul Uprava, S. F. Yermolin, and two 
representatives of the central factory workers’ committee of Sarapul.56
A republican government structure in the rebel region was finally formed 
by mid- September. The formation of the Prikomuch was also finalized, with 
Buzanov becoming its chairman. In addition to Buzanov, the committee in-
cluded A. D. Karyakin and N. I. Evseev, and from 9 September 1918, the signa-
ture of K. S. Shulakov also appeared on the documents. In some sources, the 
expression “the top four” was used for the new authority. On this same date, 
the rebel government implemented a comprehensive administrative reform 
in order to regularize the system of governance in the region, and all the mea-
sures planned in this regard were described in great detail in Decree No. 4, 
adopted that day.57
The decree began with a declaration that “the power of the Soviets and 
their Committees is abolished”. The Soviets themselves were spared, but their 
 56 Izhevskiy zaschitnik, 5 September 1918.
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actual functions were reduced to proletarian organizations of the workers and 
the working peasantry. The decree fully restored the pre- October order, and 
city and local governments were declared as regulatory bodies. They were or-
dered to act “on the strict basis of the Provisional Government’s resolutions 
concerning rural and city self- government”. In the villages, instead of the dis-
persed Soviets, it was entrusted to village gatherings, “until the general resolu-
tion of the issue of rural management on a nationwide scale”, to temporarily 
elect a committee or a person to take over the functions previously performed 
by the starosta, the village headman. All Soviet institutions and their mem-
bers were instructed to “immediately hand over their affairs and the funds and 
valuables they have […] to the restored local self- government body”. Workers 
in Soviets were also obliged to assist in the restoration of local government. 
The restoration of the zemstvos and self- governing city bodies was to be based 
on universal, direct and equal suffrage and a secret ballot. The decree by the 
provisional government concerning the township (volost’) and county (uezd) 
zemstvos was to form the basis of the elections, in which all men and women 
who had reached the age of twenty and were residing in the villages controlled 
by the rebels were eligible to participate.
However, the period during which the democratic authorities ruled the re-
gion did not last much longer than the activity of the altered Soviet. Significant 
changes took place within the upper ranks of the rebels shortly after the disso-
lution of the Komuch and the creation of the Ufa Directory on 23 September. 
It is repeatedly noted in memoirs and historical literature that in the autumn, 
the representative of the local Udmurd population of Evseev instead became 
the head of the rebel republic of Buzanov. The reasons for this change were not 
explained at the time, although they were relatively trivial. On 14 October 1918, 
Evseev began to govern on the basis of the mandate given to him by the Central 
Government of Russia: the Directory.58 Special commissioners of Evseev were 
sent to villages under the rule of Izhevsk, and by then all civil authority had 
been concentrated in their hands, although military power was still held by the 
command staff.59 Based on available sources, we can assume the authorities in 
 58 TsDNI UR. F. 350. 0p. 6. D. 50. Svyazka 2. L. 41. The Ufa Directory was a temporary all- 
Russian government, founded at a government meeting in Ufa by the anti- Bolshevik coa-
lition of representatives of the Komuch and the Omsk provisional government.
 59 The Izhevsk and Votkinsk People’s Armies initially existed independently of each other, 
and their command staff also acted separately. Rebel forces later merged in the United 
People’s Army of Prikamye, and the Izhevsk army’s command staff became the General 
Command Staff of Prikamye. A. A. Karevskiy, “K istorii antibolshevistskogo vosstaniya v 
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Izhevsk remained in this form until their forced withdrawal to the other side of 
the river Kama under pressure from the advancing Red Army.
Three stages can therefore be clearly distinguished in the evolution of the 
rebel republic: a period of Soviet administration, a period of civil administra-
tion and a period of one- person rule. The fact that civil authority at all stages of 
its development coexisted with military power should also be noted. Moreover, 
military power was initially dominant – or at least as powerful as civilian pow-
er – only temporarily disappearing into the shadows. Obviously, this peculiar 
evolution of the non- Bolshevik regime in the Kama region was determined 
by the general circumstances of the civil war, which eliminated the specifics 
behind the formation of the local authorities that emerged in the first weeks of 
the Izhevsk uprising. In those years, both in the Soviet and in the White Army 
territories, democratic and civilian institutions gave way to authoritarian and 
military ones. The ideological principles that had guided the right- wing social-
ist leaders of the uprising were soon forgotten in the face of harsh reality. At 
the same time, the rebel authorities were trying to implement these principles 
not only with regard to the structure of local administrative bodies but also 
the policies they pursued in the territories under their control. This is a subject 
that needs to be discussed separately.
4 Policies of the Rebel Authorities
In the past, the study of the policies of Izhevsk’s new rebel authorities was 
largely limited to examining the creation of the People’s Army in Prikamye, as 
well as terrorism against the Bolsheviks. This choice was determined not only 
by ideological clichés, but also by the nature of the question and the available 
sources, as these two aspects of the rebel regime’s policies are well- reflected in 
available documents. In addition, the People’s Army in Prikamye subsequently 
joined the Kolchak army and became one of its most capable units. As for the 
regime of terror carried out in Izhevsk, it was indeed particularly cruel, even 
by the standards of those harsh times.60 It is not only Soviet authors who wrote 
in Izhevsko- Votkinskoe vosstanie, ed. A.  A. Karevskiy, K.  A. Kulagin and D.  O. Churakov 
(Moscow: Posev, 2000), 5– 12.
 60 In this regard, it is worth mentioning not only its scale and organized character, but also 
for example, the most common methods of execution:  the convicts were not shot, but 
bayoneted to death. After the Red Army units entered Izhevsk, the graves of those killed 
by rebels were opened, and 50– 60 stab wounds and other signs of beatings and torture 
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about the numerous victims, but also the rebels themselves. For instance, A. Y. 
Gutman reported of “hundreds arrested in improvised detention houses”.61 
In addition, about 3,000 prisoners were kept on barges adapted as temporary 
prisons.62
It would, however, be wrong to reduce the activities of the rebel government 
of Izhevsk only to military and police measures. Normal provincial life in the 
city did not stop for a minute, and the new authorities had to maintain and 
regulate it. Various civilian institutions continued to operate, and medical as-
sistance was provided. The religious life of city dwellers and workers was reviv-
ing, and religious processions were held on special occasions. Schools began to 
operate in the autumn, and a special decree by the temporary Prikomuch was 
devoted to the new academic year. It exempted teachers and students from 
military service and ordered that the educational institutions temporarily em-
ployed for military needs should be vacated.63
The main concern of the rebels was to maintain production at the Izhevsk 
plant, because the military products made there were of strategic value. In ad-
dition, the participation of some workers in the uprising called for an active 
labour policy by the rebel authorities. In accordance with the order of 11 Au-
gust 1918, a new board took over the management of the plant. Apart from its 
managing director, Y. I. Kanevsky, and administrative and economic director, 
G. K. Vilma, there were also three representatives from the workers. The order 
noted that the workers’ representatives were only introduced temporarily until 
the elections.64
The re- election of these representatives played an important role in strength-
ening the rebel government. However, the details also show an increase in ab-
senteeism and indifference among the workers. Only 4,137 workers took part 
in the elections, and 325 people left the ballot paper blank. D. P. Krupin (1,512 
votes), V. I. Buzanov (1,394 votes) and P. A. Baryshnikov (1,291 votes) were elect-
ed as members of the collective management of the Izhevsk plants.65 Subse-
quently, when Buzanov became a member of the Prikomuch, V. E. Korepanov 
took his place on the board, having come fourth in the elections with 288 votes 
for his candidacy.66 Initially, apart from the plant’s administration, the Soviets 
 61 “Beloe delo. Letopis beloy borbyi. Berlin”, 3, (1927), in Ural i Prikame (Noyabr 1917 – yanvar 
1919): Dokumentyi i materialyi, ed. M. S. Bernshtam (Paris: Rosspen, 1982), 385.
 62 See also, TsGA UR. F. R- 609. Op. 1. D. 2. Ll. 1– 110, TsGA UR. F. R- 609. Op. 1. D. 3. Ll. 1– 139, and 
TsGA UR. F. R- 609. Op. 1. D. 4. Ll. 1– 126.
 63 Izhevskiy zaschitnik, 18 September 1918.
 64 TsGA UR. F. R- 543. Op. 13. D. 13. L. 1.
 65 TsGA UR. F. R- 543. Op. 13. D. 13. L. 9.
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dealt with the issues related to the organization of labour in the rebel region. 
Somewhat later, on 30 October, a labour department was established directly 
under the control of Extraordinary Commissioner Evseev in order to central-
ize labour policies, with M. N. Martynov appointed as the head of the labour 
department.67
Along with the new management of the plant, basic provisions for the man-
agement of production were developed to replace those that had existed un-
der the Bolsheviks. For instance, a plan was outlined with the main provisions 
for management of the artillery plant, containing items specifically addressing 
the rights of workers’ representatives in this regard. The proposal was to elect 
these representatives according to “the four pillar formula”: on a democratic 
basis. However, workers’ rights were limited in favour of the management. In 
the document, for example, it was specifically noted that “the workshops, the 
Economic Committee, forest areas, railways and other departments of the fac-
tories are to be handled by the management with full responsibility, and there-
fore all commissioners and collegiate bodies in the factories must move up the 
affairs to the heads of the relevant departments”.68
In order to improve the functioning of the plants, the authorities in the 
rebel region implemented several populist measures. For example, in the or-
der for the Izhevsk Arms and Steel Plants No. 28 of 5 September 1918, it was 
announced that on the days when the plant was not operating (from 8 to 10 
August) workers would still be paid. In addition, the fixed output system was 
abolished, meaning that everything workers produced in excess of the norm 
was to be paid additionally.69 Moral as well as economic incentives were in-
volved. In one of the special appeals of the Prikomuch to the workers, it was 
emphasized that Izhevsk plants were “the most powerful means” in the fight 
against “enslavers of the Russian people … for the final triumph of democracy 
of the people”. It was further claimed that “the workers who remained at the 
plant should remember that by increasing labour productivity in the produc-
tion of the necessary weapons they directly contribute to saving our Mother-
land”.70
To meet the needs of workers, the new authorities kept wages at the lev-
el they had been at under the Bolsheviks. The decrees of the Soviet govern-
ment concerning working conditions, working hours and social guarantees 
were also not touched, and all of them remained in force. For example, the 
 67 TsGA UR. F. R- 460. Op. 1. D. 2. L. 148.
 68 TsGA UR. F. R- 543. Op. 13. D. 13. L. 1– 1 ob.
 69 TsGA UR. F. R- 543. Op. 13. D. 13. L. 28.
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Izhevsk arms plant continued to operate three 8- hour shifts, as it had done 
before, although it would have benefitted the interests of the defence industry 
to have increased the working day. The rebel authorities limited themselves to 
introducing compulsory overtime work, although this innovation was initially 
introduced only in mid- October and was limited to workshops lagging “in the 
supply of necessary items for the production of rifles”.71 Many of the econom-
ic decisions made by the rebel leadership bore obvious traces of egalitarian 
tendencies characteristic of the Russian revolution of 1917. This was expressed 
primarily in the fact that the command ranks, the soldiers and the workers 
were to receive an equal monetary allowance. On this occasion, the Prikomuch 
adopted a special decree, ordering “to pay everyone the same salary, 420 rubles 
a month, to all those working in the factories, to all who fought against the 
Bolsheviks by arms, and all the city and factory workers without distinction of 
positions and seniority”.72
After the moderate socialists took power, the position of the trade unions 
changed. The Mensheviks – together with the right- wing Socialist Revolution-
aries who shared their stance in this matter – advocated the independence 
of the trade unions. This question was discussed in particular at the general 
meeting of the Delegate Council of the Votkinsk Union of Metalworkers. Hav-
ing delivered a report on this issue, the prominent Menshevik I. G. Upovalov 
condemned the practice of the Bolsheviks that had allowed the trade unions 
to manage the process of production. He stressed that “the Union was turned 
not into an organization of the economic or political struggle of the work-
ers but into some kind of government agency that fights against the work-
ing class and does not protect its interests”, and he called for an end to this 
practice. Members at the meeting supported the resolution proposed by the 
Mensheviks, which ended with the words: “We, the workers of the Votkinsk 
plant, delegates of the Metalists’ Union, consider it necessary that the trade 
union must make a break with all power, no matter where it comes from, i.e. 
must stay neutral and stand solely and exclusively to defend the interests of 
the working class in its struggle against the oppressors”.73 Pursuing the line 
of “independence”, the Union of Metalworkers sometimes spoke out against 
the rebel authorities of the region, even occasionally engaging in sharp con-
flicts with them.74 The positions of the workers’ organizations were especially 
strong in Sarapul. The orders of the military authorities there had to be signed 
 71 Izhevskiy zaschitnik, 15 October 1918.
 72 Fedichkin, Izhevskoe vostanie.
 73 Votkinskaya zhizn, 15 September 1918.
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by the delegates of the factory committees, without which no decisions had 
any legal force.75
At the same time, because the situation was becoming more difficult on all 
fronts, completely different approaches began to prevail in the labour policies 
of the rebel authorities. “This terrible hour of protecting our interests requires 
a great effort”, read one of the proclamations of the Union of Front- Line Sol-
diers, meaning that “at the present moment we cannot adhere to all the norms 
protecting labour in peacetime”.76 These calls were not only made on paper, as 
democratic labour rights actually came to be curtailed over time. For example, 
overtime work became mandatory. Order No. 63 of the Chairman of the Board 
of the Izhevsk Plant, dated 18 October, stated: “In view of the impossibility of 
returning workers from the front to the plant for military reasons and the ex-
treme necessity of rifles, a 2- hour overtime has to be introduced in all work-
shops where less than 1,000 articles are produced”.77 Overtime work was not 
paid, but was listed as arrears. Workers’ salaries were not paid either. At best, 
they were given only two- thirds of the amount they were due, and the rest was 
withheld. When this measure was introduced in the first half of September it 
was perceived by many as temporary, but the situation in the payment of wag-
es to workers did not improve in the second half of the month, or in October.78 
Measures in the field of labour generally became draconian in the last days of 
the existence of the rebel republic in Izhevsk, as evidenced by the factory order 
dated 28 October 1918 and signed by the Commander- in- Chief of the Prikamsky 
in the Yuriev district and the plant’s managing director, Y. Kanevsky. This order 
effectively introduced the mobilization of factory workers, concluding cate-
gorically:  “Failure to appear at work will be considered as non- fulfilment of 
the combat order”.79 The policy in relation to workers’ organizations was also 
toughened. For instance, the leader of the Votkinsk Union of Metalworkers, 
A. K. Malkov, was actually expelled from the city for his position, which had 
become undesirable to the military authorities.80
The policy concerning relations with the peasantry was an important as-
pect of the rebel government in Izhevsk. The fact that a significant part of the 
peasantry in the region sympathized with the uprising can be considered as 
 75 A. Gutman (Gann), “Dva vosstaniia”, Beloe delo. Letopis beloy borbyi, no. 3 (Berlin: Mednyi 
vsadnik, 1927).
 76 Sapozhnikov, Izhevsko- Votkinskoe vosstanie, 57.
 77 TsGA UR. F. R- 543. Op. 13. D. 13. L. 70.
 78 TsGA UR. F. R- 543. Op. 13. D. 13. L. 34, 35.
 79 TsGA UR. F. R- 543. Op. 13. D. 13. L. 79.
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a success for the rebels, which allowed them to significantly increase the po-
tential of their movement. The relationship between the rebel authorities and 
the inhabitants of the villages around Izhevsk was of course not always ideal. 
However, the sympathy of a large proportion of the peasantry helped in the 
formation of the rebels’ armed forces and the resolution of the food problem. 
The new authorities in Izhevsk began to address this latter issue immediately 
after the uprising. Among the first measures by the new Izhevsk authorities in 
this regard – that was met with complete support by the peasants – was the 
permission given for free trade, which had been prohibited under the Bolshe-
viks. The shops and markets that had been empty under the previous govern-
ment were revived. New shops opened, and the shoes, handicraft, dishes and 
metal products for household consumption that had disappeared – or rather, 
had been hidden until better times – temporarily reappeared. All these steps 
by the rebel authorities were to be expected: it was not by accident that among 
the slogans of the uprising, along with political ones there were others such 
as: “Tea, sugar, white bread and fairs twice a year”.81
In order to incentivize the peasants to help with the bread supply for the 
rebels, the Izhevsk Soviet repeatedly addressed them with special appeals that 
were widely distributed through the press.82 Special district commissioners 
were selected, who travelled to villages and asked the peasants to part with 
some grain and flour  – as much as they could give.83 Bread was bought for 
money, but often  – as even Soviet sources admit  – the peasants gave provi-
sions to rebel workers as voluntary donations; “for Christ’s sake”.84 At the same 
time, it must be remembered that by the autumn of 1918, money was no longer 
of great value to the peasants, therefore they often regarded the requests of 
the Izhevsk authorities as requisitions. For that reason, workers often paid for 
bread with their products; weapons and ammunition.85 However, it was also 
often the case that the peasants did not receive any weapons or money for 
their bread, but only promissory notes.86
Gradually, the food issue in the rebel region became difficult. Freedom of 
trade, introduced in the early days of the uprising as one of the primary mea-
sures to eliminate the Bolshevik heritage, in practice became limited again. 
Instead, a rationing system emerged. Speculation – the invariable companion 
 81 TsGA UR. F. R- 1061. Op. 1. D. 17. L. 20.
 82 For example, Izhevskiy zaschitnik, 10 September 1918.
 83 Ural i Prikamye, 500.
 84 Proletarskaya revolyutsiya, 8– 9 (1924).
 85 Fedichkin, Izhevskoe vostanie.
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of hunger – reappeared, followed by the authorities’ attempts to fight it. For 
example, in September the following order from Commissioner S. Egorov ap-
peared in one of the issues of the Votkinskaya life newspaper:
In view of the fact that lately there has been a large development of ex-
treme speculation in Votkinsk, I consider it necessary to warn those in-
volved that the regime change happened not to indulge predation and 
plunder of the population by speculators who use everything to fill their 
pockets. Therefore, the Prikamsky Committee of Members of the Constit-
uent Assembly represented by authorized bodies will mercilessly fight 
speculation and speculators as enemies of the people, sending them to 
court where they will be prosecuted to the fullest extent of the law.87
Residents in the rebel cities had to suffer labour mobilization as well. For in-
stance, in the descriptions of the battles around Izhevsk one can find refer-
ences to a powerful line of defensive fortifications built by rebels. Some docu-
ments issued by the rebel authorities give a clear description of how they were 
built. One of them reads:
On 7 September, all citizens aged 16 to 50 without exception must be 
present at 7 o’clock in the morning with axes, shovels and food for two 
days on Mikhaylovskaya Square. Those who do not have shovels and an 
axe will receive them from the district commissioners who will tempo-
rarily seize them from the inhabitants of the district. … Everyone join 
the trench works immediately! Everyone grab a shovel! A shovel will save 
Izhevsk: the deeper into the ground, the stronger the defences.
For those who did not see the urgency of the moment, it was explained that any 
“attempt to shirk from work would be punished with the utmost severity”.88
As throughout the rest of the country, the authorities had to deal with a tax-
ation system in Izhevsk that had been completely destroyed. In Soviet Russia, 
this problem was combatted with the help of trade unions and other bodies 
of workers’ self- government. In Izhevsk, the authorities tried to revive local 
public organizations. Under the circumstances of an acute shortage of funds, 
even for maintaining the fighting capacity of the rebel army, appeals to the 
factory workers’ conscience and patriotism became permanent. The tone of 
 87 Votkinskaya zhizn’, 29 September 1918.
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these appeals is interesting in itself, since it conveys the peculiarities of those 
days. For example, in one of the appeals by the Izhevsk authorities, the popula-
tion was called upon to “immediately donate or give away for a small fee warm 
clothes that are in excess or are unneeded, such as: fur coats, great- coats, jack-
ets, boots, felt boots, socks, foot cloths, mittens, underwear, soldier’s blouses”. 
It was also noted: “Do not hesitate if the donated items are not entirely new. 
The shortage is severe and the Army will be very grateful for everything”.89 The 
authorities in Votkinsk acted in a similar manner:  “We appeal to comrades, 
workers and other citizens: help the city in voluntary sewing of clothing for the 
People’s Army”, was stated in one of their communications. “Fathers of fami-
lies, ask your wives and adult daughters to sew at least one pair of clothing for 
free. Knowing the responsiveness of the working masses and citizens we have 
the hope they will treat our request sympathetically and will help in this diffi-
cult moment of the renewal of our state”.90
The rebel government of Izhevsk, which had tried to find its own “third way” 
in the early period of the civil war, lasted for only three months. Its main ac-
tivities, whether in the area of  administration, labour policy, the taxation sys-
tem or other matters, were focused on restoring the trajectory of the country’s 
development; an effort that was started in February and interrupted in Octo-
ber 1917. At the same time, the general conditions of the civil war and other 
objective and subjective issues undermined the initial democratic impulses 
of the movement, forcing the course of the Izhevsk authorities in the general 
direction of that time.
5 Crisis and Defeat
The growing difficulties undermined the strength of the rebels’ power, and 
tensions between factions in the rebel leadership escalated. The basis of this 
conflict was the disagreement between the right- wing socialists in the lead-
ership and the representatives of non- party officers. For instance, according 
to A. Y. Gutman, the Union of Front- Line Soldiers agreed “quite reluctantly” 
to the leadership of the “four members of the former Constituent Assembly”. 
It was only the position of other socialist groups supporting the right- wing 
sr s that forced the war veterans to reconcile themselves with this decision, 
and even then only temporarily, until the rebels joined the main forces of the 
 89 Izhevskiy zaschitnik, 15 October 1918.
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White Army. The words Gutman used to describe the formation and activity of 
Prikomuch very clearly show the true attitude of the “comrades in a common 
struggle” towards each other. He wrote sarcastically in his memoirs:
The example of the “Komuch” in Samara inspired the Izhevsk Right sr s, 
and they hastened to declare themselves the Supreme Power under the 
loud title “Committee of the Constituent Assembly of Prikamye”. … The 
lure of the Samara Komuch’s power was too strong so that several little 
men accidentally stumbling into public life could not resist the tempta-
tion to become the “supreme rulers” of a single uezd of a great state, even 
for a very short time. … Socialist contagion that did its evils in the capitals 
and major cities of Russia moved to the Kama. Random, weak and spine-
less people narrowly driven by party affiliation once again came to power. 
The sr s came, this time third- rate ones, and the fire of enthusiasm in the 
struggle for Russia faded.
According to Gutman, the results of “socialist management” were the 
same: “They chatted in Samara, they chatted in Izhevsk, until the Reds came 
and crushed everything and everyone”.91
A strong unitary power remained the ideal of the military officials. They 
were not satisfied with the “second edition of the Constituent Assembly”; they 
preferred the “second edition of Kornilovism”. Gutman shared his thoughts 
about this:
If an energetic and firm leader came to power in Izhevsk and managed 
to subjugate and lead the movement, everyone would have followed him. 
Everyone would have subordinated themselves to a reasonable will. But 
unfortunately in Izhevsk, at the time of the uprising, four party leaders 
valued the dogma much more than the state. Especially when it came 
to power.
In his opinion, the Izhevsk- Votkinsk uprising could have turned into a “na-
tionwide movement”, but this would have needed it to have been led by 
“people who were not tied tightly to one or another political program but 
possessed by the idea of  saving Russia from Bolshevism and restoring state 
order”.92
 91 Ural i Prikamye, 377, 378, 383, 390.
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The socialists paid back in kind. Taking advantage of their position in the 
government, they sought to impose in every way their conditions for political 
coexistence. The officers, even those who had been local factory workers be-
fore, were considered by the civil authorities to be “a necessary evil”. Only those 
officers who were members of the socialist parties were credible, one example 
being G. N. Yuriev, a Social Democrat member of the factory committee, who 
was for a long time the commander of the Votkinsk rebel group. Gradually the 
pacifist propaganda of the socialists gave way to “putting an end to the fratri-
cidal war”. Some socialists were ready to go even further, preferring the power 
of the Bolsheviks “over the epaulets and orders of the Tsarist army”, which had 
been “imposed” on the rebels from Siberia. A. I. Gutman describes his private 
conversation on the eve of the fall of Sarapul with a member of the Prikomuch, 
the right- wing Social Revolutionary Mikhailov. “We had better reconcile with 
Bolshevism than with reactionaries”, Mikhailov assured him. “And by ‘reaction-
aries’ the socialists primarily referred to ‘counter- revolutionary officers’, as in 
the times of Kerensky”.93
The result of the rivalry between the socialists and the officers was a form 
of dual power, with the relationship between the military and civil administra-
tion leading to a direct confrontation. Against this background, a row erupted, 
which became the latest in the chain of crises of rebel power and the forerun-
ner of its fall. Its beginnings can be traced back to 20 October 1918, when at a 
joint meeting of senior army officers and the Prikomuch, D. I. Fedichkin pro-
posed starting an emergency evacuation of the wounded, women and children 
as well as valuable equipment and weapons to the eastern shore of the Kama. 
He justified his decision by saying that within one week, Izhevsk would not 
have a single bullet and then they would have to “flee from Izhevsk naked on 
ice”.94
His plan was not met with understanding. Moreover, Evseev, who by that 
time had become the civilian leader of the rebel region, called Fedichkin’s pro-
posals cowardice. Fedichkin had no choice but to resign, referring to “a poor 
state of health”. The resignation was immediately accepted, and N. Evseev’s Or-
der No. 12 of 23 October stated ambiguously that Fedichkin had been dismissed 
from the post of Commander of the People’s Army of Prikamye “because of 
his poor condition threatening extremely dangerous consequences for the de-
fence”.95 However, the fear of a military coup was so great that at the end of 
the meeting the entire board of the civilian government immediately fled to 
 93 Sotsialisticheskiy vestnik, no. 16 (1922): 7.
 94 Izhevsko- Votkinskoe vosstanie, 77.
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an unknown location. Only after some time did it become known that the “top 
four” had moved to Votkinsk. As a result, the decision to evacuate people was 
not made, and major changes took place in the leadership of the People’s Army. 
The socialist Yuryev was appointed to replace Fedichkin and the command of 
the Izhevsk army units was assigned to captain N. I. Zhuravlev, a man almost 
unknown to the people of Izhevsk and even to the commanding officers. These 
changes in all likelihood followed the line of “strengthening” the command of 
the rebel army by officers close or personally loyal to Evseev.96
The turmoil in the leadership of the rebel republic, combined with the in-
creasing anarchy and anti- democratic tendencies in the life of the rebel re-
gion, caused growing discontent among the population of Izhevsk, especially 
among the workers. For instance, in mid- September, the Union of Metalwork-
ers came out to defend those arrested in the days of the August uprising. They 
formed a special delegation, with the purpose of demanding that the military 
authorities improved the conditions of prisoners and released the innocent.97 
Pro- Bolshevik sentiments began to increase among some segments of the fac-
tory workers, which was largely due to the vigorous activities of underground 
groups of Bolsheviks and non- party workers.98 Agitators, supplied with a large 
amount of communist literature and money to attract people to their cause, 
got into the rebel areas and destroyed the rebels’ rear flank from the inside. 
Their activities in Izhevsk and Votkinsk, and especially in Sarapul, were car-
ried out unpunished, as is clearly noted in the sources from the White Army. 
Pro- Bolshevik sentiments also spread in the People’s Army, strengthening the 
process of its disintegration. Entire units of the People’s Army began to go over 
to the side of the Reds, a development that had been impossible to imagine 
prior to that time.99
All the moments of crisis noted above, as well as the capital’s a priori supe-
rior strength over the temporarily seceded provinces, made the defeat of the 
Izhevsk- Votkinsk uprising inevitable; all the more so, as it became less and less 
working class in its nature. After taking Sarapul in early October, the units of 
the Red Army began to prepare for the assault on Izhevsk. The operation of 
encircling and taking the rebels’ main citadel was assigned to a special divi-
sion of the 2nd Army under the command of V. M. Azin. The order to start the 
operation was signed on 3 November 1918 by the commander of the Second 
 96 Ural i Prikamye, 394.
 97 Votkinskaya zhizn’, 15 September 1918.
 98 For more details, see N. P. Dmitriev and K. I. Kulikov, Myatezh v Izhevsko- Votkinskom ray-
one, 152– 154.
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Army, V. I. Shorin, and a member of the Revolutionary Military Council, P. K. 
Sternberg.100 The decisive battle took place on 7 November 1918. In the ear-
ly morning, an intensive artillery bombardment conducted by government 
troops began, with the rebels also responding with artillery fire. It was in this 
battle that, for the first time during the civil war, the Bolsheviks had to face 
psychological warfare, so vividly recreated in the film Chapaev. As always in 
moments of great danger, a factory whistle howled over the city and the bells 
of the Mikhailovsky Cathedral rang, as the most capable troops of the Izhevsk 
army in their full strength launched their attack under the red and green ban-
ner. According to a participant in the conflict, A. P. Kuchkin, this battle could 
be compared only with those of Chelyabinsk and Perekop in terms of its vio-
lence and brutality.101 It was not until the evening that the advancing units of 
the Reds were able to get through the fierce fire and the several lines of well- 
built fortifications. An armoured train Svobodnaya Rossiya (Free Russia) broke 
into Izhevsk station, and with its fire created disarray among the defenders, 
after which infantry and cavalry units entered the city.102
The fights near Izhevsk on 7 and 8 November 1918, together with the actions 
to normalize the situation in the city, temporarily interrupted the advance of 
the Second Red Army and allowed the remnants of the rebel army to take steps 
to organize the evacuation of Votkinsk. The decision to make an emergency 
evacuation was taken at a special meeting attended by the civilian authori-
ties of the region, the new commander of the Izhevsk- Votkinsk army, Captain 
Yuriev, Colonel Albokrinov and the commander of the Izhevsk army, Captain 
Zhuravlev. On 11 November, the Votkinsk plant was abandoned by the rebels 
and Lieutenant Bolonkin’s unit was ordered to cover the planned retreat of 
the rebels’ main forces. On the night of 12 November, the last units of the army 
crossed the Kama, and the sappers destroyed the pontoon bridge after cross-
ing it. From then on, the fate of Izhevsk rebels was linked to the history of the 
White movement in the east of the country.103
Thus ended the largest anti- Bolshevik uprising of workers in the history 
of the civil war. It became a serious challenge for the emerging revolutionary 
state. Izhevsk workers demonstrated the possibility of developing a version of 
the Russian state during the country’s crisis that was neither White nor Red. 
At the same time, the experience of the right- wing socialist government in 
 100 TsGA UR. F. R- 1061. Op. 1. D. 3. L. 67.
 101 N. P. Dmitriev and K. I. Kulikov, Myatezh v Izhevsko- Votkinskom rayone, 267– 268.
 102 Dokumentyi po istorii grazhdanskoy voynyi v SSSR. Vol. 1 (Moscow:  Politizdat, 1941), 
381– 382.
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Izhevsk showed that democratic power in those circumstances was possible 
only in the form of a “democratic dictatorship”, which in terms of its methods, 
differed very little from the Bolshevik and military dictatorships. Even if not 
dead, the political line of the right- wing socialists in Izhevsk had been heavily 
discredited. Democratic slogans without democratic content could not con-
vince people of their fairness and usefulness when those people were, above 
all, trying to survive in circumstances of complete collapse and ruin. The civil 
war relentlessly imposed its own laws, in accordance with which the barri-
cades can only have two sides, and those standing in the middle find them-
selves in the crossfire.
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Socialist Red Women in Finland in 1918
Tiina Lintunen and Kimmo Elo
In January 1918, the socialist Reds in Finland resorted to force in their strug-
gle for a social revolution, whereas the conservative Whites supported the 
government and wanted to expel the Russian troops still in the country. This 
chaotic situation became a civil war.1,2 Revolutionary ideas inspired thou-
sands of women to support the Red Guard. These “Red women” worked both 
for the troops and as armed troops themselves.3 With the war ending in a 
victory for the Whites, the rebels (women as well as men) were tried for 
treason.
During the hearings, each defendant had to state why she had joined the 
Red Guard or otherwise supported the cause. The most common justifications 
given in their testimonies were economic  – the good salary the Red Guard 
paid. Many also justified joining the Guard by saying, “Because others joined 
too”, or “I was told to”.4 Who were these “others”, who had such an influence on 
these women? What were the overarching factors that brought these women 
together, and how were these women acquainted with each other?
 1 This chapter was first published in the International Review of Social History 64, no.  2 
(2019):  279– 307. It is reproduced with permission of Cambridge University Press. The 
chapter contains various illustrations that are best viewed online and in full color. For the 
original article and supplementary online material, please visit https:// doi.org/ 10.1017/ 
S0020859019000336.
 2 Over the years, there has been a great deal of controversy about the name and nature of the 
events that took place in Finland in 1918. After the war, the Whites used the term “War of 
Liberty”; the Reds talked about revolution and rebellion. Nowadays, most researchers use the 
neutral term “civil war”.
 3 The term “Red woman” can refer to a female soldier on the Red side, to a woman serving the 
Red side, to a Red agitator, or to a family member of a Red soldier. In our study, Red women 
are taken to mean women accused of treason and prosecuted in court. They came from all 
the groups mentioned above, the exception being female soldiers:  there were no women 
soldiers in the district we studied.
 4 Tiina Lintunen, Punaisten naisten tiet. Valtiorikosoikeuteen vuonna 1918 joutuneiden Porin 
seudun naisten toiminta sota- aikana, tuomiot ja myöhemmät elämänvaiheet (Turku, 2015), 
pp. 98ff.
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The reasons the women gave were probably not always the real rea-
sons:  most women tried to minimize their sentences by understating their 
commitment and importance. It was rare for a woman to admit she had 
joined for political reasons. Surely, there were more women who shared these 
political views, since the majority of them were also members of the labour 
movement.5 The influence of others was also real. In previous studies, the ex-
ample of family and co- workers proved to be an important factor in encour-
aging others to join the revolution.6 The situation was undoubtedly complex 
and the reasons why women joined the Guard were manifold. Ideology, mon-
ey, and comrades were all contributory factors and will have differed from one 
individual to another.7
Our source material consists chiefly of documents produced by the author-
ities. Unfortunately this also means that the primary material available for this 
study included only fragmented and rare data on the social connections of 
these women. We reconstructed the prevailing social networks by treating the 
factors referred to above as social channels important for social interaction. 
Further, we assumed that geographical closeness (as implied by the same place 
of residence) strengthened social cohesion between women living in the same 
region. In order to model and analyse this complex set of relations, we decid-
ed to apply historical network analysis (hna), a formal method developed to 
analyse and graphically present complex relationships.
Our hypothesis is that Red activity was based on organizations and every-
day solidarity. The purpose of our chapter is therefore to analyse the networks 
of these Red women. What kind of connections were there? By exploring the 
networks, we are able to discover how revolutionary ideas were able to spread 
among workers. These networks were crucial not just before but also after 
the war, when the convicted women tried to survive in a society ruled by the 
Whites. The Reds were stigmatized as unfit citizens; support from other Reds 
was therefore of the utmost importance.
The Civil War is one of the most studied themes in Finnish history. It was 
also highly controversial – the terror during the conflict has aroused conflict-
ing passions among researchers, and a great deal of controversy. Research into 
the collective memories of the period has also triggered heated debates. It has 
taken nearly a century to reach some sort of consensus that there is no one 
 5 Ibid., pp. 97– 99.
 6 See, for example, Tuomas Hoppu, Tampereen naiskaartit. Myytit ja todellisuus (Jyväskylä, 
2008), pp.  73– 75, and Aimo Klemettilä, Tampereen punakaarti ja sen jäsenistö (Tampere, 
1976), p. 241.
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monolithic truth about the war, but that several parallel interpretations are 
equally valid.8
The historiography of the research into the Finnish Civil War has gone 
through four waves. After the war, the official history was written by the 
victors. During this first wave, the war was described from the perspective 
of the Whites; the Reds were presented as the sole malefactors. Researchers 
referred to the war as a War of Liberation, Revolution, or Rebellion. In the 
1960s, the situation changed when greater consideration was given to the 
Red view. The most important studies of this second wave were by Jaakko 
Paavolainen on the Red and White terror and by Viljo Rasila on the social 
background of the war and its adversaries. For the first time, the actions of 
the Whites were analysed critically.9 One of the most important pioneers 
was Anthony F.  Upton, who in 1980 wrote a comprehensive study of the 
Finnish revolution and Civil War.10 It was a sort of prologue to the third 
wave, which began in the 1990s. This period was more neutral, and the term 
“civil war” gained ground among researchers. Also, a microhistorical ap-
proach emerged, with Risto Alapuro’s and Heikki Ylikangas’s path- breaking 
studies.11 Both of these turns – the focus on the Red point of view and their 
social background, and later the microhistorical approach – have been sig-
nificant to our study.
During the present century, the historiographical emphasis has shifted to-
wards new military history – the fourth wave, with research focusing on such 
phenomena as myths, emotions, violence, and everyday life. It was not until 
this phase that ordinary women and children and their experiences were in-
cluded.12 Our study is interlinked with this field. By analysing women’s net-
works, we are able to piece together at least some of their interactions and 
sphere of activity. As far as we know, ours is the first study of revolution-
ary women’s networks in Finland, or indeed in any European country. Our 
 8 Tiina Kinnunen, “The Post- Cold War Memory Culture of the Civil War: Old- New Patterns 
and New Approaches”, in Tuomas Tepora and Aapo Roselius (eds), The Finnish Civil War 
1918: History, Memory, Legacy (Leiden, 2014), pp. 401– 439, 401– 403; Tuomas Tepora and 
Aapo Roselius, “Introduction: The Finnish Civil War, Revolution and Scholarship”, in Te-
pora and Roselius, The Finnish Civil War, pp. 1– 19, 8– 15.
 9 Jaakko Paavolainen, Poliittiset väkivaltaisuudet Suomessa 1918, 2 vols (Helsinki, 1966– 1967); 
Viljo Rasila, Kansalaissodan sosiaalinen tausta (Helsinki, 1968).
 10 Anthony F. Upton, The Finnish Revolution, 1917– 1918 (Minneapolis, MN, 1980).
 11 Risto Alapuro, Suomen synty paikallisena ilmiönä 1890– 1933 (Helsinki, 1994); Heikki 
Ylikangas, Tie Tampereelle. Dokumentoitu kuvaus Tampereen antautumiseen johtaneista 
sotatapahtumista Suomen sisällissodassa 1918 (Porvoo, 1996).
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approach is microhistorical. We focus on a local community and its social lay-
ers in a political system in transition. We are interested in the common people 
and their lives.
This chapter contributes, too, to the field of the digital humanities13 and 
seeks to exemplify how quantified historical sources can be explored using 
digital methods and tools. We apply historical network analysis to analyse the 
significance and impact of regional, social networks and to improve our under-
standing of the structural factors affecting intra- group dynamics among the 
Red women who participated in the Finnish Civil War in 1918. Viljo Rasila used 
factor analysis in 1968 in his statistical study of the structures of Finland’s polit-
ical divisions in 1918.14 We want to bring this study to the next level by studying 
the networks and closeness of the Reds.
Historical network analysis allows us to study the functions of multiple so-
cial background variables – here, we consider place of residence, kinship, and 
associations – in a much fuller way, and thus offers a promising tool for exam-
ining past communities at an aggregate level:
With sna [social network analysis], we are only interested in individuals 
as part of a much bigger whole. In fact, one advantage to the technique 
is that sna helps us view an entire community and figure out which in-
dividuals we should be truly interested in and which ones were perhaps 
less significant. When we study past relationships systematically as sna 
allows, the method will prevent us from misunderstanding the function 
of an individual’s relationships or exaggerating the distinctiveness of 
those relations.15
We chose these three variables because our hypothesis is that the connection 
of these women to the labour movement would be significant. According to 
previous studies, the political power of the working class was based on get-
ting organized. So, the first choice was obvious. Place of residence was also 
 13 Since the whole discipline is subject to continuous, often controversial debate, there is no 
space in the present chapter for an exhaustive debate about the digital humanities. Useful 
contributions to this debate can be found in Anne Burdick et al. (eds), Digital_ Humanities 
(Cambridge, MA, 2012), Frédéric Clavert and Serge Noiret (eds), L’histoire contemporaine 
à l’ère numérique / Contemporary History in the Digital Age (Brussels, 2013), and Matthew 
K. Gold and Lauren F. Klein (eds), Debates in the Digital Humanities 2016 (Minneapolis, 
MN, 2016).
 14 Rasila, Kansalaissodan sosiaalinen tausta.
 15 Robert M.  Morrissey, “Archives of Connection”, Historical Methods:  A Journal of 
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promising, since we knew that men’s ties had been local. We wanted to see 
if this held true for women. Finally, kinship was chosen since we knew, af-
ter preliminary examination of the data, that there would be relatives, and 
previous research has shown the influence of family members to have been 
important.16
We are convinced that the power of digital methods such as historical net-
work analysis lies in their ability to allow a distant reading of large materi-
al corpora. For example, social interaction patterns can be rather complex 
and hard to perceive without proper visualization. This is exactly what hna 
is designed for: to model and visualize complex relationships in an attractive 
visual form. At the same time, however, we are fully aware that all network 
visualizations require a proper context- aware interpretation and that qualita-
tive research is also needed. Further, the network data can be derived from 
documents containing only historical facts. A well- known problem is the stat-
ic nature of graphical visualizations, often criticized for “freezing” the course 
of history. An often- used workaround is to “chunk” the network in temporal 
snapshots. For this chapter, we are interested in one point in time only – the 
beginning of the Finnish Civil War. Hence the problem of dynamic networks is 
not highly relevant here.
The first section of this chapter describes the historical context by briefly 
presenting the main developments in Finland in 1917 and the first few months 
of 1918, which resulted in the outbreak of the Finnish Civil War. In the second, 
we present our primary material and discuss our method: historical network 
analysis. The third section presents the main analysis and revolves around net-
work visualizations. We conclude by summing up the most important results 
and their implications.
1 Background
The Civil War between the rebellious Reds and the conservative Whites broke 
out in January 1918. Its causes were multifarious and stemmed from both do-
mestic and world politics. At the international level, the most important ele-
ments were, naturally, World War I and the collapse of the Russian Empire, 
the mother country of the Grand Duchy of Finland. After the downfall of the 
empire and the Bolshevik Revolution, Finland gained independence but was 
 16 Hoppu, Tampereen naiskaartit. Myytit ja todellisuus, pp.  73– 75; Klemettilä, Tampereen 
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in such turmoil that it found itself embroiled in an agonizing and destructive 
civil war after only a few weeks of freedom.17
World War I had shaken the foundations of the society in Russia to which 
Finland belonged as an autonomous district. The two revolutions in 1917 also 
affected the western territories of the empire. With regard to the Finnish re-
gion, state power had already slipped out of Russian hands after the March 
Revolution. However, the political atmosphere was tense. The Russian provi-
sional government was aware of Finnish separatist ideas and was keen to re-
press attempts to secure full sovereignty. Finns tried to achieve this sovereignty 
by making the Finnish Parliament the highest legislative body. The provisional 
government refused to accept this and dissolved parliament and ordered new 
elections. The Bolsheviks, on the other hand, supported Finnish separatist as-
pirations. They hoped that their revolutionary ideas would spread to Finland 
and thus further Bolshevik aims.18
During 1917, the domestic situation in Finland slowly evolved from minor 
disputes into ever- increasing violent conflicts. What circumstances led to this 
chaos? First, there was a serious shortage of food and work. Due to the chaos 
in Russia, Finland’s trade to the east fell sharply and unemployment increased 
dramatically. There was also a severe lack of food because Finland was not self- 
sufficient and World War I interrupted grain imports from Russia, while in Fin-
land itself the harvest was less abundant than usual. Price controls failed and 
the black market flourished. Workers were hungry and disappointed with the 
government and with producers. Riots and disorder became a part of everyday 
life.19
Second, politics failed. Socialists and bourgeoisie were unwilling to compro-
mise amid the resurfacing of old, ideological, class- based conflicts. Universal 
suffrage in 1906 had not mended the deep class divisions and socialists and 
bourgeoisie were reluctant to share power, accusing each other of attempting a 
coup d’état. The socialists became frustrated when parliament was dissolved by 
the Russian provisional government in the summer of 1917 and they lost their 
majority after new elections in October 1918. If the political decision- making 
 17 Pertti Haapala and Marko Tikka, “Revolution, Civil War, and Terror in Finland in 1918”, in 
Robert Gerwarth and John Horne (eds), War in Peace: Paramilitary Violence in Europe after 
the Great War (Oxford, 2012), pp. 72– 84, 74– 79.
 18 William G.  Rosenberg, “Paramilitary Violence in Russia’s Civil Wars, 1918– 1920”, in 
Gerwarth and Horne, War in Peace, pp. 21– 39, 22– 24; Haapala and Tikka, “Revolution, Civil 
War, and Terror in Finland in 1918”, pp. 74– 75.
 19 Pertti Haapala, “The Expected and Non- Expected Roots of Chaos:  Preconditions”, in 
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processes had worked, the difficult economic situation might have been ame-
liorated. Things went from bad to worse, however, since political problems ag-
gravated everyday concerns.20
Third, after the first Russian Revolution in March, there was no police force 
in Finland. Nor did it have an army of its own. There was no official paramili-
tary force to control restless crowds. In the summer and autumn of 1917, during 
the worker strikes and political unrest, local militia were founded in order to 
protect the political rights of strikers and also the rights and political agenda 
of the landed estate owners. These early militia were clearly class- based, espe-
cially in the countryside, but later their composition became more complex.21 
Originally, the militia were regional and lacked general rules and cohesion. 
However, these coalitions were preliminary phases for the subsequent forma-
tion of the national Red and White guards, which both had c.100,000 soldiers. 
The Reds had 2,600 female soldiers, with a further 10,000 women as service 
troops. All of them were located in southern Finland.22
Finland gained its long- hoped- for independence in December 1917. It was 
not a time for celebration. Disagreements between socialists and non- socialists 
became more intense. Finally, despite efforts by more moderate party mem-
bers, the radical socialists launched a revolution in January 1918. Inspired by 
the Russian Revolution, they were ready to seize the opportunity and carry out 
a coup d’état. However, they did not adopt the Bolshevik model. They believed 
in armed, but peaceful revolution. The Reds did not plan to make Finland a 
constituent part of Lenin’s Russia but to create an independent state. This fun-
damental difference explains, at least partly, why people were so willing to join 
the revolution, which later became a civil war.23
 20 Ibid., p. 40; Tuomas Hoppu, “Sisällissodan puhkeaminen”, in Pertti Haapala and Tuomas 
Hoppu (eds), Sisällissodan pikkujättiläinen (Helsinki, 2009), pp. 92– 111, 92f. Pertti Haapala, 
“Vuoden 1917 kriisi”, in Haapala and Hoppu, Sisällissodan pikkujättiläinen, pp. 58– 89, 80.
 21 Most of the Red guardsmen were farmworkers or industrial workers. The Whites were a 
more heterogeneous group. Most of them were landowners, but there were also students, 
public servants, and middle management of industry and business. In between were the 
tenant farmers and handicraftsmen; they supported both sides. Marko Tikka, “Suomen 
sisällissodan tapahtumat”, in Tuomas Tepora and Aapo Roselius (eds), Rikki revitty maa 
(Helsinki, 2018), pp.  82– 110, 84; Alapuro, Suomen synty paikallisena ilmiönä 1890– 1933, 
pp. 47– 49.
 22 Risto Alapuro, State and Revolution in Finland (Berkeley, CA, 1988), pp. 145, 160; Haapala, 
“The Expected and Non- Expected Roots of Chaos”, pp. 45– 47; Hoppu, “Sisällissodan puh-
keaminen”, pp. 92– 111.
 23 Hoppu, “Sisällissodan puhkeaminen”, pp.  98– 101; Rosenberg, “Paramilitary Violence in 
Russia’s Civil Wars”, pp. 30– 33; Haapala and Tikka, “Revolution, Civil War, and Terror in 
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As Jorma Kalela has pointed out, the historical events that occurred in Fin-
land in 1918 should not be seen in isolation but as part of the series of proletar-
ian revolts that took place in Europe from 1917 to 1920. However, the Finnish 
case had three characteristics that marked it out from revolts elsewhere in Eu-
rope. First, in Finland the proletariat was united. They split into communists 
and social democrats only after the revolution had been suppressed. Second, 
the revolutionaries managed to hold on to power for nearly three months. 
Third, in Finland the revolt took place earlier than in Central Europe, where 
the uprisings occurred only after World War I.24 The Finnish Civil War lasted 
for just over three months and ended in victory for the Whites. Though brief, 
the war was bloody and brutal. It left one per cent of Finland’s population dead 
as a result of battles, terror, and famine in pow camps.25
The Red revolution needed both soldiers and service workers. Women, too, 
were called up for duty. The Red administration was surprised that women 
were eager to take up arms. Approximately 2,600 armed themselves. They were 
generally unmarried and young – most of them were under the age of twenty- 
one. Only some of them took part in battle; the rest acted as sentries. They did, 
however, play an important role in propaganda. Red newspapers used the fact 
that women were willing to risk their lives to put pressure on Red men to join 
in combat too. The Whites were appalled by the thought of women taking up 
arms, arguing that it was contrary to the social system and inappropriate for a 
woman to fight.26
For many years, the image of a Red woman has been dominated by those 
2,600 armed females and the role they played in the history of the Finnish 
Civil War. In contrast, we know little about the unarmed Red women. There 
were approximately 10,000 women who undertook traditional duties, such as 
nursing and subsidiary tasks.27 They were older than the female soldiers; many 
of them were married and had children. They were seduced into joining not 
just by ideological considerations; good wages also played a role. The Reds had 
 24 Jorma Kalela, “Suomi ja eurooppalainen vallankumousvaihe”, in Ville Pernaa and Mari 
K. Niemi (eds), Suomalaisen yhteiskunnan poliittinen historia (Helsinki, 2008), pp. 95– 109, 
103– 105.
 25 Marko Tikka, “Warfare and Terror in 1918”, in Tepora and Roselius, The Finnish Civil War, 
p. 118.
 26 Lintunen, Punaisten naisten tiet, pp.  36– 38; Tuomas Hoppu, Sisällissodan naiskaartit. 
Suomalaisnaiset aseissa 1918 (Helsinki, 2017), pp. 71, 270.
 27 There were more volunteers than the Guard could take. Some of the young women not 
hired to serve the army decided to form armed female companies. Despite the lack of 
general approval, 2,600 women took up arms towards the end of the war. The women we 
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occupied Helsinki in the first few days of the war and seized the Bank of Fin-
land; this enabled them to offer generous salaries that doubled the incomes of 
recruits.
Most of these Red women were also members of the labour movement. Par-
ty members were consequently committed to the cause and wanted to help 
change the prevailing social system.28 As Hoppu and Klemettilä have already 
noted, money was therefore not the only reason for joining the Guard.29 Some 
of these women and girls undoubtedly did not understand the gravity of their 
actions in joining, nor were they aware of the serious consequences of this 
affiliation. For example, thirteen- year- old Karin Sandberg, who washed dishes 
in the Red Guard’s canteen for two weeks, probably did not realise that this job 
would land her in court.30
2 Materials and Methods
To be able to examine the roots of an organization, we restrict our study to a 
particular region and community.31 A restricted area is a prerequisite, especial-
ly for network analysis. The subjects of our analysis are the women from the 
district of Pori, in western Finland (Map 4.1).32 This region is a fertile research 
subject, since it was situated near the front line and occupied by the Reds, who 
needed a large army service corps. Women were consequently also needed. 
Moreover, the labour movement was strong in this region, and workers were 
well unionized. Hence, the political atmosphere favoured radical change. Con-
sequently, the second largest regional group to face trial in the political crimes 
courts after the war comprised women from this province.
Our data comprise 267 women. We included all women from the district 
of Pori accused of Red activity. After the war, these Red women ended up in 
court on charges of committing treason or assisting in treasonous activity. 
They had either worked in support roles, been agitators, or were Red refugees. 
These women form a heterogeneous group. Their ages vary from thirteen to 
 28 Lintunen, Punaisten naisten tiet, pp. 36– 38,145– 149.
 29 Hoppu, Tampereen naiskaartit. Myytit ja todellisuus, pp. 73– 75, and Klemettilä, Tampereen 
punakaarti ja sen jäsenistö, p. 241.
 30 National Archive, Helsinki, Court for crimes against the State (vro), doc. 143/ 270.
 31 Alapuro, Suomen synty paikallisena ilmiönä 1890– 1933, p. 14.
 32 In her dissertation, Lintunen studied the background of these women, their role in the 
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sixty- nine years, but most were in their twenties or thirties. Of the women, 
53 per cent were unmarried, 37 per cent married, and 11 per cent were war 
widows. By profession, they were mainly factory workers, craftspeople, maids, 
or housewives; 69 per cent of them were members of the labour movement.33 
We examine the connections among all these women. In addition, to tackle 
the microhistorical dimension, we closely examine the women from the Aron-
en family, as representative of the larger group of Red women, which com-
prised around 5,500 people tried in court after the Civil War. We refer to our 
research subjects by their own names since more than a century has passed 
and we aim to do justice to them by understanding their activity in the context 
of their era.
Our materials consist of documents from various archival sources. The trial 
documents in the National Archive contain ten to twenty pages of information 
on each defendant, including interrogation notes in which we can read their 
own stories and where they explain what they had done, why, and where. The 
statements given in the interrogations are documented on official forms; de-
scriptions are normally brief. It should be noted that these statements were 
made under extreme duress and so should be interpreted cautiously. For ex-
ample, many of the women lied about their union membership. There are also 
letters of recommendation from relatives and influential individuals, as well 
as abusive letters from foes. The files also contain an official certificate, a two- 
page statement from the local White authorities, and the court verdict. We use 
them to identify the women who were prosecuted for treason and to get an 
overall picture of them and their backgrounds. These documents were pro-
duced by the authorities. We also have a few interviews recorded with these 
women in the 1960s. Unfortunately, there are no letters or diaries available and 
thus we have to content ourselves with this scarce material on the motives of 
these women.
The files of the local workers’ associations and trade union branches in the 
Labour Archives reveal the political participation of these women.34 Further-
more, the local parish registers and municipal archives are used as a source of 
information about kinship and place of residence. Qualitative analysis does 
not help us identify the potential interrelationships between these women. We 
 33 Ibid.
 34 These were two distinct organizations. The trade unions tried to improve the wages 
and working conditions of their members, and to reduce the number of working hours. 
Workers’ associations aimed to improve working conditions nationally through legis-
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need network analysis to help us see the nexus of the social relationships and 
to identify the key women in the network.
3 On Historical Network Analysis
The structure and dynamics of relationships between the issues, events, and 
people underlying historical phenomena are of key interest in historical re-
search. In recent years, many historians have shown a growing interest in ap-
plying digital or other formal methods to their empirical material in order to 
model and analyse patterns of social interaction underlying certain phenome-
na. One approach enjoying slowly growing popularity among historians is his-
torical network research (hnr), a research paradigm stressing the importance 
of relationships among units (people, organizations, concepts, etc.) to explain 
historical phenomena.35
Network research itself dates back to the late nineteenth century, but it was 
the development of powerful personal computers and easy- to- use software al-
lowing graphical presentations, i.e. visualizations of networks, that increased 
interest in network research among historians. Another important pioneering 
role was played by those digital or computational historians at the crossroads 
of computational science and historical research who showed how social net-
work analysis can be exploited to address research questions relevant for his-
torical research.
The main focus of hnr lies in analysing relational patterns such as social 
or institutional relations or interactions in a historical context.36 It has been 
applied to map, measure, model, and visualize relationships between differ-
ent units in a network. In recent years, network visualizations have gained a 
central position in network research, for two reasons in particular. First, new, 
easy- to- use visualization software is available, making data visualization much 
easier. And second, network visualizations are an effective form of presenting 
complex relationships in an intuitive and quite easy- to- understand form. Ad-
ditionally, different visualization layouts offer new possibilities for highlighting 
 35 See, for example, Peter Bearman et  al., “Networks and History”, Complexity, 8:1 (2002), 
pp. 61– 71; Tom Brughmans, “Thinking Through Networks: A Review of Formal Network 
Methods in Archaeology”, Journal of Archaeological Method and Theory, 20:4 (2013), 
pp. 623– 662; Ruedi Epple, “Flucht und Unterstützung: Die ‘Auskunftsstelle für Flüchtlinge’ 
in Zürich und ihre Netzwerke”, Journal of Historical Network Research, 1:1 (2017), pp. 106– 145.
 36 For a more detailed discussion about historical network research, see, for example, http:// 
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network- related attributes or visualizing a node’s relevance in regard to its 
close neighbourhood or the complete network.37
Historical network analysis as a spin- off of social network analysis is part 
of the Anglo- Saxon, quantitatively oriented development line of network 
research. Accordingly, hnr has its theoretical foundations in graph theory 
in mathematics, where a network is defined as a set of dots (nodes, vertices) 
and connecting lines (edges) between nodes.38 Both nodes and edges can be 
enriched by attaching both quantitative and qualitative attributes to them, 
and these attributes can be used in the analysis. The main purpose of using 
attributes, however, is to ensure that the formal network model, the network 
topology, provides valid, reliable, and appropriate information to answer the 
research question.
The analytical focus of network analysis lies in the network structure, con-
sisting of nodes and edges, and is based on the assumption that both the units 
(nodes) selected for the analysis and the connections (edges) between these 
are significant when it comes to understanding and explaining the larger 
phenomenon the network is connected to. Consequently, the main purpose 
of using network analysis and visualization tools is to elucidate structural as-
pects from the research object neglected or left unidentified by other research 
methods or tools. Although the analogy is not perfect, strong similarities exist 
between network analysis and statistical analysis, especially at the level of the 
research process. The network metrics used to describe the central character-
istics of a network’s structure can be compared to coefficients produced by 
fitting a statistical model. From this perspective, both provide quantitative in-
formation about dependencies between variables in the data, thus improving 
our understanding of the phenomenon subject to analysis.39
The primary material used in this chapter was processed into quantified 
network data in three steps. First, we extracted all socially relevant informa-
tion from the original historical documents. In addition to name and place 
of residence, we extracted information about membership of trade union 
branches and workers’ associations, as well as about kinships. We justify this 
 37 For more on this, see, for example, John Scott, Social Network Analysis (London, 2013); 
Barbara Schultz- Jones, “Examining Information Behavior Through Social Networks: An 
Interdisciplinary Review”, Journal of Documentation, 65:4  (2009), pp.  592– 631; Marten 
Düring and Martin Stark, “Historical Network Analysis”, Encyclopedia of Social Networks 
(London, 2011).
 38 For a good introduction to graph theory, see Keijo Ruohonen, Graph Theory (Tampere, 
2013). For good introductions to sna, see, for example, Christina Prell, Social Network 
Analysis: History, Theory and Methodology (London, 2012); Scott, Social Network Analysis.
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selection by the fact that societies and associations are among the most central 
forms of organizations with regard to collective action.40 This information was 
stored in an affiliation matrix, with each row representing one “Red woman” 
and each column representing a single variable. This table was imported to R, 
a statistical package,41 for advanced analysis.
Second, we created the actual network data by connecting women who 
had been members of the same workers’ association or the same trade union 
branch, and who had lived in the same residence. We also added connections 
based on kinship. In the third step, we imported the network data to Visone, an 
open- source software program for network analysis and visualizations. Visone 
offers an extensive set of analytical tools and innovative network visualization 
integrated into an intuitive, easy- to- use user interface.42
4 Social Networks of the “Red Women”
We have split our analysis into three main parts, each analysing the same 
network data from a specific perspective. The methodological aim is to ex-
emplify and evidence how historical social network analysis can be exploited 
to analyse the historical social reality reconstructed and represented through 
social networks. Each sub- analysis starts with a specific network visualiza-
tion seeking to highlight analytically interesting and relevant aspects from 
the social networks of selected Red women residing permanently in the Pori 
region.
All networks visualized and analysed in this chapter are one- mode net-
works, where two women are connected if they are members of the same 
workers’ association, the same local trade union branch, or if they share the 
same place of residence. Since the network data is created by projecting a two- 
mode network – for instance, a person to trade union branch network – onto 
a one- mode social network – for instance, onto a person- to- person network 
where connections are based on shared trade union branch membership – all 
nodes sharing the same affiliation form a fully connected clique. Such a projec-
tion is also needed as we want to calculate some network measures and most 
of these are defined for one- mode networks only.43 We are aware of the issues 
 40 Alapuro, Suomen synty paikallisena ilmiönä 1890– 1933, p. 14.
 41 www.r- project.org; last accessed 5 March 2019.
 42 For further details, see http:// visone.info/ html/ about.html; last accessed 14 March 2018.
 43 Stephen P.  Borgatti and Martin G.  Everett, “Network Analysis of 2- Mode Data”, Social 
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constraining the application of certain network measures to a projected one- 
mode network44 and systematically avoid using these. Further, as regards the 
overall objectives of this chapter, these technical and theoretical issues are less 
relevant and do not outweigh the benefits of using projected one- mode net-
work data in order to explore social interaction patterns. Another advantage 
is that the reader can visually explore – by focusing on the link colours – what 
kind of connections exist between the women.
Map 4.2 illustrates the geographical closeness of the city of Pori. As we can 
see, Pori’s city centre was very compact and the distances between the city’s 
sections very short. However, the Pori region was geographically rather large 
and included districts far from the centre. A good example is the district of 
Reposaari, an island located twenty- five kilometres northwest of the centre.45 
The labour movement was very active in Reposaari. Of the women we studied 
who came from there, eighty- two per cent were organized.46 Our study also 
includes the rural communes in Pori and Ulvila, both located around the city 
of Pori. Those parishes were geographically fragmented and comprised sever-
al small villages across a quite large geographic area. At the beginning of the 
twentieth century, it was difficult for the poor to travel far – the chief means 
of transport was by foot. Thus, geographical mobility was low and communi-
cation over longer distances often depended on newspapers and visits from 
political activists.47
5 Associational Connections
We start our exploratory analysis with Figure 4.1, which presents the social net-
work of the 267 women based on their membership of workers’ associations 
and trade union branches. Each node in the network represents one woman. 
The connections (links) visualized in green indicate that the two women were 
members of the same workers’ association; the connections visualized in red 
 44 Tore Opsahl and Pietro Panzarasa, “Clustering in Weighted Networks”, Social Networks, 
31:2 (2009), pp. 155– 163.
 45 In summer there was a steamboat connection linking Reposaari to the city of Pori.
 46 National Archive, Court for crimes against the State (vro and vryo).
 47 The city of Pori had 17,603 inhabitants, the rural commune of Pori 7,685, and Ulvila 8,339. 
Suomen tilastollinen vuosikirja 1919 (Helsinki, 1920), pp. 12, 14. The three parish were inter-
linked since some Ulvila villages were considered suburbs of the city of Pori. Quite a few 
people from the nearest Ulvila villages and the rural commune of Pori worked in the 
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represent membership of the same trade union branch. Although all links of 
the same main type (workers’ association or labour union branch) are visual-
ized in the same colour, heterogeneity within the same main type has been 
maintained. Hence, each individual workers’ association (green links) is vi-
sualized as its own sub- network and connects only those women who were 
members of this specific association.48 The visualization is based on the “stress 
minimization” layout, a variant of force- directed layouts widely used in social 
network analysis. As the name suggests, the graph is treated as a spring sys-






map 4.2  Map of the city of Pori
  national library, doria, collection of finnish maps, pori 1895
 48 We have included all workers’ associations and trade union branches of which the women 
were members. There were other trade union branches and workers’ associations, but 
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 figure 4.1  Social network based on membership of trade union branches and workers’ associations
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displaying “as much symmetry as possible”.49 The resulting graph is designed 
so that nodes having more mutual connections are visible as clusters/ cliques.
Figure 4.1 evidences the important role of workers’ associations and trade 
union branches as the most remarkable factors that linked these women. In 
fact, sixty- nine per cent of them were members of the labour movement. Thus, 
the majority of these women were politically active and so would also have 
had political motives for supporting the revolution. It was quite natural for 
members of the Red Guard to also have been active members of the workers’ 
movement. In addition, at the beginning of the war, the Reds wanted to recruit 
women of a mature age, not young girls, to serve the forces. The women chosen 
had previously proved their loyalty to the cause, and the generous salary was 
seen as a kind of reward for their efforts on behalf of the labour movement. 
They also encouraged one another. For example, Helena Rosengrén told her 
interrogators that Amanda Nordling fetched her from home and asked her to 
work with her in the Red kitchen. Both were members of the same workers’ 
association.50 Likewise, Hilda Tuominen said that her acquaintance Johanna 
Järvenpää had urged her to join the Red Cross of the Red Guard with her. They 
were both seamstresses and members of the workers’ association. The two of 
them were hired to sew bandages.51
6 Geographical Closeness
The social networks visualized in Figure 4.1 suggest the majority of these wom-
en were politically active, but there are a significant number of “isolates”, i.e. 
women who joined neither a trade union, nor a workers’ association. That 
a majority of them decided to join the Guard raises the question how these 
women acquired political information possibly relevant to that decision.
Since our primary sources are rather limited, even non- existent as regards 
daily interaction, for a plausible answer to this question we must rely on sec-
ondary sources, as well as on theoretical research on social proximity and 
closeness. Regarding the former, one should bear in mind that, apart from 
these active members of the labour movement, many others sympathized 
with the social democrats, read their newspapers, and participated in their 
 49 Stephen G. Kobourov, “Spring Embedders and Force Directed Graph Drawing Algorithms”, 
eprint arXiv:1201.3011, 2012, available online at https:// arxiv.org/ pdf/ 1201.3011.pdf; last 
accessed 20 September 2018.
 50 National Archive, Court for crimes against the State (vro), doc. 141/ 384.
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gatherings in the People’s Halls even though they did not pay the membership 
fee,52 making them “unconnected isolates” in our visualization. According to 
the sociologist Risto Alapuro, these non- members belonged to the same social 
networks as the active members of the workers’ association, and the mutual 
meeting places of the networks were usually the local People’s Halls.53 More-
over, the historian Kari Teräs, who has studied the commitment of Finnish 
workers to trade unions, found that people on the inner and outer levels of the 
union organization were connected to each other in their everyday life and in 
various collective activities. Thus, the trade unions’ sphere of influence was 
much wider than their membership. Those who participated in the activities 
organized by the union often shared the same worldview and values of the 
actual members.54 We can presume that these individuals on the fringes of the 
workers’ movement would be aware of any revolutionary plans. Many of them 
adopted these ideas and supported the Red Guard.
In several cases, membership of a local trade union branch shows that many 
of the women in this study worked in the same locations. For example, the 
members of the cotton mill workers union or Pihlava’s sawmill union worked 
in the same premises and met each other daily.55 Thus, they probably talked 
to one another about joining the Guard and encouraged each other to do so. 
For example, Fanni Sjöman claimed that Fanni Hockzell had persuaded her to 
join the Guard. They both worked in the cotton mill.56 Previous research sup-
ports this notion: persuasion, pressure, and inspiration at the workplace were 
important factors when workers were considering whether to join the Guard. 
For example, sixty- three per cent of members of the armed female company 
in Valkeakoski worked at the same paper mill. In Hyvinkää, eighty per cent of 
those alleged to be Red women had worked together at the same woollen mill 
and most were union members. Men’s union branches, for example carpenters 
and shoemakers in Helsinki, also formed their own companies. Usually, how-
ever, it was the workers’ associations that provided local troops.57
 52 Lintunen, Punaisten naisten tiet, pp. 75– 77.
 53 Alapuro, Suomen synty paikallisena ilmiönä 1890– 1933, pp. 102ff.
 54 Kari Teräs, Arjessa ja liikkeessä. Verkostonäkökulma modernisoituviin työelämän suhtei-
siin 1880– 1920 (Helsinki, 2001), p.  312. See also Leena Enbom, Työväentalolle vai seura-
huoneelle?  – Työväen vapaa- ajantoiminta, politiikka ja vastarinta 1920- ja 1930- lukujen 
tehdasyhdyskunnassa (Helsinki, 2014), p. 94.
 55 National Archive, Court for crimes against the State (vro and vryo).
 56 Ibid., doc. 143/ 279.
 57 Varpu Anttonen, “Valkeakosken naiskaarti Suomen sisällissodassa 1918” (Master’s the-
sis, University of Tampere, 2009), pp. 33, 40; Essi Ylitalo, “ ‘Innokas punikki’. Hyvinkään 
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All this points to the importance of place and geography. We should keep 
in mind that in the late 1910s, Finland was a pre- industrial, agricultural soci-
ety and that most people lived and worked within a small geographical area. 
This also holds true for the Pori region. Further, several empirical studies have 
tackled the question of the impact of geography on social networks, resulting 
in a rather promising theoretical consideration of how geographical proximity 
supports social closeness and interactions.58 For example, in his seminal study 
on kin and neighbours, Smith raises the role of residential propinquity by con-
cluding that the “family systems may well have been ‘functionally extended’ 
both in horizontal and vertical directions”.59 Smith continues – in accordance 
with our assumption that political ideas and information were disseminated 
among close neighbours – that neighbours “who in many cases were more im-
portant than kin, played a significant role through the giving of pledging sup-
port and aid in agricultural tasks”.60
To test whether the idea of “functional extension” through neighbourliness 
is supported in our case, we enriched our network by adding geographically 
based connections – i.e. the place of residence information available in our 
data – to our initial network. We followed a simple procedure: if two women 
lived in the same location, a geographical connection was deemed to have ex-
isted between them.
The geographically extended social network of the Red women is visualized 
in Figure 4.2, where the geographical links are coloured blue (all other visu-
al effects as in Figure 4.1). Due to the projected one- mode data, the places of 
residence determine the network representation (blue ties). Especially when 
Figure  4.2 is compared with Figure  4.1, this helps us to understand how the 
membership of different organizations actually connected different geograph-
ical locations. But also, how the geographical distance (Map 4.2) disconnected 
certain actors from the core network revolving around the centre of Pori. What 
is evident is that the geographical neighbourliness explains approximately 
half of the connections between two distinct women. In other words, the so-
cial interaction structure established through shared memberships in a work-
ers’ association or a trade union branch was functionally extended though 
of Helsinki, 2011), pp.  17– 18, 84; Marja- Leena Salkola, Työväenkaartien synty ja kehitys 
punakaarteiksi 2 (Helsinki, 1985), pp. 68ff, 422.
 58 Ling Yin and Shih- Lung Shaw, “Exploring Space– Time Paths in Physical and Social 
Closeness Spaces:  A Space– Time GIS Approach”, International Journal of Geographical 
Information Science, 29:5 (2015), pp. 742– 761.
 59 R.M. Smith, “Kin and Neighbors in a Thirteenth- Century Suffolk Community”, Journal of 
Family History, 4:3 (1979), pp. 219– 256, 247.
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neighbourliness. Theoretically – but based, too, on the empirical facts about 
the role of the local People’s Halls and shared activities – all the women were 
able to join a workers’ association or a trade union branch. But they decided 
not to do so, making the organizational non- tie between women in the outer 
and inner layers just as important as a tie.61
The geographically expanded social network comprises twenty- two com-
ponents, or separate sub- networks, that have no shared connections with the 
other components. If the original network based on associational connections 
had 124 isolated women, the second network has only eleven non- connected 
nodes (women). These nodes consist of housewives, maids, or women who 
were independent craftswomen. A majority of these isolates resided rather far 
from the industrial centres in the countryside in rural communes or in smaller 
villages in the Ulvila region.62 However, these women constitute only about 
four percent of our total sample, thus forming a tiny minority. The biggest sub- 
network – in network terminology, the giant component – can be easily iden-
tified in the topmost part of the graph. This giant component consists of 172 
women (sixty- four per cent of all the women) and has about 2,500 edges. The 
dense area in the centre of the giant component connects women who lived 
in the iv, v, and Toejoki districts of the cities of Pori and Ulvila. These areas are 
marked in Map 4.2. As Map 4.2 shows, those districts were all within walking 
distance of one another.
The “functional extension” thesis referred to above seems to apply to our 
network as well, especially when we focus on the connections between those 
women who lived in different districts but were members of the same organi-
zations. The workers’ association and trade union branch networks were rath-
er small, but, as previous research has evidenced, smaller networks tend to 
produce a higher level of emotional closeness typical of families or/ and kin re-
lations.63 In our case, the organizational connections among the geographical 
districts were fewer than those within the districts, resulting in what Ronald 
S. Burt defines as “a network of strongly interconnected elements […] in which 
people can broker connections between otherwise disconnected segments”,64 
thus creating competitive advantage with respect to information access for 
 61 Morrissey, “Archives of Connection”, p. 72.
 62 National Archive, Court for crimes against the State (vro and vryo).
 63 Sam G.B. Roberts and Robin I.M. Dunbar, “Communication in Social Networks: Effects 
of Kinship, Network Size, and Emotional Closeness”, Personal Relationships, 18 (2011), 
pp. 439– 452.
 64 Ronald S. Burt, “Structural Holes versus Network Closure as Social Capital”, in Nan Lin, 
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 figure 4.2  The complete network of Red women in the region of Pori in western Finland
  for full- color version, see https:// doi.org/ 10.1017/ S0020859019000336
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those women having organizational connections to women in other districts.65 
This is exactly what we observe when focusing on the role of membership of 
an organization: these women could transfer valuable information; they could 
also gatekeep it from one group to another. At the same time, however, they 
were dependent on their neighbours within their district, because their suc-
cess in reaching non- members in a certain district depended heavily on the 
neighbourhood’s ability to act as a “functional extension” for political commu-
nication. This also helps explain why not all women living in geographically 
close districts joined a workers’ association or trade union branch:  in a situ-
ation where the neighbourhood truly acted as a functional extension for the 
organizations, there was no need to join an organization in order to maintain 
ideological closeness.66
The following case illuminates our argument. During the Civil War, Aino 
Helin, an eighteen- year- old girl, was talking on the street with two of her 
friends from the same village when a man from the Guard struck up a conver-
sation with them. He asked if they would be willing to join the Guard’s First 
Aid. Aino was a member of a social democratic youth organization and imme-
diately felt enthusiastic. The other girls wanted to follow as well. They hoped to 
join the Guard together and work together, as friends. It felt like an adventure 
and the three girls did not need to think long, Aino Helin later explained in an 
interview.67
7 Kinship
There is a special form of social connection relevant for our case as well: kin-
ship. Although a vast majority of historical network studies deal with social 
relations among families, clans, or other forms of kin relations,68 the kin it-
self has been studied as an end in itself: “Charting ‘who lived with whom’ be-
came the answer to the question of how people related to each other in the 
past”, resulting in a rather scarce number of empirical studies on kinship and 
 65 Ibid.
 66 See also Roberts and Dunbar, “Communication in Social Networks”, p. 440.
 67 Interview with Aino Helin, Uusi Aika, 27 May 1978.
 68 See, for example, Barry Wellman and Charles Wetherell, “Social Network Analysis of 
Historical Communities: Some Questions from the Present for the Past”, The History of 
the Family, 1:1 (1996), pp. 97– 121; Charles Wetherell, “Historical Social Network Analysis”, 
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social relations.69 Generally speaking, kinship relations enjoy a special status 
in social network analysis since they seem to be less prone to decay,70 foster 
emotional closeness,71 and are important for maintaining identity.72 Also in 
our data, kin relations seem to be important: of our total of 267 women, fifty 
were related to one another. In most cases the degree of relationship was close; 
there were mothers and daughters, sisters and in- laws. It was the rule rather 
than the exception that the men of these families also participated in the Red 
Guard, whether as a husband, a father, a brother, or a son. The families often 
shared the same ideological worldview and even encouraged one another to 
join. For example, seventeen- year- old Ida Perkiö said her brother had advised 
her to join the Guard. Anna Kivi explained that her own husband, who worked 
for the Guard, had asked her to join since they did not have children and she 
was not employed.73
We selected the Aronen family (Figure 4.3) for a closer analysis since they 
played an exceptionally remarkable role in the district. Six women from this 
single family were prosecuted. They were suspected of treason not only due 
to their own actions but also due to the important positions of the men in the 
family. For example, Nestori Aronen, Anna Aronen’s son and the husband of 
Selma Aronen, was the right hand of the Red’s chief procurator and worked in 
the headquarters of the Red administration. But these women were not simple 
bystanders. For example, Selma had been a key figure in the pre- war labour 
movement. She was the chairwoman of the women’s section of the local work-
ers’ association and thus had influence and access to information.74 Anna, in 
turn, lived in a house that also served as the headquarters first of the workers’ 
association and later of the local Red Guard. She was able to acquire informa-
tion and pass that on to her acquaintances.75
All the husbands of these women were members of the Red Guard. The 
Aronen brothers were leaders of the local Guard, and after the war the entire 
family were branded as rebels and charged with treason. None of the six wom-
en had joined the Red Guard, but they had supported it. They were accused 
 69 Hilde Bras and Theo van Tilburg, “Kinship and Social Networks:  A Regional Analysis 
of Sibling Relations in Twentieth- Century Netherlands”, Journal of Family History, 32:3 
(2007), pp. 296– 322, 297, 300.
 70 Ronald S. Burt, “Decay Functions”, Social Networks, 22 (2000), pp. 1– 28.
 71 Roberts and Dunbar, “Communication in Social Networks”, p. 446.
 72 Ralph Piddington, “The Kinship Network among French Canadians”, International Journal 
of Comparative Sociology, 6 (1965), pp. 145– 165.
 73 National Archive, Court for crimes against the State (vro), doc. 141/ 73 and 47/ 120.
 74 National Archive, Court for crimes against the State (vryo), doc. 20898.
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of agitating for rebellion and of hiding guns and stolen property. Only the two 
youngest women, Katri and Ellen, were acquitted on all charges. The other four 
were sentenced to penal servitude, though they were all released within a year 
in general amnesties.
Figure 4.4 focuses on the social network of the Aronen family by dim-
ming all nodes and edges other than those around its members, thus high-
lighting the central position of the Aronen clan in our network. The Aronen 
family are visualized in red, the members of their ego networks are marked 
in blue, and their neighbours are visualized in cyan. In total this “Aronen 
network” was at most only two steps removed from 143 (54 per cent) of the 
267 women in our sample and covered – as the visualization evidences – 
the core geographical area located in the central districts of Pori (see also 
Map 4.2).
 figure 4.3  The Aronen family. A photograph of the Aronen family, taken in 1917. The women 
in our research are indicated as follows: 1. Anna, the matriarch (69); 2. Jenny, 
daughter (33); 3. Selma, daughter- in- law (39); 4. Vendla Josefiina, daughter- 
in- law (36); 5. Ellen, daughter- in- law (23); 6. Katri, daughter- in- law (21). Juha 
Kuoppasalmi, Nestori Aronen – tunteita ja taisteluita (Helsinki, 2018), p. 36. 
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The central position of the members of the Aronen family is supported also by 
network measures. We use the closeness centrality measure to analyse a woman’s 
structural position in the network. Closeness centrality measures the mean dis-
tance from a node to other nodes in the network, thus providing information on 
how easily a node can reach other nodes in the network, or, in other words, how 
close a node is to all other nodes in the network.76 Normally, closeness centrality 
is standardized on a scale from 0 to 1, where 0 indicates an isolated node and 1 a 
 figure 4.4  The social connectivity of the members of the Aronen family
  for full- color version, see https:// doi.org/ 10.1017/ S0020859019000336
 76 Scott, Social Network Analysis, pp.  84ff. See also Ulrik Brandes, Sven Kosub, and Bobo 
Nick, “Was messen Zentralitätsindizes?”, in Marina Hennig and Christian Stegbauer (eds), 
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node having a direct connection to all other nodes in the network. By definition, 
nodes with a higher closeness centrality might have better access to information 
at other nodes or more direct influence on other nodes.
Closeness centrality measures of the six members of the Aronen family 
support their central position in the network of the Red women. Ellen Aron-
en, whose ego network covers Pori’s central districts with forty- six connec-
tions, has a closeness centrality of 0.340, the highest in the family. Jenny, 
Selma, Vendla, and Katri Aronen each have a closeness centrality of 0.215, 
followed by Anna Aronen with 0.212. An interesting observation is that all 
women with the highest closeness centrality measures (from 0.355 to 0.343) 
are Ellen Aronen’s ego connections. Hence, Ellen Aronen not only had better 
access to information and more direct influence on other women, she could 
also mobilize women in her direct neighbourhood in order to gain even more 
influence.
As these results evidence, the Aronen family were able to reach practically 
all the members of the most central network in the Pori region. This confirms 
a central insight from network analysis, which is that most networks tend to 
have certain key individuals – in our case the Aronen family – with multiple 
connections.77 At the same time, the Aronen network confirms the importance 
of weak links: the kinship network of the Aronen family was rather small, but 
it had access to a huge network of associates, enabling the Aronens to reach 
women in most central associations and districts.
As can be seen, these women were politically active and had wide connec-
tions through the labour movement. This was important since their husbands 
were in leading positions and had knowledge of the revolution’s progress. 
Thus, these women could pass on information through their networks to other 
women in the district. Kinship with the Aronens proved to be a dangerous con-
nection after the war, as was highlighted in the court statements. For instance, 
Anna was described as a mother “who has raised sons who have stirred up 
the whole world ‘to rebellion’ ”.78 In Jenny’s papers it was claimed that “she is 
one of the socialist villains of Aronen”.79 The entire family were labelled Red 
rebels. This was common after the Finnish Civil War; the acts of one family 
member could define the reputation of the entire family in the eyes of soci-
ety. In addition, membership of a trade union or socialist association was con-
sidered an aggravating factor after the war since the Social Democratic Party 
 77 Morrissey, “Archives of Connection”, p. 77.
 78 National Archive, Court for crimes against the State (vryo), doc. 20897.
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was regarded as a scapegoat for the rebellion. Thus, the Aronen women had 
both their political background and their kinship with revolutionary leaders 
on their crime sheet.
The experiences of 1918 also united these women more strongly. Both Anna 
and Jenny lost their husbands in the aftermath of the war. The men died in 
pow camps. Jenny moved back home to live with her mother. Selma, Vendla, 
and Katri also needed support since their husbands were given long sentences 
and were not released until the 1920s. They all had young children; Vendla gave 
birth to a baby in the autumn of 1918.80 In a crisis like this, support networks 
were of the utmost importance. The support of people with similar ideas was 
crucial since White society was hostile and distrustful of the Reds. Evidence of 
this negative attitude can be found, for example, in a letter that two schoolmis-
tresses and the mistress of a wealthy house sent to the authorities concerning 
Selma Aronen:
She has always been the first one to sing and rage behind the red cloth 
and has agitated others to strikes and riots. She has raised her children 
to be snoopers both in school and in the village. […] From many years’ 
experience we know that Selma Aronen’s secret and public actions are 
very dangerous to society.81
The women of the Aronen family continued to have political influence even af-
ter the Civil War. And this happened rather soon. Despite the sentences, the so-
cial democrats were again the largest party in parliament in 1919. Many of the 
reforms they had demanded in 1917 were legislated after the war. Thus, the Civil 
War ended in a compromise. It is quite unique for the losers of a war to be able 
to gain their demands so soon afterwards.82 At the beginning of the 1920s, the 
labour movement split into social democrats and communists. Three women 
from the Aronen family formed a new communist association for women in 
the Pori region and became members of the board. They later became local 
communist leaders. All the younger women in the family later became com-
munists; only Anna remained a social democrat.83
 80 Parish Archives of Pori and Ulvila; Juha Kuoppasalmi, Nestori Aronen – tunteita ja taistelu-
ita (Helsinki: self- published, 2018), p. 93.
 81 National Archive, Court for crimes against the State (vryo), doc. 20898.
 82 Pertti Haapala, “Yhteiskunnallinen kompromissi”, in Haapala and Hoppu, Sisällissodan 
pikkujättiläinen, pp. 395– 404, 404.














This chapter had two main objectives. First, we wanted to empirically study 
Red women’s social relations at different levels. Second, we wanted to test how 
historical network analysis could be applied as a tool for distant reading in 
order to quantify and model social networks.
Our analysis shows that the Red women came as closely tied groups from 
certain quarters of the town. Furthermore, membership of workers’ associa-
tions and the local trade union branches united women from different neigh-
bourhoods. The trade union memberships prove that the women worked in 
the same workplaces. They were thus able to meet daily and also to discuss 
the revolution together and ponder whether to join the Guard or not. Put in 
more theoretical terms, daily encounters with politically like- minded sisters 
strengthened emotional closeness, which broadened the connections of these 
women and provided both information and support, helping them to survive 
after the war. Our results support the hypothesis that there was a strong social 
basis for Red activity. Socialist activity in the spring of 1918 in Finland was not 
only an outcome of ideological manipulation.
Our results support the assumption that membership of a trade union 
branch or workers’ association was an important factor in support for the Red 
Guard. Previous studies have evidenced this phenomenon with regard to men. 
Our study indicates a similar tendency among women. There were thus strong 
similarities between the two genders with regard to the impact of organiza-
tional membership.
The application of network analysis helped us to improve our understand-
ing of the social cohesion among these Red women, and of how organiza-
tional membership strengthened the geographical connectedness between 
different districts. Our analysis showed that the most active people lived in 
different districts and were connected by membership. At the same time, 
this network analysis helps us to understand why not all women needed 
to be members of labour organizations in order to gain access to political 
 information.
The network structure underlines the importance of geographical close-
ness. Since the most active women lived in various districts, they acted as 
mediators and gatekeepers between the organizations and non- members in 
their own districts. Another interesting finding is that network components 
correlate with geographical distance to Pori city centre. Those districts further 
than walking distance from Pori city centre form isolated localities in our net-
work structure. A closer look at the giant component in our network structure 
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reveals that this component brings together women living close together in 
Pori’s city centre.
Our findings also provide support for the relevance of geographical close-
ness as a factor intensifying social interaction patterns. Although we cannot 
document how the women included in our material really interacted, or how 
intense connections between them were, the idea of emotional closeness fos-
tered by geographical and social closeness gains support from the findings of 
previous studies on kinship and elite networks.
The use of hna has yielded many interesting and valuable insights into the 
social structure of Red women in the Pori region on the eve of the Civil War, 
but the real analytical power lies in combining the quantitative analysis with 
a qualitative interpretation. On the one hand, the network analysis helped us 
to identify important women in the network. On the other, through qualitative 
analysis we were able to reconstruct the historical context and thus explain 
why these individuals were so important in our networks.
In his critical article on historical network research published in 1998, 
Charles Wetherell listed three main reasons for the slow adoption by historians 
of quantitative, computational methods: a lack of familiarity with the concep-
tual orientation, the fact that the number of quantitatively oriented historians 
is so few, and the formidable requirements in relation to data in a discipline 
“plagued with an incomplete historical record and imperfect understandings 
of past social relations”.84 This is also partly connected with the so- called cul-
tural turn and microhistorical turn, both of which have diminished the role 
of quantitatively oriented research. This is alarming, since “the present status 
of digital history studies shows that the history project benefits from applying 
digital humanities tools to the study, obtaining new answers to old questions 
without denying the benefits of digital archives and methods”.85 Our chapter 
combines the microhistorical approach with strong computational orienta-
tion. Since the method is rather independent of the amount of data used in 
the analysis, it can help researchers to cope with very much larger datasets 
 84 Wetherell, “Historical Social Network Analysis”, p. 125. A similar assessment can be found, 
for example, in Raymond L. Garthoff, “Foreign Intelligence and the Historiography of the 
Cold War”, Journal of Cold War Studies, 6:2  (2004), pp.  21– 56, Claire Lemercier, Formal 
Network Methods in History: Why and How?, available at http:// halshs.archives- ouvertes.
fr/ halshs- 00521527/ fr; last accessed 4 March 2019, and Christian Rollinger et al., “Editors’ 
Introduction”, Journal of Historical Network Research, 1 (2017), pp. i– vii.
 85 Qing Wang, “Distribution Features and Intellectual Structures of Digital Humanities: A 
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containing information on social interaction, thus helping us gain new insights 
into the past.
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 chapter 5
The Hungarian Revolution of 1956 and Its 
Consequences for the Ikarus Bus Factory
Technology, Workforce and Power Relations
Zsombor Bódy
In scholarly work dealing with the Hungarian Revolution of 1956, emphasis 
with regard to factories has been placed largely on the political activities and 
influence of the workers’ councils, which were revolutionary in spirit.1 Atten-
tion has also been paid to the suppression and disbanding of these councils 
after the defeat of the uprising. This is understandable, since for a short time 
the workers’ councils did indeed represent a threat or challenge to the Kádár 
regime, which was trying to consolidate its hold on power after having been 
installed by the Soviet troops.
As Hannah Arendt has observed, in the case of the Hungarian revolution – 
which in her view was the only real workers’ revolution in the twentieth cen-
tury – it is worthwhile to make a distinction between the workers’ councils 
and the other councils, which were hastily formed and had political goals. 
“At any event, the Revolutionary and the Workers’ Councils, though they 
emerged together, are better kept apart, because the former were primarily 
the answer to political tyranny, whereas the latter in the case of the Hungar-
ian revolution were the reaction against trade unions that did not represent 
the workers but the party’s control over them”.2 However, the emphasis in lat-
er scholarship was on the political and armed clashes. Accordingly, questions 
about the conditions in the factories at the outbreak of the revolution and 
the state of the factories themselves were relegated to the background; as was 
 1 István Kemény and Bill Lomax, Magyar munkástanácsok 1956- ban (Dokumentumok) [Hun-
garian Workers’ Councils in 1956 (Documents)] (Paris:  Magyar Füzetek, 1986); Imre Var-
jasi, Az 1956- os munkástanácsok tevékenysége és dokumentumai Hajdú- Bihar megyében 
[The Works and Documents of the 1956 Workers’ Councils in Hajdú- Bihar County] (Haj-
duböszörmény: Fábián, 2008); József Géczi and Éva Szrenka, 8 napért 8 év. A munkástanácsok 
1956- ban és ami utána jött … [Eight Years for Eight Days. The Workers’ Councils in 1956 and 
what Came in their Wake] (Szeged:  Bába, 2012). This research was carried out within the 
frame of ‘mta – szte – elte History of Globalisation Research Group’.
 2 Hannah Arendt, The Origins of totalitarianism (Cleveland and New  York:  World Pub. Co., 
1964), 498. Not all of the editions include the chapter on the Hungarian revolution.
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the question of the extent to which the revolution and its fall brought about 
changes in the relationships among the various groups in the inner world of 
the factories (and if so, then how).3 Nevertheless, the actions and roles of 
the workers’ councils during the revolution were not limited entirely to the 
national political context. If one considers the events of the revolution that 
took place at the factory level, then it quickly becomes apparent that – like 
other dramatic upheavals that stirred the masses – to a significant extent the 
Hungarian Revolution of 1956 constituted an outburst of tensions that were 
not tied directly to the spectacular events of national politics at the time, and 
even less to political ideologies or conscious political stances. These tensions 
had built up more in everyday life, particularly in the workplace and in rela-
tions between workers and plant directors. Thus, to further a more nuanced 
understanding of the causes and the consequences of the revolution, these 
tensions should not be analysed exclusively from the perspective of political 
theory or great power politics, but also from the perspectives of everyday life 
and the workplace.
The “corrective measures” taken by the Soviets after Stalin’s death in 1953 
to reform the Rákosi regime’s dictatorial approach to rule fragmented the re-
gime in Hungary and created factions within the power structure that turned 
against one another. This was of crucial importance in the path that led to 
the outbreak of the revolution three years later. Because of these divisions, 
the regime was unable to deal with the very real social tensions. Thus, the 
attempt by the Soviets to address the situation – which in their assessment 
was already on the verge of exploding in 1953 – failed. The approach that re-
lied on the use of force (in this case, violence), which from time to time had 
gained the upper hand, also failed to stifle people’s calls for change. Instead, 
the proverbial genie had been let out of the lamp. By October 1956, students 
in Hungary and the youth movements had become unmanageable by the au-
thorities, because they had been joined by broad strata of the working class. 
It only took the Soviet troops, who returned to Hungary to quell the revolu-
tion on 4 November, about a week to defeat the Hungarian forces. However, 
for quite some time, the workers’ councils in the factories remained a signif-
icant opposition force to the Kádár government, which had arrived in Buda-
pest quite literally on the back of Soviet tanks. The central workers’ councils, 
which consisted of delegates from the workers’ councils of the individual 
factories, were forcefully dissolved before Christmas 1956. However, in the 
 3 For example, Zoltán Ripp, Forradalom és szabadságharc Magyarországon 1956- ban [Revolu-
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factories, the workers’ councils that had been freely chosen during the few 
days of revolutionary freedom, continued to function, and it took the regime 
months to subdue them.4
Thus, the conduct and activities of workers and labourers in factories 
were of crucial importance in the unfolding of the revolution and the con-
tinued resistance against the Soviet forces, even after the military forces 
fighting against the Soviets had been defeated. Their decisions and actions, 
however, were shaped by tensions that had become increasingly palpable 
in the years before the revolution. These tensions were aggravated by tech-
nological circumstances, the prevailing work culture and the expectations 
of the regime. Historians, however, have only rarely devoted any energy to 
this subject.
Based on the secondary literature on the earlier and later periods, one 
would have every reason to assume that the inner world of the factories was 
rife with conflicts and tensions, both before and after the revolution.5 The po-
litical upheaval certainly did not leave the power relations between the differ-
ent groups in the factories unchanged (for example the skilled labourers, the 
technicians and the factory managers). In the current chapter, I examine the 
events that took place at, and the shifting relations within, the Ikarus Car Body 
and Motorized Vehicle Factory (which primarily produced buses) during the 
Hungarian Revolution of 1956. I seek first and foremost to present the medium- 
term changes in the operations of the factory that came about as a result of 
the revolution. In order to put these into context, I  begin by examining the 
conditions and internal relations within the enterprise before the outbreak of 
the revolution, and subsequently the manner in which the factory was run in 
the period after it. Thus, I do not limit myself narrowly to the relatively short 
period of the revolution itself and the repressive measures taken in its wake, 
but instead I examine the shifts that took place at Ikarus in a broader temporal 
framework (roughly from 1950 to 1960). In order to offer an accurate assess-
ment of the effects of the revolution, I examine the relationships and power 
 4 A short summary of the history of the revolution can be found in János M. Rainer, “The Hun-
garian Revolution of 1956: Causes, Aims and Course of Events”, in The 1956 Hungarian revo-
lution: Hungarian and Canadian Perspectives, ed. Christopher Adam, Tibor Egervari, Leslie 
Laczko and Judy Young (Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press, 2010), 12– 31.
 5 Gyula Belényi, Az állam szorításában:  Az ipari munkásság társadalmi átalakulása Mag-
yarországon, 1945– 1965 [In the Grip of the State. The Social Transformation of the Industrial 
Working Class in Hungary, 1945– 1965] (Szeged: Belvedere Meridionale, 2009); István Kemény, 
Velük nevelkedett a gép. Magyar munkások a hetvenes évek elején [The Machine was Raised 
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hierarchies between the groups and the individuals who played important 
roles in the operations of the enterprise in the relevant period. The revolution 
should accordingly not be understood as a single point that can be detached 
from the flow of events, but as an intersection of processes that were underway 
at the time; processes that were given a new direction by the revolution itself, 
at least in part. What was this new direction, and to what extent did it influ-
ence shifts in relations at Ikarus?
In 1956, the Ikarus factory was a plant in operation in Mátyásföld, an area 
on the outskirts of Budapest. Investments in the first half of the 1950s not-
withstanding, the Mátyásföld factory unit continued to function essentially 
on the same scale as it had done when it was built during the Second World 
War as the Uhri Brothers’ Automobile Bodywork and Motorized Vehicle Facto-
ry. When the revolution broke out, the factory was employing approximately 
4,000 workers. Plans had already been made for the plant to acquire a form 
of monopoly as the sole provider of large buses for the entire Eastern Bloc, 
though this was only actually realized towards the end of the 1960s. The plant, 
however, was still one of the most important motor vehicle enterprises in Hun-
gary at the time. When the revolution started, the earlier plant management 
was removed and control shifted to the workers’ council and a few directors, 
who until then had been on the second level of the management. All the signs 
suggest that the workers’ council and the new management were able to work 
together effectively. Some of them were later affected in one way or another by 
the reprisals that were taken following the defeat of the revolution, including 
István Cséfalvay (head of the design division), head engineer Béla Zerkovitz 
(the son of operetta and pop music composer Béla Zerkovitz, who was well 
known in Hungary) and Emil Hant (the chief accountant).
A monograph written at what could be called the height of the Kádár period 
and describing the history of Ikarus Factory in Hungary, offers the following 
assessment of their roles:
The fact that, after 4 November,6 the [people] mentioned offered assis-
tance to anti- communist measures can be considered political naïveté, 
lack of experience, and short- sightedness. With these acts, they not only 
sinned against their own workers, their past, and their earlier friends, 
they also – locking themselves out of life at the company – rejected the 
amazing and unbelievable development, development which had risen 
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almost from nothing, of which they themselves had been the initiators, 
directors, active participants, and soldiers.7
Neither Cséfalvay, Zerkovitz nor Hant remained at Ikarus after the revolution. 
In 1957, along with many others, they left the company. Hant was arrested and 
condemned, as was Ignác Balogh, the chairman of the workers’ council. Al-
though not explicitly, the monograph suggests that some of the failures in con-
nection with the development of new types of buses were consequences of the 
revolution.8 In other words, the departure of some of the technical staff lead-
ers and skilled employees brought an end to the “amazing and unbelievable 
development” of the company. According to the monograph, the acts commit-
ted by the people in question, and their general conduct during the revolution, 
were due to their “political naïveté” and “lack of experience”, although the con-
sequences were dire, both for them personally and for the company. In total, 
according to the monograph, 26 people – mainly workers – were arrested in 
the wake of the revolution.
I first offer an overview of the “amazing” development of the company in 
the period before the revolution, and political experience of the people at the 
company who ended up taking part in the revolution. In fact, these people were 
not “lacking” in political experience by any measure, the contention found in 
the aforementioned monograph notwithstanding. I  continue my discussion 
with an examination of what took place at the Ikarus factory in Mátyásföld 
(now within district xvi of Budapest) during the revolution, and the way in 
which repressive measures were implemented in 1957. Lastly, I  describe the 
consequences of the fall of the revolution up to the mid- 1960s.
1 Operations at the Ikarus Factory before the Revolution
In order to understand the course of events during the revolution, and their 
consequences, one needs to know something about the history of the factory 
in the decade between the end of the Second World War and the outbreak 
of the revolution. The factory was nationalized in 1947, which was before the 
wave of nationalization that took place in 1948. The position of managing di-
rector changed hands relatively frequently. Béla Zerkovitz, however, was given 
 7 Károly Jenei and József Szekeres, Az Ikarus Karosszéria  – és Járműgyár története 1895– 1980 
[The History of the Ikarus Bodywork and Motorized Vehicle Factory, 1895– 1980] (Budapest: 
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the job of chief engineer in the summer of 1947, and remained in this position 
until the tumultuous days of October 1956. István Cséfalvay had been given 
the position of head of the design division at the beginning of the war. Thus, 
these two Ikarus employees were at the plant for a relatively long time. This 
was important, because in the second half of the 1940s, the factory was at the 
intersection of various conflicts of interest (the effects of which were still be-
ing felt in the 1950s), and new internal tensions were added to these clashes.
In 1946, the plant started to become an arena for conflicts of interest be-
tween the Social Democratic Party and the Communist Party. Both sought to 
recruit Ikarus workers into their organizations. The Social Democratic Par-
ty was far more successful in its efforts, until the two parties were forcefully 
united. The two “workers’ parties” nevertheless had strikingly different visions 
for the role of the plant in the economic policies of the country. The Social 
Democratic Party had planned on procuring the vehicles necessary for mass 
transportation in Hungary by relying on foreign imports. By contrast, the Com-
munist Party had wanted to produce buses domestically, and had planned to 
use the Ikarus factory in part to address this need. When the political struggle 
between the two parties at the national level came to an end and the Com-
munist Party emerged victorious, it prevented the Budapest Capital Transpor-
tation Joint Stock Company (the enterprise responsible for transportation in 
Budapest) from being able to order buses from abroad. In the Ikarus factory, 
the social- democratic organization was eliminated, and the positions of power 
within the plant were occupied by communist party activists. However, some 
people who assumed central positions in the network of the social- democratic 
organization in the plant before 1948 remained employees of Ikarus. Balogh – 
who served as chairman of the workers’ council during the revolution – was 
one of them, as was Béla Grandits, who was the chairman of the Üzemi Bi-
zottság (Plant Committee) before the nationalization of Ikarus and who be-
came deputy chairman of the workers’ council in 1956.
After 1948, when foreign imports were banned for political reasons, the ac-
tual delivery of buses at the necessary scale in Hungary constituted a challenge 
that the domestic industry and Ikarus were only able to meet with consider-
able difficulties, and only at a questionable standard from the perspective of 
quality. One of the difficulties was the lack of suitable- sized modern engines. 
This was again a source of conflict between people who supported acquiring 
the necessary materials abroad and purchasing foreign licenses, and those who 
preferred the idea of developing and producing the engines in Hungary. The 
first solution was expensive. The cost of the second solution was also an issue, 
but equally importantly it would only have been possible after development 
work had been carried out. It was not easy to say how long this would have 
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taken, since the process of designing an engine and perfecting it through series 
of time- consuming tests would itself take a great deal of time.9
Ikarus, however, was affected more directly by other design questions con-
cerning bus production, since the company did not manufacture its own en-
gines. As part of their vision for cost- effectiveness, the politicians responsible 
for decisions concerning economic policy wanted the engines and the chassis 
for the buses to be made using the same main parts that were used for lorries. 
The engineers at Ikarus, however, knew that it was not possible to design mod-
ern buses that would meet the users’ expectations of them (that they should 
be comfortable, efficient and relatively inexpensive to use and maintain) using 
lorry chassis. After the Second World War, the production of buses all over the 
world essentially separated once and for all (in terms of the technology in-
volved) from the production of trucks. Buses with self- supporting bodywork 
were considered pioneering experiments within the industry. This shift in the 
industry was in part a consequence of a change to the production of aeroplanes 
that had taken place during the war, because the self- supporting bus bodywork 
was based essentially on an adaptation of the construction methods used to 
make aircraft fuselages. During the war, the Ikarus factory was used for the 
production of aeroplanes, and the industrial knowhow gained in this process 
was then applied to the production of buses. Thus, with regard to fundamen-
tal technical issues concerning bus production, Zerkovitz and Cséfalvay – the 
chief engineers  – were in constant conflict with the higher authorities that 
were in charge of the plant.10
 9 Béla Zerkovitz, “Újabb irányok az autóbusz építésben [New Directions in the Construc-
tion of Buses]”, Magyar Technika:  Műszaki és gazdaságtudományi folyóirat [Hungarian 
Technic: Journal of Technological and Economic Science] no. 4 (1949): 45– 51. Béla Czére 
and László Prohászka, Hazai Gépjárműközlekedésünk fejlesztése:  A Magyar Tudományos 
Akadémia Közlekedéstudományi Főbizottsága és a Közlekedési Minisztérium által 1952. július 
11– 12- én rendezett első Gépjárműközlekedési Ankét előadásai és hozzászólásai [The Develop-
ment of Domestic Motor Vehicle Transportation: Compiled from the material of the pre-
sentations and comments of the first Motor Vehicle Transportation Conference, organized 
on 11– 12 July 1952 by the Main Transportation Sciences Committee of the Hungarian Acad-
emy of Science and the Ministry of Transportation] (Budapest: Közlekedési Kiadó, 1953).
 10 With regard to the early years of the Ikarus factory, see Zsombor Bódy, “Egy szocial-
ista járműipari vállalat születése [The Birth of a Socialist Enterprise in the Automobile 
Industry]”, Korall 52 (2013):  91– 112; Jenei and Szekeres, Az Ikarus Karosszéria  – és 
Járműgyár. According to Jenei and Szekeres, there were continuous struggles surrounding 
“the oppositional elements among the engineering experts”, who were nonetheless irre-
placeable at the factory. Regrettably, Jenei and Szekeres offer no details concerning the 
individuals or the struggles in question. Cséfalvy, who had grown up in Czechoslovakia as 
a member of the Hungarian- speaking minority, had studied at the technical university in 
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The organizations in charge of economic policy insisted that Ikarus should 
design buses on the basis of the lorry bodywork that was made at the Csepel 
Automobile Factory. The proposals that were devised by Ikarus, which rec-
ommended developing buses with self- supporting bodywork, were rejected. 
Therefore, the designers at the factory worked on plans for the buses they were 
expected to provide. Nevertheless, Cséfalvay and Zerkovitz did not give up on 
the idea of using self- supporting bodywork and they continued to work on 
designs for these vehicles, while of course continuing to develop designs as 
requested by the policymakers. Thus, in a way, they resisted the expectations 
of the higher authorities, by working as employees of the company on an idea 
that, in their view as engineers, was preferable. However, this was without hav-
ing any authorization to do so. Finally, in the summer of 1951, the authorities 
gave permission for plans to construct buses with self- supporting bodywork, 
though alongside rather than instead of work on ones designed for the Csepel 
bodywork. For quite some time, the work on these two different types of de-
signs did not actually yield practical, functional models. It was not until 1955, 
with the production of the Ikarus 55 model, that a self- supporting bus was ac-
tually made by the plant, and that could be regarded as a success.
In addition to the conflict concerning matters of technology and engineer-
ing (which was also, of course, a conflict of personalities and personal inter-
ests), there was also an internal affairs aspect. Zerkovitz had been under con-
tinuous observation by the secret police since 1952. They believed he had been 
making mistakes that impeded completion of the plans issued by the regime 
and hurt the national economy. They also thought that he had been breaking 
various resolutions issued by the Council of Ministers. The secret police could 
not prove that Zerkovitz’s “mistakes” were deliberate sabotage, but they sus-
pected it. They also suspected him of hindering the labour competition move-
ment,11 and the switch from hourly wages to piece rates, which was one of the 
most important tools used by the regime in striving to improve production 
partitioning of Czechoslovakia in 1938 (the Award ceded significant territories in south-
ern Czechoslovakia, which were populated largely by Hungarian speakers, to Hungary). 
In 1945, Cséfalvy became a member of the Hungarian Communist Party, and later joined 
the Hungarian Workers’ Party, so he could not have been characterized as an “opposi-
tional element”. Zerkovitz could, however, as he had originally belonged to the Social 
Democratic Party.
 11 A strategy used by the regime to motivate workers by placing them in competition with 
one another and offering rewards to those who outdid their peers. It is also known as the 
Stakhanovite movement, after Aleksei Grigorievich Stakhanov, a coal miner in the Soviet 
Union who allegedly produced more than fourteen times his quota in 1935 and who was 
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following the introduction of a command economy. The labour competition 
movement did not serve simply as a means of providing evidence that workers 
were indeed labouring enthusiastically to further the construction of the so-
cialist state. It was also intended to improve the pace of work by emphasizing 
the importance of performance and production.12 Other sources mention the 
accusation against Zerkovitz concerning the shift from hourly wages to piece 
rate, and it seems likely that there was ongoing tension at Ikarus about wages. 
According to the official monograph of the Kádár era mentioned at the be-
ginning of this essay, for the Ikarus factory, the collective agreement negotiat-
ed – or rather, imposed – following nationalization was a tremendous disap-
pointment for the workers. According to the text of the monograph, this was 
because in their negotiations with the “capitalists”, the trade unions had man-
aged to reach an arrangement over wages that the company simply could not 
afford. The real reason, however, lay in the conflict and struggle between the 
two so- called workers’ parties. The members of the factory committee (a body 
brought into being by law in 1945 with the task of exercising oversight over 
companies in labour affairs), most of whom were Social Democrats, contin-
uously raised the workers’ wages in order to ensure that the Hungarian Com-
munist Party organization at the plant would not be able to undermine them 
and drum up support for their own party by making demands for better pay.13 
At Christmas time in 1951, around 100 workers were arrested after a riot, which 
broke out because of the timing of wage payments.14 The assessments of the 
factory that were carried out at the time by the higher authorities overseeing 
economic policy also noted tensions concerning the form of the wage system 
and the amounts that were paid.
According to a factory assessment dated 3 October 1952, only slightly more 
than half of the manual labourers were employed on a piece rate basis. The 
rest were paid hourly wages, though the goal was to have as many employees 
as possible on piece rate, which was supposed to motivate them to work more 
efficiently. The assessment noted several other problems, including the man-
agement of materials and the storage of tools. The most important problem, 
 12 Miklós Haraszti, Darabbér: Egy munkás a munkásállamban [Piece Rate: A Worker in the 
Workers’ State] (Budapest: teka Könyvk., n.d.).
 13 Bódy, “Egy szocialista járműipari vállalat”.
 14 Jenei and Szekeres, Az Ikarus Karosszéria – és Járműgyár, 126. The proceedings lasted for 
years, with the various party organizations at different levels making decisions, and the 
appeals submitted by those effected in the case of party members who had taken part in 
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however, was that only half of the manufacturing work (or during the most 
productive periods only two- thirds) carried out was in accordance with an ap-
propriate operations plan.15 According to a domestic affairs report on Zerko-
vitz’s performance at the time, he would allow the work (being carried out in 
order to reach the goals set by the authorities) to fall behind during normal 
working hours. In this way, he would then need the employees to work over-
time, for which they were naturally paid more, thus incurring additional costs 
for the factory and the state.16 It is quite possible that Zerkovitz used this strat-
egy to alleviate tensions at the factory concerning wages, which also at least in 
part explains why, during the revolution, he was one of the factory leaders who 
were able to remain in their position. Indeed, he even gained some room for 
manoeuvre. As someone who had the trust of the workers, he was able to push 
through personnel changes at the plant’s head of department level during the 
revolution.17
A source that was produced after 1956 sheds light from a distinctive per-
spective on the earlier problems with production in the factory. In 1958, the 
regular annual factory assessment again noted serious failings at Ikarus, for 
which the management was blamed. Chief engineer Antal Hirmann, who was 
Zerkovitz’s successor, wrote a long report dated 31 December 1958 in which he 
offered an explanation in a very personal tone. According to Hirmann’s report, 
the “counterrevolutionary events of 1956 had a decisive effect on life at the fac-
tory. Precisely for this reason, I must touch on operations at the factory before 
1956”. Hirmann, who had worked at the factory before 1956, did not dispute 
the contentions that were made in the annual assessment. He merely felt that 
these observations could only be understood properly if seen in their historical 
context. That is, with some grasp of operations at the factory before 1956 and 
 15 Hungarian National Archives box xxix F 187  – r 178. Ikarus Bodywork and Motorized 
Vehicle Factory. The reports drawn up after factory assessments in previous years (which 
are also held in this box in the archive) clearly reveal that the factory was continuously 
struggling with major losses. After nationalization, it was given a large injection of capital 
in order to settle debts from the previous period and to address the lack of floating capital, 
but capital remained a problem and every year new subsidies were given, even though the 
volume of production grew quickly. In financial terms, the plant was not viable.
 16 Historical Archives of the Hungarian State Security 3.19. V- 141867. The investigation dos-
sier on Dr Emil Hant and Associates.
 17 According to the report submitted by resident “Rezső Németh”, Zerkovitz often put the 
managing director of the company in a difficult position when he let employees work 
overtime in order to complete a task or promised to give workers bonuses for which no 
money had been set aside by the people in charge of budgeting. Thus, the managing 
director (whichever one happened to be holding the position at a given time), who was 
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an understanding of the consequences of the revolution. The most significant 
problem, according to the assessment, was that buses were being produced 
without the necessary documents for the plans and the methods involved. 
There were no technical drawings illustrating the processes for assembling the 
various parts, nor was there even a proper inventory of the parts that needed 
to be assembled. These failings led to problems with the quality of the buses 
that were produced, and significant inconsistencies, meaning that there were 
undocumented variations in one model of bus. Models that were manufac-
tured and delivered, and were in principle part of the same series, were in fact 
not identical.
Hirmann offered an explanation that concerned the circumstances at the 
factory before 1956. The plant did indeed produce the models in the series, 
which were manufactured in relatively small numbers, “under the oversight 
of several of the superb engineers at the plant … and a relatively large number 
(considering the number of vehicles manufactured) of first- class skilled work-
ers” without the technical documentation that would have been necessary for 
standardized production. According to Hirmann, they simply did not have the 
capacity to produce the technical drawings that would have been necessary 
as a form of detailed documentation, since they would have had to produce 
the corresponding technical drawings and descriptions for several different 
smaller series (50 per cent of which were made for military purposes). Hir-
mann insisted that the management had indeed sought to enforce discipline, 
compelling employees to adhere strictly to the expectations placed on them, 
but “this ambition was also defeated by the opposition with which it was met 
in the workshop”. In other words, when it came to the production of buses, the 
plant relied to a large extent on the experience and knowledge of its engineers, 
and first and foremost its skilled labourers, who performed the tasks they were 
assigned without precise documentation. The production of the motor vehi-
cles, or more precisely, the assembly of principal parts that were produced 
elsewhere, and the manufacture of the bodywork (the only part of the vehi-
cles that Ikarus actually manufactured) rested on an industrial work culture in 
which the bodywork mechanics were the key figures. At the plant, they were 
referred to as “emperors of sheet metal”, able to produce any type of bodywork 
panel with a small amount of mechanized labour.18 Clearly, they were people 
 18 Pál Michelberger makes mention of the “emperors of sheet metal”. Michelberger 
started working at Ikarus after 1956, and he later became one of the directors of the 
so- called Public Roads Motorized Vehicle Development Programme. As part of this 
programme, at Ikarus  – where changes had been made to attain the highest possi-
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who did not consider the technical documentation, which specified precise 
standards, terribly important. As Hirmann remarked in his report,
the workers consider the documentation completely unnecessary, and 
only after considerable re- educational work has been done will they be 
persuaded to consider this question important to them, since at the mo-
ment they see only the unpleasant side . … This leads to particularly chal-
lenging problems in the case of a few of the old trained labourers who 
really can work.19
The production capacity and work culture at Ikarus were consequences of the 
economic circumstances during the war. The employees who were part of this 
culture had worked at the plant either during the war (for instance Cséfalvay, 
whose knowledge of engineering was highly valued by his successors)20 or im-
mediately after it.
2 The Revolutionary Events and Their Aftermath
For the most part, work at the factory came to a halt in the immediate wake of 
the events of 23 October 1956. In response to the news concerning the political 
upheavals, many employees did not go to their workplace. On 28 October, a 
workers’ council was formed at the Ikarus factory, in which the managing di-
rector and other members of the factory leadership took part. Originally, this 
was on the initiative of the ruling party itself, as was the case at other factories. 
The regime hoped that the factory workers’ councils would serve as buttresses 
against armed insurrections. Ultimately, things went very differently, since the 
factory workers’ councils across the country ended up supporting the demands 
of the revolution. These demands included holding people who had taken part 
produced. See Pál Michelberger, “Előszó [Preface]”, in Földön – vízen – levegőben. Uhri 
testvérek története 1941– 1942 [On the Ground – In the Water – In the Air. The Story of 
Uhri Brothers, 1941– 1942], ed. Finta László (Budapest: Finta László, n.d.). Michelberger 
later became the dean of the Faculty of Transportation Engineering at the Budapest 
University of Technology, and subsequently rector of the university. See the collec-
tion of interviews with him, Zsuzsa Szentgyörgyi, Mérnök  – tudós  – iskolateremtő. 
Michelberger Pál és kora [Engineer – Scholar – School Creator. Pál Michelberger and his 
Era] (Budapest: Typotex, 2008).
 19 Hirmann’s report. Hungarian National Archives, xxix F 187 –  r 178.
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in the earlier regime responsible, arranging elections and, first and foremost, 
the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary.21
According to Balogh’s later confession to the investigators, the first work-
ers’ council at the Ikarus plant had not been elected. It had instead been ap-
pointed, because on that particular day (28 October) there had been very few 
workers in the factory. Balogh had been entrusted essentially with the posi-
tion of chairman by members of the company management. We do not know 
why someone who had been employed as a mechanic at the Ikarus factory 
was considered suitable for this role. Two days later, when there were more 
workers at the plant, they demanded that the members of the council should 
introduce themselves at an assembly, and when some of the names were an-
nounced, the workers expressed their disapproval with vehement jeers. A new 
workers’ council was chosen the same day.22 The managing director and peo-
ple in his close circle were not elected, but Balogh remained as chairman. On 11 
November (after the launch of the Soviet counteroffensive), another workers’ 
council was elected, and again Balogh remained the chairman. The council 
had 53 members. Indeed, the organizational culture of the party seems to have 
had an influence on the workers, because they also elected 29 alternate mem-
bers.23 This relatively large body elected an 11- member presidium, which from 
the last days of October onwards (when the person who had previously held 
the position of managing director stopped going to the factory), dealt with the 
affairs of the company. According to data later compiled by the political police, 
skilled labourers formed the vast majority of the 83- member council. There 
were very few so- called “déclassé elements” among them. In the usage of the 
Hungarian regime in the 1950s, this term referred to former army officers and 
members of the middle classes who had lost their former positions and had 
 21 A collection of memoirs and interviews with the one- time leaders of the workers’ coun-
cil, “Szuronyok hegyén nem lehet dolgozni”. Válogatás, “1956- os munkástanács- vezetők 
visszaemlékezéseiből [One Cannot Work at the Tip of a Bayonet”. Selections from the 
Memoirs of the 1956 Workers’ Council Leaders] (Budapest: Századvég K., 1993), 148– 167. 
See in particular the interview with Sándor Rácz, chairman of the Workers’ Council of 
Greater Budapest, 148– 167.
 22 Similar processes took place at other enterprises. Workers’ councils were created from 
above at first, and the leaders of the enterprise also served on them. A few days later, a 
new workers’ council would be elected, on which the representatives of the plant manage-
ment did not serve. Attila Szakolczai, “A győri vagongyár munkástanács: Bevezető tanul-
mány [The Workers’ Council of the Győr Railway Coach Factory. Introductory Essay]”, 
in A győri vagongyár munkástanácsa. Dokumentumok [The Workers’ Council of the Győr 
Railway Coach Factory], ed. Attila Szakolczai (Győr: Attila Szakolczai, 2007), 9– 46.
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become workers of some sort, but who were still regarded as potential enemies 
of the socialist state. Most of the people on the council were from working- 
class families or families with peasant backgrounds, and as far as their edu-
cation was concerned, this comprised only the vocational training they had 
been given after having completed elementary school.24 The chairman, Ignác 
Balogh, was born in 1925 in Szamosszeg, a small village in eastern Hungary. He 
was a child of a peasant with just over four hectares of land. In 1944, Balogh 
had been given a position at the company that would later become Ikarus. In 
1948, after the two workers’ parties had been united, he had not been admitted 
into the new Hungarian Workers’ Party, which meant he was also dismissed 
from his position.25 After having worked in various other places, in 1954 he 
was given a job at Ikarus again. Grandics, who as mentioned earlier served as 
deputy chairman of the council, was the chairman of the factory committee 
in the company which later became Ikarus, and he too had been a member 
of the Social Democratic Party. Like Balogh, he had not been welcomed as a 
member of the new Hungarian Workers’ Party, though oddly enough, he was 
eventually allowed to join in September 1956 (one month before the outbreak 
of the revolution), when the decision originally made in 1948 was re- examined 
and he was rehabilitated.
The workers’ council dealt at least in part with the economic affairs of the 
factory, for instance delivering the buses that had been ordered and finding 
solutions to enable the factory to pay wages. However, it also dealt with ques-
tions that belonged to the pressing topics of national politics at the time, as 
well as personnel issues within the company. The Ikarus workers’ council un-
questionably took a clear stance on questions that were unrelated to the facto-
ry itself, and it very clearly adopted positions in support of the revolution and 
in opposition to the Soviet intervention. The workers’ council for district xvi, 
consisting of delegates sent from the factories in the area, was also formed in 
the Ikarus plant, since it was the largest enterprise in the district. Balogh be-
came the chairman of this council as well, which also enabled him to become a 
 24 Historical Archives of the Hungarian State Security 3.1.9. V- 150384/ 5. Budapest. Summary 
report of the vi/ 2. group of the Political Investigative Division of the Police Headquarters 
on the Workers’ Council of the Ikarus Bodywork and Motor Vehicle Factory. 29 September 
1959. Even when this report was issued, almost three years after the suppression of the 
revolution, the political police still felt that the “object remains a fairly infectious area 
from the perspective of the enemy”.
 25 The same thing happened to János Vörös, who had served as the secretary of the party 
organization of the Social Democratic Party at the company, and also to some of his col-
leagues when the two parties were unified. See Bódy, “Egy szocialista járműipari vállalat” 
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member of the Greater Budapest Workers’ Council. The Ikarus workers’ coun-
cil received leaflets from the Greater Budapest Workers’ Council, of which it 
made copies that were then distributed among workers in the factory. Balogh 
often took part in sittings of the Greater Budapest Council. He brought leaflets 
from the council meetings to the factory and read out the resolutions over the 
public address system.26 The Central Workers’ Council emerged as the body 
that, for a few weeks at least, functioned as a form of parallel power in oppo-
sition to the Kádár government, even after the Soviet soldiers had defeated 
the uprising and put an end to armed resistance. The Ikarus workers’ council 
called for a boycott of the official newspapers of the Kádár regime, and in re-
sponse to an appeal by the Greater Budapest Workers’ Council in December, it 
actually organized a strike. Initially, it also attempted to hamper any organiza-
tional efforts on the part of the Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party within the 
company, when it tried to refuse to give the party organization any space in 
which to operate within the plant. The workers’ council drafted, printed and 
distributed leaflets on 30 October and 13 November. These leaflets expressed 
the Ikarus factory employees’ views and demands, which included the with-
drawal of Soviet troops. In the case of the second batch of leaflets, printed after 
the Soviet attack, the demands also included the reinstatement of the Imre 
Nagy government, more specifically the last embodiment of this government, 
comprising a coalition of parties that had been revived.27
However, in addition to the stance adopted by the Ikarus workers’ council 
to general political questions, it is also worth taking into consideration its ac-
tivities within the factory, since the support of the broader segments of the 
workers definitely depended in no small part on them. The council had to have 
this support in order to maintain its presence in the factory from the end of 
October 1956 until March 1957, especially taking into consideration the fact 
that the regime forcefully rid itself of the Central Workers’ Council on 11 De-
cember 1956.
As far as changes within the factory were concerned, the council seems to 
have been led by a desire to see “justice” done in response to earlier events 
and processes. As part of this, on 31 October, the presidium of the workers’ 
 26 Historical Archives of the Hungarian State Security 3.19. V- 141867. The investigation dos-
sier on Dr Emil Hant and Associates.
 27 Several parties were formed during the revolution, among them parties that had enjoyed 
widespread support in the period between 1945 and 1948, when they had formed the gov-
erning coalition. During the revolution, Imre Nagy, who was a member of the communist 
party, accepted a position at the head of a coalition government consisting of delegates 
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council banned 38 employees from the plant, including the former director. As 
the list was being compiled, the head of the personnel division was summoned 
to appear before the council. He had been asked to name people in individual 
departments who had been stool pigeons. Undoubtedly alarmed by the course 
of events, the man did name a few people who were then added to the list of 
those to be banned. Essentially, all the members of the workers’ council made 
suggestions concerning individuals from their spheres of work who should be 
banned. The council accepted the suggestions, though most of them did not 
actually know the individuals in question; only the person making the pro-
posal. In an attempt to justify himself, Hant later alleged to the investigators 
that the people whose names had ended up on the list would have been at risk 
had they gone to the plant during the revolution, and thus the decision to ban 
them had actually been in their best interests. Patek simply contended that 
these “people had been banned from the factory because, as a consequence of 
their conduct in the earlier period, they had lost the trust of the workers”.28 The 
list was signed by Balogh and his deputy, Béla Grandics, and was displayed on 
the notice board and the factory gates. According to some of the confessions 
made after the revolution, the factory guards were given instructions not to let 
the people on the list into the plant, but whether this actually happened is a 
question that remained unresolved in the proceedings of the political police. 
While the list was being compiled, the workers’ council had also taken steps to 
seize the material in the personnel division, a measure that was implemented 
by council member Patek. Anyone who came to claim his or her professional 
documents and records was given them. The rest of the material was destroyed 
in the presence of witnesses. The delivery of personnel records to those con-
cerned or the destruction of this material (which was a type of shared ritual 
of the revolution) was a symbolic act of the liberation of the individual from 
control from above and the triumph over fear.
These events, which historians can reconstruct on the basis of confessions 
later made to the police, show that the workers’ council took measures against 
people who were regarded by its members as “communists”. However, this 
term was not understood as a matter of ideological conviction. During the rev-
olution, they regarded the leaders of the factory who had been appointed by 
the higher management as “communist” enemies, who had forced measures 
intended to increase production. This included wanting to transform work 
practices based on the expertise of the skilled labourers towards production 
 28 Confession of Alajos Patek, 18 April 1957. Historical Archives of the Hungarian State 
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technologies that were more standardized and relied much less on individual 
contributions. The desire of the workers to maintain as much control as they 
could over the work practices was in harmony with the efforts of the engineers, 
whose goal was not to increase production from the perspective of quantity, 
but to produce new models which met high standards of quality. During the 
revolution, these two groups that shared common interests were able to take 
active steps and free themselves from the “communist” management. The 
workers were not enamoured of this management, which sought to maintain 
control over them and over production that was hardly innovative in terms of 
the technologies and expertise involved.
The workers were linked by the training they had received as skilled labour-
ers, the similar positions they had held at the company and – at least some of 
them – by their membership of the Social Democratic Party before it had been 
essentially dissolved by the Communist Party. Between 1945 and 1948, Zerkov-
itz had also been a member of the Social Democratic Party, but he had become 
a member of the Hungarian Workers’ Party immediately upon its founding, 
without any interruption in his status as a party member. Thus, the people who 
were active in the factory during the revolution seem for the most part at one 
time to have been members of the Social Democratic Party, and this clearly 
constituted a shared experience and common link. Cséfalvay, who had orig-
inally been a member of the Hungarian Communist Party, was an exception, 
having worked in the factory from the beginning of the Second World War. 
Alajos Patek was the only one of those arrested in the trial against the “counter- 
revolutionaries” at Ikarus who had never been a member of the Social Demo-
cratic Party or any political party. However – in common with the others who 
had accusations levelled against them  – he had worked at the factory since 
1940, although in the autumn of 1944 (during the Nazi occupation of Hungary), 
the Arrow Cross authorities had briefly arrested him because he had hampered 
the delivery of machines from the factory to Germany, that had been ordered 
by the Nazi authorities. Thus, during the revolution, the management of the 
factory ended up in the hands of people who, for the most part, had been work-
ing at the plant during the war (Balogh, Grandics, Patek and Cséfalvay) or who 
had been given positions in the immediate aftermath of it (Zerkovitz), and 
who at some point had been members of the Social Democratic Party (with the 
exception of Cséfalvay and Patek).29
 29 As Standeisky has observed, in some revolutionary committees, people who had been 
active in the so- called coalition period immediately after the war also came into the fore-
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During January 1957, by which time the Kádár regime has consolidated its hold 
on power, the Ikarus workers’ council clearly refrained from taking any official 
political stance, although according to the political police, even then the “compo-
sition of the wc [Workers’ Council] was bad”. Again according to the information 
gathered by the police, in February the council was still trying to dismiss “commu-
nists” under the pretext of downsizing.30 On 7 March 1957, sensing that it was be-
ing rendered powerless, the council resigned; or to be more precise, the presidium 
resigned. This did not save the most important leaders of the council or the peo-
ple in their immediate circle from being arrested; even while a new council was 
being elected, comprising people acceptable to the regime. On 13 and 14 March, 
Ignác Balogh, Emil Hant and Erzsébet Alberti were taken into custody, as was Ala-
jos Patek on 1 April. Trials were launched against these four individuals for the 
“counterrevolutionary” events that had allegedly taken place at Ikarus. However, 
many other people were interned, including István Balázs, who had served as the 
commander of the factory guards during the days of the revolution. They were 
among the 26 people mentioned in the aforementioned monograph who were 
arrested, but in the course of the repressive measures taken by the regime in the 
months following the revolution, it was Balogh, Hant, Alberti and Patek who were 
condemned for “counterrevolutionary” activities at the Ikarus plant.
The investigation relied on interrogations of the detainees and witnesses, 
material evidence that had been gathered and searches of premises, includ-
ing the private residences of the accused. The political police considered the 
confessions made by the accused and the witnesses statements (which were 
supposedly compared in an effort to ensure their reliability), together with the 
material evidence (which included leaflets and stencil machines), adequate 
proof that the accused were indeed guilty of having committed “counterrevo-
lutionary acts”.
On 18 October 1957, the court of first instance pronounced its verdict. Ba-
logh was sentenced to three years in prison and a fine of 400 forint, Patek was 
sentenced to two years in prison and a fine of 600 forint, Hant was sentenced 
to two years and six months in prison and a fine of 1,000 forint, and Alberti – a 
typist who had kept the minutes during the sittings of the workers’ council 
and had taken part in the duplication of the leaflets – was sentenced to seven 
months in prison.31 In the case of Balogh, the court recognized as a mitigating 
 30 Historical Archives of the Hungarian State Security 3.1.5. O- 11804/ 1. Reports of the iv divi-
sion of the ii department of the National Police Headquarters from 4 January and 22 
February 1957.
 31 According to the verdict, Balogh, Patek and Hant were guilty of having taken active part 
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circumstance that apart from his training as a skilled labourer, he had no ed-
ucation other than elementary school. Further, he had not been a figure who 
had incited or initiated insurrection, unlike the intellectuals who had led the 
company during the “counter revolution”. This again raises the question of why 
Zerkovitz, who was one of these intellectuals, was not among the accused. 
On 3 March 1958, after appeals had been submitted by the prosecution and 
the defence, the Supreme Court announced its verdict. Balogh’s sentence was 
unchanged and Patek’s prison sentence was increased to four years and his 
fine to 1,000 forint. Hant’s prison sentence was increased to 10 years and all of 
his property was confiscated. From the perspective of the regime, which was 
eager to consolidate its hold on power, this made perfect sense. As the court 
explained in its verdict, it regarded Hant as the leader in spirit of the coun-
terrevolutionary events at Ikarus. Alberti’s sentence was changed to one year 
in prison, and she was put on probation for three years (she had essentially 
already spent a year in custody by then).32
Other people could just have easily been chosen as scapegoats. As became 
clear on the basis of other confessions, from late October, Zerkovitz did indeed 
oversee the actual work of the factory, but he also took part in political acts. 
These included the drafting of leaflets, compiling the list of people who were 
banned from the plant and organizing the strike. As the chief engineer, Zerko-
vitz submitted suggestions to the workers’ council concerning the replacement 
of two division leaders and the head of the personnel division; proposals that 
the council accepted. Zerkovitz also painted one of the leaflets issued by the 
central workers’ committee onto a billboard and put it on the notice board. 
guilty of aiding and abetting theft (because of the stolen stencil machine), and Hant was 
guilty of having served as an accessory to theft. Alberti was found guilty of having com-
mitted incitement against the people’s democracy (i.e. the letters she had written to her 
two friends).
 32 This summary of the events that took place at Ikarus during the revolution is based on the 
material from the investigation carried out by the political police, and documents from 
the subsequent trial. In all likelihood, it is not entirely reliable or complete. However, as 
far as the most important events are concerned, it is probably accurate, at least broadly, 
even if the confessions do not agree on every point. These differences may simply be 
due to the natural and inevitable differences in the ways in which people recall the same 
events, or they may be consequences of attempts on the part of the accused (and in part 
the witnesses) to defend themselves. It is likely, however, that some of the events or some 
of the acts committed by various figures did not come to the knowledge of the political 
police or were deliberately ignored. As noted, the sources offer no explanation for why 
Zerkovitz was not among the accused, nor do they explain why the authorities showed no 
interest in Cséfalvay, who had been a member of the Hungarian Communist Party since 
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Zerkovitz, as part of the management of the plant, was present at every sitting 
of the council. The police officer in charge of the investigation even suggested 
to his superior that he “try to broaden the case with the inclusion of Zerkov-
itz”.33 On 18 April 1957, a “summary report on the case of Béla Zerkovitz” was 
issued, according to which, “on the basis of the above, in our view, Béla Zerkov-
itz can be remanded into custody”.34 However, he spent only one day in custo-
dy and was then released. Considering that there were suspicions concerning 
Zerkovitz a good four years before the outbreak of the revolution, it is all the 
more surprising that no case was brought against him in 1957.35 He was also 
not among the accused in the trial of those allegedly responsible for “coun-
terrevolutionary” acts at Ikarus, in spite of the fact that several witnesses con-
tended he had taken part in the drafting of both leaflets, had initiated changes 
in personnel and had been the leader in spirit of the workers’ council. A worker 
in the factory who went by the code name “Rezső Németh” also contended 
this. Neither the documents used in the course of the investigation nor later 
material concerning Zerkovitz held in the historical archives of the Hungarian 
state security reveal why he was not in the end included among the accused.36 
He was compelled to leave Ikarus, but for him, that was the only consequence 
of the revolution.37
 33 Historical Archives of the Hungarian State Security 3.19. V- 141867. The investigation dos-
sier on Dr. Emil Hant and Associates. A suggestion was made in connection with the “H” 
report submitted by resident “Rezső Németh” as part of the further additional measures.
 34 Historical Archives of the Hungarian State Security 3.19. V- 141867. The investigation dos-
sier on Dr. Emil Hant and Associates.
 35 The earlier material concerning Zerkovitz (reports submitted by agents and expert 
assessments of the mistakes he allegedly made) were lost during the revolution. When 
the investigation was launched against him in 1957, the facts that allegedly spoke against 
him were based on the knowledge of the officials working on his case. Historical Archives 
of the Hungarian State Security 3.19. V- 141867. The investigation dossier on Dr. Emil Hant 
and Associates.
 36 There were other individuals against whom accusations could easily have been brought, 
but who were also left out of the trial. Their cases are as difficult to explain as that of 
Zerkovitz, if not necessarily as striking. The accusations brought against Hant included 
the charge that, after the Soviet forces attacked on 4 November, he had hidden a sten-
cil machine with the intention of later using it to duplicate leaflets. No charges were 
brought, however, against the person who took the machine from an office of the Union 
of Working Youth during the revolution and hid it, at Hant’s suggestion.
 37 In a letter dated 15 April 1957 and addressed to the Minister of Metallurgy and Engineering, 
the chairman of the executive committee of the Ikarus organization of the Hungarian 
Socialist Workers’ Party, the director of the factory and the chairman of the new workers’ 
council (which was loyal to the regime) asked that Zerkovitz be removed from Ikarus. 
They contended that he was unable to perform the organizational tasks of a chief engi-
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3 The Ikarus Factory after the Revolution
During the revolution, engineers with considerable experience and firm views 
concerning the production of vehicles  – such as Cséfalvay and Zerkovitz  – 
were able to play roles and were even able to act independently of the Ikarus 
former management, which had been appointed by the Ministry of Metallur-
gy and Engineering. They found partners among the skilled labourers, whose 
trust they clearly enjoyed.
The defeat of the revolution caused this circle to disperse. Zerkovitz man-
aged somehow to avoid being brought up on charges, but he was not allowed 
to remain at Ikarus. Cséfalvay was also forced to leave the factory in 1957. 
Of the people who had served on the workers’ council or had played signifi-
cant roles in its operations, only Grandics remained at Ikarus, though he was 
demoted from workshop director to a mere worker. Many others outside of 
this circle left Ikarus (and perhaps the country). Hirmann’s abovementioned 
report offers the following description of the situation. The “number of peo-
ple working as designers, production engineers, and foremen, which was al-
ready low, suffered a serious loss because of the counterrevolution, a loss 
which I don’t need to describe in detail here”.38 These changes meant that the 
very model of production at the factory – which was based on the expertise 
of skilled labourers with experience in the fundamental work processes of 
bus manufacture, and which also involved continuous strife over wages and 
overtime pay – underwent a significant transformation because of the 1956 
revolution. As Hirmann laments, with the loss of experienced skilled labour-
ers and the core of specialists, it became impossible to continue production 
within the framework of the work culture that had existed before the revolu-
tion. This resulted both in failures in the planning and testing of new models 
(as mentioned earlier) and continuous problems with the manufacture of 
the models that were already in production. Hirmann offered the follow-
ing description of the relationship between the engineering staff, many of 
whom were new, and the old skilled labourers: “since they have already seen 
many solutions, they think, ‘what is this young engineer or technician doing 
explaining things to me, when I  was making much better stuff back when 
he was still a kid’”. The undated record books of a later factory assessment, 
who, one could easily sense, “would prefer to work in the service of the other system”. 
Historical Archives of the Hungarian State Security 3.1.5. O – 16656/ 15. Dossier on Béla 
István Zerkovitz.
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probably from the late 1950s, noted the lack of competent skilled labour-
ers, and it insisted on the importance of regular production as the primary 
goal. Production was constantly interrupted and constantly falling behind. 
As a consequence of this, some of the individual factory units did not have 
anything to do at times, while at other times, they had to complete a huge 
amount of work relatively quickly.
Thus, though it unquestionably improved from the perspective of quality, 
production at Ikarus did not actually show “amazing development” – even be-
fore 1956 – since the company suffered continuous financial losses and there 
were always serious tensions among the employees and management that hin-
dered production. After 1956, with the removal of many of the engineers and 
skilled labourers who had overseen manufacture, production along the lines of 
the earlier model was no longer possible at all. The old guard of skilled labour-
ers end technical experts had enjoyed some degree of independence. Some 
of them, for example Cséfalvay, had belonged to the Hungarian Communist 
Party. In the wake of the revolution, however, many of them disappeared from 
the workplace, and others simply had their will broken. These changes gave 
the new management more power in its dealings with the workers, and also 
cleared the way for a new generation of engineers. The “two sides” that had 
earlier stood in opposition to each other at Ikarus – with a little oversimpli-
fication, employees who had begun their careers at the company owned by 
the Uhri brothers during the war, and those who had been made part of the 
management in the 1950s – disappeared as clearly defined opposing groups. 
One of the paradoxes of the revolution is that the young engineers brought 
in to replace people who had been dismissed from their posts at the factory 
also lost their positions because of the events of the revolution. Most of them 
had been military engineers involved in a programme designed around 1950 in 
preparation for the outbreak of the next world war. However, after 1956, prepa-
ration for a new world war was no longer an item high on the agenda of the 
regime, which in Kádár’s quest for consolidation reduced military expenditure 
in order to fund a rapid rise in living standards. Many of the engineers whose 
training had focused primarily on military needs became superfluous, or were 
considered unreliable because of their conduct during the revolution. The Fac-
ulty of Military Engineering at the Budapest Technical University was closed. 
According to Pál Michelberger, who was a central figure among the engineers 
sent to Ikarus after the revolution (and who later had a very successful career), 
the bodywork for the busses in the period after the revolution was designed 
by aeroplane engineers and the mechanical engineering for the vehicles was 
carried out by people who had been trained as tank engineers. According to 
Michelberger,
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there was a need for a change of approach at Ikarus. Many people had 
left the country as dissidents. The aforementioned airplane engineers re-
placed them. … They brought new constructions and new attitudes. They 
merged the traditional automobile with the idea of the airplane. One or 
two good engineering technologists came who solved the technological 
problems of mass series production. They automated [production]. They 
had tricks that you would not have been able to use for small production 
series. It was not for nothing that the 200 series was in production … for 
20 years.39
However, the new management and engineering staff only became able to 
tackle the complexities of production when, thanks to new investment – first 
in the paint shop and then in the production of bodywork with the use of 
large- capacity stamping machines – it managed to introduce a new industrial 
work culture. This made it possible to produce significantly larger series, in 
part by relying significantly less on the experience and expertise of skilled 
workers (though of course new problems emerged). Thus, the events of the 
revolution made it possible, or even necessary, to introduce change in the pro-
duction technology at Ikarus. With what amounted essentially to the destruc-
tion of the work culture that had previously prevailed, it was simply no longer 
possible to continue production according to the methods and technologies 
that had been in use. This, however, belongs to the history of the investment 
programme of the 1960s, which was founded on a fundamentally technocratic 
vision.40
4 Conclusions
In 1956, a significant number of the employees at the Ikarus factory clearly 
took positions. These positions touched on the major political questions of the 
revolution, but they also constituted stances with regard to the representatives 
of power at the factory itself. The group or network of workers and staff who 
were moved to act were linked by shared experiences before the nationaliza-
tion of the plant. The tools with which the regime sought to compel workers 
to perform more effectively and efficiently set them against the system. They 
 39 Szentgyörgyi, Mérnök – tudós – iskolateremtő, 139.
 40 See Zsombor Bódy, “Enthralled by Size. Business History or History of the Technocracy in 
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put up lasting resistance to the changes that were implemented from above, 
and they insisted – at least as far as they were able to – on supervising and 
maintaining control over the work processes themselves. The engineering staff 
at the plant who disagreed with the higher bodies of economic policy on tech-
nical questions, shared their stance. During the revolution, they were able to 
take power into their own hands. It took the new factory leadership, which had 
been appointed by the Kádár government after the suppression of the revolu-
tion by the Soviet forces, months to eliminate the workers’ council at Ikarus 
as an alternative centre of power. The series of events also made it necessary, 
however, for the factory to recruit a new circle of engineers and adopt new 
production techniques and technologies. These did not rely nearly so heavily 
on skilled labour, and gave workers far less leeway in the supervision of the 
production processes. The annual factory reports (and the monograph on the 
history of the enterprise) note that in the late 1950s and early 1960s, the level 
of turnover among the workers was very high; in three years, it amounted to 
75 per cent of the workforce. This shows that the workers, who enjoyed less 
control over production practices than had earlier been the case, had a weaker 
attachment to the factory. In addition, they were less likely to address their 
concerns within the factory by adopting collective strategies, which given the 
new level of technological automation, would no longer have been possible. In 
the search for better prospects, they were more likely simply to look for better 
job offers.41 This process was part of the larger effort of the Kádár regime to 
atomise society itself.42
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 chapter 6
The Antinomy of Workers’ Control in Socialist 
Eastern Europe
Adrian Grama
How might the experiences of East European workers between 1945 and 1989 
fit into a general history of the left in the twentieth century?1 Writing in the 
mid- 1990s, the great Italian trade union leader Bruno Trentin offered one pos-
sible answer. La Città del lavoro, his bitter indictment of the Western European 
labour movement’s failure to respond to the crisis of Fordism, makes the story 
of state socialism central to understanding the setback of trade unionism after 
the 1970s.2 The book narrates an all too familiar history of defeat: the increased 
mobility of capital after the termination of Bretton Woods, coupled with the 
emergence of transnational value chains and the relocation of production 
away from the core industrialized countries spelled the end of Fordism as a 
model of growth rooted in a specific “post- war” social order.3 Against this back-
ground, according to Trentin, trade unions found themselves confronted with 
a double challenge. First, in Italy and other West European countries, the sheer 
range of employment relations expanded to accommodate new forms of less 
secure, more precarious work contracts. Second, inside factories, management 
successfully secured control of the production process, reorganizing work 
teams, pushing for speed- ups and redesigning work schedules.
Less familiar is Trentin’s explanation for the historical failure of the labour 
movement to negotiate a favourable transition out of Fordism.4 This failure 
 1 For comments and criticism, I thank Goran Musić, Ștefan Guga, Andrei State, Pieter Troch, 
the members of the social anthropology study group at the Graduate School for East and 
Southeast European Studies in Regensburg/ Munich and last but not least the editors of this 
volume.
 2 Bruno Trentin, La città del lavoro: Sinistra e crisi del fordismo (Milan: Feltrinelli, 1997).
 3 From a vast body of literature, see Andrew Glyn, Capitalism Unleashed: Finance, Globaliza-
tion, and Welfare (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 104– 129; Jeffry A. Frieden, Global 
Capitalism: Its Fall and Rise in the Twentieth Century (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 
2007), 363– 385; Robert Brenner, The Economics of Global Turbulence: The Advanced Capitalist 
Economies from Long Boom to Long Downturn, 1945– 2005 (London: Verso, 2006), 145– 229.
 4 It falls outside the scope of this article to evaluate Trentin’s overarching argument about the 
historical trajectory of the left in the twentieth century. It is worth noting that La Città del 
lavoro is a polemical book, deeply rooted in the Italian debates of the 1970s and Trentin’s 
© Adrian Grama, 2021 | DOI:10.1163/9789004440395_008
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was not merely contingent on national contexts and economic sectors, but 
structural, grounded in the original sin of its early twentieth- century founding 
fathers, Lenin and Gramsci. Trentin argued that this was because irrespective 
of their differences, the two shared a fascination for Taylorism and Fordism as 
the embodiment of science and progress. Their combined legacy, in the East 
and the West, was an across- the- board acceptance of both Taylorism and Ford-
ism as neutral production technologies that could generate economic growth, 
when placed under collective property regimes.5 Their followers throughout 
the century – whether communist parties in power in the Soviet Union after 
1921 and Eastern Europe after 1947, or socialist parties partaking in the post- 
war economic boom of Western Europe – carried on from this initial fascina-
tion, adapting variants of scientific management and borrowing the toolkit of 
Fordism to fashion planned and market economies alike. Western European 
trade unions, according to Trentin, turned their attention away from the facto-
ry floor and enthusiastically supported various productivity bargains well into 
the 1970s, making wages and working time the cornerstone of their struggles. 
These redistributive strategies left union leaders unprepared to grasp the crisis 
own experiences within the Italian (communist) labour movement. A critique of Trentin’s 
book would arguably focus on his narrow conception of Fordism, his sidelining of social- 
democracy and of the various experiments with the humanization of labour relations during 
the postwar epoch. Moreover, such a critique would also call for a more encompassing notion 
of “the left” that can accommodate its manifold traditions.
 5 Trentin understood Fordism much along the lines sketched by Antonio Gramsci in the early 
1920s. From this point of view, Fordism was on the one hand a technology of production 
defined by the large- scale, vertically integrated industrial plant, standardized production 
and the assembly line. On the other hand, Fordism was also a technology of mass con-
sumption, to the extent that it pioneered higher wages and directly helped the expansion 
of nationally- embedded markets for durable goods. For Trentin, however, Fordism also rest-
ed on a trade- off between higher wages and higher productivity in which the former were 
seen as a precondition for the latter. The notion of “workers’ control” denoted this precise 
trade- off – workers’ shop- floor solidarity had to be constantly dislodged (or at least fought 
against) in order for the assembly line to run according to managerial imperatives rather 
than workers’ established work routines and rhythms. See, first, Antonio Gramsci, “Amer-
icanism and Fordism”, in Selections from the Prison Notebooks, trans. ed. Quinn Hoare and 
Geoffrey Smith (New York: International Publishers, 1971), 277– 318. For Trentin’s uses of the 
concept, see Mimmo Carrieri, “Tra politica e organizzazione del lavoro: Fordismo da regolare, 
Taylorismo da controllare”, in Bruno Trentin: lavoro, libertà, conoscenza, ed. Alessio Gramolati 
and Giovanni Mari (Florence: Firenze University Press, 2010), 95– 106. For a partial review of 
various definitions of Fordism, see Adelheid von Saldern and Rüdiger Hachtmann, “Das ford-
istische Jahrhundert. Eine Einleitung”, Zeithistorische Forschungen 2, no. 6, (2009): 174– 185. 
For Fordism as a “regime of accumulation” that cannot explain the dynamics of a centrally 
planned economy, see Marcel Drach, “Crise du travail et non- lieu du fordisme dans les écon-
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of Fordism and the ensuing managerial revolution that transformed the dy-
namics of industrial production.
Moreover, Trentin suggested, voices critical of the acceptance of Taylorism 
and Fordism on the left were seldom given their due. Therefore, La Città del 
lavoro revisits forgotten figures such as Simone Weil and Georges Friedmann, 
both of whom allegedly better understood the darker side of celebrating the 
productive capacity of scientific management. However, Trentin was also criti-
cal of his fellow trade unionists in Italy and beyond for having ignored the writ-
ings of East European dissidents such as Rudolf Bahro and Miklós Haraszti that 
could have taught them about the “oppressive character” of such production 
technologies under state socialism.6 Lastly, Trentin’s book might be read – as 
Alain Supiot argues – as a plea to rethink the relationship between citizenship 
and work; a relationship that ought to entail remaking the factory floor into a 
terrain of the struggle for rights.7 How, then, would such a goal be served by the 
writings of these East European critics of scientific management? Or to put it 
differently, how adequate is the representation of state socialism seen through 
the writings of Bahro and Haraszti? Is Trentin’s story of a gradual loss of work-
ers’ control over the production process – however contentious for Western 
Europe after 1945 – valid for Eastern European state socialism?
The current chapter is arranged in four steps. In the first section, I show that 
the representation of the state socialist production process that one obtains 
from dissidents such as Haraszti and Bahro does not satisfactorily explain the 
dynamics of the shop floor in Eastern Europe after 1947. Because workers un-
der state socialism enjoyed a comparatively higher degree of autonomy at the 
point of production, stories of deskilling tend to distort the facts. Instead, I ar-
gue that we need to revisit the importance of skills and turn the spotlight onto 
the craft masters of the assembly lines. Conceptually, this move involves pay-
ing more attention to currently obsolete categories of analysis in global labour 
history, such as “workers’ control”. In the second section, I show how the pro-
ductivity bargain never really came to define the relationship between man-
agement and workers under state socialism. The idea of a productivity bargain 
was that higher levels of productivity, and implicitly less control over the pro-
duction process on the part of the workers, would be traded off against higher 
wages. However, this was difficult to implement under state socialism and in 
a context in which repressed consumption was the norm of capital accumu-
lation. The third section moves on to a comparative assessment of what I call 
 6 Bruno Trentin, La città del lavoro. Sinistra e crisi del fordismo (Milan: Feltrinelli, 1997), 35, 117.
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the “antinomy of workers’ control” in Eastern Europe. This antinomy refers to 
the fact that in all socialist countries of the East, reforming wage relations was 
the exclusive way of dislodging workers’ entrenched control of production. 
For central planners, workers’ autonomy on the shop floor was conducive to 
what they called “wage levelling” and “norm over- fulfilment”, accompanied by 
a supposed loss of motivation and low productivity. For industrial managers, 
workers’ autonomy was a safety net for coping with the inherent shortages 
occurring in a shortage economy. These two middle sections of the chapter 
draw on empirical material from the monitoring section of Radio Free Europe 
(rfe). Lastly, in the concluding remarks I reflect on Trentin’s interpretation of 
the fate of the left in the twentieth century in light of the trajectory of labour 
in Eastern Europe after 1989.
1 The Slightly Eerie Abstraction
It is not hard to understand what Bruno Trentin found appealing in the writ-
ings of Rudolf Bahro. On the one hand, Bahro had a good knowledge of the 
East German shop floor and, much like Trentin himself, was interested in the 
creative potential of work.8 In interviews with the West German media, Bahro 
repeatedly pointed out that East German workers suffered from a lack of work 
morale and that they were caught up in a system of “organized irresponsibil-
ity”.9 The alienating effects of Taylorism were part of the story. Yet even more 
important was the structure of politics in communist societies, with the party 
ruling hierarchically from the top down and thus curtailing any attempts to 
democratically organize the production process. On the other hand, Bahro’s 
most famous book, Die Alternative, put forward the argument that communist 
parties in power across Eastern Europe were pursuing a politics of growth that 
was antithetical to the emancipation of labour. Under state socialism, produc-
tion for the sake of production did trickle down to the workers in the form of 
mass consumption, but the price of “quantitative compensation” was political 
subordination; or what Bahro famously called Subalternität.10
 8 Rudolf Bahro, Plädoyer für schöpferische Initiative: Zur Kritik von Arbeitsbedingungen im 
real existierenden Sozialismus (Köln: Bund Verlag, 1980).
 9 See, for example, the interview with Lutz Lehmann in Rudolf Bahro, Eine Dokumentation 
(Köln: Europäische Verlangsanstalt, 1977), 98 and passim.
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In these arguments, Trentin might have found confirmation of his own in-
tuitions. Bahro’s concern with the emancipating, creative potential of work 
resonated with Trentin’s guiding idea of providing workers with the tools for 
pursuing “liberazione e autorealizzazione nel lavoro”.11 Equally important, the 
emphasis on the logic of “quantitative compensation” in Die Alternative sound-
ed remarkably similar to Trentin’s own attack on the strategy of productivity 
bargaining, through which Western trade unions gave up control of the shop 
floor in favour of higher wages and a larger share of the growth pie.12 In other 
words, the East German dissident could have been taken as criticizing a variety 
of Fordism; an impoverished one for certain – and one backed by a repressive 
political order  – but nevertheless one that could be acknowledged as such. 
Fordism, after all, had been an object of admiration, transplantation and local 
adaptation in the early Soviet Union. As Stefan Link put it, in the interwar pe-
riod, modernizers of all sorts “were attracted by the immense gains in produc-
tivity brought about through the rationalized production organization and full 
utilization of automatic machinery found in Fordism”.13 Soviet leaders dreamt 
of an “Americanized Bolshevism”, and Soviet industrial experts regarded Ford-
ism as “the decisive repudiation of craft- based principles”.14
It was therefore reasonable to assume that a variety of Fordism structured 
the planned economies of state socialism, and it was equally reasonable to ar-
gue that Taylorism ruled the socialist assembly line. Miklós Haraszti’s A Work-
er in a Worker’s State depicted a shop floor structured by an alienating form 
of remuneration – piece- work – the unfolding of which subjugated workers 
to machines, crushing them under the pressure to meet ever higher output 
targets.15 Haraszti found the piece- rate system and its associated practice of 
norm- setting to be the epitome of exploitation and the best symbol of the per-
version of socialism. During his trial in October 1973, he declared before the 
 11 Alessandro Casellato, “Bruno Trentin”, Belfagor 64, no.  3 (2009):  308 (emphasis in the 
original).
 12 Trentin describes here what Charles Maier called “the politics of productivity”, namely 
the bundle of industrial policies that underpinned the boom of the West European 
economies during the 1950s and 1960s. Charles S. Maier, “The Postwar Social Contract”, 
International Labor and Working- Class History 50 (1996): 148– 156.
 13 Stefan Link, “Transnational Fordism: Ford Motor Company, Nazi Germany, and the Soviet 
Union in the Interwar Years” (PhD Dissertation, Harvard University, 2012), 9.
 14 David E. Greenstein, “Assembling Fordizm: The Production of Automobiles, Americans, 
and Bolsheviks in Detroit and Early Soviet Russia”, Comparative Studies in Society and 
History 56, no. 2 (2014): 259– 289; Link, “Transnational Fordism”, 7.
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judge that piece- rate working was a capitalist, not a socialist institution. Yet 
the logic of the system was not merely exploitative, because no matter what 
forms of solidarity workers might develop on the shop floor, it was the sense 
of generalized powerlessness that pervaded the socialist factory. Workers had 
little control over the production process, and even less over the dynamics of 
norms and income.
This was a bleak picture indeed. In form rather than intent, Haraszti’s book 
resembled the genre of the factory reports produced by incognito activists in 
the aftermath of May 1968, of which Robert Linhart’s L’Établi is arguably the 
most famous. It went to great lengths to describe the rhythms and routines 
of the shop floor, paying attention to clues that might indicate the possibility 
for oppositional sentiment among workers.16 One reviewer noted with some 
disappointment the sheer ambiguity of this strategy:
Evil is equated with the status quo while Good is left as an undefined 
alternative. One may agree or disagree with him, but in neither case can 
one really acquire any deeper insight or understanding of the author’s 
reality – the only explanation allowed is the Evil attributed to the deus 
ex machina, be it called ‘Them’, a ‘New Ruling Class’, ‘Communist Total-
itarianism’, or whatever. At the same time, the deus ex machina quality 
that makes A Workers’ State – along with much other dissident writing – 
ultimately unsatisfying as literature is the main source of its notoriety as 
a political document: the same Manichaeism making it politically inad-
missible in the East gave it all too warm a welcome in the West.17
Literary style and political implications aside, Trentin might have cared more 
about Haraszti’s thick description of work under state socialism, notably the 
impact of Taylorism run amok.
Yet in this respect too, academic sociologists found Haraszti’s grasp of the 
shop floor problematic. Michael Burawoy, who took up work in several Hun-
garian factories during the early 1980s to test out his comparative sociology of 
“factory regimes”, found Haraszti’s book “a work of critique, not explanation”.18 
Because the book presented a “picture of atomized, oppressed, alienated, 
 16 Robert Linhart, L’Établi (Paris: Editions de Minuit, 1981). For more on the établissement 
literature in France, Italy or the United States, see the special issue dedicated to the topic 
in Les Temps Modernes, Ouvriers volontaires les années 68, 3– 4, no. 684– 685 (2015).
 17 Ellen Turkish Comisso, “A Worker in a Worker’s State”, Telos 21, no. 54 (1982): 218.
 18 Michael Burawoy and János Lukács, The Radiant Past. Ideology and Reality in Hungary’s 
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degraded working class” in order to pit it against an ideal socialist society, the 
end result could not be anything other than a description of a “homogenized 
society with no dynamics or variation”, not unlike the simplified paradigm that 
framed the research agenda for Soviet area studies in American universities 
for much of the Cold War.19 A more serious objection, however, is related to 
Haraszti’s choice to universalize his experience, implying that all work under 
state socialism resembled the bundle of characteristics he observed at the Red 
Star factory on Csepel Island. This “slightly eerie abstraction”, the editors of 
New Left Review suggested, was parallel to abstract labour itself, indicating that 
no matter how different one task is from another, labour under state social-
ism became homogeneous and thus replaceable:  “Haraszti’s silence as to its 
location emphasizes the similarity of conditions elsewhere”.20 Burawoy saw 
differently:
The most distinctive difference was our conception of social relations 
on the shopfloor. Haraszti painted a picture of atomized individuals, and 
here I  think he was projecting his own (unreflected) placement within 
the factory. As a dissident, a Jew and an intellectual, he was shunned by 
his fellow workers. He was thrown into competition with them, he was 
ruled by them, and he was most certainly not one of them. To be sure, 
I was not one of them either – but my strangeness had an appeal. They 
laughed at my inept Hungarian and at my incompetence as a machine 
operator, and I  was embraced as an exotic foreigner. Within hours of 
hitting the shopfloor, I was ringed by workers asking me about the USA. 
From my vantage point, I could see and experience the spontaneous co-
operation that made production possible in the socialist factory.21
“Spontaneous cooperation”, linked to what Burawoy would later identify as 
workers’ autonomy on the shop floor, was one side of what I  term here as 
“workers’ control”. The other side of it was, pace Haraszti’s editor at the New 
Left Review, workers’ irreplaceability; a phenomenon most clearly identified 
by another Hungarian sociologist carrying out research on Csepel Island in the 
1970s. István Kemény was equally interested in the effects of Taylorism on Hun-
garian workers, but rather than focusing on the piece rate remuneration sys-
tem, he started out from the observation that in centrally- planned economies, 
 19 Ibid.
 20 “Introduction to Miklós Haraszti”, New Left Review, no. 91 (May- June, 1975): 6.
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the more rigid the plan is, the more flexible the production process becomes. 
In this context, it was the practical knowledge, autonomy and initiative of the 
skilled workers that kept production going amidst shortages galore. Without 
doubt, Kemény’s workers were equally as exploited as were Haraszti’s; their la-
bour on the assembly line was monotonous and repetitive, while their official 
wages could barely keep them above the poverty line. In reaction to these grim 
circumstances, two intertwined processes took shape: first, skilled workers en-
gaged in extra hours, working well beyond the eight- hour legal norm in order 
to boost their take- home pay; second, the very same skilled workers exercised 
a high degree of control over the rhythms of the production process:
Most every gesture is indeed mechanical, but the general deployment 
of work is not. From a certain point of view, workers are able to control 
what they are doing on the shop floor, yet their work is less easily con-
trollable. They have come to master every detail that pertains to the pace 
of work. It is during extra hours that they can better control and adjust 
the pace of work. Those among workers employed by the pre- assembly 
workshop can even control it during the regular working day. But even 
the skilled assembly workers can dictate their own pace of work, which 
means that neither the rhythms of the assembly line nor the norm set 
for its various tasks are particularly tight. The choice of technology, of 
work methods and tools is determined by objective conditions. Howev-
er, within the limits of these objective conditions, each worker on the 
assembly line freely chooses his methods and devices. He selects his own 
tools, sometimes he even manufactures them, or he simply invents new 
ones. […] No worker on the assembly line has the possibility to influence 
the quality and quantity of the produced goods. The production of these 
goods is subjected to the tyranny of the monthly plan, as well as to the 
quantity and quality of tools and component parts available at any given 
time. Workers are less able to exert control over the duration of their 
work. If they can manage to achieve in only four hours what they were 
supposed to do in eight, it is obvious they cannot afford themselves to 
work only four hours a day.22
Writing in the 1970s – a decade of crisis and transformation for capitalism, 
but also one of intense labour militancy across the developed economies 
 22 István Kemény, “La chaîne dans une usine hongroise”, Actes de la recherche en sciences 
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of Western Europe and North America – David Montgomery felt compelled 
to go back to the turn of the century in order to explore the competing vi-
sions of organizing the shop floor that emerged out of workers’ resistance 
to scientific management. Much like Bruno Trentin, Montgomery under-
stood that the transition out of Fordism plays out as much on the shop 
floor as away from it, and he attempted to revisit the past experiences of 
workers’ opposition to earlier managerial revolutions of the production 
process. The central figures in this story were the so- called “quintessential 
workers”:  male, white, skilled master craftsmen, predominantly in metal 
industries, who engaged in the defence of their autonomy at the point of 
production via union and non- union methods.23 These were, in short, the 
type of workers targeted by scientific management, as their control of the 
shop floor was taken to reside “in the superiority of their knowledge over 
that of the factory owner”.24 Montgomery emphasized that he was not writ-
ing about the traditional clash between artisanal routines and industrial 
discipline, but rather about:
[T] he patterns of behavior which took shape in the second and third gen-
erations of industrial experience, largely among workers whose world 
had been fashioned from their youngest days by smoky mills, congested 
streets, recreation as a week- end affair and toil at the times and the pace 
dictated by the clock (except when a more or less lengthy layoff meant no 
work at all). It was such workers, the veterans, if you will, of industrial life, 
with whom Taylor was preoccupied.25
The concept of workers’ control, after a moment of fame during the heyday 
of social history, did not fare well.26 Comparative historical sociologists found 
Montgomery’s depiction of the everyday struggle for control at the point of 
production a welcome insight into the emergence of labour militancy at the 
 23 With regard to the notion of “quintessential worker”, see Sonya O. Rose, “Class Formation 
and the Quintessential Worker”, in Reworking Class, ed. John R.  Hall (Ithaca:  Cornell 
University Press, 1997), 133– 166.
 24 David Montgomery, Workers’ Control in America: Studies in the History of Work, Technology, 
and Labor Struggles (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 9.
 25 Ibid, 10.
 26 See the studies collected in Jonathan C.  Brown, ed., Workers’ Control in Latin America, 
1930– 1979 (Chapel Hill:  The University of North Carolina Press, 1997). More recently, 
Immanuel Ness and Dario Azzellini, ed., Ours to Master and To Own. Workers’ Councils 
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turn of the century; not only in the United States but also across continental 
Europe.27 It certainly helped that the notion itself was already part of the po-
litical language forged by workers’ representatives during the general strikes 
and failed revolutions of the late 1910s and early 1920s.28 Empirical sociolo-
gists exploring the abodes of production, however, opted to speak of labour 
rather than of workers’ control; perhaps a more neutral term, unencumbered 
by historical legacies and hence more readily adapted to scholarly research.29 
The meaning of the two terms is practically interchangeable, both denoting 
what David Harvey called the “perpetual guerrilla warfare” on the shop floor 
between management and workers around the issue of just how much auton-
omy the latter might enjoy in decisions concerning the piece rates, the distri-
bution of tasks, personnel and workloads, the rhythms of work or the adoption 
of new technology.30
Be that as it may, the historiographical revolution that swept across the field 
of labour history over the recent decades has brought about new research ob-
jects and moved beyond the concern with such “veterans” of industrial life. The 
concept was devoid of any explanatory value for writing histories of marginal 
and marginalized workers, women, racial minorities and immigrants, just as it 
was when the centre stage of historical research was taken by the integrated 
working consumer of mature Fordism. The global turn in labour history also 
entailed leaving behind the factory as the main arena for investigating the fate 
of the working multitude: farmlands and sweatshops, the informal economy of 
the Global South and the expanding service sector of the Global North were all 
inhabited by different workers, for whom exerting control at the point of pro-
duction was barely a question at all. Nor was the question particularly salient 
for workers defending their livelihood against capital relocation, plant closures 
 27 Carmen Sirianni, “Workers’ Control in Europe: A Comparative Sociological Analysis”, in 
The Experience of Labor in Europe and America 1900– 1925, ed. James E. Cronin and Carmen 
Sirianni (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1983), 254– 310.
 28 Georges G. Assan, La question du contrôl ouvrier en Italie, avec un aperçu dans les autres 
pays (Paris: Marcel Giard, 1922).
 29 The body of literature is vast and multifaceted. For a discussion of labour control around 
the issue of workplace alcohol consumption, see Michel Pialoux, “Alcool et politique dans 
l’atelier. Une usine de carrosserie dans la décennie 1980s”, Genèses 7, no. 1 (1992): 94– 128. 
For a gendered analysis of labour control linking labour market dynamics and factory 
regimes, see Ching Kwan Lee, Gender and the South China Miracle: Two Worlds of Factory 
Women (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998). Taking into account company size, 
the classic typology of labour control remains Richard Edwards, Contested Terrain: The 
Transformation of the Workplace in the Twentieth Century (New York: Basic Books, 1979).
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and looming unemployment.31 Nevertheless, with regard to understating the 
historical trajectory of state socialism in Eastern Europe after 1945, the concept 
remains seminal for two complementary reasons.
One reason is structural, and derives from the logic of the centrally- planned 
economy. Against the background of full employment, these economies in-
variably generated a higher demand for labour relative to supply, creating re-
current labour shortages, particularly with regard to skilled workers.32 In turn, 
these labour shortages endowed specific groups of workers across industry 
with significant bargaining power, which translated into control of the pro-
duction process.33 In conjunction with labour shortages, the socialist shortage 
economy imparted high mobility on the less skilled, usually younger workers, 
for whom job switching within the same industrial sector or even across sec-
tors became common. This turnover of personnel – a genuine obsession for 
communist industrial relations experts  – only reinforced the control of the 
production process the skilled minority enjoyed. The main consequence of 
this runaway dynamic, as I show below, was the equally recurrent attempts of 
communist policymakers to reform the wage system and periodically experi-
ment with wage dispersion ratios and incentive schemes.
The other reason is contingent, and emerged out of what the late Mark Pit-
taway called “the Stalinist revolution in production”; a process of translation 
and adaptation of Soviet labour relations to Eastern Europe during the early 
1950s.34 The revolution unfolded together with the exponential growth of the 
working class across the region, beginning in the late 1940s. One of its premises 
(and promises) were to dislodge the pre- war working- class culture, forge a new 
socialist work culture and integrate new generations of industrial youth, wom-
en and workers of peasant origin. Stakhanovism, for example, was regarded as 
a training method for the unskilled, who could circumvent traditional appren-
ticeship routines through a sheer commitment to a higher pace of work. It is 
 31 The above paragraph summarizes the arguments of Nelson Lichtenstein, “David 
Montgomery and the Idea of ‘Workers’ Control’ ”, Labor. Studies in Working- Class History 
of the Americas 10, no.1 (2013): 68– 69.
 32 The classic analysis is János Kornai, The Socialist System:  The Political Economy of 
Communism (Oxford: Claredon Press, 1992).
 33 In other words, it is the structural logic of the shortage economy that makes the form of 
workers’ control I  describe here unique. For while empirically similar processes could 
also be observed across market economies, explanations for the occurrence and/ or per-
sistence of workers’ control under those conditions would most likely identify the rigidity 
of the labour market or the power of trade unions as causal mechanisms.
 34 Mark Pittaway, “The Reproduction of Hierarchy:  Skill, Working- Class  Culture, and the 
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no wonder that the most hated workers of the time were precisely the same 
Stakhanovists  – so- called “labour heroes”  – who challenged the established 
rhythms of the production process by working faster. The famous burning 
brick scene in Andrzej Wajda’s Man of Marble (1976) must have been an every-
day reality for quite a few “labour heroes”.35 In practice, therefore, the revolu-
tion only produced a deeply segmented working class, with skill, gender, social 
origin and age acting as markers for exclusion and marginalization. In Hungary 
and other socialist countries of the region, the early 1950s led to a reproduction 
of hierarchy at the shop floor level, allowing for the skilled minority of veter-
an, urban workers to retain their control of the production process and reach 
informal bargains with management over access to better tools, raw materials 
and higher wages. In this formative context, workers’ control was not merely a 
form of resistance against the Stalinist revolution in production; it was also a 
ground for cooperation between skilled workers and management.36
This brief incursion into the reception of Miklós Haraszti’s A Worker in a 
Worker’s State by representatives of the West European left shows a funda-
mental misunderstanding about the nature of the state socialist shop floor. 
For readers such as Bruno Trentin, Haraszti’s book was supposed to confirm 
the original sin of the global labour movement, originating from the embrace 
of Fordism and Taylorism by Lenin and Gramsci. This early commitment to 
supposedly neutral production technologies produced either entire socialist 
societies built on the “tyranny of the norm”, homogenization and the exploita-
tion of the working class, or – as with the Italian trade unions of the 1970s and 
1980s – labour leaders blinded by the promise of higher wages and hence inca-
pable of mounting any opposition to post- Fordism at the point of production. 
However, a closer look at the socialist shop floor reveals a different picture, 
as no matter how exploitative labour relations were in Eastern Europe after 
1945, the system was premised on a minority of skilled workers being able to 
 35 The scene, halfway through the film, follows the main character  – the Stakhanovist 
worker Mateusz Birkut – on tour. As a “labour hero”, Birkut travelled through Poland from 
one construction site to another to hold demonstrations on the art of laying bricks, work-
ing faster and better than the average labourer. On one such construction site, immersed 
in the process of erecting a wall, Birkut is handed a hot brick, which instantly burns his 
hands and stops the demonstration. This is a typical depiction of acts of resistance by 
workers against the higher pace of work forced on them by the Stakhanovist movement.
 36 The cooperation aspect has often been ignored in literature by authors who assign lit-
tle explanatory value to the shortage economy and instead emphasize the exploitative 
nature of the relationship between management and workers. For example, see Donald 
Filtzer, “Labor Discipline, the Use of Work Time, and the Decline of the Soviet System, 
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dominate the production process and exert control over the pace of work, the 
distribution of tools and the division of tasks. Rather than a gradual loss of 
workers’ control under the combined impact of Fordism, Taylorism and higher 
wages, the state socialist regimes of the East exhibited an inverse historical 
dynamic: higher wages resulting from the ability of a segment of workers to 
master the production process.
2 Dinu’s “Darkened Period”
What, then, of Bahro’s “quantitative compensation” – the supposed socialist 
equivalent of the productivity bargains that structured the post- war boom in 
Western Europe? Was this a more accurate description of the socialist labour 
relations that might suggest the presence of Fordism east of the river Elbe? 
Fordism, after all, does not exclude workers’ control altogether. As Simon 
Clark argued, the Fordist organization of work proceeds by a strict separation 
of skills, grounded in a dual labour market “composed of a small stratum of 
skilled workers and a mass of unskilled immigrant workers”.37 The separation 
of skills is also conducive to increased interdependence, which makes the ver-
tically integrated modern large- scale factory ever more vulnerable to various 
breakdowns along the supply chains and production lines. This in turn re-
quires a certain degree of flexibility on the part of the workforce. The need for 
flexibility might then open up room for manoeuvre for some workers, allowing 
them to reconquer their autonomy at the point of production. It is for this rea-
son that the perennial problem of Fordism is workers’ control (what sociolo-
gists call “labour control”), which tends to manifest itself in various ways; from 
quota restrictions and the deterioration of quality, to goldbricking and other 
forms of foot dragging. The resolution of this problem of workers’ control in 
Fordism usually takes the form of the “five- dollar day” (that is, higher wages).
Romanian industrial experts and their peers across Eastern Europe were, of 
course, not unaware of this method of resolution. An entire strand of literature 
published throughout the 1950s, sometimes translated from Soviet sources, 
purported to analyse the wide gamut of problems that plagued supply chains 
and production lines. The vocabulary developed to grasp the haphazard sup-
ply of raw materials or breaks in the production process aimed to underline 
the crucial duty of managers and workers alike to maintain the steady flow of 
 37 Simon Clarke, “What in the F- - - ’s Name is Fordism”, in Fordism and Flexibility: Divisions 
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production. So- called “bottlenecks” are an example of one such pathology of 
industrial production. This referred to the practice of intermittent work due to 
the chaotic supply of necessary raw materials, thus causing clogging. “Storm-
ing” was the other side of the coin. Once raw materials finally arrived at the 
workbench, workers were summoned to make up for the lost time and put 
their effort into achieving the planned output targets. More serious, however, 
was the issue of “overblown” or “over- fulfilled” norms, which – as Kemény ar-
gued – was often associated with working extra hours. For industrial experts, 
the over- fulfilment of norms indicated various forms of workers’ control at the 
point of production, through which some workers could appropriate better 
tools and materials, enter into agreements with the supervisory personnel and 
increase their income. In so doing, however, they were believed to distort pro-
ductivity indicators. Let us take one example from the first decade of state so-
cialism in Romania.
In May 1950, an aspiring young journalist by the name of Radu Cosaşu took 
up a job in one of Bucharest’s leading metal factories, then named Timpuri 
Noi (New Times). Of middle- class background, Cosaşu became a committed 
communist at the end of the war and set out to explore the daily life of the 
working class out of a mix of ideological persuasion and party sanctions for his 
bourgeois upbringing and family connections. This experience would make it, 
thirty years later, into his justly celebrated novel, Armata mea de cavalerie, a 
first- person fictionalized retelling of the author’s biographical trajectory. The 
fragment that builds on Cosaşu’s first- hand knowledge of factory work revolves 
around a made- up conflict between a skilled worker by the name of Dinu and 
the author’s alter- ego, an apprentice lathe operator, the details of which do 
not concern us here. What is important for the argument in this chapter is the 
work routine that Cosaşu unwittingly recorded in his novel. Dinu would regu-
larly divide his working month into two periods: one in which he could afford 
to take it easy, fool around and devote time to training his apprentice; and a 
second one, just before the payday, when Dinu would work without any inter-
ruptions, neglect everything else and break the norm.38 This latter timeframe 
was dubbed by Cosaşu perioada vânătă (roughly translated as the darkened 
period); days during which Dinu was so focused on over- fulfilling the norm and 
securing a higher income for himself that no horseplay, and not even ordinary 
chat, was tolerated around the lathe. Any attempt by the apprentice to trouble 
Dinu during his darkened period would often result in physical punishment, 
 38 Radu Cosaşu, Opere IV. Supravieţuirile: 1. Rămăşiţele mic- burgheze, 2. Armata mea de caval-
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the exact opposite of the jovial and friendly atmosphere Dinu created around 
himself for the rest of the month, when his spirits were so high that he cavalier-
ly tolerated myriad mistakes on the part of the apprentice.
Perhaps no other depiction of workers’ control is more apt than Cosaşu’s 
metaphor. It stood for Dinu’s ability to thoroughly control the routine of the 
shop floor, dictating the pace of work and the level of take- home pay; not 
only for himself, but also for his apprentice. Nothing was more damaging to 
the entire socialist norm- setting and wage system than the ups and downs 
of the darkened periods. Industrial experts in Romania and beyond regard-
ed such displays of workers’ control as inimical to higher productivity, and 
nothing but bulwarks against attempts to rationalize industrial work and 
push for efficiency. The most common answer to this perceived pathology of 
the shop floor was the so- called policy of “mutual material interests” (cointe-
resare materială) – the state socialist equivalent to the productivity bargain 
of Fordism.39 The scope of this “mutual material interests” arrangement 
was to empower management in undertaking the transition from so- called 
“statistical- experimental” to “technical- economical” norms. The first type of 
norms governed much of industrial production in socialist Romania up to the 
late 1950s: they were arrived at through informal negotiations between man-
agement, norm- setters and some of the most experienced workers in various 
branches of industry, and were supposed to record the maximum output per 
worker expected, given the existing machinery. The second type of norms re-
lied far less on the practical input of the skilled workers and would be decided, 
in turn, by planning and ministerial agencies on the basis of the technologi-
cal specifications of the machinery and other “objective” production index-
es. Extending “technical- economical” norms across industry was believed to 
increase productivity per worker and make Dinu’s darkened periods the rule 
rather than the exception in the working month. In other words, this was the 
socialist strategy of enforcing managerial control over the shop floor with the 
aim of boosting efficiency.40
What could workers expect in exchange for accepting the work rhythm 
of the “technical- economical” norms? In a similar way to the Fordist pro-
ductivity bargain, they could enjoy higher take- home pay. The socialist 
wage was divided into two main component parts: first, the basic or “tariff ” 
wage, which was compounded according to the type of industry, difficulty 
 39 I. Blaga and F.  Burtan, Principiul leninist al cointeresării materiale (Bucharest:  Editura 
Politică, 1961).
 40 For a similar dynamic in the interwar Soviet Union, see Lewis Siegelbaum, “Soviet Norm 
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of tasks, nature of working conditions and skill; second, on top of the tariff 
wage there was an entire, often highly complex, system of premiums and 
bonuses that rewarded dedication, dexterity and commitment to higher out-
put. In principle, both components of the socialist wage were dependent on 
fulfilling output targets:  the norms for the tariff wage were usually within 
the reach of every worker irrespective of age, skill level, gender or location 
in the production process; the norms for receiving premiums and bonuses 
were harder to fulfil, at least by those who lacked experience, access to bet-
ter tools and a steady supply of materials. Dinu, for example, would typify 
a worker in the first category. For much of the working month he would be 
content with working to the extent necessary to secure the tariff wage, all 
according to his own pace of work and established routine. In his “darkened 
period”, however, Dinu would push himself hard to amass as many premi-
ums and bonuses as possible, thereby increasing his wage. For the vast mass 
of unskilled workers, young apprentices and fresh recruits to factory work, 
such darkened periods did not exist. Their take- home pay would amount to 
the tariff wage alone, and they were seldom able to engage in episodes of 
norm- breaking.
The logic of this wage system was deeply divisive and skewed towards a 
minority of skilled, usually male, veteran workers, who were able to earn 
significantly more due to their privileged position in the production pro-
cess. However, it was precisely this minority of “quintessential workers”  – 
who could profit most from the system and appropriate its logic for higher 
income – that effectively hindered the proper functioning of norms. Their 
control of the production process afforded them the luxury of taking it easy 
on some days and making up for this on others; a dialectic of working time 
and task fragmentation that was the very opposite of Taylorism. The haphaz-
ard supply of materials characteristic of a shortage economy only reinforced 
their privileged position, as management could rely on their commitment 
on those occasions when “storming” was deemed necessary. In this context, 
the socialist variety of productivity bargaining premised on “mutual mate-
rial interests” could only alter the significance of the tariff wage in the sum 
total of the take- home pay. The first major wage reform in socialist Roma-
nia implemented at the end of the 1950s raised the proportion of the tar-
iff wage from just above 50 per cent to over 70 per cent across industrial 
branches. At the same time, tighter norms elaborated by industrial experts 
replaced the allegedly obsolete “statistical- experimental norms” that had 
guided industrial output for the first post- war decade. The immediate con-
sequence of this reform was a general wage increase for unskilled workers 
and a slight decrease in the income of the skilled ones, the latter having been 
- 978-90-04-44039-5
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suddenly confronted with harder to achieve target outputs via premiums 
and  bonuses.41
By the mid- 1960s, Romanian policymakers were contemplating yet another 
overhaul of the wage system. In little under a decade, the scenario seemed 
to be repeating itself. A report commissioned by the government in 1967 not-
ed with some alarm that in many cases, workers were receiving inadequate 
norms, since as much as one quarter of the entire workforce was able to “over- 
fulfil” norms by 130 per cent.42 Therefore, the new wage reform insisted on re-
dressing the balance in favour of efficiency, and once again boosting the tariff 
wage at the expense of premiums and bonuses. As the rfe expert monitoring 
Romania put it:
The better part of income from exceeding norms and premiums achieved 
so far as additional benefits, will in the future be included in the tariff 
wage. In this way, the worker or employee will be more interested than in 
the past in the tariff wage and thus will be more anxious than formerly to 
qualify for a higher tariff wage. It appears that in the past, by consensus 
of management, the trade unions, etc., the norms were artificially kept 
low so as to facilitate the fulfilment of certain plan indices. The workers 
relied increasingly on the over- fulfilment of norms. Norms were often not 
raised internally although new and more productive machinery was in-
troduced. The new wage system, which practically envisages a consider-
able increase of norms, will provide a higher income from the tariff wage 
but a lower one from exceeding norms. On balance, the workers will prof-
it only if he manages to be highly efficient and his industrial unit prosper-
ous (the criterion will be the sale of marketable production or export).43
In their basics, the Romanian wage reforms of the late 1950s and late 1960s 
were essentially identical. Both offered much the same solution to virtually 
the same problem: the tariff component of the workers’ take- home pay was 
pushed up with the hope of empowering management to impose tighter, sup-
posedly more scientific norms and mine for efficiency deep in the abodes of 
 41 For an extensive analysis of this reform see Adrian Grama, Laboring Along. Industrial 
Workers and the Making of Postwar Romania (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2019), 232– 242.
 42 anr, pcm, 6/ 1967, 11.
 43 “Situation Report:  Romania, 13 October 1967”, 13 October 1967. HU OSA 300- 8- 47- 
181- 15; Records of Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty Research Institute:  Publications 
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production. It could not have been otherwise. When the tariff component of 
the wage made only half of the take- home pay, as was the case up to 1957, the 
hindrance to increased productivity was high wage dispersion. A wide gap be-
tween the income of the skilled and the unskilled, resulting from the first being 
able to over- fulfil their norms, perpetuated a situation in which the majority 
of workers eking out a living on the tariff wage alone could hardly have had 
any interest in over- performing on the shop floor, let alone the means to do so. 
High wage dispersion, therefore, was incompatible with the strategy of “mu-
tual material interests”. Giving the tariff wage more weight in the final wage, 
however, was equally troublesome. First, as the report mentioned above ob-
served, at least a quarter of workers were still able to earn significantly more 
through their control over the production process. Second, in the longer term, 
increasing tariff wages tended to drastically reduce wage dispersion, a phe-
nomenon that communist policymakers dubbed “levelling” (see table below). 
It is little wonder that in 1973, a new wage reform was deemed necessary in so-
cialist Romania; this time not to redress the norm of over- fulfilling, but instead 
to widen again the gap between the wages of the skilled workers and the rest 
of the workforce.44
The logic of wage reform under state socialism made plain the sheer difficul-
ty of implementing productivity bargains in a shortage economy. Yet what also 
frustrated the strategy of “mutual material interests” was the overall intention 
of policymakers to keep the cost of labour low.45 Because socialist economies 
were geared towards overinvestment in capital goods at the expense of mass 
produced consumer goods, the most common growth pattern available to pol-
icymakers was repressed consumption, which allowed the planning apparatus 
to divest funds away from consumption (and implicitly, light industry).46 Harry 
Trend, the rfe expert on wage policy, correctly noted in a survey of the vari-
ous wage reforms undertaken across Eastern Europe during the mid- 1960s that 
 44 The wage differential was supposed to be cut from 1.92 to 1.45. See “Situation Report: 
Romania, 7 December 1973”, 7 December 1973. HU OSA 300- 8- 47- 193- 21; Records of Radio 
Free Europe/ Radio Liberty Research Institute:  Publications Department:  Situation 
Reports; Open Society Archives at Central European University, Budapest, 9.
 45 For a general assessment, see also “Wage Differentials and Economic Reform in Eastern 
Europe”, 2 May 1966. HU OSA 300- 8- 3- 15908; Records of Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty 
Research Institute: Publications Department: Background Reports; Open Society Archives 
at Central European University, Budapest.
 46 Even during the 1970s, a decade that saw a relative boost of private consumption 
in Romania, the catchword remained consumers’ “sacrifice”. See Ronald H.  Linden, 
“Socialist Patrimonialism and the Global Economy: The Case of Romania”, International 
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even if nominal wages were to go up, this would be “accomplished through a 
redistribution of existing wage payments rather than through a larger share of 
the savings from reductions in production costs and the introduction of im-
proved technology or management techniques”.47 The situation was not unlike 
the one that underpinned the South Asian export- led industrialization boom 
of the same decade. In both contexts, the assumption was that growth must be 
premised on the comparative advantage of cheap labour that emerging econ-
omies enjoyed within the global economy.48 Trend’s suggestion to Eastern Eu-
ropean communist policymakers could have very well been directed at South 
Korea in the 1960s:
Finally, a wage policy which will largely depend on redistributive mea-
sures rather than on a change in the manner of distributing newly gained 
savings and on a change in economic policies favouring a more rapid 





(in % of total 
workforce)
1965 1967 1970
up to 700 37.5 15.2 – – 
701– 1,000 35.8 36.0 38.5 23.5
1,001– 1,500 21.6 35.0 40.9 47.3
1,501– 2,500 4.7 12.6 18.3 25.0
over 2,500 0.4 1.2 2.3 4.2
source:  “situation report:  romania, 18 october 1967”, 18 october 1967. hu osa 
300- 8- 47- 181- 17; records of radio free europe/ radio liberty research insti-
tute:  publications department:  situation reports; open society archives at 
central european university, budapest, 3
 47 “The New Residual Claimant Wage System in Eastern Europe”, 28 April 1966. HU OSA 300- 
8- 3- 15909; Records of Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty Research Institute: Publications 
Department: Background Reports; Open Society Archives at Central European University, 
Budapest, 3.
 48 Soon- Kyoung Cho, “How Cheap is ‘Cheap Labor’? The Dilemmas of Export- led 
Industrialization” (PhD Dissertation, University of California, Berkeley, 1987). With regard 
to how Romanian economists saw the comparative advantage of low- cost labour, see Ion 
Rachmuth, “Trade between Countries with Different Socio- Economic Systems”, Soviet 
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growth of the consumer sector, is bound to provide only the most meagre 
effects on labor productivity and the standard of living. A page from Hen-
ry Ford’s policy during the twenties – “high wage – high consumption” 
could serve as a much better guide.49
Rudolf Bahro’s notion of “quantitative compensation” and the Romanian strat-
egy of “mutual material interests” could indeed be misread as socialist varieties 
of the Fordist productivity bargain. A closer look at the structural setting in 
which such bargains were supposed to operate reveals a different picture. First, 
the logic of wage reform shifted between high and low wage dispersion, which 
perpetuated workers’ control on the shop floor, in turn making it hard for man-
agement to impose ever tighter norms in search of higher productivity. Second, 
even if such attempts might have occasionally been successful, the pattern of 
growth grounded in repressed consumption and low labour costs was at the 
opposite end of the spectrum from Ford’s “high wage  – high consumption” 
model. Put differently, no matter how much the fascination with such produc-
tion technologies on the part of communist leaders in power, Fordist produc-
tivity bargains never quite caught on outside the capitalist core of the Euro- 
Atlantic area.50 To interpret the industrial development under state socialism 
in Eastern Europe as a form of Fordism is likely to deprive the concept of all 
explanatory value.
3 The Logic of Wage Reforms under State Socialism
Above and beyond the conceptual stakes of correcting the interpretation of 
state socialism Bruno Trentin derived from the writings of Bahro and Ha-
raszti, the problems that these dissident intellectuals identified on the state 
 49 “The New Residual Claimant Wage System in Eastern Europe”, 28 April 1966. HU OSA 300- 
8- 3- 15909; Records of Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty Research Institute: Publications 
Department: Background Reports; Open Society Archives at Central European University, 
Budapest, 3.
 50 For a similar argument in Latin American labour history, see Joel Wolfe, “The Social 
Subject versus the Political: Latin American Labor Studies at a Crossroads”, Latin American 
Research Review 37, no.  2 (2002):  247. Wolfe criticized his peers for mistaking factory 
redesign, rationalization campaigns and speed- ups for Fordism: “The key component of 
Fordism is a high industrial wage, for the system is predicated on increasing domestic 
markets for internally produced goods. Fordism is therefore defined largely by the con-
sumption of goods and services by workers earning high wages that they often receive in 
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socialist shop floor were real enough: lack of motivation, the atomization of 
the working class, low productivity and high labour turnover. Communist 
policymakers grappled with these alleged problems of industrial life through 
periodic wage reforms. Wage policies were widely regarded as the pillar of 
economic reforms, and often went hand in hand with the introduction of 
market mechanisms and the decentralization of decision- making at the level 
of the enterprise. Therefore, wage reforms can be interpreted as experimental 
attempts to overcome the inbuilt disequilibrium of the socialist command 
economy.51
Take, for instance, the Czechoslovak wage reform of the mid- 1980s, the ex-
plicit goal of which was to make the tariff wage account for over 70 per cent of 
the take- home pay. An earlier reform undertaken in the first half of the 1970s 
aimed to normalize wage scales after the crisis of 1968 and the supposed dis-
organization of industrial production brought about by the events leading up 
to the Prague Spring and its aftermath. It granted more authority to foremen, 
extended the three- shifts work schedule, cut down on overtime and encour-
aged high wage dispersion. In addition to these measures, this earlier reform 
also targeted workers’ control, by pushing up the tariff component of the wage, 
tightening norms and trimming the premiums and bonuses that came with 
over- fulfilling norms.52 In just over a decade, Czechoslovak policymakers saw 
themselves forced to reform the wage system once again, because as one rfe 
report noted, by the mid- 1980s “the variable portion of an individual’s wage 
(the portion determined by one’s performance measured against production 
norms) grew until it came to account for up to fifty percent of the overall 
wage”.53 This was a clear symptom of workers’ control on the shop floor that 
allowed some workers to engage once more in norm busting and to increase 
their income. Similar to the Romanian case discussed above, the Czechoslovak 
 51 For a general assessment of the reforms of the 1960s across Eastern Europe, see Besnik 
Pula, Globalization under and after Socialism. The Evolution of Transnational Capital in 
Central and Eastern Europe (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2018), 32– 64.
 52 “Situation Report:  Czechoslovakia, 13 February 1974”, 13 February 1974. HU OSA 300- 8- 
47- 65- 7; Records of Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty Research Institute:  Publications 
Department: Situation Reports; Open Society Archives at Central European University, 
Budapest. This rfe report does not break down the reform on industrial sectors or 
branches, which would have arguably made it easier to grasp the many inherent contra-
dictions of these policies.
 53 “Situation Report:  Czechoslovakia, 2 May 1986”, 2 May 1986. HU OSA 300- 8- 47- 81- 
7; Records of Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty Research Institute:  Publications 
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wage reforms attempted to eradicate norm breaking, only to see it re- emerge 
again in the course of a decade.
Not all wage reforms under state socialism in Eastern Europe tried to break 
the vicious circle of norm over- fulfilling by increasing tariff wages. The Bul-
garian wage reform of 1977, for example, eliminated bonuses for norm over- 
fulfilment and introduced a more “flexible” base salary, which would go up or 
down depending on the performance coefficients each worker displayed at the 
end of the month.54 Yet another take on the issue is represented by the early 
1970s wage reform in Poland, where policymakers decided to pay more atten-
tion to the correlation between the wages of managerial staff and white- collar 
employees, and the remuneration of workers. While in the Czechoslovak, Ro-
manian and Bulgarian cases the assumption was that technological upgrading 
coupled with workers’ control rendered norms obsolete and required a reor-
ganization of the wage system, Polish industrial experts put their money on 
the necessary role of supervision and expertise at the factory level.55 As rfe 
argued in a detailed analysis of this policy:
The worker is treated as an object, not a subject. Up to now, all incentives 
were, in principle, distributed down to the workers, and the size of the 
white- collar employee bonuses was clearly based on the achievements 
of the workers. The reversal of this approach  – although it does prove 
the ability to break with deep- rooted dogmas – means that the primary 
target is the intensification of the activities of the management.56
Poland was, of course, an exception. In no other socialist country were workers 
able, and the government willing up to 1981, to push up wages through mili-
tancy, sovereign debt and collective bargaining. Equally exceptional was the 
 54 “Situation Report:  Bulgaria, 25 March 1977”, 25 March 1977. HU OSA 300- 8- 47- 33- 
9; Records of Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty Research Institute:  Publications 
Department: Situation Reports; Open Society Archives at Central European University, 
Budapest, 9.
 55 In his famous study of the global spread of Taylorism during the first half of the twentieth 
century, French sociologist Georges Friedmann noted that in those national contexts in 
which labour productivity was more an outcome of higher employment figures than of 
technological upgrading, factories would be in need of highly trained “cadres de direc-
tion et surveillance”. See Georges Friedmann, Le travail en miettes. Spécialisation et loisirs 
(Paris: Gallimard, 1956), 17 and passim.
 56 “The Draft of a New Wage System in Poland”, 1 April 1970. HU OSA 300- 8- 3- 4677; Records 
of Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty Research Institute:  Publications Department: 
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Yugoslav case; a socialist state that allowed unemployment, strikes and labour 
migration to Western Europe. Here, wage reforms took on a similar dynam-
ic to that recognizable in market economies. On the one hand, the economic 
reforms of the mid- 1960s, granted labour- managed firms control over wages 
and investments, with deep consequences for the labour market. As Leonard 
Kukić put it: “even though real wages had collapsed during the 1980s, existing 
workers were able to capture a larger share of the wage bill than could have 
been possible if entry of labour into existing labour- managed firms was not re-
stricted. This behaviour resembles insider- outsider models of labour markets 
characterized by strong trade unions”.57 On the other hand, the crisis of the 
1980s in Yugoslavia was translated by policymakers into the more tradition-
al anti- inflationary policy package of wage freezes, price controls and cuts in 
domestic consumption.58 This macroeconomic context, underpinned by Yu-
goslavia’s idiosyncratic industrial relations model and federalism, made prob-
lems resulting from workers’ control more likely to be dealt with through the 
interplay of local labour markets and political compromise, rather than simply 
through wage reform as in the other East European socialist countries.59
By far the most interesting case of wage reform under state socialism was 
in Hungary. For much of the 1970s, Hungarian policymakers struggled to intro-
duce a certain degree of wage differentiation, aiming to widen the low wage 
dispersion by way of rewriting classification tables and encouraging skills ac-
quisition. One decade of wage experiments, however, only produced further 
egalitarian effects, so much so that by the early 1980s, a new wage reform was 
needed in order to restore higher remuneration for the segment of skilled work-
ers: “It is not the purpose of the new system to promote social justice through 
egalitarian incomes. On the contrary, its aim is to create economic inequality 
based on performance because, in the regime’s view, at present that seems to 
be the best way of improving the lot of everyone”.60 This constant search for 
 57 Leonard Kukić, “Socialist Growth Revisited: Insights from Yugoslavia”, European Review of 
Economic History 22 (2018): 403– 429, 418.
 58 “Situation Report: Yugoslavia, 4 May 1987”, 4 May 1987. HU OSA 300- 8- 47- 217- 3; Records of 
Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty Research Institute: Publications Department: Situation 
Reports; Open Society Archives at Central European University, Budapest.
 59 Goran Musić, “Yugoslavia:  Workers’ Self- Management as State- Paradigm”, in Ours to 
Master and To Own. Workers’ Councils from the Commune to the Present, ed. Immanuel 
Ness and Dario Azzellini (Chicago: Haymarket Books, 2011), 172– 190. According to Musić 
(in a private communication), Yugoslavia was structurally more open to productivity bar-
gains than the shortage economies of Eastern Europe.
 60 “Situation Report:  Hungary, 13 January 1981”, 13 January 1981. HU OSA 300- 8- 47- 112- 
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economic inequality in Hungary was nevertheless not only pursued through 
wage reform, which – as one official put it – was likely to “stop at the factory 
gates”.61 It was also pursued (and in this lies the originality of late socialism in 
Hungary) through the creation of semi- autonomous subcontracting teams of 
workers within factories. These teams comprised up to 30 workers who were 
allowed, in their spare time, to negotiate contracts with management for the 
production of goods using the factory’s machinery and materials. By the mid- 
1980s, almost a quarter of a million Hungarian workers out of a total workforce 
of five million were engaged in such schemes, bargaining with management 
over higher wages; a process that led not only to significant wage differenti-
ation, but also to a re- segmentation of the workforce between a privileged 
minority and the rest.62 This legal innovation, as David Stark showed, mere-
ly brought to light well- established shop floor practices, officialising workers’ 
control and the bargaining routine over higher pay, extra- hours and better ac-
cess to machinery that always came with it.63
This brief examination of wage reform in state socialist Eastern Europe 
shows the conundrum faced by the policymakers involved in seeking to or-
ganize productivity bargains by means of wage reform. Almost every wage 
reform after the 1960s was intended to rectify two of the problems inherent 
in a centrally- planned economy:  either norm over- fulfilment and high wage 
dispersion, or various forms of egalitarianism and low wage dispersion. Almost 
every other wage reform implemented during the 1970s and 1980s ended up 
reproducing the same problems it was supposed to rectify. The back and forth 
between cutting down on norm over- fulfilment and encouraging low wage 
dispersion, and struggling against “wage levelling” to promote high wage dis-
persion was structurally determined by what I have termed the antinomy of 
workers’ control. It is indeed one of the historical peculiarities of the socialist 
shortage economy to have turned wage policy into the pillar of various cyclical 
reform attempts. This historical peculiarity, I argue, was causally influenced by 
the phenomenon of workers’ control, which was itself perceived by managers 
Department: Situation Reports; Open Society Archives at Central European University, 
Budapest, 15.
 61 “Situation Report:  Hungary, 15 December 1982”, 15 December 1982. HU OSA 300- 8- 47- 
113- 18; Records of Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty Research Institute:  Publications 
Department: Situation Reports; Open Society Archives at Central European University, 
Budapest, 14.
 62 László Neumann, “Circumventing Trade Unions in Hungary: Old and New Channels of 
Wage Bargaining”, European Journal of Industrial Relations 3, no. 2 (1997): 185.
 63 David Stark, “Rethinking Internal Labor Markets:  New Insights from a Comparative 
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and policymakers either as a problem to be solved in search for higher produc-
tivity or, more often, as a solution to improve economic efficiency. Every time 
new “scientific” norms were supposed to boost productivity, workers’ control 
was deemed a problem for the very simple reason that the quintessential veter-
ans of the shop floor were able to manipulate the norms. Every time the short-
age economy bumped into “bottlenecks”, faulty supply, “storming” and the like, 
the very same veterans were called upon to put in the extra hours, reach the 
planned quotas and save face.
On the socialist shop floors, therefore, rather than Taylorism subjecting a 
vast mass of atomized and oppressed workers to the rhythms of the stopwatch, 
as Haraszti would have it, some workers always managed to command suffi-
cient control of the production process to afford themselves respite, better 
incomes and a modicum of leverage in their relationship with management. 
With regard to Fordist productivity bargaining premised on the payment of 
higher wages in exchange for more managerial control of the production pro-
cess, state socialist Eastern Europe generally saw average monetary wages grow 
faster than labour productivity after the period of wage restraint of the 1950s.64 
If this observation is accurate, then Bahro’s “quantitative compensations”  – 
such as bubbles of modest consumerism and urban expansion during the gold-
en Eastern European decade of the 1970s – were strictly politically motivated, 
and mere socialist concessions to the first generation of socialist workers rath-
er than genuine Fordist bargains.65
4 Conclusion
I started this chapter with one possible answer to the following question: for 
writing a general history of the left in the twentieth century, how should one 
think about the trajectory of the working class under state socialism? The expe-
rience of East European workers between 1945 and 1989 was interpreted by an 
Italian trade union leader as a grim lesson about Taylorism and Fordism run-
ning amok. This was an understanding Trentin took from the writings of a cou-
ple of influential dissidents. Granted, this was an idiosyncratic interpretation 
 64 “Industrial Wages and Labor Productivity in Eastern Europe”, 5 September 1978. HU 
OSA 300- 8- 3- 16266; Records of Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty Research Institute: 
Publications Department:  Background Reports; Open Society Archives at Central 
European University, Budapest.
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and – as I have tried to show – a deeply misleading one, but the practice of 
looking across the Iron Curtain for such lessons was once common, at least on 
the left. For much of the 1970s and 1980s, Yugoslav self- management and the 
Polish independent trade union Solidarność served as sources of inspiration 
for rethinking political strategies and renewing the conceptual vocabulary of 
the West European left. The narrative outlined by La Città del lavoro, however, 
does not accurately depict the experience of workers in Eastern Europe be-
fore 1989. The overarching story of an “original sin” attributed to Lenin and his 
followers’ fascination with Taylorism and Fordism that ill prepared the left to 
navigate the global transformation of the 1970s rests on shaky ground. Used by 
Trentin in support of his account of the failure of the left in Western Europe, 
the dissident writings of Miklós Haraszti and Rudolf Bahro cannot be taken as 
generalized depictions of labour relations under state socialism. Nor should 
the homogenizing concepts of Taylorism and Fordism be permitted to erase 
the historical specificity of macroeconomic contexts that lacked the basic pre-
conditions for securing “high wages – high consumption” social contracts.
In this chapter, I  have suggested that “workers’ control”  – a category of 
analysis resurrected by David Montgomery in the 1970s – might prove more 
profitable for exploring both the lived experience of entire categories of work-
ers and the policy decisions taken by communist governments. This notion, 
I  further contend, might prove equally valuable in understanding the emer-
gence of capitalism in Eastern Europe after 1989. Scholarship on the industrial 
transformation of the region in the aftermath of the collapse of state socialism 
has focused predominantly on processes of privatization and deindustrializa-
tion. Within these frameworks of interpretation, post- socialist workers appear 
mostly as symbolically dispossessed Geldsubjekten ohne Geld66:  eking out a 
living on the margins of industrial ruins, struggling against mass unemploy-
ment, taking early retirement and buy- out options, pooling resources across 
the urban/ rural divide and kinship networks, or killing time on low wage jobs. 
Studies of post- socialist trade unions, moreover, customarily examine defen-
sive struggles against plummeting living standards, plant closures, lay- offs and 
the general collapse of union density throughout the past two decades.67
 66 The expression belongs to Robert Kurz, Der Kollaps der Modernisierung:  Vom 
Zusammenbruch des Kasernensozialismus zur Krise der Weltökonomie (Frankfurt am 
Main: Eichborn Verlag, 1991), 225.
 67 The amount of literature is too vast to quote. Two landmark studies in this vein are David 
Kideckel, Getting By in Postsocialist Romania: Labor, the Body, and Working- Class Culture 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2008) and Adam Mrozowicki, Coping with Social 
Change: Life Strategies in Poland’s New Capitalism (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2011). 
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This strand of literature builds on the double constitutive paradox of post- 
socialism across Eastern Europe: the transition from centrally planned to mar-
ket economies on the one hand, and on the other, the deep social and cultural 
implications of social change in essentially egalitarian societies.68 “Rebuilding 
the ship at sea” after 1989 implied a sudden spike in inequality, “shock thera-
pies”, the rapid accumulation (and display) of private wealth, the erosion of 
state- sponsored welfare and the sidelining of working- class dispositions, voic-
es and lives. Research agendas construed in light of these characteristics of 
post- socialism have no need for the concept of “workers’ control”. Unionized 
or not, workers contemplating unemployment, precarity and a future without 
work are far removed from the type of “quintessential workers” analysed by 
Montgomery, Kemény or Burawoy. Nevertheless, post- socialist Eastern Europe 
offers plenty of cases of effective industrial restructuring via privatization and 
foreign direct investment in an entire array of industries; from textile and food 
processing to car manufacturing and steel. In these cases, the issue of work-
ers’ control was arguably the most important socialist legacy to be overcome 
through disciplinary campaigns, productivity bargains and the reorganization 
of shop floor routines and workplace solidarities.69 La Città del lavoro does not 
help us to grasp the historical trajectory of state socialism, but it could certain-
ly come in useful for understanding the tremendous success of capitalism in 
contemporary Eastern Europe.
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 chapter 7
African Forced Labour and Anti- colonial Struggles 
in the Portuguese Revolution
A Global Labour History Perspective
Raquel Varela and João Louçã
The Portuguese Revolution took place between 25 April 1974 and 25 November 
1975, and was the most profound revolutionary event in Europe following the 
Second World War. During those 19 months, hundreds of thousands of work-
ers went on strike, and hundreds of workplaces were occupied; sometimes for 
months at a time. At some stage, almost one third of the population of about 
ten million people was engaged in some form of power structure outside the 
scope of the state, whether workers, soldiers or committees of residents.1 The 
Portuguese Revolution was such a social explosion that US president Gerald 
Ford considered it capable of transforming the entire Mediterranean into a 
“red sea” and causing the downfall of all the regimes of southern Europe like 
dominos.2 Although it did not produce the predicted domino effect, the imme-
diate results of the revolution were considerable, including the nationalization 
of banks and large companies without compensation, the birth of the welfare 
state and social security, the agrarian reform of large estates in the south of 
the country, and the introduction of workers’ management for 300 companies. 
These measures were not realized by state decree or by governmental action, 
as some have tried to frame them, but through popular assemblies. The banks 
were brought under the control of their workers, who prior to nationalization 
had stopped capital flight; the strikes in the major companies resulted in sal-
ary increases and price freezes; a number of hospitals and schools were occu-
pied and managed democratically; public transport came under the control of 
workers and users, who decided to extend these to peripheral areas and to re-
duce fares; and land was occupied by salaried agricultural workers, more than 
tripling productivity and employment.
On 25 April 1974, a coup led by the mfa (Movimento das Forças Arma-
das; Armed Forces Movement)  – a group of middle- ranking officials in the 
 1 Raquel Varela, A People’s History of the Portuguese Revolution (London: Pluto Press, 2019).
 2 La Vanguardia (Barcelona), 23 March 1975.
© Raquel Varela and João Louçã, 2021 | DOI:10.1163/9789004440395_009








Downloaded from Brill.com10/09/2020 11:57:52AM
via free access
200 Varela and João
Portuguese Army, opposed to the colonial war – toppled the Portuguese Es-
tado Novo (New State). Established after the 1926 coup, the Estado Novo had 
been the longest standing dictatorship in Europe, and its downfall marked the 
beginning of a revolutionary process. Despite the mfa’s plea  – people were 
urged via radio broadcasts to stay at home  – thousands took to the streets. 
The government’s leader hid at Quartel do Carmo, in Lisbon, surrounded by 
people outside shouting “kill fascism”. In Caxias and Peniche, the prison gates 
were opened and all the political prisoners were released. The secret police 
(pide) was disbanded, the headquarters of the regime’s newspaper (A Época) 
were attacked, and censorship was consequently abolished. The dictatorship’s 
fall was unheralded, and the social forces carrying out the April coup were not 
a consequence of the country’s backwardness, but instead of its colonial sit-
uation, as is explained in the next part of this chapter. The liberation wars in 
Africa had led to the deepest crisis the regime had yet to face, and by the time 
of the Portuguese Revolution, thirteen years of colonial war had been fought 
on three fronts: Guinea Bissau, Angola and Mozambique.
The story of the Portuguese Revolution often starts, incorrectly, with the 
Movimento das Forças Armadas. We argue that in reality it was triggered by 
the anti- colonial revolution in 1961, even if it was the mfa that opened up 
the gates of revolution. On Sunday 9 September 1973, amid stringent security 
precautions, 136 officers – none more senior than captain – met deep in the 
countryside ostensibly for a “special farmhouse barbecue”. They were drawn 
together by self- interest; they resented the dilution of their ranks with con-
script officers who had briefly attended the military academy. By April 1974, 
the mfa had built a network of 200 supporting officers from all three services 
and had drafted its first programme calling for “Democracy, Development and 
Decolonization”. Europe’s oldest dictatorship needed to reorganize and mod-
ernize its industry. The mfa wanted a democratic modern “mixed economy” 
based on the Western European model, and refused to accept the blame for 
colonial setbacks. At that time, none of the officers would identify themselves 
as “socialist”.3
By early 1974, the paigc (Partido Africano para a Independência da Guiné 
e Cabo Verde; The African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape 
Verde) in Guinea was on the verge of victory and frelimo (the Front for the 
Liberation of Mozambique) had opened a new offensive. There was no pros-
pect of winning the wars in Africa. The number of Portuguese dead – an esti-
mated 9,000 – was greater than in any conflict since the Napoleonic wars, and 
 3 Jornal República, 26 April 1974. 
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the army was being blamed for these failures. Some officers were ashamed to 
wear their uniforms in the streets of Lisbon, and a crisis had been developing 
in the middle ranks of the army. Over the course of 13 years, nearly 200,000 
men failed to report for enlistment and 8,000 had deserted.4 The crisis that 
emerged in the state’s backbone – the armed forces – through the importance 
of its defeat, led to the fall of the longest- standing dictatorship in Europe. The 
impact of this crisis within the Portuguese army can be measured by the ab-
sence of any acts of repression against the workers’ movement in the early days 
of the revolution. For the working class in the modern industrial and services 
sectors, the successful struggle for civil, political and social rights following the 
Portuguese revolution could not be dissociated from its founding cause:  the 
widespread resort to African forced labour and the resistance triggered by it. 
Further research will probably establish that the widespread struggle of the 
liberation movement in the Portuguese colonies, mainly based in peasant ar-
eas in countries subjected to forced labour, allowed the paicg (Partido Afri-
cano para a Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde; African Party for the In-
dependence of Guinea and Cape Verde), led by Amílcar Cabral, to unilaterally 
declare Guinea’s independence in 1973. Despite inflicting significant military 
defeats on the Portuguese colonial army in Angola and Mozambique, the war 
dragged on for thirteen years without the prospect of any political solution 
whatsoever in the framework of Marcelo Caetano’s regime.5
The revolution profoundly changed Portugal, but it did not change the 
relations of production in a lasting way. The state recovered after a counter- 
revolutionary coup on 25 November 1975, the regime was stabilized and the 
government functioned without the involvement of the masses that had 
helped to make the revolutionary events in 1974– 1975. The revolution was de-
feated, even if it was not crushed like that in Chile the year before or the upris-
ings in Hungary in 1956. As in other cases, the history of the Portuguese revo-
lution was written by the victors, who left out the scale and the magnificence 
of the struggles from below and their transformative capacity. Some even lik-
ened it to a hallucinogenic dream.6 Most of the accounts that appeared at 
the time, and subsequently, have applied a top- down approach; they are often 
written by “important figures” who have focused on their own role. In other 
 4 Estado- Maior do Exército/ Comissão para o Estudo das Campanhas de África 1988. Covered 
in more detail in Chapter five.
 5 Caetano was Prime Minister from 1968 until the 1974 revolution. He was preceded by António 
de Oliveira Salazar, who died in 1970.
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cases, the narrative is about the army and the senior military personnel, or 
the bourgeois machinations, but almost never about the povo: the people. If 
the working class is referred to, it appears as “the threat of labour unrest”, and 
is thus seen from the outside, as a problem rather than the solution. These 
approaches have marginalized the working class in a political, administrative 
and economic sense, both in Portugal and in its former colonies. The current 
state’s short memory concerning historical facts is undoubtedly one of the key 
factors that have led to this dominant approach. Yet there is another set of 
pivotal causes related to the geographical and social aspects of the revolu-
tion: methodological nationalism, Eurocentrism and a limited conceptualiza-
tion of the working class. These three major criticisms, which were raised in 
Marcel Van der Linden’s essential contribution to the global history of labour, 
are crucial to interconnect the Portuguese revolution, (anti)colonialism and 
forced labour.7
Some progress has been made in recent decades, with the publication of 
studies highlighting the exceptional history of a small country at the European 
periphery; a country that also was the last European colonial empire.8 Never-
theless, the social history covering the revolutionary period remains minimal 
when compared with the preponderance of political- institutional, diplomatic 
and military histories. As Manuel Redero rightly observed, “Research on dic-
tatorships and revolutionary movements, quite abundant in the 1960s and 
1970s, gave way to the study of democracy and the problems faced by transition 
processes and democratic consolidation”.9 More importantly, this chapter ad-
dresses a serious gap in the studies on Portugal, which have rarely established 
a link – either in terms of cause and effect, or of correlation – between on the 
one hand the dictatorship’s political regime, its “late modernization”, the revo-
lutionary process and the end of the dictatorship; and on the other hand, the 
 7 Marcel van der Linden, Workers of the World: Essays toward a Global Labor History (Leiden: Brill 
Academic Publishers, 2008); Marcel van der Linden and Jan Lucassen, Prolegomena for a 
Global Labour History (Amsterdam: International Institute of Social History, 1999).
 8 Encarnación Lemús, En Hamelin … La Transición Española más allá de la Frontera (Ovie-
do: Septem Ediciones, 2001); Ana Mónica Fonseca, “O apoio da social- democracia alemã a 
democratização portuguesa (1974– 1975)”, Revista Ler História 63 (2012): 93– 107; Muñoz Sán-
chez, António, “Cambio mediante acercamiento. La socialdemocracia alemana y el régimen 
de Franco, 1962– 1975”, in Zeiten im Wandel. Deutschland im Europa des 20. Jahrhundert. Kon-
tinuität, Entwicklungen und Brüche, ed. Jürgen Elvert and Sylvain Schirmann (Bruxelas: P. I. E. 
Peter Lang, 2007), 119– 140; Tiago Moreira de Sá, Os Estados Unidos da América e a Democracia 
Portuguesa (1974– 1976) (Lisboa: mne, Instituto Diplomático, 2009).
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forced labour in the colonies and the way workers subjected to it supported 
the liberation movements against the Portuguese army. The vast majority of 
the studies on the Estado Novo (1933– 1974) and the revolution (1974– 1975) have 
focused on Portugal as a territorial unit, and have pinpointed the colonial war 
as the beginning of the end for the regime.
Among the studies on forced labour, those focusing on “where, under what 
conditions and who carried out the work” prevail. There is in fact a great deal 
of literature dealing with forced labour within the different colonial empires, 
as well as some relevant work on forced labour taking place inside Portugal’s 
former colonies, but none relate the political organization of the resistance 
to forced labour. Likewise, the relationship between forced labour and the 
political- military groups fighting against Portuguese colonialism on the battle 
front is never addressed. For an overview of forced labour, we refer to the two 
general studies published by Oporto University’s African Studies Centre (2005, 
2007),10 Alexander Keese’s work on Angola,11 Eric Allina’s study on Mozam-
bique12 and Augusto Nascimento’s study about servants in São Tomé.13 Many 
records concerning forced labour have been preserved by organizations and 
individuals, ranging from commissions, missionaries, journalists and pub-
lic servants, to researchers and historians. The matter cannot therefore be 
attributed to a lack of sources, even if one considers the degree of illiteracy 
in a population with few written records and with underground political or 
military organizations. In addition, the reports of the regime’s own colonial 
missions and of its military actions, together with the archives, constitute im-
portant sources. As Eric Hobsbawm reminds us, “plenty of the resources for the 
history of popular movements were only acknowledged as such because some-
one asked a question and then desperately searched for a way – any way – to 
 10 Centro de Estudos Africanos da Universidade do Porto (Org.), Trabalho Forçado 
Africano  – experiências coloniais comparada (Porto:  Campo das Letras  – Editores, S.A., 
2005); Centro de Estudos Africanos da Universidade do Porto (Org.), Trabalho Forçado 
Africano. Articulações com o poder político, Colecção Estudos Africanos (Porto: Campo das 
Letras – Editores, S.A., 2007).
 11 Alexander Keese, “The constraints of late colonial reform policy: forced labour scandals 
in the Portuguese Congo (Angola) and the limits of reform under authoritarian colonial 
rule, 1955– 1961”, Portuguese Studies 28, no. 2 (2012): 186– 200.
 12 Éric Allina, Slavery By Any Other Name:  African Life under Company Rule in Colonial 
Mozambique (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2012).
 13 Augusto Nascimento, Poderes e quotidiano nas roças de S. Tomé e Príncipe de finais de oito-
centos a meados de novecentos (Lousã, s.n. 2002); Augusto Nascimento, Desterro e con-
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answer it. We ought not to be positivist and accept that questions and answers 
arise naturally out of material research”.14
Studies on forced labour in the production chain – which was legally abol-
ished in 1961, but remained in four of the colonies until 1974 – have failed to es-
tablish a link between the Portuguese Carnation Revolution on the one hand, 
and on the other, its pivotal role in the creation of a world market, the regime’s 
crisis and its colonial wars. Nevertheless, we place this link at the centre of our 
study in the current chapter. Although well- informed studies on the historical 
background of forced labour are rare, there are two that stand out. The first 
is Perry Anderson’s pioneering work that links primitive accumulation in the 
colonies to forced labour and subsequent demographic anaemia, and applies 
to it the theory of uneven and combined development.15 The second is Dalila 
Cabrita Mateus’ study on conflict among forced labourers at the outbreak of 
the colonial wars.16 Research using books such as the highly regarded A Guerra 
Colonial (The Colonial War), by Aniceto Afonso, provides a detailed account 
of the number of fatalities inflicted on the Portuguese army, as well as of the 
brutality of its actions, such as the use of napalm against civilians.17 However, 
no information is provided concerning the number of casualties inflicted on 
the liberation movement’s fighters – or among civilians, for that matter.
We believe it is essential to study production chains, as this can shed light 
on the extent to which the development of distinct social classes across the 
different continents is interconnected, and can clarify how the unequal wealth 
distribution emerged among core and peripheral countries.18 It is therefore 
questionable, as highlighted by Perry Andersen, that the anachronistic Portu-
guese empire failed to provide for a relatively impoverished working class in 
the urban areas with no means of social mobility, and that even in the colo-
nies there was unemployment amongst the white community.19 Accordingly, 
this chapter also contributes to the study of the making of the working classes 
in the Portuguese empire, focusing on some of the most marginalized areas 
in social history: the resistance, organization and political struggles of forced 
labourers, and the relationship between these labourers and the Portuguese 
 14 Eric Hobsbawm, Sobre História (São Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 1998), 220.
 15 Perry Anderson, Portugal e o Fim do ultracolonialismo (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Civilização 
Brasileira, 1966).
 16 Dalila Cabrita Mateus, A PIDE- DGS e a Guerra Colonial (Lisboa: Terramar, 2004), 420.
 17 Aniceto Afonso and Carlos de Matos Gomes, Guerra Colonial (Lisboa: Bertrand, 2000).
 18 Marcel van der Linden, “The Promises and Challenges of Global Labor History”, in Global 
Histories of Work, vol. I, ed. Andreas Eckert (Oldenbourg: Gruyter, 2016), 40– 42.
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Carnation Revolution, in which the working class played a crucial role. As far 
as liberation movements are concerned, we do not refer simply to the armed 
struggle, but to the wider movement that was structured around the peasants 
and their social support networks, food supply, protective activities and resis-
tance to forced labour.
1 Forced Labour in the Portuguese Colonies
By the end of the nineteenth century, the Portuguese colonies were facing a 
serious challenge: how to force black/ native populations to work when slavery 
was no longer legal or accepted.20 As Oliveira Martins stated:
It was still necessary to dry the swamps, navigate the rivers, pave the 
roads, build the warehouses and obtain the human working tool. Before-
hand, slavery supplied all of this, while capital consolidated in the black 
people’s (market value) – today, it consolidates on immigrants’ wages, or 
on the black and ethnic workers hired to work in desolate areas. Capital 
acts similarly in regions inhabited by indigenous peoples liable of ba-
sic submission to civilization, although it might seem different at first 
glance. Force, instead of contracts, is its actual expression.21
In Capital, Marx looked at colonial relations in the eighteenth century to il-
lustrate that the historical process severing the worker from the means of 
production is typical of capitalism anywhere it takes hold: “The expropriation 
of the agricultural producer, of the peasant, from the soil, is the basis of the 
whole process. The history of this expropriation, in different countries, as-
sumes different aspects, and runs through its various phases in different orders 
of succession, and at different periods”.22 Primitive accumulation of capital, a 
concept developed by Adam Smith, is named by Marx as the root of the pro-
cess of capitalism, whereas the expropriation of the agricultural producer’s 
soil was the onset of primitive accumulation, a form of “original sin” in terms 
 20 Dalila Cabrita Mateus, “El Trabajo Forzado en las Colonias Portuguesas”, in Historia, 
Trabajo y Sociedad, no. 4 (2013): 63– 87; Valdemir Zamparoni, “Da Escravatura ao Trabalho 
Forçado, teorias e práticas”, Africana Studia, no 7 (2004): 300.
 21 Oliveira Martins. O Brazil e as Colónias Portuguesas, 1920. Cited in Zamparoni, “Da 
Escravatura”, 301.
 22 Karl Marx, The Capital, Vol 1, Part 8, Chapter 26, 508, https:// www.marxists.org/ archive/ 
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of political economy. Unlike in the Americas – where the flow of millions of 
Europeans together with enslaved Africans created the labour force required 
for capitalist modernization processes  – in Portuguese Africa, European oc-
cupation remained relatively feeble. By 1955, Angola had fewer than 80,000 
white European settler colonialists compared with over four million African 
natives. In 1925, the former numbered only 25,000, and in 1911, only 13,000. 
This fact is inextricably linked with Portugal’s localization in the international 
state system as a weak metropolis, depending on an old alliance with England 
(negotiated in order to remain independent from Spain). The backward econ-
omy meant that until the 1950s, it was unable to settle a sufficient amount of 
its white population in the colonies, which thus attracted little capital from 
the metropolis – even though the regime had, from 1926 onwards, extended 
industrial restrictions to colonial possessions, controlling exports. In the 1930s, 
trade exchanges with the colonies remained as low as 15 per cent of the coun-
try’s total. It was at this stage that cotton cultivation was imposed on the colo-
nies. “It was not until the Estado Novo that the State apparatus is employed for 
colonial purposes”,23 despite the “peace- making” campaigns that took place 
between the end of the nineteenth century and the 1920s – a euphemism for 
the military occupation of African land.
Especially in Angola, the colonial regime tried to replicate Brazil, opening 
up coffee, cotton and large sugar plantations from the beginning of the twen-
tieth century. Lack of investment, weather conditions and the soil turned this 
enterprise into a distant mirage. In fact, only the spirits industry prospered, 
aimed at the African market. The last years of legal slavery, between 1858 and 
1868, saw a 30 per cent increase in the number of slaves in colonial possessions, 
but after 1878, cocoa production in São Tomé and Princípe caused a spurt of 
new traffic from Angola. This growth of human traffic caused a boycott by the 
Cadbury company, since in 1909 the British chocolate maker learned that plan-
tation owners, together with the Portuguese government, were to blame for 
the ongoing slavery in these islands. The boycott lasted until 1916.
In 1899, the Indigenous Work Regulation established the following types of 
forced labour: “compelled”, “corrective”, “in public interest works” and “hired”. 
The “hired” workers left their villages, families and agriculture to work in large 
plantations for very low wages. The same regulation stated that the Portuguese 
colonies’ indigenous peoples were subject to the moral and legal obligation of 
finding ways to survive and improve their social status by means of work.24 In 
 23 Valentim Alexandre, “O Império Colonial”, in Portugal Contemporâneo, ed. António Costa 
Pinto (Lisboa: D. Quixote, 2005), 71.
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1907, the “hut (cubata) tax” was introduced, only to be replaced in 1919 by an 
indigenous poll tax. In a similar way as in the remaining European colonies in 
Africa, this tax pushed Africans submitted to the colonial system into relying 
on a monetary economy, and forced them to work outside the scope of their 
own traditional livelihoods. However, the legal documentation claimed that 
this tax embodied a civilizing mission. At first, work assumed the form of cargo 
transport, effectively turning the men into packhorses. Then came compulsory 
farm work: in return for virtually no wages at all, men left their villages to go 
work on cotton, tea or rice fields. Afterwards, came work in the mines in Trans-
vaal and Mozambique, on cocoa plantations in Sao Tomé and Principe, and 
domestic work throughout all the colonies. The 1928 Indigenous Labour Code 
asserted that indigenous people were not allowed to work for private purposes 
under any circumstances.25 Nevertheless, it still underlined the moral obliga-
tion to work, and this code – which remained the backbone of all the labour 
schemes in the colonies  – established a system of contracts that were only 
voluntary on the surface. On the other hand, any local administrator could la-
bel work carried out by Africans in private undertakings as “of public interest”.
2 Building a Racialist Ideology
Since the 1920s, many of the leading Portuguese figures in anthropology have 
come from the Oporto School, which in liaison with University of Porto and 
the Natural History Museum developed the subject’s close links with the colo-
nial issue. Up to at least the 1940s, anthropology was a subject for doctors and 
biologists, who carried out anthropometric research into native populations 
and used racialist approaches, popular at the time, to assess people’s physi-
cal features and fitness for work. In 1934, the First Colonial Anthropology Na-
tional Congress was held in Porto. In tandem with the Colonial Exhibit, which 
displayed a substantial amount of research material on physical, serological 
and psychological features of colonial populations, the subject was promot-
ed based on the need to possess knowledge of such populations, specifically 
“towards a more rational colonization and the revaluation of the native work-
force”.26 António Mendes Correia, a professor in physical anthropology who 
was close to the regime and had served as Porto’s mayor and president of the 
Portuguese Geography Society, had for some time been in charge of the jmgic 
 25 Dalila Cabrita Mateus, Ibid.
 26 Rui M. Pereira, “Raça, Sangue e Robustez. Os paradigmas da Antropologia Física Colonial 
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(Junta das Missões Geográficas e de Investigações Coloniais; Colonial Research 
and Geographical Missions Junta). This was a body that was established in Jan-
uary 1936, under the direct responsibility of the colonies’ minister. The jmgic 
coordinated all the research missions carried out between 1937 and 1956 in 
Mozambique, Guinea, Angola, Cape Verde, São Tomé and Princípe, and Timor.
Around 1935, Orlando Ribeiro, the founder of Portuguese geography and a 
keen observer of social phenomena, was travelling throughout Angola. On one 
occasion, he was amazed to find a group of hired people, tied to each other 
with rope and guarded by two armed men, more than fifty years after slav-
ery had been abolished. He wrote:  “We took pictures and filmed such a de-
basing display and asked the guards why those people were tied, what crime 
or offense had they committed. ‘They are bums who do not want to work on 
their own land’ ”.27 Henrique Galvão, a colonial surveyor in 1947, disclosed his 
conclusions at a parliamentary session held behind closed doors: “the govern-
ment has become the main recruiter and dealer of native labour, to such an 
extent that settlers unabashedly require in writing manpower ‘supplies’ from 
the Indigenous Affairs Office”.28 Both cases – Henrique Galvão’s and Orlando 
Ribeiro’s – illustrate the way in which prominent personalities in the country’s 
political and academic life could react in face of the evidence of the brutality 
of forced work, risking their career and their own freedom in its denunciation.
There was also intensive use of African labour to build roads In Portuguese 
Guinea. With no other relevant investments to speak of, the communications 
network resulted in the Guinea population declining by more than ten per 
cent up to the mid- 1930s due to internal migration, losing the capacity to sus-
tain their own agriculture. The situation was different in Angola, where the na-
tive populations maintained control over their own crops. In Mozambique, the 
road maintenance impressed European visitors at the time, until they realized 
it was being carried out by women and children equipped with primitive tools 
and under the armed coercion of the colonial authorities. The situation was 
more blatant in the south, where natives were recruited to work in the South 
African gold mines. In 1966, Perry Anderson estimated that 100,000 Mozambi-
can workers annually were sent to the mines in South Africa.29 Introduced in 
1909, this contract was successively extended and allowed a substantial pro-
portion of freight transit to Johannesburg to pass through Lourenço Marques’ 
docks. In addition to being paid 150 escudos for each worker, the government 
 27 Orlando Ribeiro, A colonização de Angola e o seu fracasso (Lisboa: Imprensa NacionalCasa 
da Moeda, S. A., 1981), 192.
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kept half of their wages. This was paid in gold at the end of the contract, where-
as the workers themselves were paid in the devalued colonial currency.
Marcelo Caetano, who had replaced Salazar as head of the government in 
1968, estimated on a 1954 report that the number of Mozambicans working 
outside the province was about 500,000. That same year, the United Nations 
estimated there were a similar number of Angolans living outside the territory. 
With regard to Mozambique, over two thirds of the male workers were relocat-
ed, not only to the Transvaal mines, but also to cocoa plantations in São Tomé 
and Princípe or cotton fields in Southern Rhodesia.30 Anderson was adamant 
when describing what he labelled as “ultra- colonialism” that “human oppres-
sion experienced in Portuguese forced labour is so brutal and intense it has 
no parallel anywhere else in the continent. It is the absolute zenith of African 
misery”.31 He considered that there were more African emigrants, both legal 
and illegal, in Angola and Mozambique than in all the rest of Africa.
Since agriculture was the main activity and source of wealth, as much for 
the native populations as for the colonial occupation, its regulation by the state 
was of the highest importance. Thus, the Rural Labour Code was published in 
1962. It permitted the government to defend itself against international bod-
ies – such as the UN and the ilo – and international public opinion, because 
wages were fixed by collective bargaining. The truth was that with no trade 
unions in place, African workers’ wages were established in secret meetings or, 
as was often the case, they were never officially documented at all.32 It was all a 
mirage, as the wage gap in Mozambique in 1969 attests to.33 In manufacturing, 
while unskilled native Africans earned 5 escudos per day, semi- skilled Africans 
earned 30 escudos; in agriculture, Africans considered to be citizens earned 
5,478 escudos annually, Africans who were non- citizens earned 1,404 escudos 
and white settlers earned 47,723.
In its final stages, the Estado Novo regime bred an ideology of patronizing 
and protecting native populations, which provided a natural framework for 
the Christian civilizing missionary effort through work and assimilation. Rear 
Admiral Sarmento Rodrigues, Mozambique’s Governor- General in 1962, de-
scribed the Portuguese presence in Africa as follows:
 30 Zimbabwe was a British colony with self- government established in 1923 and adminis-
tered by the British South Africa Company. It remained a British colony until 1980.
 31 Perry Anderson, Ibid., 50.
 32 Dalila Cabrita Mateus, “El Trabajo forzado en las colonias portuguesas”, 63– 87, isnn: 
2172– 2749.
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From the onset, we did not ward off natives. We always dealt with them 
with humanity, and, quite often, welcomed them into our families. At the 
same time, we civilized them on our own terms, and gave them our laws 
and customs. In other words, moved by simple natural generosity, we 
wanted to turn them into equals. Nowadays, between us, in overseas Afri-
ca, there are only two classes of Portuguese people: civilized and natives. 
The latter are protected by their primitive customs. As for the civilized, 
we do not care whether they are black, white or mixed- race: they are all 
the same, all civilized. It could not be more Christian, human or kind. It 
is pure assimilation.34
“Forced labour was, in reality, an in- kind tribute charged by the winner from 
the dominated peoples”,35 as Phillip Havik described the situation. Portugal 
was a feeble empire, which turned the metropolis into a recipient of the wealth 
created by colonial despoilment. Paradoxically, from the 1960s on, it was the 
war economy that provided some investment to the colonies and started en-
abling a form of internal market. Nevertheless, destitution spread through 
the countryside, and with no industrial alternative in place this led to whole 
generations searching for better living conditions through emigration, mostly 
to France (around one and a half million emigrated between 1961 and 1974). 
At the same time, the regime produced one last imperial attempt in Africa: 
 colonial war.
3 Forced Labour and Colonial War
For decades, the prison raid carried out by the mpla (Movimento Popular de 
Libertação de Angola; People’s Movement for the Liberation of Angola) was 
depicted as the starting point of the colonial war. The main historical archive 
for the revolution (Centro de Documentação 25 de Abril) still labels it as 
such: “On the 4 February 1961, members of the mpla raided the military con-
finement building, psp headquarters and the National Broadcaster’s delega-
tion in Luanda. 4 February 1961 marks the beginning of colonial wars in Ango-
la, Guinea- Bissau and Mozambique”.36 The next milestone is usually credited 
 34 Sarmento M. M. Rodrigues, Caminhos do Futuro nos Horizontes da Nação: Grupo de Estudo 
e Trabalho (Lourenço: Marques, 1962), 119.
 35 Philip J.Havik, “Estradas sem fim: o trabalho forçado e a ‘política indígena’ na Guiné (1915– 
1945)”, in Trabalho Forçado Africano – experiências coloniais comparadas, coord. Centro de 
Estudos Africanos da Universidade do Porto (Porto: Campo das Letras, 2006), 243.
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to the upa (União dos Povos de Angola; Angola Peoples Union), when its mil-
itants attacked ranches and colonial villages in Northern Angola on 15 March 
1961, brutalizing its populations. However, before these canonical events took 
place, something else had already happened. This was described by the histori-
an Dalila Cabrita Mateus, who had already taken Portuguese historiography by 
surprise with her book A pide- dgs e a Guerra Colonial (pide- dgs and Colonial 
War).37 Based on an assessment of the morphology regarding the secret police 
in the colonies – using African archives, as well as a number of interviews with 
freedom fighters – Dalila Mateus provided evidence for the brutal repression 
of the colonial freedom fighters. This came somehow as a surprise for those 
who had studied pide’s behaviour in the metropolis, because it was regarded 
as relatively ineffective, despite the atrocities committed against Communist 
Party members. In the colonies, the police were just as callous: they arrested 
and tortured thousands of combatants, with widespread support from the set-
tlers. An information and surveillance network was pivotal in assisting the war 
effort, as were the close links with the military leadership. Above all, it was ex-
tremely efficient: “The acts of colonial violence were a sort of lifeblood fuelling 
pide/ dgs’ crimes and brutality. In Africa, it embarked upon mass repression 
and played an instrumental role in Colonial War”.38
In February 1961, the Portuguese army reacted to the Baixa do Cassange 
(in Angola) cotton workers’ strike, by bombing the communities with na-
palm. This strike had begun in earlier that month and lasted only around 
two weeks. Between ten and twenty thousand people were killed, and whole 
villages were razed.39 This northern area was a monoculture monopoly ex-
ploited by Cotonang, a Portuguese- Belgian company:  “There was open re-
volt on 4 January, when Cotonang foremen were tied at the Soba Quivota 
Sanzala, ten kilometers away from Milando. … Then came the population’s 
threat to bash whoever tried to force them to work in the cotton fields”,40 in 
 37 This historiographic output had been addressed before in some news features and literary 
novels. In this regard, Diana Andringa’s documentaries As Duas Faces da Guerra (The Two 
Faces of War) and Tarrafal: Memórias do Campo de Morte Lenta (Tarrafal: Memories from 
the Slow Death Field) are crucial, as well as Joaquim Furtado’s, A Guerra (The War). These 
made a successful attempt to display the two sides of the conflict, as well as the colonial 
army’s inhumanity. With regard to literature, we could single out dozens of writers and 
poets, many of whom were active in the ranks of liberation movements: Luandino Vieira, 
Pepetela and Mia Couto are amongst the most popular.
 38 Dalila Cabrita Mateus, A PIDE DGS e a Guerra Colonial (Lisboa: Terramar, 2004), 420.
 39 Ibid. This was considered the starting moment of the colonial war, which continued 
until 1974.
 40 Aida Freudenthal, “A Baixa de Cassange:  Algodão e Revolta”, Revista Internacional de 
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public works like roads and other infrastructures or paying the annual tax. 
Production stopped for a whole month, and nothing would subsequently be 
the same again:
Gathered in large groups, the insurgents attacked both private and offi-
cial buildings, damaged vehicles, bridges and rafts, brought down the Por-
tuguese flag’s pole, but no Europeans were killed. In remote areas, such 
as Luremo, Cuango and Longo outposts, burnt cottonseeds piled up and 
native carnets were torn, alongside other signs of hostility. Gatherings be-
came more frequent and threatening. Despite Cotanang’s expressed con-
cerns as the uprising was unfolding, and multiple requests by European 
dealers’ for armed intervention to bring it to an end.41
No systematic survey was ever carried out into the conflicts or the collective 
action undertaken by forced workers within Portuguese colonies. However, 
there was a partial one, based on both oral and written sources from the army 
and secret police – sources that had never previously been scrutinized by his-
tory – and it provides evidence of much more widespread resistance to forced 
labour than previously thought, both in terms of the dimension of events and 
continuity over time. The Portuguese army’s psychological action guide flags 
up the “non- improved group” (the masses) as the staunchest supporters of lib-
eration movements – in contrast to “tribal lords”, “ intermediate groups, and 
“improved groups” and settlers  – in a typology based on qualification levels 
and territorial origins. According to the army, the “non- improved” group tend-
ed to “support subversion” because liberation movements pursue the struggle 
against the “moral duty to work”, “food and income culture” and taxes: “subver-
sion capitalizes on taxes, portraying them as a kind of violence aimed solely at 
making the white man richer”.42
Let us take the example of Pidjiguiti, Guinea- Bissau, a Portuguese colony on 
the African West Coast. Bissau itself used to be in the Bissau’s docks catchment 
area, but fishing and coasting boats, sailing inside Guinea, used the adjacent 
Pidjiguiti docks. On 3 August 1959, a strike began in the general workshops, 
and spread to the whole of Pidjiguiti docks. Amongst others, it included sailors 
providing cabotage services, as well as those working for Casa Gouveia, linked 
to the powerful cuf (Companhia União Fabril; Industrial Union Company), 
the largest Portuguese industrial conglomerate. Detention orders for those on 
 41 Ibid.: 263.
 42 General Staff of the Army, Memorandum of the functions of psychological officers in the 
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strike led to clashes, and the strikers fought back with sticks and stones. In 
response, the police shot and killed seven people.43 The French newspaper Le 
Monde44 mentioned a riot that had left five people dead and a significant num-
ber injured. According to the account of Pinto Rema, a Franciscan priest:
The insubordinate have paddles, sticks, iron bars, stones and harpoons. 
Both sides refuse to give in or talk to each other. On the first clash, two po-
lice chiefs, Assunção and Dimas, are brutally attacked after firing warning 
shots. The fray causes injuries to seventeen guards, the police loses con-
trol and starts shooting to kill without restriction to exact vengeance; the 
result is that thirteen to fifteen people laid dead on the Pidjiguiti docks. 
The bodies of more sailors and dock workers were swept away by the 
river Geba, we do not know how many.45
Historian Dalila Cabrita Mateus points out that this strike was at the root of the 
paicg’s decision to turn to armed struggle, with peasant support:
A confidential report on this meeting, the “most crucial” in paicg’s his-
tory, according to Cabral, states it was the place where the move from 
nationalist unrest to national liberation struggle was prepared. Three in-
strumental resolutions were adopted: first, to shift the party’s activity to 
the countryside, mobilizing the peasantry; second, to get ready for armed 
struggle; third, to move a share of the party’s leadership abroad.46
A paigc memorandum  – undated, but archived between the 1959 and 1961 
files – addressed to the Portuguese government urged an end to the brutality 
towards natives, and drew attention to the starvation caused by rice exports, 
since this was the sole food source for Guinean people, and increasing exports 
meant that food reserves were being drained. Between 1942 and 1947, the death 
toll reached “thirty thousand people, mown down by hunger”, while their 
 43 Letter from 15 August 1959 (National Archive Torre do Tombo)  – ANTT- PIDE- DGS- 
Proc.299- 46- SR- Pt.9- 1 (Pasta 81944).
 44 Cutting from the newspaper Le Monde, 15 August 1959 (National Archive Torre do Tombo) 
ANTT- PIDE- DGS- Proc.299- 46- SR- Pt.9- 1_ c0009 (File 81944).
 45 Henrique Pinto Rema, “História das Missões Católicas da Guiné”, ed. Franciscana (Braga, 
1982), 856, cited in Dalila Mateus, “Conflitos Sociais na Base da Eclosão das Guerras 
Coloniais”, in Greves e Conflitos Sociais em Portugal no Século XX, ed. Varela, Raquel et al., 
(Lisboa: Colibri, 2012), 180.
 46 Basil Davidson, “Révolution en Afrique: la Libération de la Guinée Portugaise”, ed. Seuil 
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children were forced to accept being exported as “hired workers on Portuguese 
farmsteads in other colonies”.47
Other examples concern Mozambique, which had close ties with neigh-
bouring countries, including South Africa and some that had already achieved 
independence. In the early hours of 11 June 1960, Faustino and Chibilite, mem-
bers of a mutual assistance association for the Macondes Peoples Organiza-
tion, insisted on talking to the Portuguese authorities to negotiate the return 
to Mozambique of the Macondes48 who were in Tanganyika. In Tanganyika,49 
they had gained more rights, so should come back as “uhulu, meaning they 
could live freely, dismissed from forced labour”.50 For four days, Faustino and 
Chibilite put pressure on the Portuguese authorities, and were followed by an 
increasing number of men, women and children, “on foot or bike”, heading 
to the Macon constituency. On the morning of 15 June, they numbered five 
thousand. It should be borne in mind that about 60 per cent of the wages of 
Mozambicans forced to work in South African gold mines was handed directly 
to the Portuguese state in gold, and workers only received a proportion of this, 
in local currency; the rest went straight into the metropolis’ coffers.51 On that 
day, the authorities met the Macondes’ demands with a barrage of gunfire – 
the Mueda Massacre – leaving fourteen dead according to an official report, or 
150 as claimed by fremlimo (Frente de Libertação de Moçambique; Mozam-
bique Liberation Front): “From then on, the Macondes wanted war and were 
ready to follow frelimo when the organization sparked it on September 25th 
1964”.52
The secret police archives include several accounts of conflicts in Mozam-
bique, at the docks, for example. On 11 January 1971, reference is made to a pro-
test in 1970, during which production was halted: “low wages and ill- treatment 
at the hands of stowage officials in Nacala were at the root of the refusal to 
work, as for some time, stowage work was done by prisoners”.53 A confidential 
 47 paigc memorandum addressed to the Portuguese Government (National Archive Torre 
do Tombo, n.d.), 1. Ref: PT- ANTT- AOS- CO- UL- 32- C_ c0001, 1. (File 84619).
 48 The Marcondes are a Bantu ethnicity living in the southeast of Tanzania and northeast of 
Mozambique, mostly on the Mueda plateau.
 49 Tanganyika used to be a republic in Eastern African and a member of the British 
Commonwealth. It was named after the Tanganyika Lake, at its western border. Between 
1880 and 1919, it was a German colony, but in the aftermath of the First World War it 
became a British one between 1919 and 1961. In 1964 it was unified with the island of 
Zanzibar.
 50 Dalila Cabrita Mateus, “Conflitos Sociais na Base das Guerras Coloniais”, 183.
 51 Dalila Cabrita Mateus, “El Trabajo forzado en las colonias portuguesas”, 69.
 52 Dalila Cabrita Mateus, “Conflitos Sociais na Base das Guerras Coloniais”, 183.
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report from 2 August 1972 mentions a gathering of 60 men hired by cfm 
(Caminhos de Ferro de Moçambique; Mozambique Railways) at the Nacala 
Dock Police building on 29 April that year. The men were protesting against be-
ing scheduled to work a 24- hour shift with no assurance that they would ever 
be paid at all. An inquiry established that on the aforementioned date “one 160 
men were hired by cfm to work on the Nacala docks, divided in two groups. 
One comprised one hundred men, who were to work from 7 a.m. to midnight, 
while the remaining 60 were expected to work for twenty- four hours, from 7 
a.m. to 7 a.m. in the following day”. This second group would only be allowed 
breaks to eat. The report indicates that the demands of the “strikes” (the word 
is never used) were met.54
4 Between the Metropolis and the Colonies
In July 1974, the revolution in the metropolis, the soldiers’ refusal to fight in the 
colonies and the fissures within the state’s leadership forced the government 
to concede and endorse the colonies’ independence law. As a consequence, 
one sector of the state felt side- stepped, and moved towards a more extreme 
political stance, culminating in a failed coup on 28 September 1974 led by the 
conservative General António de Spínola. As claimed by Kenneth Maxwell, 
events in Lisbon, Luanda and Maputo were indissociable.
The same crises that shifted Portugal decisively to the left were the ones 
determinately pushing Portuguese Africa towards independence. They 
arose as a range of conflicts, sometimes long- term, whereupon political 
tension in Portugal, events in Africa and external pressure combined, 
leading to serious confrontations. The majority of those in Portugal who 
were politicized were fully aware of the underlying causes of these crises, 
although the national press seldom reported on them, or did it in rather 
vague terms. When the crises were over and their consequences became 
visible, what was publicly discussed was the resignation of Prime- Minister 
Palma Carlos on the 9th of July and Vasco Gonçalves’ appointment for 
the job, or General Spínola’s resignation on the 30th of September and his 
substitution by general Costa Gomes. Notwithstanding, no one involved 
in these crises ever doubted that the shape and substance of Portugal’s 
 54 Report, 2/ 8/ 1972 (National Archive Torre do Tombo) ANTT- PIDE- DGS- Proc.SC- 12918- 
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political future and the independence of the colonies were inextricably 
linked. Achievements on one sphere would either consolidate victory or 
bring defeat to the other.55
“Prompt independence for the colonies”, was the slogan on a famous poster. “At 
five o’clock, the situation at the gates of Estrela, the Hospital Militar Principal 
(Main Military Hospital), did not allow predicting the evolution of the events 
related to the demands for the release of Captain Peralta”.56 Pedro Rodriguez 
Peralta, a short man with Caribbean features, was a Cuban armed- forces Cap-
tain, who had been captured and injured by the Portuguese military in Bissau 
in 1969 and later taken to Lisbon under arrest. Five years later, in 1974, the de-
mand for his release was the motto for one of the many anti- colonial “demos” 
called by the far left. The demonstration turned out to be a large mobilization, 
despite facing an impressive repressive apparatus. The gnr (national guard) 
on horseback and some psp (another police force) agents were stationed near 
Pedro Nunes High School, while Maoist militants of the mrpp (Movimento Re-
organizativo do Partido do Proletariado; Movement for the Reorganization of 
the Proletariat Party) and the Trotskyists of the Liga Comunista Internaciona-
lista (Internationalist Communist League) and other activists carried banners 
displaying anti- colonial slogans. A few Cape Verde workers who lived nearby 
joined them. Yet Captain Peralta was not released that day; only at the end of 
September 1974, as a result of the political friction that lead to General Spíno-
la’s resignation.
There were several demonstrations against the war throughout this period, 
organized mostly by the far left, that actually managed to prevent some soldiers 
from travelling to the colonies: on 3 May 1974, a group of mrpp demonstra-
tors prevented the boarding of a military unit headed for Africa; the following 
day, the same happened at the Figo Maduro airport; on 5 May, an anti- colonial 
protest went from Estrela to Rossio, in Lisbon, and an anticolonial demo was 
dispersed by the gnr and psp; on the 6th of May, the Movimento de Esquerda 
Socialista (the Socialist Left Movement) organized a gathering in Cabo Ruivo, 
supporting the liberation movements. These protests were usually led by far- 
left groups and students:
After successive preparatory assemblies, a final meeting took place 
yesterday afternoon, at the Faculdade de Ciências [Science Faculty], 
 55 Kenneth Maxwell, A Construção da Democracia em Portugal (Lisboa: Editorial Presença, 
1999), 99.
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attended by people from Angola and other colonies living in Lisbon, as 
well as plenty of progressive young students. Attendees headed to Casa 
de Angola [Angola House] and occupied its premises. Later, a military 
unit came up and, after being informed of the motives for the occupa-
tion, left. In a general meeting, the Angolans elected a provisional steer-
ing group and adopted a motion in support of their brothers and sisters 
who are fighting colonialism with guns in their hands, and addressed the 
salute not only to mpla, but to all movements fighting for independence 
at the colonies.57
The colonies’ independence came about thanks to a combination of inter-
weaving factors. These included a crisis within the army, reflected in a divide 
among the generals, the officials’ refusal to continue the war and the demoral-
ization of soldiers, who were still being killed after 25 April 1974 in areas where 
the war was continuing.58 The political crisis fuelled the military crisis and vice 
versa. In the international framework of the Cold War, doors had been opened 
to allow the Soviet Union and the US to exploit the former colonies without 
having to share the gains with the Portuguese capital. However, one must not 
overlook the instrumental role played by the combination of social struggles in 
the metropolis, both those undermining the government by industrial action – 
even if they were not in outright opposition to the war – and those organized 
mostly by students and far- left organizations that challenged the colonial war 
directly. Albeit often forgotten, the strikes and shutdowns that took place in 
Angola and Mozambique at this time were also pivotal, insofar as they were 
an example for other workers in the region, specifically in South Africa. In May 
1975, a wave of strikes hit companies and the public service sector in Angola 
and Mozambique, in the cities of Luanda, Lobito, Lourenço Marques, Beira 
and Vila Pery.
Rail traffic on the Benguela line was brought to a total halt, from Lobito to 
the border . … The Rail Workers Union instructed all staff at Companhia 
dos Caminhos de Ferro de Buenguela [Benguela’s railway company] to go 
on strike in order to push for collective bargaining, something rail work-
ers had been fighting for over a long time. This strike does not only affect 
the Angolan economy, but also those of neighbouring countries such as 
Zaire and Zambia.59
 57 Diário Popular, 26 May 1974, 9.
 58 Diário Popular, 19 May 1974, 11.
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The legendary Benguela line originally linked Lobito, the Atlantic harbour, to 
the inland areas. Its construction had begun in 1899 – in the early stages of 
inland colonization – at the hands of the also legendary explorer Cecil Rhodes, 
who died in 1902. His friend Robert Williams completed the project. It turned 
out quite rewarding, as it was the shortest route to bring mineral wealth from 
the inner African Congo to the Atlantic, to be shipped to Europe. However, 
strikes were not restricted to the transport sector. On 15 May 1974, in Lou-
renço Marques, Mozambique, staff at the O Diário newspaper went on strike, 
while suburban transport workers threatened to stop work if the “immediate 
dismissal of management”60 did not take place. Two days later, the city faced 
widespread strikes. Towboat workers at the Lourenço Marques docks claimed 
they were working up to twenty- four hours in a row without extra pay; hence 
they went on strike on 17 May 1974. Workers at the cashew factory in Machava 
rejected a wage increase from 37 to 45 escudos, demanding 200. At the Fábrica 
Colonial de Borracha (Colonial Rubber Factory), where pay was on average 800 
escudos, a rise to 2,500 was called for. On the same day, railway connections 
with South Africa, Rhodesia and Swaziland were suspended due to a strike by 
rail workers that involved all three thousand employees.61 In Lobito, workers 
on strike at the Sorefame company remained at their work stations, demand-
ing “better wages and better working conditions”.62 Luanda was also “on fire”. 
Rosa Coutinho, who was appointed president of Angola’s Government Com-
mittee just before these events, made the following observation about the 
causes of the violence: “The first reaction I met in Luanda was the expulsion 
of cantineiros [local food merchants] from the musseques [slums]. Luanda 
seemed on fire. Houses were burned down. The population’s outrage against 
the cantinas ended up causing some trouble, for there was a shortage of sup-
plies afterwards”.63
Throughout the colonial regime, cantina shops were controlled by white or 
black settlers. Most were pide informants, because owning a cantina required 
a license from the secret police: “The level of exploitation was such that sugar 
was not sold by the kilo but by the spoon . … Sewing thread was not sold in 
reels, but by the meter”.64 The struggles with the burgeoning workers’ move-
ment in the colonies added to another long- standing strain on the regime from 
 60 Diário Popular, 15 May 1974, 9.
 61 Diário Popular, 16 May 1974, 1.
 62 Diário Popular, 29 May 1974, 11.














Downloaded from Brill.com10/09/2020 11:57:52AM
via free access
African forced labour 219
anti- colonial revolutions: soldiers’ refusal to go to war. By 1973, the deployment 
of soldiers had reached unprecedented figures. The metropolitan troops in 
the African war theatres numbered 87,274, supplemented by 61,816 locally re-
cruited troops.65 In percentage terms, only Israel has deployed more men than 
Portugal, despite the fact that over the course of 13 years, about 200,000 men 
avoided the army call- up.66 A study by the Army’s Central Headquarters itself 
revealed that the scale of desertion67 was huge and on the rise:  in 1961, the 
percentage of those skipping the draft was 11.6 per cent; in 1962, it had risen to 
12.8 percent, and reached 15.6 per cent in 1963. In 1964, the figure was 16.5 per-
cent, between 1965 and 1968 it hovered around 19 per cent and between 1970 
and 1972, it remained close to 21 per cent.68 In the early summer of 1974, three 
months after the military coup, Mozambique (25 June), Cape Verde (5 July) 
and São Tomé and Princípe (12 July) became independent. Angola joined them 
on 11 November 1975.
5 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have tried to demonstrate that the Portuguese Carnation 
Revolution (1974– 1975) should be understood as a process that began not in 
Lisbon in 1974, but in the Portuguese colonies in 1961. In between lay 13 years 
of war and revolts in a socio- political space that connected a highly developed 
economy – with one of the youngest and largest industrial working classes in 
Western Europe – to the extractive economy and forced labour in African ter-
ritories. While these two regions and their social dynamics have been treat-
ed separately in the historiography, we have underlined their entanglement, 
which is reflected for example in the fact that the revolutionary liberation 
movements in Angola, Guinea and Mozambique began after the resistance to 
 65 Estado- Maior do Exército, 1988 I:  260, 261 in J.  P. Borges Coelho, “African Troops in 
the Portuguese Colonial Army, 1961– 1974:  Angola, Guinea- Bissau and Mozambique”, 
Portuguese Studies Review 10, no.1 (2002): 129– 150.
 66 Miguel Cardina, “Guerra à Guerra. Violência e anticolonialismo nas oposições ao Estado 
Novo”, Oficina do CES, no. 334 (2009): 14.
 67 As an example, a statement from the most important leader of the officers’ desertion in 
the whole Estado Novo, Fernando Cerdeira, exiled in Olof Palme’s Sweden: “I speak pri-
marily to those who know me best, the officers I taught in Mafra. … I speak to you to tell 
you, once again, that the war they are taking part in is a crime. It is a war against people 
fighting for independence and freedom” (statement from Sweden to paigc radio).
 68 Estado- Maior do Exército/ Comissão para o Estudo das Campanhas de África, Resenha 
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forced labour was repressed in these countries by the metropolis. Hence, in the 
study of the Portuguese Revolution, it is crucial to reorient our historical gaze 
onto forced labour. There is no single explanation for the existence of forced 
labour in the colonies. It is beyond doubt that labour supply played a pivotal 
role in the period between the 1960s and 1970s – a view that is corroborated 
by the documented sources and by the statements of state officials and colo-
nial authorities. As nationalist ideologies became influential, international op-
position to colonialism increased, the colonial war intensified and resistance 
to forced labour in the colonies became stronger. The wave of resistance that 
emerged in this context in the Portuguese colonies is now considered as having 
been significant and widespread, but more research is needed to explore its 
various actors, dynamics and outcomes.
In turn, forced labour and resistance to it in the colonies had an indisput-
able impact on Portugal in the second half of the twentieth century. At that 
time, Portugal was going through a rapid industrial revolution that was cen-
tred around the industrial belts of Lisbon, Oporto and Setúbal; each strongly 
infused with foreign capital and investment from Northern Europe and the 
USA. It is therefore not surprising that Salazar said “All to Angola in full force” 
in his famous war speech on 13 May 1961, reacting to the upa massacre, and 
sending several thousand young men to their death. In the words of the Por-
tuguese poet Sophia de Mello Breyner, “That primary day, so whole and clean” 
was made possible thanks to African resistance and its contamination of the 
occupying army, and it also was the last day of forced labour under the colonial 
rule scheme.
There is a fine line between free labour and forced labour systems to pro-
duce value in capitalism, and the same applies to how it is resisted, as com-
bined and hybrid forms demonstrate that even the most advanced capitalist 
system can encapsulate the most backward practices. Its demise came from its 
imperial features – its “colonial possessions” – and the impulse to undermine 
the Portuguese State’s might throughout 13 years of war came from forced la-
bour, the most “backward” form of labour within the empire. The large scale 
involvement of the late industrial organized labour movement and its impact 
on African independence are combined parts of the whole process. We can 
no longer ignore the centrality of this “backwardness” in European “modern-
ization”. Although, formally seen as being on opposing sides of the “Colonial 
war”, or the “Liberation war”, depending on one’s perspective, workers in Por-
tugal and its colonies in Africa alike embarked on a process that created the 
conditions for the Carnation Revolution and the independence of new Afri-
can states in 1974 and 1975. Together, they succeeded in defeating the longest- 
running colonial dictatorship of the twentieth century.
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It is up to future research to further explore the forms of resistance, social 
ties and organizational relations that existed between forced labourers and 
liberation movement organizations. This will contribute to a non- Eurocentric 
perspective that is necessary to think of “class as a whole”, in order to include 
the formal and informal working class, and free and forced labourers in differ-
ent territories, both in the colonies and in the metropole.
 Bibliography
Afonso, Aniceto, and Carlos de Matos Gomes, Guerra Colonial (Lisboa: Bertrand, 2000).
Alexandre, Valentim, “O Império Colonial”, in Portugal Contemporâneo, ed. António 
Costa Pinto (Lisboa: D. Quixote, 2005), 67– 86.
Allina, Éric, Slavery By Any Other Name: African Life under Company Rule in Colonial 
Mozambique (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2012).
Anderson, Perry, Portugal e o Fim do ultracolonialismo (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Civili-
zação Brasileira, 1966).
Borges Coelho, J. P., “African Troops in the Portuguese Colonial Army, 1961– 1974: Angola, 
Guinea- Bissau and Mozambique”, Portuguese Studies Review 10, no.1 (2002): 129– 150.
Cardina, Miguel, “Guerra à Guerra. Violência e anticolonialismo nas oposições ao Esta-
do Novo”, Oficina do CES, no. 334 (2009): 1– 25.
Centro de Estudos Africanos da Universidade do Porto (Org.), Trabalho Forçado Africa-
no – experiências coloniais comparada (Porto: Campo das Letras – Editores, S.A., 2005).
Centro de Estudos Africanos da Universidade do Porto (ed.), Trabalho Forçado Africa-
no. Articulações com o poder político, Colecção Estudos Africanos (Porto: Campo das 
Letras – Editores, S.A., 2007).
Estado- Maior do Exército/ Comissão para o Estudo das Campanhas de África, Resenha 
histórico- militar das Campanhas de África (1961– 1974), 5 vols. (Lisboa: eme, 1988).
Fonseca, Ana Mónica, “O apoio da social- democracia alemã a democratização portu-
guesa (1974– 1975)”, Revista Ler História 63 (2012): 93– 107.
Freudenthal, Aida, “A Baixa de Cassange: Algodão e Revolta”, Revista Internacional de 
Estudos Africanos, no. 18– 22 (1995– 1999): 245– 283.
Havik, Philip J., “Estradas sem fim: o trabalho forçado e a ‘política indígena’ na Guiné 
(1915– 1945)”, in Trabalho Forçado Africano – experiências coloniais comparadas, co-
ord. Centro de Estudos Africanos da Universidade do Porto (Porto: Campo das Let-
ras, 2006), 229– 247.
Hobsbawm, Eric, Sobre História (São Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 1998).
Keese, Alexander, “The constraints of late colonial reform policy: forced labour scan-
dals in the Portuguese Congo (Angola) and the limits of reform under authoritarian 
colonial rule, 1955– 1961”, Portuguese Studies 28, no. 2 (2012): 186– 200.
 
- 978-90-04-44039-5
Downloaded from Brill.com10/09/2020 11:57:52AM
via free access
222 Varela and João
Lemús, Encarnación, En Hamelin … La Transición Española más allá de la Frontera 
(Oviedo: Septem Ediciones, 2001).
Linden, Marcel van der, and Jan Lucassen, Prolegomena for a Global Labour History 
(Amsterdam: International Institute of Social History, 1999).
Linden, Marcel van der, Workers of the World:  Essays toward a Global Labor History 
(Leiden: Brill Academic Publishers, 2008).
Linden, Marcel van der, “The Promises and Challenges of Global Labor Histo-
ry”, in Global Histories of Work, vol. I, ed. Andreas Eckert (Oldenbourg: Gruyter, 
2016), 25– 48.
Mateus, Dalila Cabrita, A PIDE DGS e a Guerra Colonial (Lisboa: Terramar, 2004).
Mateus, Dalila Cabrita, Memórias do Colonialismo e da Guerra (Lisboa:  Edições 
Asa, 2006).
Mateus, Dalila Cabrita, “Conflitos Sociais na Base da Eclosão das Guerras Coloniais”, 
in Greves e Conflitos Sociais em Portugal no Século XX, ed. Varela, Raquel et al. (Lis-
boa: Colibri, 2012), 179– 188.
Mateus, Dalila Cabrita, “El Trabajo Forzado en las Colonias Portuguesas”, in Historia, 
Trabajo y Sociedad, no. 4 (2013): 63– 87.
Maxwell, Kenneth, A Construção da Democracia em Portugal (Lisboa:  Editorial Pre-
sença, 1999).
Medeiros Ferreira, José, História de Portugal, Vol. viii: Portugal em Transe (1974– 1985) 
(Lisboa: Estampa, 2001).
Moreira de Sá, Tiago, Os Estados Unidos da América e a Democracia Portuguesa (1974– 
1976) (Lisboa: mne, Instituto Diplomático, 2009).
Muñoz Sánchez, António, “Cambio mediante acercamiento. La socialdemocracia ale-
mana y el régimen de Franco, 1962– 1975”, in Zeiten im Wandel. Deutschland im Euro-
pa des 20. Jahrhundert. Kontinuität, Entwicklungen und Brüche, ed. Jürgen Elvert and 
Sylvain Schirmann (Bruxelas: P. I. E. Peter Lang, 2007), 119– 140.
Nascimento, Augusto, Desterro e contrato: moçambicanos a caminho de S. Tomé e Prínci-
pe: Anos 1940 a 1960 (Maputo: Arquivo Histórico de Moçambique, 2002).
Nascimento, Augusto, Poderes e quotidiano nas roças de S. Tomé e Príncipe de finais de 
oitocentos a meados de novecentos (Lousã, s.n.: 2002).
Pereira, Rui M., “Raça, Sangue e Robustez. Os paradigmas da Antropologia Física Colo-
nial Portuguesa”, Cadernos de Estudos Africanos, 7/ 8 (2005): 209– 241.
Redero, Manuel, “La Transición Española, Cuadernos del Mundo Actual”, História 16, 
no. 72 (1994).
Ribeiro, Orlando, A colonização de Angola e o seu fracasso (Lisboa: Imprensa Nacional-
Casada Moeda, S. A., 1981).
Rodrigues, Sarmento M. M., Caminhos do Futuro nos Horizontes da Nação: Grupo de 
Estudo e Trabalho (Lourenço: Marques, 1962).
- 978-90-04-44039-5
Downloaded from Brill.com10/09/2020 11:57:52AM
via free access
African forced labour 223
Varela, Raquel, A People’s History of the Portuguese Revolution (London:  Pluto 
Press, 2019).
Zamparoni, Valdemir, “Da Escravatura ao Trabalho Forçado, teorias e práticas”, Afri-
cana Studia, no 7 (2004): 299– 325.
- 978-90-04-44039-5




The Rebellion of Temporary Workers and the Chinese Cultural Revolution
Felix Wemheuer
December 1966 marked a unique moment in the history of state socialism.1 
In that month, as China’s Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution reached fever 
pitch, the central government in Beijing issued official permission for work-
ers to form what it termed “rebel organizations”. These were to be directed in 
the first place not against traditional “bad elements” or external enemies, but 
against “capitalist roaders” inside the Chinese Communist Party (ccp) itself. 
Throughout the early years of the People’s Republic of China (prc), the party 
had portrayed itself as the champion of the worker. Now its own leaders pro-
claimed that “capitalist roaders” in the leadership were in fact turncoats. To 
save the party, workers would have to refashion it.
Labour unrest in the early days of the Cultural Revolution centred on Shang-
hai. In China’s largest city, a range of disadvantaged groups took advantage of 
a moment of extraordinary political upheaval to demand improved treatment 
from the state under the banner of rebellion. Among the most vocal were the 
so- called “temporary workers” (linshi gong)  – contract labourers employed 
alongside the regular, permanent workforce. The number of these temporary 
labourers had expanded dramatically in the years after the Great Leap Forward 
famine (1959– 1961), producing a “dual system” of labour that allowed the gov-
ernment to expand the urban workforce while limiting access to the generous 
welfare system available to permanent workers. The rebels of the early Cultur-
al Revolution attacked contract labour as “capitalist exploitation”, demanding 
access to the same “iron rice bowl” of benefits and job security given to their 
permanent counterparts.
Western scholars have generally viewed the substance of the battle over 
workers’ rights in late 1960s Shanghai in some crucial sense as subordinate to a 
larger game of revolutionary Realpolitik. From this viewpoint, the most import-
ant feature of the mobilization of temporary workers was not their own aims, 
 1 This chapter is partly based on an early version of Felix Wemheuer, A Social History of Maoist 
China: Conflict and Change, 1949– 1976 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019).
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but how these aims were instrumentalized by leftist party leaders. These lead-
ers, so the story goes, rode the wave of workers’ anger and used it to overthrow 
the local government in Shanghai, which was toppled in the so- called “January 
Storm” of early 1967. Once the leftists had secured power, they promptly be-
trayed their temporary worker allies, initiating a campaign to restore produc-
tion and retaining the dual system of labour almost unchanged. Some scholars 
have even argued for viewing the “power seizure” by rebel forces – backed as 
they were by the People’s Liberation Army – as a restoration with Mao’s bless-
ing: a coup against worker unrest designed to curb popular demands and to 
demobilize out- of- control mass movements.2
The current chapter argues for a reassessment of this narrative, suggesting 
that although the rebellion of temporary workers did not secure an immedi-
ate change in labour relations, it did achieve what we might call a “deferred 
success”. By 1971, the state had begun to enforce policies that allowed many 
temporary workers to become part of the permanent workforce, just as the 
rebels had demanded in 1966. To explore the background to this change, I start 
by introducing the role of workers in the state socialist economy and the dual 
system of labour. I then examine the conflicts created by the massive reduction 
of the permanent urban workforce in the aftermath of the early 1960s’ famine, 
as well as the concomitant expansion of contract labour. It was these conflicts 
that came to the surface so dramatically in the Shanghai worker rebellion of 
late 1966. I  follow earlier scholars in acknowledging that the new municipal 
government installed by the “power seizure” of 1967 demobilized this move-
ment, rather than fulfilling its promise. I depart from earlier accounts, how-
ever, in stressing the massive increase of workers and staff in the urban state- 
owned and collective sectors of the economy in the later years of the Cultural 
Revolution. Statistical surveys make plain that far from continuing to shrink, 
the urban “iron rice bowl” expanded significantly in the late Mao era.
1 Workers and Chinese State Socialism
Workers in Maoist China enjoyed a higher level of prestige than any other of-
ficially recognized class. In the language of the ccp, “worker” (gongren) was a 
relatively exclusive term, referring only to permanent employees of industrial 
work units, who were lauded by the party as “masters of the country”. In the 
 2 For example, see Andrew Walder, Chang Ch’un- ch’iao and Shanghai’s January Revolution (Ann 
Arbor: Cambridge University Press, 1978); Yiching Wu, The Cultural Revolution at the Mar-
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early days of the prc, this was a highly select group: in 1951, Zhou Enlai esti-
mated that there were three to four million industrial workers across the whole 
of China, accounting for less than one per cent of the population.3 Most mod-
ern industry was concentrated in Shanghai and Manchuria.
Chinese labour’s relationship with the state had long been fraught. In the 
first half of the 1920s, labour movements had begun to develop in the cities, 
and large strikes had broken out. Antagonism between workers and the au-
thorities reached a peak in 1927, when the nationalist government of the Guo-
mindang (gmd) massacred large numbers of communists and labour activists. 
Organized labour in China never fully recovered from this blow. Later, urban 
labour movements played only a minor role in the Chinese Civil War and the 
1949 revolution. As the People’s Liberation Army swept through China’s cities, 
the ccp’s outreach to workers was limited to calls to maintain production and 
defer to the party’s representatives. Following the establishment of the prc, 
the ccp restricted representation of workers to the party- backed All- China 
Federation of Trade Unions. In the first years of the new China, urban unem-
ployment remained high.
A number of scholars have pointed out continuities between the ccp’s ap-
proach to managing the urban workforce and that adopted by the gmd before 
1949. The establishment of official labour unions and workers’ militias under 
party leadership were both nationalist innovations, as was the system of work 
units that the gmd had set up during the Anti- Japanese War.4 In the years af-
ter 1949, the party emphasized increased production, work discipline and the 
mutual benefits for labour and capital in a mixed economy; goals that differed 
little from those of corporatist regimes across the globe. Evidence from case 
studies adds to the impression of continuity with the old regime. To take one 
example, archival research on the silk industry in the city of Wuxi has shown 
that male overseers from the pre- 1949 period, some of whom were known to 
have viciously beaten female workers, were still in charge of shop floors sever-
al years after the communist victory.5 Workers who had taken the promise of 
 3 Zhou Enlai, “Guanyu zhishifenzi de gaizao wenti”, in Jianguo yilai zhongyao wenxian xuan-
bian, vol. 2, ed. Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe (Beijing: Zhongyang Wenxian Chubanshe, 
1992) (quoted as jgyl in the following notes), 446.
 4 For details, see Elisabeth Perry, “Masters of the Country? Shanghai Workers in the Early Peo-
ple’s Republic”, in Dilemmas of Victory: The Early Years of the People’s Republic of China, ed. 
Jeremy Brown and Paul G. Pickowicz (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007), 78; 
Mark W. Frazier, The Making of the Chinese Industrial Workplace: State, Revolution and Labor 
Management (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).
 5 Robert Cliver, Red Silk: Class, Gender, and Revolution in China’s Yangzi Delta Silk Industry (un-
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“liberation” seriously were often disappointed that so little had changed, and 
many believed that the revolution had failed to live up to its early promise. In 
Shanghai, labour unrest and strikes in the early years of the prc put the gov-
ernment under sustained and unwelcome pressure.
Against this background, how are we to understand the ccp’s lofty asser-
tion that, under its rule, workers were “masters of the country”? The claim 
makes sense only in the context of the party’s Marxist- Leninist ideology. Karl 
Marx had argued that prior to the proletarian revolution, which would begin 
the transition to socialism, the bourgeoisie would seize power from the feudal 
classes and replace the system of feudal exploitation with one of capitalist ex-
ploitation, of which the bourgeoisie itself would be the primary beneficiary.6 
The working class would then lead a second revolution, which would result 
not only in the liberation of the workers, but – through the overthrow of the 
capitalist system – of humanity as a whole. Thus, the proletariat was the ulti-
mate liberating class, expected not only to seize power, but also to abolish class 
structures and exploitation entirely.
During the Chinese revolution of 1949, peasants had played a much more 
important role than the urban population. Urban workers, however, represent-
ed the future of the communist cause and were a key element of the industri-
alized, socialist country the ccp was seeking to build. In line with the rest of 
the socialist bloc in Eastern Europe, the party in the 1950s saw workers as the 
most progressive class. Industrial labourers worked with advanced technolo-
gies in the factories of urban China, and their social relations were thought 
to be based less on kinship structures than on class solidarity, built through 
collective experiences of strikes and the class struggle on the shop floor. The 
growth in the number of industrial workers in state industries after 1949 there-
fore amounted to an expansion of the pool of future socialists. After private 
ownership of land and means of production were abolished, everyone was to 
be a worker.
In short, the ccp’s descriptions of “mastery of the country” grew out of the 
workers’ theoretical role in the construction of socialism and the expectation 
that as the new China modernized, the working class would inexorably expand 
with it. On these terms, “mastery” did not necessarily equate to governing au-
thority. In fact, the party constitutions of 1945, 1969 and 1973 defined the ccp 
not as the servant of the working class but as its “vanguard”.7 The party was the 
 6 Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, Manifesto of the Communist Party (1848), https:// www.marx-
ists.org/ archive/ marx/ works/ 1848/ communist- manifesto/ ch01.htm#007 [1 March 2017].
 7 Zhongguo geming bowuguan, ed., Zhongguo gongchandang dangzhang huibian (Beijing: 
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mouthpiece, not of the transient, subjective desires that workers might them-
selves express, but of their deeper, objective interests. Building a communist 
future required the party to inculcate “class consciousness” into the workers, 
encouraging them to act according to the laws of historical development that 
would lead humanity towards communism.
Hand in hand with this went the need to strengthen the proletarian character 
of the party, a goal that required continual struggle against the negative ideolog-
ical influence of the petty bourgeoisie and peasant smallholders. Workers had to 
be systematically trained to become cadres and leaders to replace officials from 
the old regime. The ccp under Mao adopted a narrative that viewed purging “class 
enemies” and fighting against leftist or rightist deviation as a way for the party 
to purify itself. While only the most advanced and revolutionary workers could 
become party members, all the workers in state- owned enterprises were automat-
ically enrolled in official labour unions. These were the “schools of communism” 
that would educate and raise the political consciousness of all workers, acting – in 
Lenin’s formulation – as the link between the vanguard and the masses.8 This link 
worked in both directions. On the one hand, the best trade union talent could be 
recruited into the party- state apparatus. On the other, unions were expected to 
implement government policies, enforce labour discipline and organize welfare 
in work units.
Despite their lack of independent representation and political power, many 
workers benefited significantly from the socialist transformation. For millions, 
the founding of the prc brought safe jobs and entitlement to welfare. The 
number of Chinese citizens enjoying official worker status rose dramatically 
between 1949 and 1957, as relatively lax controls on internal migration allowed 
the urban population to boom. Over this period, the population of China’s cit-
ies and towns rose from 57.6 to 99.4  million,9 while the workforce in state- 
owned enterprises tripled from eight to 24 million. For those who managed to 
become part of the permanent workforce, the prc’s promise of upward social 
mobility was a genuine reality. For the rest of their life, they were entitled to 
secure employment, welfare, food rations, free health care and cheap housing. 
The official retirement age was 55 for women and 60 for men, and workers 
could be reasonably confident that at least one of their children would be able 
to join their work unit in adulthood. Beyond the state sector, the workforce 
in collectively- owned enterprises also expanded rapidly; from 230,000 in 1952 
 8 V. I. Lenin, The Trade Unions, The Present Situation and Trotsky’s Mistakes (1920), https:// www.
marxists.org/ archive/ lenin/ works/ 1920/ dec/ 30.htm [18 September 2017].
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to 6.5 million people in 1957.10 As was intimated above, the work unit system 
was not an invention of the ccp, but had its origins in Republican China and 
the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, it was under the ccp’s rule that almost the 
entire urban population became part of the system, with social life, sport and 
cultural activities all collectively organized by work units for their members. 
For those on the inside, the new regime brought tangible benefits, and these 
success stories of the early prc should not be overlooked.
However, it should not be forgotten that only a small percentage of the pop-
ulation ever tasted the sweetness of the “iron rice bowl”. During the Mao era, 
it remained beyond the reach of the entire rural population. To use the con-
temporary phrase, almost the whole of China beyond the cities was “outside 
the system” (tizhiwai), without access to state- backed entitlements. Peasants 
became members not of work units with defined welfare schemes, but of ag-
ricultural cooperatives (established nationally by 1956) and then, by 1958, of 
People’s Communes. Their standard of living depended on the production 
output of their collectives, and they were not entitled to grain rations or state- 
mandated welfare. Mao was among a number of leaders to argue that the 
country was too poor for the urban welfare state to be expanded to the villages. 
Only by focusing on industrial development could China escape backwardness 
and poverty, and welfare for all would have to wait.11 By 1958, the government 
had established a system of household registration (hukou) that divided Chi-
na into “agricultural” and “non- agricultural” populations. An important goal of 
this innovation was to limit and control rural- to- urban migration. Agricultural 
hukou holders who left their villages without permission from the authorities 
had no legal access to ration cards, employment, schooling or housing in the 
cities. In Maoist China, life in the state- subsidized urban world was a privilege, 
and the government reserved the right to decide who was entitled to that priv-
ilege and who was not.
Significant inequalities existed within urban society as well. At one end of 
the scale was the permanent workforce of the state- owned enterprises, which 
existed “inside the system” (tizhinei), with high job security and generous 
benefits. Lower down the pecking order were workers in the collective sector, 
who generally earned reasonable salaries, but had reduced access to housing, 
medical care, social security and pensions. Below them sat a group of more 
 10 Zhonggong zhongyang shujichu yanjiushi lilunzu, ed., Dangqian woguo gongren jieji 
zhuangkuang diaocha ziliao huibian, vol. 2 (Beijing: Zhonggong zhongyang dangxiao chu-
banshe, 1983), 105– 107.
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or less casual labourers, known either as “temporary workers” (linshigong) or 
“contract workers” (hetonggong). This group, who enjoyed only minimal pro-
tection, comprised people recruited by work units for seasonal tasks or as ad-
ditional labour to fulfil short- term production goals. Many were from a peasant 
background, and their stay in the urban world was strictly limited. In most 
cases they retained their original, agrarian household registration, meaning 
that they were expected to return to their village after the expiration of their 
contract. In addition to the rural labourers, urban women made up a large pro-
portion of the temporary workforce. Particularly in industry, contract workers 
were often drawn from among the wives of male permanent workers. This gen-
dered dimension of the dual system of labour needs to figure prominently in 
any analysis.12
Divisions between the permanent and non- permanent workforce were an 
important feature of labour conflict throughout the prc’s twentieth- century 
history; from the wildcat strikes and unrest of 1956, through the early Cultural 
Revolution and even into the 1980s.13 All through the pre- reform period, tem-
porary workers’ demands for access to the “iron rice bowl” met with a lack of 
solidarity from permanent workers, who generally defended the status quo. 
The early Cultural Revolution saw this particular form of intra- class conflict 
reach its zenith, and to understand why, we need to examine the central gov-
ernment’s labour policy in the two years following the Great Leap Famine 
(1961– 1963).
2 Famine Recovery: The Origins of Conflicts over Temporary Labour
In 1958, the prc government launched the Great Leap Forward, aiming to in-
dustrialize China with unprecedented speed. The subsequent two years saw 
a massive expansion of the urban population and the workforce in the state- 
owned and collective industries. Despite the establishment of a nationwide 
household registration system, between 1957 and 1960 the population of Chi-
na’s cities and towns increased by over 30 million, and industrial enterprises 
continued to recruit labour power from the countryside to fulfil the ambitious 
targets of the Great Leap.14 This trend meant that a smaller number of agrarian 
 12 For more details see Wemheuer, A Social History of Maoist China, 132– 134, 270– 272.
 13 Elizabeth Perry, Challenging the Mandate of Heaven:  Social Protest and State Power in 
China (Armonk: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 170– 295.
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producers had to feed a much larger urban population, even as government 
mismanagement and adverse weather conditions began to put the harvests 
under pressure.
As the Great Leap Famine began to bite in 1959, the countryside bore the 
brunt of the pain. State control of grain supplies under the “unified purchase 
and sale” (tonggou tongxiao) system meant that the authorities could continue 
to appropriate as much grain as they saw fit, even under starvation conditions. 
The central government chose to use this power to protect urban grain con-
sumers at the expense of rural farmers. Remarkably, net grain procurement as 
a proportion of the harvest actually increased after 1956, rising from 14.9 per 
cent to 28 per cent in 1959, followed by a decrease to a still elevated 21.5 per 
cent in 1960, at the peak of the rural famine.15 This supposedly surplus grain 
was used to feed the expanding urban population and rural labour power out-
side of agriculture, and some of it was also exported.
Even this increased procurement could only protect the cities for so long. In 
the winter of 1960, urban grain stocks began to run low, including in key cities 
such as Beijing and Shanghai. Unwilling to countenance the prospect of a rural 
famine reaching the major urban centres, the government had little choice but 
to reverse many of the central policies of the Great Leap. In order to reduce 
the pressure on the supply system, programmes were launched to reduce the 
number of people entitled to welfare; that is, the urban population in general 
and the industrial workforce in particular.16
3 Reduction of the Urban Population and Workforce
The architects of this “readjustment” of the national economy were the senior 
party officials, Chen Yun and Li Xiannian. Both men argued for a reduction of 
the urban workforce and for the import of grain in order to restore the balance 
between urban consumers and net grain producers in the countryside. Chen in 
particular believed that the uncontrolled growth of the urban population had 
been the major reason, not only for the enormously destructive Great Leap 
Famine, but also for smaller disruptions to the grain supply in 1953, 1954 and 
 15 With regard to production and procurement, see “Zhonghua renmin gongheguo nongye 
bu jihuasi”, ed., Zhongguo nongcun jingji tongji daquan 1949– 1986 (Beijing: Nongye chu-
banshe, 1989), 410– 411.
 16 For more details, see Felix Wemheuer, Famine Politics in Maoist China and the Soviet Union 
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1957.17 Fewer consumers entitled to urban ration cards would mean reduced 
pressure on the state to extract grain from the countryside to feed the cities. 
Not only would this rebalancing increase the number of agricultural workers, 
but crucially it would also reduce the overall amount of grain needed for the 
country as a whole, since much smaller rations were provided to rural resi-
dents than those with an urban household registration were entitled to. Along 
with population transfers, Chen also argued for the restoration of plots of land 
for private household use within the structure of the People’s Communes. In 
many places, these had been abolished during the collectivist fervour of the 
Great Leap, and Chen believed that reintroducing them would allow those 
who were sent back from the cities to be self- supporting.18
Taking into account the volume of agricultural production and the number 
of urban consumers of trade grain, Chen estimated in 1962 that 20 million peo-
ple needed to be sent back to the countryside from the cities and towns (cheng-
zhen). Recent migrants who had come to urban areas during the Great Leap 
became the main target of the “downsizing” policy. In total, 26 million people 
were moved to the countryside between late 1960 and 1963.19 Table 8.1 outlines 
the reduction in the workforce of the state- owned enterprises (also known as 
“ownership by the whole people”): 8.7 million in 1961 and a further 8.6 million 
in 1962. By contrast, the number of workers in collectively- owned enterprises, 
where entitlements were more restricted, actually increased slightly during 
those years. Attempts to assess the exact effect of Chen and Li’s recovery plan 
on the urban population are complicated by the fact that statistics from the 
period almost invariably include within the category of urban residents, seg-
ments of the suburban population that were actually engaged in agricultural 
production. Taking this statistical anomaly into account, it seems probable that 
non- agrarian urban residents never constituted more than 20 per cent of the 
Chinese population during the Mao era, although within this low percentage, 
the reforms do appear to have had a significant effect. The non- agrarian urban 
population’s proportion of the national total decreased during the 1960s, from 
14 per cent in 1964 to 12.9 per cent in 1968; a figure it did not exceed until after 
Mao’s death in 1976.20 The government effectively capped the population of 
 17 “Shangyebu dangdai Zhongguo liangshi gongzuo bianjibu”, ed., Dangdai Zhongguo liang-
shi gongzuo shiliao, vol. 1 (Baoding: Hebei sheng gongxiaoshe Baoding yinshuachang yin-
shua, 1989), 314.
 18 Chen Yun, “Dongyuan chengshi renkou xiaxiang”, in JGYL, vol. 14, 374.
 19 Lu Yu, Xin Zhongguo renkou wushi nian, 594.
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the towns and cities, limiting the number of people who were entitled to food 
rations, welfare and non- agrarian jobs. The leadership of the ccp had learnt 
important lessons from the famine.
These measures alone, however, were still not sufficient to stabilize the food 
supply system in the post- famine years. Reform had to be coupled with imme-
diate relief via grain imports. As Chen Yun argued: “If we import grain, we can 
take less from the peasants, stabilize their attitude towards production, and 
raise the enthusiasm of the peasants for production. If we take two or three 
years to develop agricultural production, the problems of the internal market 
can be solved”.21 Between 1961 and 1965, China imported on average five mil-
lion tons of grain each year; net imports stood at around 4.18 million tons per 
annum.22 Rather than being sent to famine- hit rural areas, this grain was used 
to supply Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai and Liaoning. All four areas were part of 
the urban supply system administered directly by the central government, and 
the imports therefore constituted a form of indirect famine relief, reducing the 
burden on peasants to meet grain quotas and allowing more grain to remain 
in the villages. By opting for this method of relief, the government avoided 
imported grain passing through the hands of rural officials, thereby reducing 
the risk of fraud and misappropriation. From 1962, quotas for grain procure-
ment had stabilized enough to bring rural communities out of famine. Strict 
enforcement of the household registration system helped maintain the bal-
ance between agricultural production and urban consumption.
Although the austerity policies and downsizing of the urban population 
were necessary, they nevertheless had a deleterious effect on morale in the 
cities. Little is known about how ordinary people reacted to the programme of 
downsizing, or about differences in responses between rural and urban China. 
It seems safe to say, however, that many would have agreed with the words of 
one worker in Shaanxi: “The capitalists call it going bankrupt, we call it stop-
ping production. The capitalists call it firing, we call it being sent down. The 
capitalists call it unemployment, we call it [workforce] reduction. In any case, 
we have no jobs and it is still the same as in capitalist countries”.23 Work units 
throughout China were given quotas for reducing their workforce. Some urban 
residents tried to avoid being sent back to the countryside by petitioning the 
local government. Most petitioners argued that they were sick, pregnant or 
 21 Quoted in Jin Chongji, ed., Zhou Enlai zhuan, vol. 4 (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chuban-
she, 1998), 1565.
 22 Luo Pinghan, Da qian xi: 1961– 1963 nian de chengzhen renkou jing jian (Nanning: Guangxi 
renmin chubanshe, 2003), 118.
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had to provide care for dependent family members, while others threatened to 
commit suicide if they were not allowed to remain in the cities.24 The fact that 
targets for staff reductions were generally met suggests that these strategies 
tended to be ineffective. The central government’s ability to enforce a large- 
scale population transfer hard on the heels of the famine crisis reflects the 
remarkable capacity of the early prc state.
Little research has been carried out into how the arrival of returnees from 
the cities affected the villagers who had stayed behind. In contrast to the “sent- 
down youth” of the Cultural Revolution, many people who were hit by the 
downsizing of 1962 and 1963 were recent migrants who had left the countryside 
only a few years earlier and had remained familiar with agricultural produc-
tion. They were not strangers in their home villages. Nevertheless, it remains 
an open question as to whether the returnees were welcomed as additional 
labour power or seen as competitors for scarce food. What is certain, however, 
is that the countryside finally recovered under the influence of the ccp’s new 
table 8.1 Total number of employees in state- owned and collectively- owned enterprises, 
1960– 1965 (all figures in millions)
Year Total 
workforce
Ownership by the people Collective ownership
Workforce Year- on- year 
increase
Workforce Year- on- year 
increase
1960 59.69 50.44 4.83 9.25 2.11
1961 51.71 41.74 - 8.70 10.00 0.75
1962 43.21 33.09 - 8.65 10.12 0.12
1963 43.72 32.93 - 0.16 10.79 0.67
1964 46.01 34.65 1.72 11.36 0.57
1965 49.65 37.38 2.73 12.27 0.91
source:  zhonggong zhongyang shijichu yanjiu lilunzu (ed.), dangqian woguo 
gongren jieji zhuangkuang diaocha ziliao huibian (beijing, 1983) vol. 2, 105– 106
 24 For more details, see Jeremy Brown, City versus Countryside in Mao’s China: Negotiating 
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policies. To achieve this recovery, the government sacrificed its push for rapid 
industrialization, which prior to 1961 had been primarily driven by imports of 
foreign technology financed by exports of grain. The state also raised the price 
it paid for grain to incentivize production, but in order to keep the peace in ur-
ban areas, the sale price remained stable. The losses from what was effectively 
a massive subsidy programme would be a burden on the state’s budget for the 
next two decades.25
4 Reforms in the Labour Market: Enforcing Dualism
In addition to population transfers, another major element of the central gov-
ernment’s recovery programme was a change in the recruitment of urban la-
bour. Between 1962 and 1965, the ccp established the already- mentioned dual 
system in the labour market, as well as an equivalent system in education. The 
reasoning behind this move was simple. Many factories required new workers 
in order to meet their post- famine production targets. However, the central 
government was reluctant to increase the number of people on the state’s pay-
roll; a move that had backfired so spectacularly during the Great Leap. Between 
1960 and 1963, the workforce in state- owned enterprises had decreased from 
59 to 43 million, releasing some of the pressure on the urban welfare system. 
Some of these losses had been absorbed by the collective enterprises, where 
the workforce had increased from 9 to 11 million, but the overall number of 
workers had still dropped, and more labour had to be found from somewhere.
It was soon realized that one way to control government spending while 
enlarging the workforce was to allow an increase in the number of temporary 
workers. Short- term work had existed alongside lifetime employment since 
1949. A decision by the Labour Department in 1959 had distinguished between 
three forms of urban work: long- term employment, temporary contract work 
undertaken by urban workers, and a system of “peasant- workers” recruited 
from the countryside for short- term work in factories.26 Now, the government 
dramatically expanded the number of workers in the latter two categories. 
“Peasant- workers” were an especially useful resource, since although their 
 25 Terry Sicular, “Grain Pricing: A Key Link in Chinese Economic Policy”, Modern China, 14, 
no. 4 (1988): 461– 463.
 26 Zhongguo shehui kexueyuan and zhongyang dang’anguan, ed., 1958– 1965 Zhonghua 
renmin gongheguo jingji dang’an ziliao xuanbian. Laodong jiuye he shouru fenpei juan 
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wages were higher than the average rural income, they remained poorly paid 
compared with regular urban workers.
It was clear from the outset that peasant- workers were not to be allowed to 
become part of the permanent urban workforce. A 1965 report by the Labour 
Department about the situation in Sichuan Province expressed concern that if 
wages for young peasant- workers were set too high, they would cause tension 
in the villages after their return. The report also recommended that production 
brigades should be able to claim compensation for work lost as a consequence 
of members taking temporary jobs outside agriculture.27 Both these conclu-
sions rested on the assumption that a peasant- worker was and would remain 
part of his or her rural community, with no prospect of earning admission to 
the urban world. Although temporary workers were a minority, they were nev-
ertheless a significant part of the urban workforce in the 1960s. By the end 
of 1965, China had over 33 million permanent workers and 3.18 million urban 
contract workers; an increase of 540,000 over the previous year. Another two 
million people were employed as peasant- workers. A contemporary report by 
the State Statistics Bureau praised the dual labour market for allowing urban 
work units to replace many permanent workers with temporary staff.28
In expanding the dual labour market, the government never planned to 
abolish the “iron rice bowl”, but it did intend for a significant number of work-
ers to be temporarily employed and denied access to the welfare state. From 
1964, President Liu Shaoqi was an important advocate for the dual system in 
the labour market and in education. In a speech on the topic, Liu argued that 
while the iron rice bowl was the gold standard, it introduced problems by mak-
ing it difficult to “withdraw” workers; that is, to fire them. For seasonal tasks, 
temporary employment was a more desirable route. As Liu put it, “If there is 
work, they come. If there is not, they can go home”.29 Liu argued against fu-
ture increases in the permanent workforce, and he even suggested that entire 
sectors might become the exclusive preserve of temporary workers. Discuss-
ing the mining industry, Liu noted that life underground could lead to severe 
health problems, and he proposed that workers should be recruited only to 
work in the mines for a few years before being mandatorily discharged. While 
he was careful to frame his argument in terms of workers’ interests, “manda-
tory discharge” would have had the convenient side effect of turning a whole 
industry into short- term contract work. Liu’s speech was rooted above all not 
 27 Ibid., 400.
 28 Ibid., 459.
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in the socialist logic of worker entitlements, but in the government’s desire to 
reduce costs.
In sum, the years between 1962 and 1966 saw a deepening of the urban- rural 
divide, resulting from a deliberate reduction in the number of people entitled to 
access the urban welfare state and stricter enforcement of the hukou registration 
system. A side effect of these policies was to limit social mobility for the rural 
population. Within the cities, the gap between the permanent and temporary 
workforce also widened. Nevertheless, the party leadership remained united be-
hind the new measures, and it is notable that Mao never questioned the hukou 
system in his lifetime, or the various programmes to reduce the urban population.
5 The Worker Rebellion during the Cultural Revolution
Before examining the rebellion of temporary workers in greater detail, it may 
be useful to set out, in brief, the events of the first months of the Cultural Rev-
olution, when labour unrest was at its peak.
Shanghai was at the centre of labour unrest during the early Cultural Revo-
lution, but the movement as a whole began in June 1966 in Beijing. Its earliest 
manifestation – the student Red Guards, who emerged in middle schools and 
universities that month – was dominated by the children of high- ranking cad-
res. These young people focused their attacks on teachers and members of the 
old cultural and intellectual elites. Mao gave his blessing to this movement, but 
from August 1966 the agenda and targets began to change, as other students, 
and eventually workers, entered the fray. Some scholars describe this period as 
the “People’s Cultural Revolution”, which lasted until a conservative backlash 
began in earnest in January 1967.30
A few weeks into the movement, on August 18 1966, the ccp Central Com-
mittee issued a decision on the direction of the Cultural Revolution, mark-
ing a shift from the purge of cultural elites to an attack on “capitalist roaders 
in power inside the Communist Party”. The decision emphasized the right 
to form mass organizations.31 One of the first leading figures to come under 
pressure was President Liu Shaoqi, who was finally purged that autumn. The 
 30 For example, see Liu Guokai, “Lun renmin wenge (yi) – wei wenge sishi zhounian er zuo”, 
Epoch Times, 12 December 2005, http:// www.epochtimes.com/ gb/ 5/ 12/ 30/ n1171757.html 
[3 December 2015].
 31 “Decision of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party concerning the 
Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution” (8 August 1966), https:// www.marxists.org/ sub-
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major accusation against Liu was that he had suppressed the student move-
ment in the summer by sending work teams to the universities to curb the 
Red Guard’s activities. Many students who had been labelled as “rightists” or 
“counterrevolutionaries” by the work teams or school authorities during that 
period fought for rehabilitation. Under the slogan “rebellion is justified”, all 
manner of grievances against local party apparatuses began to be aired. Revo-
lutionary groups took the interpretation of Mao Zedong Thought, the core of 
ccp ideology, into their own hands. Mass organizations published unautho-
rized transcripts of speeches and quotations by Mao and other central leaders 
in their  newspapers.
As time went on, conservative mass organizations, also called the “protecting- 
the- emperor faction”, were formed to defend local party committees against 
the rebels. Local cadres mobilized ccp and Communist Youth League mem-
bers, labour activists and loyal workers. Some elite “old” Red Guards from the 
early days of the Cultural Revolution had grown disillusioned, as they watched 
the movement turn against their parents from August onwards, and they there-
fore supported the conservatives. The move to restore order was met, in Oc-
tober, by a new campaign against “the reactionary bourgeois line”, meaning 
the suppression of the rebel movement by officials. Widespread revolt broke 
out against cadres all over the country. As dissent concerning local authorities 
grew, the Central Committee finally allowed workers to join the Cultural Revo-
lution, as long as they did so outside of work hours. As a result, the movement 
spread to the whole urban population.
During the “People’s Cultural Revolution”, the government’s ability to con-
trol the fledgling rebel movement was tested. Young people who had been 
sent down to the countryside under the centrally mandated “Up to the Moun-
tains, Down to the Villages” programme demanded to be allowed to return to 
the cities. Many of those who had suffered in the campaigns of the pre- 1966 
period sought rehabilitation, and disadvantaged groups “hijacked” the rebel-
lion to promote their own economic and political interests.32 In Shanghai in 
particular, temporary workers were a major force in the Cultural Revolution, 
calling for secure, permanent posts in the state- owned enterprises. The first 
attacks on the local authorities in Shanghai were student led, but in Novem-
ber 1966, workers began to press for their own right to form city- wide rebel 
organizations. Their request was refused, and on November 10, around 1,000 
workers led by Wang Hongwen’s Shanghai Revolutionary Rebel Worker Head-
quarters commandeered a train and set out for Beijing to petition the central 
 32 Wu, The Cultural Revolution at the Margins, 97– 104. 
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government. They were halted at Anting on the outskirts of Shanghai, and 
their refusal to disembark resulted in all traffic on the Beijing line being halted 
for over 31 hours. As the Anting Incident unfolded, the mayor of Shanghai, Cao 
Duiqi, demanded that the workers immediately return to their units. Wang’s 
rebels refused to back down until their demands had been met: the recogni-
tion of their mass organizations and an acknowledgement that their actions 
were legal. They also demanded public criticism of Cao Duiqi and the handling 
of the conflict by the higher authorities.33 Zhang Chunqiao, the negotiator sent 
by the Cultural Revolution Leading Group from Beijing, eventually signed off 
on the rebels’ demands with Mao’s support.
The Anting Incident showed that grassroots pressure could persuade the 
ccp leadership to ally with rebels against local party authorities, even in the 
country’s most important industrial city. Only a few thousand workers had 
joined the initial Shanghai rebellion. After the success in Anting, however, reb-
el workers’ organizations in other cities were emboldened, and many called for 
official recognition. On December 12, the Central Committee declared the right 
of workers to participate in the Cultural Revolution and to form their own mass 
organizations, with the proviso that production should not be disturbed.34 For 
the first time since 1949, the central leadership recognized independent work-
ers’ organizations that were not integrated into the state apparatus. This might 
have represented an opportunity for progress in workers’ rights, but the change 
did not last for long.35 It should be noted that many workers remained sus-
picious of the rebel forces: between November and late December, the party 
leadership in Shanghai was able to mobilize significant numbers of workers 
in a counterattack by the conservative Scarlet Guards. Another critical point 
to note is that the students’ and workers’ rebel movements drew on very dif-
ferent demographics. In contrast to many of their student counterparts, rebel 
workers often had good class status, and more than a few had been party mem-
bers before 1966. From August 1966 onwards, many of the student rebels were 
the children of intellectuals and capitalists – victims of previous purges who 
had much to gain from a shake- up of the political order. By contrast, industrial 
workers “inside the system” were one of the most privileged groups in China.
 33 Li Xun, Geming zaofan niandai: Shanghai wenge yundong shigao, vol. 1 (Hong Kong: Oxford 
University Press, 2015), 333.
 34 “Zhonggong Zhongyang guanyu zhua geming, cu shenchan de shitiao guiding (cao’an)”, 
(9 December 1966), in The Chinese Cultural Revolution Database, ed. Song Yongyi (Hong 
Kong:  Universities Service Centre for China Studies, The Chinese University of Hong 
Kong, 2006).
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Why, then, did permanent workers participate at all? Without doubt, some 
had grievances against the system of one kind or another, and the Cultural 
Revolution offered a rare opportunity to air them. In fact, however, the main 
demand of the rebel permanent workers in Shanghai was for the right to 
participate in the Revolution at all, since this would offer them the possibil-
ity of improving their political status through performance. In Maoist China, 
the access to party or army membership, higher education and social status 
within society was linked to class status, family background and political per-
formance. People could do little to change their official class status or family 
background, but could improve the party’s evaluation of their performance by 
engaging in political activism. The extent to which rebellion was about rais-
ing one’s political status was made clear after the movement, spearheaded by 
Wang Hongwen’s Rebel Workers’ Headquarters, took over power from the mu-
nicipal authorities in January 1967. From this point on, activists from the heady 
days of the Anting Incident began to claim the label of “old rebels”, meaning 
that they had attacked the authorities when it was dangerous to do so and the 
fate of the rebel groups had remained uncertain. This privileging of early par-
ticipation recalled the boast of “revolutionary cadres” from the pre- 1949 days, 
of having joined the party before its victory was assured. The Cultural Revo-
lution offered those born too late to be revolutionaries the chance to perform 
their own acts of political daring. For permanent workers therefore, the main 
goal was participation rather than any critique of categorization or of the sys-
tem of class status.
The foregoing paragraphs have captured only a snapshot of the multiple 
competing interests at work among the conservative and rebel factions during 
the “People’s Cultural Revolution”. For Mao and the other ccp leaders, the 
complex, shifting alliances of this period presented a serious problem. The 
leadership was left in the unenviable position of trying to propel some aspects 
of the movement while at the same time limiting others. Leaders remained 
keen to harness the energies of the masses, but at the same time they worried 
that widespread strikes and factional infighting could put economic develop-
ment at risk.
More seriously still, from the Party Central’s perspective, the attempts of 
rebel organizations to coordinate at the national level represented a potential 
challenge to the ccp’s monopoly on state power. This was – as it remains to 
this day – a line that could not be crossed. By the end of 1966, the central gov-
ernment had halted the so- called “big link- up” of rebel groups, as well as the 
free train travel that had allowed Red Guards to easily connect with groups 
far from home. The slogan of the day, the double- headed “grasp revolution, 
promote production”, gave some indication of the balance the party leadership 
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was attempting to strike. Temporary workers, soldiers on active duty, public 
security staff and labour camp inmates were banned from forming their own 
rebel organizations; the occupation of archives and public security offices was 
also outlawed. The “People’s Cultural Revolution” came to an end, and the reb-
el organizations shifted their focus to a goal acceptable to the leadership: “seiz-
ing power” from suspect local officials.
6 Temporary Workers and the Attack on “Economism”
With this general overview of the “People’s Cultural Revolution” in mind, we 
now turn more specifically to the rebellion of temporary workers. As we have 
seen, the expansion and downsizing of the urban workforce between 1958 and 
1962 had been a major source of conflict. In the winter of 1966, temporary work-
ers used the Cultural Revolution and the ongoing critique of Liu Shaoqi to at-
tack the system of contract labour as an anti- socialist form of exploitation. Liu 
was accused of masterminding the nationwide expansion of this system from 
1964 onwards, with the aim of splitting workers into two classes and depriving 
temporary workers of their political rights. Particularly in Shanghai, tempo-
rary workers carved out a strong position within the rebel movement, and they 
used this platform to demand to be made part of the permanent workforce.
By late 1966, the old municipal government of Shanghai had given in to de-
mands including higher wages, access to welfare and public housing, and fi-
nancial support for a new “big link- up” to exchange revolutionary experiences 
with groups elsewhere in China. By this stage, strikes had already caused parts 
of certain industries to collapse.36 In what became national news, on 26 De-
cember 1966 in the Great Hall of the People in Beijing, Jiang Qing met with del-
egates of the All- China General Rebel Regiment of the Red Labourers, an orga-
nization representing temporary workers. Jiang – who was not only Mao’s wife 
but an important member of the central Cultural Revolution Leading Group – 
expressed her support for abolishing the system of temporary contract work 
and attacked the Ministry of Labour in a highly- charged speech.37 On 2 Janu-
ary 1967, the General Rebel Regiment, the Ministry of Labour, and the official 
All- China Federation of Trade Unions issued a “common announcement” that 
during the Cultural Revolution, contract, temporary and outsourced labour 
 36 Ibid., 649– 657.
 37 Jiang Qing and Chen Boda, “Jiang Qing Chen Boda yu quanguo hongse laodongzhe zao-
fan zongtuan daibiao de tanhua”, December 26 (1966), in The Chinese Cultural Revolution 
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should be abolished. Soon, temporary workers started to rebel against local 
authorities across broad swathes of China.
Central government leaders now began to worry about the immense cost of 
making all contract workers permanent employees – the very problem that had 
led to the expansion of contract work in the first place. Barely a few weeks had 
passed before the General Rebel Regiment fell victim to a Central Committee or-
der that nationwide mass organizations be dissolved. Then, on 17 February, the 
Central Committee and the State Council declared that the “common announce-
ment” abolishing contract labour had no legal basis.38 The two bodies stated that 
temporary labour could be acceptable in some cases, and that full resolution of 
the problem should be deferred until a later stage of the movement. The decision 
emphasized the political rights of temporary workers to participate in the Cul-
tural Revolution, and those who had been labelled as “counterrevolutionary” by 
their work units simply for joining a rebel organization were permitted to demand 
rehabilitation. However, infiltrators from among the “four elements” (landlords, 
rich peasants, and counterrevolutionary and “rotten elements”) should be purged. 
Temporary workers were not to form their own rebel groups, although they could 
join the mass organizations of their work units. Participation was contingent on 
them returning to work in line with their existing contracts.
This dampening of the demands of temporary workers was in line with the 
wider campaign against “economism”, backed by both the central government 
and the new rebel authorities in Shanghai. In an “urgent notice” issued on 9 
January 1967, the Shanghai Rebel Workers’ Headquarters listed the restoration 
of production and the fight against economism as top priorities. Rebellion in 
the cause of higher wages or other material demands was attacked as risking 
the ruin of the economy and as an expression of the “reactionary bourgeois 
line” advocated by “capitalist roaders”.39 Concessions given by the old party 
leadership to the workers were derided as a ruse to sabotage the Cultural Rev-
olution. Some scholars have argued that Zhang Chunqiao and other radical 
leaders who assisted in the takeover in Shanghai were simply using temporary 
workers for their own political ends and were always set to betray their in-
terests once the new government had been formed. Others have pointed to a 
silencing of social and economic demands as a result of the campaign against 
“economism”.40 In January 1968, the Central Committee and the State Council 
 38 “Zhonggong zhongyang and guowuyuan, ‘Guanyu linshigong, hetonggong, waibaogong 
de tonggao’ ”, (17 February 1967), in The Chinese Cultural Revolution Database, ed. Song 
Yongyi (Hong Kong: Chinese University of Hong Kong,  2006).
 39 Li, Geming zaofan niandai, vol. 1, 668– 669.
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reaffirmed their stance that the “common announcement” of the previous 
winter was invalid and that temporary labour should continue to be used.41
With this conservative reaction in full swing, prospects for an end to the 
large- scale use of temporary labour seemed bleak. However, as we shall now 
see, there was in fact a surprising denouement to the tale, as many temporary 
workers did become part of the permanent workforce in the early 1970s.
7 The Working Class and the Expansion of the “Iron Rice Bowl”
Throughout the late Mao period, the official media continued to celebrate 
workers as “masters of the country”. Less visible, but no less important, was 
the social transformation and expansion of the working class that took place 
in this period. In 1967, radical leaders had reacted to the push for improved 
pay and conditions by accusing “revisionist cadres” of corrupting workers with 
economic demands (in the reform era, the roles would be reversed, with Jiang 
Qing and the rest of the Gang of Four blamed for wastefully expanding the 
“iron rice bowl” to temporary workers).42 This hostility to workers’ demands 
began to change in 1971, when the State Council issued a decision banning 
work units from using temporary labour for year- round production tasks. The 
council also ruled that there should be no more than two and a half million 
temporary workers engaged, even on short- term or seasonal tasks. As a result 
of this decision, over eight million temporary workers were able to acquire per-
manent worker status (as against a total of over nine million in 1971).43 The 
change in policy had a sharply gendered impact, because (as noted earlier), 
in many cases temporary workers were female relatives of existing permanent 
workers.
The temporary worker rebels of the early Cultural Revolution had initial-
ly seen their demands rejected by the government, but those demands were 
now belatedly fulfilled. By 1971, no rebel mass organizations existed to pres-
sure the government to improve workers’ conditions, but it appears that the 
old argument  – that hiring workers without political and social rights went 
against the principles of socialism – was eventually persuasive. By that time, 
 41 Dangdai Zhongguo congshu bianji weiyuanhui, ed., Dangdai Zhongguo de laodongli 
guanli (Beijing: Zhongguo Shehui Kexue Chubanshe, 1990), 16.
 42 Ibid.
 43 “Guowuyuan guanyu gaige linshigong, lunhuangong zhidu de tongzhi (gaiyao)”, (30 
November 1971), in The Chinese Cultural Revolution Database, ed. Song (Hong Kong: 









Downloaded from Brill.com10/09/2020 11:57:52AM
via free access
244 Wemheuer
the government had no reason to fear any large- scale labour unrest, because 
party leadership had already been re- established on the shop floor. A direct 
link between the rebellion of the temporary workers in late 1966 and the gov-
ernment’s change in policy in 1971 is difficult to prove, because no references 
to the early Cultural Revolution are made in relevant documents. What we can 
say, however, is that with only five years between the rebellion and the reforms, 
the temporary workers of the “People’s Cultural Revolution” must at least have 
been in the leadership’s minds.
After 1971, the great divide between people inside and outside the system of 
the “iron rice bowl” remained, but the number of workers in precarious tem-
porary employment was significantly lower in urban China. It is more difficult 
to assess the impact of the Cultural Revolution on workers who were already 
in permanent, “iron rice bowl” positions at the outset. While the social prestige 
of workers was high throughout the last decade of the Mao era, wages were 
stagnant, rising once – and then only slightly – in 1971. Bonuses, an important 
part of the pre- 1966 salary package, were decried as a “material stimulus” redo-
lent of capitalist economics, and attacked by the rebels as part of Liu Shaoqi’s 
“revisionist line”. At the same time, wage cuts and penalties for poor labour 
performance were abolished; a decision that lowered the pressure on workers, 
but also made it difficult to enforce discipline in some factories. Young workers 
who had entered the workforce after 1958 found it more and more difficult to 
secure promotions and wage increases, resulting in a widening gap between 
the young and the old. These income restrictions hardly pushed workers to the 
brink of starvation, but they did make covering daily expenses beyond rations 
more of a challenge. Workers in the lower ranks, especially those with several 
children or elderly dependents, had to count every penny to provide for their 
living expenses.
The stagnation of wages went hand in hand with another, more striking 
trend: a massive expansion of the urban workforce. In 1966, state- owned en-
terprises employed 39.3  million people, but by 1976 the figure had risen to 
68.6 million. The workforce in the collectively- owned sector expanded from 
12.6 to 18.1 million in the same period.44
Unsurprisingly, this expansion placed the state’s supply systems under re-
newed strain. In 1972, a year after the decision to include temporary workers in 
the permanent workforce, the State Council issued a report identifying prob-
lems with the grain supply and calling for a limit on the increase of the urban 
 44 Zhonggong zhongyang shujichu yanjiu lilunzu, ed., Dangqian woguo gongren jieji 
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population and workforce. In response, the government acted to slow the ur-
ban expansion. The urban population entitled to grain rations had increased 
by almost ten million in 1971– 1972, a figure that fell to below five million over 
the subsequent two years.45 This smaller increase still represented a burden 
on the urban supply system and the peasantry, but stable agricultural produc-
tion meant that it remained a manageable one, in contrast to the failings of 
the famine years. The rise in the urban population during this period was also 
partly mitigated by the continued absence from the cities of millions of urban 
middle- school graduates, who had been “sent down” to the countryside from 
1968 onwards to be educated by “poor and lower middle peasants”. Many of 
table 8.2 Total number of employees in state- owned and collectively- owned enterprises, 
1966– 1976 (all figures in millions)
Year Total 
workforce
Ownership by the people Collective ownership
Workforce Year- on- year 
increase
Workforce Year- on- year 
increase
1966 51.98 39.34 1.96 12.64 0.37
1967 53.05 40.06 0.72 12.99 0.35
1968 55.04 41.70 1.64 13.34 0.35
1969 57.14 43.35 1.65 13.79 0.45
1970 62.16 47.92 4.57 14.24 0.45
1971 67.87 53.18 5.26 14.69 0.45
1972 71.34 56.10 2.92 15.24 0.55
1973 73.37 57.58 1.48 15.79 0.55
1974 76.51 60.07 2.49 16.44 0.65
1975 81.98 64.26 4.19 17.72 1.28
1976 86.73 68.60 4.34 18.13 0.41
source:  zhonggong zhongyang shijichu yanjiu lilunzu, ed., dangqian woguo 
gongren jieji zhuangkuang diaocha ziliao huibian (beijing, 1983) vol. 2, 105– 106
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these young people were not permitted to return home for several years, and 
some never returned to the cities at all.
One striking aspect of the late- Cultural Revolution expansion of the urban 
workforce was the change in demographics that accompanied it. Available 
data suggests that the gender and social origin profiles of urban workers un-
derwent a radical shift in this period. The number of female workers and staff 
in the state- owned enterprises more than doubled; from 7.8  million in 1965 
to over 20 million in 1977. Of these 20 million, 8.5 million worked in industry, 
2.7 million in the trade, food and service sectors, and 3.3 million in science, 
education and health.46
A survey circulated internally among the official labour unions in 1983 cap-
tures some of the major demographic shifts in the workforce during the Cultur-
al Revolution. From a sample of 11 work units in key industrial cities, a picture 
emerges of a workforce that was larger, younger, more educated and populated 
with greater numbers of party members than was the case before 1966. The 
work units surveyed had a combined staff of over 183,000, of whom only three 
per cent had joined before 1949, compared with 37.8 per cent (69,395 people) 
during the Cultural Revolution.47 The breakdown of the newer workers’ back-
grounds is particularly interesting. Of those recruited between 1966 and 1976, 
some 1,213 were existing workers, 3,070 were young people leaving vocational 
training programmes, 4,981 were peasants, 8,403 were demobilized soldiers 
and a full 18,039 were “sent down youths” – young people who had been al-
lowed to return from the countryside.48
It is noteworthy that “sent down youths” represented a plurality of the new 
workers. Permission to return to the cities, particularly to a job in a state- owned 
factory, was a highly desirable outcome for those who had been sent down, 
and it evidently remained an obtainable one. Demobilized soldiers, the second 
largest group, were likely to have been given their assignments in most cases 
more as a reward for service than because of any specific qualifications or ed-
ucation. The omission of “bad elements” – such as landlords and capitalists – 
from the data makes it difficult to determine how these less favoured groups 
fared. One other obvious point evident in the data is a significant increase in 
the average new workers’ level of education during the Cultural Revolution, 
compared with the years 1956– 1965. The number of new workers who were 
 46 Guojia tongjiju shehui tongjisi, ed., Zhongguo laodong gongzi tongji ziliao (Beijing: Guojia 
tongji chubanshe, 1987), 32.
 47 Zhonggong zhongyang shujichu yanjiu lilunzu, ed., Dangqian woguo gongren jieji, vol. 2, 1.








Downloaded from Brill.com10/09/2020 11:57:52AM
via free access
Revolution Betrayed? 247
illiterate or who had only primary- school education dropped rapidly, while the 
proportion who had enrolled in junior high school more than tripled and the 
intake of workers with senior high- school degrees increased almost fivefold.49 
For the workers in these 11 sample work units, at least, the reform era narrative 
of a collapse in the education system during the Cultural Revolution simply 
does not fit.
By the time the 1983 survey had been compiled, 16.9 per cent of all 149,995 
workers for whom data was available were party members, of which the larg-
est group – about 44 per cent – had joined their work units between 1966 and 
1976.50 Given that less than four per cent of the population at large were ccp 
members, 16.9 per cent represented a high degree of penetration. There are 
two possible interpretations of the figure: either workers had a higher “politi-
cal consciousness” than the general population, or alternatively the ccp had 
recruited too indiscriminately among this demographic, destroying the elitist 
“vanguard” status that had long been one of its chief strengths.
Across the 11 sample work units, 23 per cent of the total workforce of 183,611 
people were women. The figures show that during the Cultural Revolution, the 
number of women in the factories more than doubled; from 7,644 in 1965 to 
16,944 in 1976. However, a gendered division of labour is still clearly visible 
in the data. Light industry and the services sector were dominated by wom-
en, while heavy industry, shipping and mining were almost exclusively a male 
preserve. To take the extreme cases, the Shanghai No. 17 Cotton Mill had the 
highest proportion of female workers at 64 per cent, whereas the Guangzhou 
Ocean Shipping Company at the other end of the scale had a 99.8 per cent 
male workforce. The Changchun First Automobile Factory, however, employed 
26 per cent women; an unusually high number for that industry.51 Data from 
the Anshan Iron and Steel Company, a well- known national entity, suggests 
that the division of labour inside the factories changed during the course of 
the Cultural Revolution, with women moving into formerly male jobs. After 
1966, the first women joined its primary steel and chemical production lines. 
In 1976, some 26 per cent of new workers were female.52
Curiously, the data also shows that – not only during, but also before and after 
the Cultural Revolution – work units with a high percentage of women tended 
to have fewer party members than those dominated by men. For example, the 
Shanghai No. 17 Cotton Mill, Shanghai No. 1 Department Store and Nanjing Radio 
 49 Ibid., 42– 25. This sample is based on 149,995 workers.
 50 Ibid., vol. 2, 6.
 51 Ibid., 18– 19.
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Factory all had very low numbers of party members, compared with heavily male 
units such as the Guangzhou Ocean Shipping Company, the Zhengzhou Railway 
Branch Bureau and the Datong Coal Mining Company. This may be a sign that 
on average, the ccp considered female workers less qualified and less politically 
reliable as party members, or that a lack of support with childcare and other do-
mestic labour (still considered very much a female preserve) presented a barrier 
to entry into political life. It is also possible that industrial workers simply enjoyed 
greater prestige than those in the light industry or services sectors, and that this 
status difference played out in the party’s nomination process. The data from the 
1983 survey suggests that some progress was made towards gender equality in the 
state sector during the Cultural Revolution. Nevertheless, to quote Mao’s much- 
overused phrase, even with these improved figures, women hardly “held up half 
the sky”.
8 Conclusion
The Mao era saw striking changes in prc labour relations. Permanent employ-
ment, into which the new peasant workers were recruited in the 1970s, was by 
far the most desirable form of work. It was also growing rapidly. The workforce 
in the state- owned enterprises increased from 10 million in 1950 to 68.6 million 
in 1976, while in the collectively- owned enterprises, the rise was even more 
rapid; from 1.3 million in 1955 to 18.1 million in 1976. In total, about 75 million 
people were recruited into the socialist urban workforce during the Mao era. 
For most, access to the iron rice bowl would have meant a great improvement 
in their standard of living, especially compared with life “outside the system” 
or “before liberation”. From their perspective, social mobility was a genuine 
reality.
How, then, are we to assess the hukou household registration system and 
the other classificatory mechanisms through which the ccp sought to channel 
and direct social mobility to certain groups? It seems inappropriate simply to 
dismiss the hukou as a form of medieval “estate”, as some have done. Certainly, 
people unlucky enough to be classified among the “four elements” (landlords, 
rich peasants, and counterrevolutionary and rotten elements) were treated as 
outcasts, with few opportunities to improve their situation. However, they ac-
counted for less than ten per cent of the population. For the rest, mobility may 
not have come easily, but it was achievable – even if a person’s prospects were 
ultimately dependent on the goodwill of the party- state.
The regulation of the centre of social mobility, urban- rural migration and 
access to jobs or political institutions produced many disturbing outcomes, but 
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there was some logic to the ccp’s methods, however unsavoury they undoubt-
edly were. On occasions when the government relaxed controls on rural- urban 
migration, the number of workers in the cities tended to grow at unsustainable 
rates, as was the case during the Great Leap and in the early 1970s. The centre 
was then forced to tighten control again and to “adjust” access to the cities to 
preserve limited resources. It seems to me that struggles around the rural- ur-
ban divide, and inclusion or exclusion based on class status – another major 
feature of early prc economic life – were an almost unavoidable consequence 
of the way the ccp tried to manage resources. In establishing the party- state as 
a gatekeeper, it ensured that these conflicts would become politicized.
It is ironic that the party leadership under Mao, which so thoroughly 
crushed the rebellion of temporary workers in 1966, eventually fulfilled most of 
the demands of this rebel movement in the late Cultural Revolution. However, 
this victory for labour was short lived. From the mid- 1980s, the new leadership 
under Deng Xiaoping began to call not simply for a rollback of the temporary 
workers’ 1970s gains, but for the wholesale destruction of the “iron rice bowl” to 
improve “economic efficiency” and to subject workers to market relations.53 It 
took until 1998, when the central government dismantled the old state- owned 
industries through the closure of small units and corporatization of larger 
ones, for the Dengist vision to be realized. When it was, social unrest took place 
against privatization, layoffs and the commodification of labour. Nevertheless, 
in the end, it was workers who ended up on the losing side. Capitalist labour 
relations were – eventually – enforced.
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The Showras in the Iranian Revolution
Labour Relations and the State in the Iranian Oil Industry, 1979– 82
Peyman Jafari
“We snatched freedom, and we won’t lose it soon”, an Iranian oil worker ex-
claimed six weeks after the Pahlavi monarchy was overthrown in February 1979.1 
Although oil workers had not participated in the initial stages of the revolu-
tionary mobilization, their strikes had paralyzed the state and injected a sense 
of strength and viability into the revolutionary movement. After the fall of the 
monarchy, the strike committees in the oil industry and some other industri-
al sectors developed into showras (councils) – workplace committees through 
which workers made collective decisions and gained, or attempted to gain, con-
trol over production and the management of their workplace. Therefore, the 
showras became an important part of the political power struggle that emerged 
in 1979, and reflected the radical reimagining of social and political possibilities 
among significant sections of the urban workforce. Workers’ initial perception 
that they had “snatched freedom” did not last long, however, as the showras were 
gradually side- lined, repressed and finally banned as independent organizations.
Despite their importance during revolutionary upheavals, the history 
of grassroots organizations such as the showras has remained in the shad-
ows. As a recent study of these organizations notices, “in all kinds of his-
torical situations and during various political and economic crises and in 
different political systems, workers have taken control of their workplac-
es. Yet this story of workers’ self- administration is rarely told”.2 In the case 
of Iran, there is only one monograph3 and a few articles published on the 
 1 Kargar, 25 Farvardin 1358/ 14 April 1979.
 2 Dario Azzellini, “Introduction”, in An Alternative Labor History: Worker Control and Workplace 
Democracy, ed. Dario Azzellini (London: Zed Books, 2015), 1. For other studies on workers’ 
control, see Donny Gluckstein, The Western Soviets Workers’ Councils Versus Parliament, 
1915– 1920 (London: Bookmarks, 1985); Immanuel Ness and Dario Azzellini, ed., Ours to Mas-
ter and to Own: Workers’ Control from the Commune to the Present (Chicago, IL: Haymarket 
Books, 2011).
 3 Asef Bayat, Workers and Revolution in Iran: A Third World Experience of Workers’ Control (Lon-
don: Zed, 1987).
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showras.4 The lack of accessible sources has been an obvious obstacle, but 
state- centric approaches have rendered the showras invisible as well. More-
over, the revolutionary events leading to the fall of the monarchy in February 
1979 and the Iran- Iraq War that started in September 1980 and ended eight 
years later have overshadowed the period in between, when the showras 
emerged. Finally, after the war ended, the ideological shifts following the fall 
of the Soviet Union further diminished the interest in the showras.5
The topic of this volume – labour relations and revolutions – offers an excel-
lent opportunity to revisit the history of the showras, as they directly challenged 
and attempted to transform the established conditions and rules regulating la-
bour during the Iranian Revolution. Making extensive use of newspapers, offi-
cial documents, oil workers’ leaflets and reports, memoirs and oral history, this 
chapter examines the experiences of showras in the Iranian oil industry during 
the period from 1979 to 1982.6 This industry is particularly interesting for two 
reasons. First, it is largely absent in previous literature about the showras in 
Iran. Second, given the strategic position of the oil industry in the country’s 
economy, the showras in this sector played an essential role and had an impact 
beyond the local level, shaping political developments and national debates 
about labour relations.
Based on the international history of workers’ councils, I discern five cru-
cial features that define them. First, workers’ councils are a form of collec-
tive organization based on direct democracy, which is expressed in debates 
and decision- making in assemblies, and in the election of delegates who are 
accountable and can be recalled. Second, the councils involve workers’ self- 
activity, expressed in the different forms of collective action through which 
they try to realize their demands. Third, workers’ councils allow workers to ex-
ert some form of control over the production process (of services or products) 
and the administration of the workplace. Fourth, the councils can (but do not 
always) coordinate their activities within and beyond a specific economic sec-
tor or industry. Fifth, workers’ councils have to relate to state power in one way 
 4 Shahrzad Azad, “Workers’ and Peasant’s Councils in Iran”, Monthly Review, no. October 1980 
(1980); Chris Goodey, “Workers’ Councils in Iranian Factories”, MERIP Reports, no. June 1980 
(1980); Saeed Rahnema, “Work Councils in Iran - the Illusion of Worker Control”, Economic 
and Industrial Democracy 13, no. 1 (1992).
 5 For an excellent discussion of the impact of the Iran- Iraq War on state- society relations, see 
Kaveh Ehsani, “War and Resentment:  Critical Reflections on the Legacies of the Iran- Iraq 
War”, Middle East Critique 26, no. 1 (2017).
 6 The current chapter is partly based on an extensive chapter on the oil workers’ showras in my 
doctoral dissertation, Peyman Jafari, “Oil, Labour and Revolution: A Social History of Labour 
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or another. Some not only challenge the economic power of capitalism in the 
workplace, but also project their power beyond it, by challenging the existing 
state and providing an alternative. These aspects, which collectively challenge 
capitalist labour relations at the workplace, sectoral and national levels, will be 
discussed in this chapter in order to evaluate the attainments, limitations and 
potential of the oil workers’ showras.
The first part of the chapter provides an overview of the Iranian Revolution 
and the emergence of the showras. The second analyses the nature of labour 
relations on the eve of the revolution. The third part looks at the different ideo-
logical articulations of the showras. This is particularly important in the Irani-
an case, as workers’ control is often associated with socialist, communist and 
anarchist ideas, while in Iran, Islam provided an additional important source 
of inspiration. The fourth part discusses the development of the conflict be-
tween the showras and the post- revolutionary state, identifying three phases. 
The subsequent final parts analyse the development of the showras’ activities 
during these three phases.
1 From Revolution to Showras
The Iranian Revolution marked the return of oil workers to the national po-
litical stage after three decades of relative absence. Oil workers had played 
a pivotal political role in 1946– 1953, when they had stood at the heart of a 
popular movement that demanded the nationalization of Iranian oil, which 
was controlled by the Anglo- Iranian Oil Company. That labour militancy re-
ceded, however, when Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddeq was ousted in 
1953 through a coup d’état orchestrated by the American and British secret 
services.7 During the following 25 years, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, the Shah, 
consolidated his power by building a strong army, a modern secret service (the 
savak), an enlarged bureaucracy and a patronage network around the court; 
and in the process became heavily dependent on American military and po-
litical support. He also embarked on an ambitious project of modernization 
within the framework of the White Revolution, which was launched in 1963, 
and spurred a rapid and uneven process of capitalist development leading to 
massive social, political and economic contradictions. Moreover, this develop-
ment also “combined”, pulling together traditional and modern features into 
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new hybrid formations.8 A more elaborate discussion of these contradictions, 
and how they undermined the stability of the monarchy while making signifi-
cant sections of the society receptive to revolutionary ideologies, falls beyond 
the scope of this chapter.9 There is no space here to discuss the complex causes 
and the dynamics of the revolution either, but instead this section provides an 
overview of the different stages of the revolution in order to contextualize the 
emergence of the showras.10
The revolutionary mobilization that led to the fall of the Shah in February 
1979 unfolded in five stages, each marked by a particular combination of ac-
tions.11 The first stage, between June and December 1977, was marked by non-
violent mobilization of nationalist and liberal politicians, leftist authors and 
students, and lawyers and other professionals, who mainly wrote open letters 
and organized petitions. In October 1977, the death of Ayatollah Khomeini’s 
son became a rallying point for the religious opposition, when ceremonies 
were organized in various cities. The second stage started in January 1978, after 
the daily paper Ettela‘at published an article defaming Ayatollah Khomeini. In 
response, seminary students in Qom organized protests and were joined by ba-
zaaris (shop owners and merchants in the bazaar) who shut down their shops, 
exerting enough pressure on the ayatollahs to end the students’ classes. The 
clashes with the police left five people dead, and broadened “the revolutionary 
coalition from the intelligentsia to include a large segment of the ulama and 
the bazaar”.12 Commemorating the “martyrs” of Qom 40 days later in accor-
dance with Shia tradition started a cycle of protests every 40  days, as every 
 8 This reading is inspired by Leon Trotsky’s analytical framework of “uneven and combined 
development”. See S. Ashman, “Capitalism, Uneven and Combined Development and the 
Transhistoric”, Cambridge Review of International Affairs 22, no.  1 (2009); Kamran Ma-
tin, Recasting Iranian Modernity:  International Relations and Social Change (Abingdon, 
Oxon: Routledge, 2013).
 9 For a more extensive discussion of this period, see Ervand Abrahamian, Iran between Two 
Revolutions (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1982).
 10 For the causes and dynamics of the Iranian Revolution, see Misagh Parsa, Social Origins of 
the Iranian Revolution, Studies in Political Economy (New Brunswick and London: Rutgers 
University Press, 1989); Mansoor Moaddel, Class, Politics, and Ideology in the Iranian 
Revolution (New York: Columbia University Press, 1992); Mohsen M. Milani, The Making 
of Iran’s Islamic Revolution: From Monarchy to Islamic Republic (Boulder: Westview Press, 
1994); Charles Kurzman, The Unthinkable Revolution in Iran (Cambridge, MA:  Harvard 
University Press, 2004); Behrooz Ghamari- Tabrizi, Foucault in Iran Islamic Revolution after 
the Enlightenment (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2016).
 11 For a detailed discussion of these stages, see Ahmad Ashraf and Ali Banuazizi, “The State, 
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commemoration- protest ended with casualties. This cycle had receded by June 
1978, as many participants became wary of the military violence.
August to September 1978 marked the third stage of the revolution, as the 
protest movement was revived when Islamist activists used the religious occa-
sions during Ramadan – the month of fasting that started on 5 August 1978 – 
to stage a series of protests. In August, several cinemas were set on fire, most 
notoriously in Abadan where at least 410 people were killed.13 Although agents 
of the Shah were blamed for this tragedy at the time, evidence points to the 
involvement of fanatic Islamist activists. Meanwhile, the regime had started 
to follow a confused strategy, alternating between repression and concession, 
and showing signs of panic as the political crisis deepened. While in late Au-
gust 1978, the Shah had appointed Jafar Sharif- Emami to head a government of 
“national reconciliation”, the military opened fire on demonstrators who had 
gathered in Zhaleh Square in Tehran on 8 September (“Black Friday”), killing 
79 people.14
Demonstrations continued, albeit with less intensity, but the locus of the 
protests shifted from the streets into the workplaces, and a mass strike – most 
importantly in the oil industry – became the hallmark of the fourth stage from 
September to December 1978. The fifth stage of dual power emerged in January 
and February 1979. As I  have argued elsewhere, the strikes in the oil indus-
try were an important launch pad for the emergence of three institutions that 
underpinned an alternative pole of authority parallel to the monarchy:  the 
Committee for the Coordination of Strikes in the Oil industry, led by Mehdi 
Bazargan; the Council of the Islamic Revolution (cir), which represented Kho-
meini’s revolutionary authority; and the neighbourhood committees that were 
responsible for local fuel distribution and security, and were later transformed 
into komitehs that were loyal to Khomeini.15
The revolutionary situation continued in the three years following the Feb-
ruary 1979 insurrection. The new state was consolidating its power, but was 
confronted with the mobilization of dissident political organizations, subal-
tern groups of women, ethnic minorities (most importantly the Kurds) and 
workers. In this period, workers’ protests continued, although with greatly 
reduced intensity after the Iran- Iraq War started in September 1980, and the 
showras became a serious obstacle to the consolidation of the new state. This 
 13 Most reliable reports put the number of casualties somewhere between 410 and 450.
 14 Kurzman, The Unthinkable Revolution in Iran, 73.
 15 Peyman Jafari, “Fluid History:  Oil Workers and the Iranian Revolution”, in Working for 
Oil: Comparative Social Histories of Labor in the Global Oil Industry, ed. T. Atabaki, E. Bini 
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contestation ended in early 1982, when forces loyal to Ayatollah Khomeini 
monopolized state power, banned the remaining leftist organizations and re-
pressed grassroots organizations, including the showras.
The workers’ showras resulted from the confluence of two processes. First, 
following the February 1979 insurrection, the economy entered a period of cri-
sis due to the strikes, political insecurity and a lack of raw materials; many en-
terprises shut their doors, and in many cases the owners fled the country. Oth-
ers were purged by their workers or by revolutionary organizations. Second, 
the capitalist relations of production were challenged by radical ideologies, 
ranging from Marxist to Islamist.
As Asef Bayat has argued, in workplaces where the management had left or 
was severely weakened, there was a practical trigger for the creation of show-
ras, often through the transformation of the existing strike or “inquiry com-
mittees”, established to identify and purge members of the savak, the Shah’s 
secret service. In workplaces where the management had remained, showras 
emerged from a more combative attitude, derived from the revolutionary 
transformation of workers’ consciousness. This revolutionary consciousness 
had two essential elements. First, the revolution had created a sense of owner-
ship among workers regarding their workplace and society. This sense of own-
ership was not only expressed in terms of class, I should add, but was also artic-
ulated in terms of nation; particularly in the oil industry, which was regarded 
as a national asset. Second, many workers equated the old factory regime with 
the authoritarianism of the monarchy, and hence saw democratization of the 
workplace as an alternative.16
In the absence of genuine labour unions, the showras articulated oil work-
ers’ socioeconomic demands, particularly regarding wages and housing condi-
tions, and campaigned to realize them. They were, however, much more than 
labour unions, due to their function as “workplace organisations that aimed 
to extend the control of labour over the organisation of production, lim-
it the authority of management, and democratize the work environment”.17 
Their “elected executive committee represented all the employees of a factory 
(blue – and white- collar) and/ or an industrial group, irrespective of trade, skill 
or gender. Their major concern was to achieve workers’ control”.18
 16 Bayat, Workers and Revolution in Iran, 109– 112.
 17 Asef Bayat, “Labor and Democracy in Post- Revolutionary Iran”, in Post- Revolutionary 
Iran, ed. Hooshang Amirahmadi and Manoucher Parvin (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 
1988), 43.
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2 Pre- revolutionary Labour Relations
Labour relations before the revolution were heavily shaped by the uneven 
and combined development in Iran, creating a situation in which traditional 
and modern labour relations existed at the same time, but were also drawn 
together into new combinations. The manufacturing sector was strongly bi-
furcated. Nearly 97 per cent of the manufacturing establishments were small 
sized, each employing fewer than 10 workers, and in total about 44 per cent 
of all the workers in manufacturing. While the remaining 3 per cent of the 
establishments were medium sized (10 to 49 workers) or larger (50 or more), 
they employed about 56 per cent of the manufacturing workers.19 Labour rela-
tions in the small establishments were mainly shaped by what Bayat has called 
“semi- craft management”, referring to “the decentralized mode of production 
in small- scale, technically backward and organizationally simple units of pro-
duction in which the worker- capitalist relations assume the appearance of the 
patron- client relation of the classic craft system”.20 In most of the medium- 
sized establishments, which were often labour intensive, the “traditional man-
agement” prevailed. “In such units, direct control was dominant; there was 
no structural hierarchical mediating element between labour and capital … 
The supervisors, the boss’s hands, exerted an effective and extended control 
over the disciplinary process of the workshop, in terms of hiring, firing, wage 
increases, promotion, overtime, punishments and penalties”.21 In the large 
establishments, the principles of “modern rational management” were par-
tially used to regulate labour relations through “methods of organization and 
production, which, while raising the productivity of labour, at the same time 
sought the co- operation of the workforce […], in the words of Burawoy, ‘ob-
scuring and securing surplus- value.’ ”22
The oil industry, directly employing about 70,000 white- collar and blue- 
collar workers on the eve of the revolution,23 was one of the sectors where 
modern rational management was applied the most systematically, but only 
partially, to regulate labour relations. Using Richard Hyman’s notion of indus-
trial relations as a synonym, labour relations are defined here as the “processes 
 19 Farhad Nomani and Sohrab Behdad, Class and Labor in Iran: Did the Revolution Matter? 
(Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 2006), 91.
 20 Bayat, Workers and Revolution in Iran, 53.
 21 Ibid., 55.
 22 Ibid., 56.
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of control over work relations”.24 On the one hand, “work relations” are con-
trolled by state policies regulating the capital- labour relations. As in many 
countries, the labour law in Iran played an important role in regulating these 
relations. The oil workers’ struggles in the 1940s had contributed significant-
ly to the societal pressures that had forced the government to introduce the 
labour law in 1946. On the other hand, labour relations are of course also reg-
ulated at the workplace or the industrial level, through what Michael Bura-
woy calls the “factory regime”, referring to “the set of institutions that organize, 
transform, or repress struggles over relations in production and relations of 
production at the level of the enterprise”.25
As I have explained more elaborately elsewhere, the factory regime in the 
Iranian oil industry before the revolution was a combination of what Bura-
woy calls “hegemonic” and “bureaucratic despotic” forms.26 In the former, the 
state and factory apparatuses are separated, but the state intervenes through 
laws and regulations to shape and constrain the action of the factory apparatus 
(for example, collective bargaining, trade unions and grievance settlements), 
which is geared towards the creation of consent. The “bureaucratic despotic” 
factory regime, based on repressive mechanisms of control, is characterized by 
the fusion of the factory and state apparatuses, and bureaucratic state inter-
vention in the factory regime and the economy.27
The specific mechanisms of controlling the labour processes in the oil in-
dustry, which can be discussed here only very briefly, clarify why the labour 
relations there could be conceived of as hybrid. The first mechanism was the 
modern rational management discussed above. Most importantly, this cre-
ated an internal market, a structural hierarchy within the workforce and an 
aligned system of rewards and punishments, which aimed to increase pro-
ductivity while creating consent among the oil workers. The remuneration 
system was organized according to a well- defined job classification system 
that also regulated promotions. Hiring and firing were subject to bureau-
cratic rules, and there was an advanced system of educational and training 
 24 Richard Hyman, Industrial Relations:  A Marxist Introduction (London:  Macmillan, 
1975), 12.
 25 Michael Burawoy, Manufacturing Consent: Changes in the Labor Process under Monopoly 
Capitalism (Chicago, IL, London: University of Chicago Press, 1979), 110.
 26 Jafari, “Oil, Labour and Revolution”, 151– 171.
 27 Burawoy also identifies “market despotic” and “collective self- management” factory 
regimes. This is a simplified version of Burawoy’s typology, limited to the main forms of 
factory regimes. See Michael Burawoy, The Politics of Production: Factory Regimes under 
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institutions. The most important aspect, however, was an extreme hierarchy 
within the workforce that created a huge differentiation, and also conflicts, 
between white- collar and blue- collar employees, reflected in their wages 
and social, cultural, housing and health amenities. A similar differentiation 
existed between those directly employed by the National Iranian Oil Com-
pany (nioc) and those employed by subcontractors. A system of collective 
bargaining and trade unions had also been established in the oil industry, 
expressing the Shah’s will to create a corporatist system, but these were highly 
controlled by the state, which brings us to the “bureaucratic despotic” fea-
tures of its labour relations.
The factory regime in the oil industry was not fully autonomous from the 
state, and had many authoritarian features. The oil workers’ candidates for the 
trade unions and for the collective bargaining that took place every two years 
were vetted by the savak. Agents of the secret service had also established a 
network of surveillance within the oil industry, creating fear among workers, 
who could face arrest, dismissal or transfer if they were reported as dissidents. 
The last factor contributing to the managerial control mechanism was the of-
ficial ideology disseminated by managers and the nioc’s educational system 
and official publications, which promoted the ideas of meritocracy, competi-
tion and individual progress in the oil industry. However, there were also many 
internal contradictions here, as the idea of meritocracy and progress was con-
tradicted by the political system of privilege for the supporters of the Shah. 
In 1975, for instance, the Shah introduced a one- party system, and obliged all 
civil servants – including the white- collar workers in the oil industry – to join 
the Rastakhiz Party. While some workers perceived this measure as repressive, 
others joined the party, only to discover that they were not allowed to play a 
meaningful role.
3 Ideological Articulations
The Iranian Revolution represented a major challenge to established labour 
relations in the oil industry – and elsewhere, of course. The showras became 
the most important institutions through which this challenge was organized 
in practice – as will be discussed in the final part – and articulated ideological-
ly. Although the showras emerged more or less spontaneously, the influence 
of communist ideologies played an important function. The role of commu-
nist organizations in the creation of the showras was initially limited, in the 
sense that they had no preconceived plan to build the showras after the in-
surrection, but in many workplaces their members and sympathisers played 
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a key role in founding and especially in sustaining them.28 Once the showras 
had been established, nearly all of the communist organizations supported 
them enthusiastically, however, without having a clear understanding of their 
potential, and without proposing a concrete strategy for them. Instead, the 
strategy was formulated only in very general terms as “communism”. Having 
mainly debated issues around guerrilla warfare, imperialism, dependent de-
velopment and other matters, it was rare to find any discussion about the 
historical and international experiences of workers’ control in communist 
publications before the emergence of the showras. These organizations were 
therefore not well prepared and equipped to contribute to the debates that 
emerged.
The pro- Moscow Tudeh Party was the least enthusiastic about the showras. 
A major factor in Iranian politics in the 1940s and early 1950s, it was harshly re-
pressed after the US and UK orchestrated coup d’état that toppled Prime Min-
ister Mohammad Mosaddeq in 1953. The Tudeh Party lost much of its appeal to 
the younger generations, who thought it had failed to build resistance against 
the 1953 coup, and in the following two decades they grew impatient with its 
reformist approach to the Shah; an approach that in their view reflected the 
“revisionism” of the Soviet Union. After the insurrection, the party prioritized 
not the showras, but instead the creation of a national labour union. It op-
posed most of the strikes and accused other groups who did support them of 
ultra- leftism.29 The Tudeh Party argued – correctly – that labour unions and 
showras were two different things, and that both should be established, rather 
than substituting one for the other. In practice, however, this meant a strategy 
that favoured the unions.30 When the showras became a fact, the party tried to 
direct them into labour union activities rather than activities related to work-
ers’ control.
A wide range of communist organizations opposed the Tudeh Party’s “op-
portunist” orientation, the largest of which was the Marxist- Leninist People’s 
Fada‘i Guerrilla Organisation (pfgo). Inspired by the Chinese and Cuban 
 28 Shahrzad Azad (a pseudonym of Valentine Moghadam) attributed a larger role to left-
ist organizations, arguing:  “Left forces, in particular the Marxist- Leninist oipfg and 
the progressive Islamic Mojahedin, played a major role in the formation and defence of 
these councils. In several factories in Teheran, the Daneshjooyan- e- Pishgam (‘vanguard 
students’ – associations of students throughout Iran that support the oipfg) supported 
workers’ strikes, assisted in their efforts to elect representatives to the councils, and coop-
erated in formulating the workers’ political and economic demands.” Azad, “Workers’ and 
Peasants’ Councils in Iran”, 17.
 29 Nameh- ye Mardom, 19 Khordad 1358/ 9 June 1979.
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revolution, it advocated and conducted a guerrilla struggle against the Shah, 
but turned sharply towards the workers’ movement after the insurrection, 
launching the journal Kar (labour) as its main publication. The editorial in its 
first issue, on 10 March 1979, stated:
It is our duty to take another step toward the advancement of the work-
ers’ movement with the publication of a special workers’ journal … Work-
ers’ collective struggles are organized through labour unions around eco-
nomic demands … but in order to be finally free, the working class has no 
other choice than to take political power, abolish private property of the 
means of production and destroy capitalism.
Thus, the pfgo promoted the creation of independent trade unions, but also 
called for workers’ interference in management and ultimately the taking of 
political power through the showras and other grassroots organizations. Kar, 
for instance, argued: “If the showras act correctly and organize those who are 
capable and knowledgeable, and actively interfere with political affairs, they 
can develop into people’s organizations for running the politics of the coun-
try”.31 Similar views were espoused by the People’s Mojahedin Organisation 
of Iran (pmoi), another guerrilla organization that had emerged before the 
revolution and that combined Islamic and Marxist ideas. This orientation was 
quickly derailed by the repression of the new regime and by the many splits 
within the pfgo and other communist organizations.32 Nevertheless, it is im-
portant to note that despite having a weak presence in the workplace during 
the revolution, the various leftist organizations grew during the oil strikes and 
in the months following the insurrection, and their presence in the showras 
became significant during 1979.
There were different approaches to the showras among the Islamic forces 
within them. Many Muslim members of the showras were influenced by Sha-
riati’s Islamic liberation theology, which advocated the revolutionary transfor-
mation towards an Islamic classless society (jame‘e- ye bitabaqeh- ye towhidi), 
and they were inspired by his reference to the concept of showras as an Islamic 
principle.33 Reflecting these radical views, the statutes of the Islamic showras 
 31 Kar, 13 Ordibehesht 1358/ 15 March 1979.
 32 A detailed history of the Tudeh Party, the pfgo and its splits, and other communist orga-
nizations can be found in Maziar Behrooz, Rebels with a Cause: The Failure of the Left in 
Iran (London, New York: I.B. Tauris, 1999).
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proposed in June 1979 by the Society of the Islamic Workers’ Showras – which 
was established to coordinate the activities of the showras – defined their task 
as the supervision and control of all the financial, personnel and cultural ac-
tivities of factories.34
Another version of Islamism was represented by the maktabi (doctri-
naire) ideology of those who supported Khomeini’s line.35 This ideology 
supported the showras, finding justification in two verses of the Quran that 
refer to the need to arrive at decisions through consultation. Supporters of 
maktabi ideology opposed capitalism and “liberal” managers, but were zeal-
ously pro- Khomeini and supported his Islamic state, as well as the Islamic 
Republic Party (irp), which was established on 20 March 1979. The contra-
dictions of the maktabi ideology reflected the contradictions of Khomeini’s 
political Islam as a form of populism that opposed capitalism, favoured Is-
lamic justice (adl- e islami), voiced support for the mostazafin (downtrod-
den) and mobilized them; however, without challenging private property.36 
Khomeini and the irp tried to restrict the autonomy of the showras, Islam-
ize them and subsume them within an authoritarian Islamic corporatist ar-
rangement.
Not all of the Islamic ideologies were supportive or ambivalent towards the 
showras. Representing liberal Islam, Mehdi Bazargan’s provisional government 
opposed the showras, as they disrupted the capital- labour relations of the free 
market. The conservative clerics who were aligned with the bazaaris were even 
more vehemently opposed. They became more vocal after 1982 and formed 
the right wing of the irp. The existence of diverging ideological orientations 
within the showras inevitably led to conflicts. These conflicts in fact became 
a central point around which the post- revolutionary state- building project de-
veloped. In the following, I distinguish three phases in the development of the 
showras and their conflicts with the state.
 34 Amalkard- e Dosaleh- ye Kanun- e Showra- ha- ye Islami- ye Kargaran Va Komiteh- ye Kargari 
[Performance of the Society of the Islamic Workers’ Showras and the Workers Committee in 
the Last Two Years] (n.p.: Kanun- e Showra- ha- ye Islami- ye Kargaran, 1359/ 1982), 4.
 35 For a similar distinction, see Siavash Saffari, Two Pro- Mostazafin Discourses in the 1979 
Iranian Revolution (Berlin: Springer Science+Business Media, 2017). With regard to polit-
ical factions in this period in the Islamic Republic of Iran, see Mehdi Moslem, Factional 
Politics in Post- Khomeini Iran, (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2002), 60– 61.
 36 With regard to the interpretation of Khomeini’s political Islam (Islamism) as populism, 
see Ervand Abrahamian, Khomeinism: Essays on the Islamic Republic (London: I.B. Tauris, 
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4 The State and the Showras
The state apparatus that emerged after the fall of the monarchy consisted of 
competing institutions with different ideological orientations that vied for po-
litical authority. Ayatollah Khomeini and his supporters exerted power through 
the Council of the Islamic Revolution (cir), which functioned as the main leg-
islative body until July 1980, a few weeks after the first parliament assembled. 
The neighbourhood komitehs and the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps (irgc) 
provided armed support to Khomeini and the cir.
In theory, executive power lay with the provisional government of Prime 
Minister Bazargan that was appointed by Khomeini on 1 February 1979, al-
though its authority was regularly undermined by the political interventions of 
the komitehs, the irgc and powerful clerics. Another centre of executive pow-
er was established after a presidential system was enshrined in the new con-
stitution adopted in December 1979. Two months later, Abolhassan Bani- Sadr 
was elected president and remained in this post until he was ousted in June 
1981 after a conflict with Khomeini. Within this field of competing centres of 
power, ultimate power resided with Khomeini in his position as the Supreme 
Leader, as envisioned in his doctrine of the velayat- e faqih, Guardianship of 
the Islamic Jurist. From the moment of their inception in the first months of 
1979, the showras were confronted with this fragmented state apparatus. Their 
conflict developed in three distinctive phases in the subsequent three years.
The first phase in which the showras tried to create self- management and 
workers’ control over production started immediately after the February 1978 
insurrection, and continued until August 1978. Expressing what many work-
ers expected, the oil workers’ representatives believed “that the day after the 
revolution under the leadership of Imam Khomeini we will officially take over 
the control over the factories”.37 However, when the showras did try to take 
control, both the provisional government and Khomeini and the irp opposed 
them. The former tried to restore the pre- revolutionary labour relations based 
on technocratic managerial control by appointing new “liberal” managers in 
the establishments where the management had left and retaining them in the 
oil industry, while the latter encouraged the creation of Islamic Labour Asso-
ciations (Anjoman- ha- ye Islami- ye Kar) to oppose the left, and supported the 
Islamic showras’ opposition to the provisional government.
As the showras in the oil industry and elsewhere proliferated, the provi-
sional government struggled to keep them in check. In early March 1979, it 
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published a document that defined the nature and tasks of the showras as 
being separate from executive bodies such as the factory management. Refer-
ring to an Islamic principle, their task was defined as the “promotion of virtue 
and prevention of vice” (amr- e be ma‘ruf, nahi az monkar). More concretely, 
they were to gather the workers’ wishes and grievances, categorize them and 
pass them on to the officials, and enhance the unity between workers and the 
executive branches.38 The cir went much further, introducing a law against 
“counter- revolutionary crimes” on 4 July 1979. Article 9 of this law directly tar-
geted individuals who “disrupt the business in the country’s workshops and 
factories or encourage workers to stop working or closing the workshop or fac-
tory”, and specified a sentence of two to nine years for these “crimes”.39 It was 
not until June 1980 that the authorities formulated regulations to give legal 
status to the showras; however, at this stage, what determined the practical 
functioning of the showras was not the laws and regulations, but the balance 
of power in the class struggle. In this respect, the interventions of the irgc, 
the komitehs and the Islamic Labour Associations as tools for repression were 
much more significant.
The first phase ended in August 1979, when the new state conducted its 
first major assault against the opposition in Kurdistan. This marked the be-
ginning of the crackdown on oppositional forces, including the showras. At 
the same time, the intra- state conflict continued and intensified at the highest 
managerial level of the oil industry. In late September 1979, Hassan Nazih, the 
chair of the nioc and a close ally of Bazargan, was ousted after he had enraged 
pro- Khomeini supporters by criticizing the entanglement of religion and pol-
itics.40 He was replaced by Ali Akbar Mo‘infar, another close ally of Bazargan, 
who also became the first minister of oil a month later. The second phase start-
ed in September 1979, and was marked by the defensive posture of the showras 
as they came under heavy attacks from both Mo‘infar and the pro- Khomeini 
forces. Following the occupation of the American Embassy in November 1979 
by radical pro- Khomeini students, the provisional government resigned and 
the balance of political power shifted dramatically to the maktabis, who sup-
ported the existence of the showras while attempting to turn them into cor-
poratist organizations, forcing out communists and pmoi sympathisers. The 
maktabis also clashed with the first elected president of the Islamic Republic, 
Bani- Sadr, who wanted to put technocratic managers at the head of factories. 
Thus, the maktabis in and outside the showras were fighting on two fronts; 
 38 Ettela‘at, 19 Esfand 1357/ 10 March 1979.
 39 This law can be viewed online at http:// rc.majlis.ir/ fa/ law/ show/ 98141 [13 November 2019].
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against the “liberal” president on the one side, and the communists and pmoi 
sympathisers on the other.
The third phase started with the Iran- Iraq War on 22 September 1980. The 
war was a decisive turning point, as it destroyed many oil facilities and forced 
thousands of oil workers to move out of the oil- producing region that bordered 
Iraq. Moreover, the war served as a distraction from the social conflicts, en-
couraged nationalism and allowed the state to crack down on the opposition 
in the name of national unity. The repression increased dramatically after June 
1981, when President Bani- Sadr was ousted. The weakened showras in the oil 
industry were banned in early 1982.
Having discussed the overall development of the conflict between the show-
ras and the state in the period from 1979 to 1982, we can now look at how they 
organized and tried to transform the labour relations in this period.
5 Fighting for Control: February to August 1979
As one journalist aptly observed in early March 1979, the emergence of grass-
roots organizations in the oil industry posed a serious challenge to the state- 
building process after the collapse of the monarchy: “After winning the battle 
on the streets of Tehran and ousting first the Shah and then [his last] Prime 
Minister Bakhtiar, Ayatollah Khomeini’s new Islamic regime faces crucial 
weeks as it tries to strengthen its grip on the government. Nowhere will the 
battle for control be more difficult and vital than in the oil fields where Na-
tional Iranian Oil Co. is gearing up to resume exports”.41 A month later, Time 
Magazine reported:
In dusty, steamy Abadan … an air of normality appears to have returned. 
But life is anything but normal inside the world’s largest refinery. … Mem-
bers of the workers’ council argue interminably. Said one welder after 
a particularly boisterous session:  “Nobody can make any decisions. All 
anybody does is talk”. Convinced that they were the dominant force in 
ousting the Shah, the oil workers feel that they are being neglected by 
the revolutionary government. They are insisting on 50% to 100% wage 
 41 Roger Vielvoye, “New Nioc Chief Faces Explosive Situation”, Oil & Gas Journal, no.  5 
(1979): 93. Shapour Bakhtiar was a longstanding member of the National Front, who was 
appointed prime minister by the Shah as a conciliatory move. This move failed, how-
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increases and are threatening to walk out if they do not get them. Mem-
bers of the workers’ council have been demanding sweeping changes in 
management.42
The establishment of oil workers’ showras posed a challenge not only to Kho-
meini’s Islamist populism and Bazargan’s Islamic liberalism, but also to the 
technocratic- managerialist order that Nazih wanted to restore in the oil indus-
try. In Abadan, the strike committee in the refinery had taken effective control 
over the production before the February 1979 insurrection. The workers had 
organized the “Committee of the Guards of the Oil Industry” to protect the 
refinery, and had introduced a five day, 40- hour working week.43
After the insurrection, the strike committees in the Abadan Refinery invited 
all the workers to participate in general assemblies in order to elect the repre-
sentatives of the showras. Higher wages, better and cheaper housing, retire-
ment benefits, participation in management and the purge of senior ancien 
régime employees were the most important demands made by the Abadan 
oil workers.44 This experience was replicated in the oil fields and in other re-
fineries (Tehran, Shiraz, Tabriz, Kermanshah and Isfahan). At the same time, 
the workers in the Razi petrochemical complex near Abadan established their 
own showra. The showras of the Abadan Refinery and the Razi petrochemical 
complex represented both blue- collar and white- collar workers, and in both 
locations there was a central showra, consisting of representatives of those 
from the different departments.
In Abadan, the showras had become so powerful that the entire board of di-
rectors resigned on 18 April in protest at their interference in the management 
of the plant, and only returned two days later after Nazih’s intervention.45 
Describing the situation in Abadan, an Associated Press journalist reported 
that Iran’s oil industry was in the hands of “radical workers who demanded 
a major role in deciding who gets their products and at what price. Marxists 
are actively recruiting among them, although they remain a minority”.46 Up 
until late April 1979, the showra exerted considerable control over production 
and administration in the Abadan Refinery, and introduced a 40- hour working 
week, but its role gradually changed into participation after the provisional 
 42 Bruce Van Voorst, “Another Crude Awakening in Iran after the Revolution, Oil Workers 
Gush Discontent”, Time 113, no. 23 (1979): 43.
 43 Kar (Minority), Bahman 1367/ January- February 1989.
 44 The New York Times, 6 March 1979.
 45 Ettela‘at, 30 Farvardin 1359/ 19 April 1979 and 1 Ordibehesht 1359/ 21 April 1979.
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government appointed a new management. Nevertheless, interference with 
the management’s affairs continued and created tensions.47
In some of the refineries, the showras took over almost total control of pro-
duction and administration. This happened, for instance, in the Pars Oil Com-
pany (refinery) near Karaj, which was Iran’s first and only private refinery at the 
time.48 After the insurrection, its 503 employees established a showra of seven 
people and seven sub- committees, and drafted a list of demands: nationaliza-
tion of the refinery by nioc, the dismissal of foreign employees, pay increases, 
a housing allowance, lowering of the mortgage interest rate to 2 per cent and 
a meeting place for the showra. Confronted with an unwavering director, the 
showra organized a general meeting in May and called for the nationalization 
of the Pars Oil Company. When this move did not produce the desired result, 
the showra changed track. In a general meeting on 20 June 1979, it decided to 
sell the products itself and use the income to pay wages and salaries. The Pars 
Oil Company showra held a meeting with the production managers to coordi-
nate the takeover, and established a “committee for the provisional adminis-
tration of the refinery”, consisting of the showra members and two technicians. 
After the general meeting of the showra ratified this decision, it took over the 
refinery on 24 June, hanging banners on the main gate and inside the refinery 
reading, “National Oil Company of Iran: Karaj Refinery”. In a following step, 
the showra stopped the sale of products, stockpiling them in the depots, and 
sent two of its members to negotiate a merger with the nioc. The provisional 
government finally stepped in on 13 August 1979, authorising the Ministry of 
Industry and Mines to appoint a director for the company and rolling back 
workers’ control.49
In the Tehran (Rey) refinery, pipelines and depots (Tehran Refinery in short), 
communist workers were gradually manoeuvred out of the common syndicate 
that had been established during the strikes in late 1978. It became dominated 
by those who were either supporters of the irp, or took a neutral or conciliato-
ry stance towards it. In response, leftist workers started to establish showras in 
different departments of the refinery.50 Three main showras were established 
at general assemblies that elected their members. The Showra of Maintenance 
Employees represented workers in the turnery, transport, precision tools, elec-
trics, general and pump repair departments, together with the barrel- making 
factory and a number of others. The Showra of Shift Employees represented 
 47 Kar (Minority), Bahman 1367/ January- February 1989.
 48 Kayhan, 3 Dey 1339/ 24 December 1960.
 49 See http:// rc.majlis.ir/ fa/ law/ show/ 104980 [13 November 2019].
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the shift workers in the control rooms, lubricant and bitumen factories, the 
electricity, water and steam powerhouses, the loading stations, etc. The Unit-
ed Showra emerged through the unification of the showras of the engineers, 
the administration, and the safety and security services. At a general assembly 
in the Tehran Refinery, these three showras nominated their own candidates, 
who were elected into the Showra of the (Tehran) Refinery Employees.51
A further step was taken towards greater coordination among the show-
ras in late February or early March 1979, when the white- collar workers in the 
nioc headquarters in Tehran initiated the establishment of the General Show-
ra of the Oil Industry Employees (Showra- ye Sarasari- ye Karkonan- e San‘at- e 
Naft), bringing together representatives from the showras in the oil, gas and 
petrochemical industries all over Iran. It was agreed to elect one representative 
for every 1,000 employees, bringing the membership of the General Showra of 
the Oil Industry Employees in theory up to 65 to 70.52 In practice, however, it 
started its activities with 47 elected members.53 On 17 March 1979, the Gener-
al Showra of the Oil Industry Employees created a number of subcommittees 
dealing with:  1) projects; 2)  contact with the nioc chair Nazih; 3)  technical 
affairs; 4)  personnel and accounting; 5)  gathering advice from employees; 
6) wages and salaries; 7) social affairs of the employees; 8) cultural activities; 
9) fuel distribution; and 10) communication with the production units.54 Most 
of those on the showra were members or sympathisers of leftist organizations, 
but despite these organizations’ ideological differences, the members cooper-
ated relatively well. Until the autumn of 1979, the General Showra of the Oil 
Industry Employees was involved in the recruitment and dismissal of employ-
ees, their wage and job classification, and the election of department heads by 
general assemblies. Workers had taken over a number of positions, including 
the head of the security guard, the head of the administration and the head of 
the transport department.55
Another important showra in the oil industry was the General Showra of the 
Ahwaz Oil Employees, which had 60 representatives from the various showras 
 51 Yadollah Khosrowshahi, “Tashkilat- e Mostaghel- e Kargari Va Zarf- e Tashakolpaziri- ye 
Kargaran- e Iran Dar Moghe’iyat- e Konuni [Independent Worker Organizations and the 
Possibility to Organize Workers in Contemporary Iran]”, Kargar- e Tab’idi, no. 36 (January 
1997): 17.
 52 Kar (Minority), Bahman 1367/ January- February 1989.
 53 Peygham- e Emruz, 22 Ordibehesht 1357/ 12 May 1979.
 54 Peygham- e Emruz, 23 Ordibehesht 1357/ 13 May 1979.
 55 Khosrowshahi, Tashkilat- e Mostaghel- e Kargari Va Zarf- e Tashakolpaziri- ye Kargaran- e 
Iran Dar Moghe’iyat- e Konuni [Independent Worker Organizations and the Possibility to 
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in the oil fields, the production units, the maintenance departments and the 
administrative offices in and around Ahwaz. In the first months of its activity, 
it managed to force the authorities to reduce the inequalities between blue- 
collar and white- collar workers. The blue- collar workers, for instance, were 
given air- conditioning, which  – unlike their white- collar colleagues  – most 
were unable to afford by themselves. The Ahwaz showra also gave support to 
workers in the drilling companies, who were demanding the nationalization 
of their companies.56
6 Fighting against Repression: September 1979 to September 1980
When the balance of power dramatically shifted to the pro- Khomeini forc-
es between August and November 1978, the showras retained their collec-
tive decision- making function but lost much of their effective control over 
production and management. They nevertheless continued to intervene in 
the management’s activities. The “frontier of control” within the oil indus-
try thus shifted, mainly under the influence of the national political conflicts 
discussed earlier.57 After the attacks on the grassroots organization had in-
tensified in August 1979, and Nazih was ousted as chair of the nioc in Sep-
tember, the repression of the showras increased, and they faced a state that 
had become controlled to a greater extent by the pro- Khomeini forces. This 
second phase of the showras’ activities lasted until the Iran- Iraq War started 
in September 1980.
In this phase, the activities of the showras in the oil industry became com-
pletely defensive, as they faced repression and attempted to maintain some 
level of control by interfering in matters of management over a number of 
specific issues. First, the showras resisted the provisional government’s deci-
sion in late September 1978 to cancel Thursdays being considered as part of 
the weekend. The management of the Abadan Refinery issued its own decree 
to announce this new policy, but the representatives of the refinery workers 
immediately published a statement opposing the new schedule for working 
hours, “because it was introduced without consultation with the workers’ rep-
resentatives”, and announced that they would continue working in accordance 
with the previous schedule. The workers in the Aghajari oil field also refused 
to work on Thursdays, and a group of “militant oil workers in Ahwaz” issued 
 56 Interview with Kobra Qasemi, 8 August 2017, Amsterdam.
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a statement calling on their colleagues to similarly boycott the new sched-
ule.58 On 30 September, workers at the Shiraz Refinery went on strike after a 
week of go- slow protests.59 According to Mansour Sadri, head of the nioc’s 
statistical staff at the time, high absenteeism by blue- collar workers and low-
er- ranking white- collar staff became prevalent during this period.60 Thanks 
to their protests, the oil workers scored a major victory in December 1979, 
when a 40- hour working week and time off based on the weekend including 
Thursday and Friday was agreed by the cir and announced by Minister of Oil, 
Ali Akbar Mo‘infar.61
A few weeks earlier, another victory had been achieved by radical oil work-
ers who had demanded the cancellation of oil exports to the US. In its session 
of 12 November 1979, the cir decided to cut off these exports.62 Although the 
occupation of the American Embassy was the main trigger, Mo‘infar explained 
that this measure had been taken at the request of “a large number of our com-
patriots, especially the noble workers of the oil industry”. The Islamic Labour 
Showra of the oil workers of Kharg Island then issued the following statement:
We are all your soldiers, Khomeini; we await your order, Khomeini. Im-
mediately after the midnight news broadcast by the radio and having 
been informed of the orders of the great idol- breaker and the brave and 
diligent Imam of the Islamic Revolution of Iran, Imam Khomeini … we 
stopped the oil flow to the tanker, Northern Line, which was loading at 
quay number 14 of Kharg Island to be transported to the US.63
The Abadan Refinery was one of the main sites of continuing showra activi-
ty, including collective decision- making. In February 1980, the showra of the 
northern Abadan Refinery workers issued a statement demanding that any 
 58 Peykar, 16 Mehr 1358/ 8 October 1979. Khabar- e Kargar, Dey 1358/ December 1979– January 
1980.
 59 Peykar, 23 Mehr 1358/ 15 October 1979.
 60 US Embassy in Tehran to Secretary of State, Washington DC, 29 October 1979; Document 
Number 1979TEHRAN11423; Electronic Telegrams, 1979; Central Foreign Policy Files; 
General Records of the Department of State, Record Group  59; National Archives at 
College Park, Maryland.
 61 Kar, 28 Azar 1358/ 19 December 1979.
 62 This came after pro- Khomeini students occupied the American embassy in Tehran on 
4 November 1979. Many workers, including in the oil industry, saw the ensuing radical-
ized political atmosphere as an opportunity to step up their activities and demands. For 
Khomeini and his supporters, this anti- imperialist move created an opportunity to side-
line the liberals and the left.
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change in the grades of employees should only be made after it had been in-
formed and consulted. It also issued a statement condemning any workers 
who met with the management without the showra’s consent.64
On 15 April 1980, the Islamic Showra of the Abadan Oil Employees orga-
nized a general assembly that was attended by a few thousand workers. At the 
end of the gathering, the general assembly adopted a resolution, which started 
with the words, “In the name of the God of the mostazafin [downtrodden]” and 
stated the following demands:
 1) condemnation of all measures undermining the showras;
 2) the unconditional release of four arrested oil workers;
 3) a televised debate between Minister of Oil Mo‘infar and representa-
tives of the oil workers’ showra;
 4) dismissal of Mo‘infar;
 5) legal pursuit of those violating Article 36 [the right of the accused to 
be heard in a competent court] and 37 [the principle of innocence 
until proven otherwise];
 6) lifting the ban on Payam [the journal of the Abadan oil workers];
 7) attention paid to oil workers’ social and economic conditions;
 8) an invitation to President Bani- Sadr to visit the Abadan Refinery for 
negotiations.
The declaration ended with the statement that the showra of the Abadan Re-
finery took no responsibility if the demands were ignored.65 Yet another ex-
ample is provided by the Islamic Showra of the Distribution Employees of the 
Oil Industry, representing about 12,000 workers. This was one of the strongest 
showras in which religious forces were dominant.66 On 15 December 1979, it 
held a general assembly to elect its representatives.67 After it had decided to 
purge ten managers on 6 July 1980, Mo‘infar retaliated by demanding the sus-
pension of ten of its members, but the conflict quickly escalated as the showra 
issued a statement, demanding in turn the dismissal of Mo‘infar.68
 64 Kar- e Jonub, 30 Esfand 1358/ 20 March 1980.
 65 Kargar (sk), 3 Ordibehesht 1359/ 23 April 1980.
 66 The influence of religious workers in the showra is acknowledged in leftist literature by 
references such as “the showra was labelled Islamic due to the illusions of workers about 
Khomeini”.
 67 Khabar- e Kargar, Dey 1358/ December 1979- January 1980. Bahram Burbur, Nasser 
Manuchehri, Ali Asghar Heydari Moqadam, Ali Tarfaq, Kiyumars Najmabadi and 
Shamsaldin Raqami were elected to the central showra. A number of others, among them 
one woman, were elected as representatives in the regional showras.
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The Tehran Refinery showras regularly interfered in the running of the re-
finery and participated in the weekly management meetings, which inevitably 
created tensions. A turning point was reached after the showra members, who 
were concerned with the income gap between the management and ordinary 
workers, approached the financial department and demanded to see the salary 
list; a request that was met. In response, officials promptly arrested a number 
of the showra’s members in the summer of 1980 to draw a line in the sand. In 
the Isfahan Refinery, the majority of the workers attended the general assem-
bly on 26 November 1979, where the following demands were made:
 1) the refinery director Mir- ‘Azimi will be discharged and replaced by 
Aghasi ‘Alaqband and Haj Hashem Alhosseini;
 2) the heads of accounting, administration and the fire brigade will be 
sacked;
 3) all contracts of the refinery will be continued until the end of the 
month but no payments should be made till the showra has made a 
final decision;
 4) from 27 November, all employees of the refinery must use the refinery 
transport service and the use of refinery cars is no longer allowed.
Worried about the power of the showra, Ayatollah Ali Qodusi, the national 
prosecutor, sent a representative to the Isfahan Refinery to condemn the ac-
tions. When Mo‘infar attempted to visit the refinery to deal with the problems, 
a number of workers spread the rumour that he would be physically attacked, 
forcing the minister to stay away.69
Although the showras had lost much of their direct control, the examples 
above demonstrate that they were still intervening in the management of com-
panies. The American Embassy staff asked its top ranking contacts the ques-
tion: “How are decisions made at nioc?” They were surprised by how many 
did not know:
nioc is compartmentalized to the point that few offices are aware of 
what is going on down the hall. Ghobad Fakhimi, director for distribu-
tion and pipelines, and formerly a close associate of Nazih, suggested 
that decision- making was something of a negative veto process. Either a 
policy is adopted by consensus, or an issue remains unresolved. It can be 
carried over indefinitely, or until the blocking faction became convinced 
or fatigued.70
 69 Khabar- e Kargar, Dey 1358/ December 1979- January 1980.
 70 US Embassy in Tehran to Secretary of State, Washington D.C., 29 October 1979; Document 
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Purging (paksazi) the oil industry of managers and employees who had support-
ed the Shah or had worked for the savak was perhaps the most important issue 
in which oil workers’ showras interfered in the operations of the management. 
Although this had been on the agenda of oil workers since the insurrection, its 
importance increased during the second phase of the showras’ activities. There 
were multiple reasons for the nearly obsessive emphasis on the need to purge the 
oil industry. First, the element of revenge played a significant role, as many showra 
members had first- hand experience of obstruction and repression by some of the 
managers during the oil strikes, and by savak members before the revolution. Sec-
ond, there was a symbolic meaning attached to the purges: revolutionary change 
in the workplace was closely associated with the change in management. The 
need to be rigorous in this respect was moreover fed by the fear of a coup. This fear 
was triggered by the 1953 coup and the counter- revolution in Chile in 1973, both 
of which were part of oil workers’ political memory. Third, as the showras lost 
control in other aspects, the attempt to remove high- ranking managers became 
the main mechanism to assert their own power within the industry and send a 
message to the new political establishment.
One of the grievances the showras had harboured against Nazih during the 
period from February to September 1979 was his reluctance to move ahead 
with the purges, as he was trying to retain experienced managers based on 
the argument that they were needed in order to sustain productivity. In re-
sponse, the showras and the Islamic labour associations increasingly acted on 
their own, pushing nioc to take action or threatening to exclude those ac-
cused of links with the former regime from the workplace. In October 1979, 
the Showra of the Employees of the Oil Industry in Ahwaz published a list of 
70 employees who they accused of having collaborated with the savak and 
foreign companies, and of having undermined the oil workers’ strikes. Frus-
trated by the government’s lack of action, the showra sent the accused a letter 
stating the nature of the allegations and the consequences (dismissal for 43 
of them, retirement for 17 and suspension for three months for the remain-
ing 10). In response to this form of action, the cir installed a committee of 
five men on 15 December 1979 to deal with the purges, and Mo‘infar called on 
employees to forward any accusations to this committee.71 However, the oil 
workers in turn complained that the committee was acquitting suspects, and 
had even allowed some of those who had been sacked under Nazih to return.72 
General Records of the Department of State, Record Group  59; National Archives at 
College Park, Maryland.
 71 Khabar- e Kargar, Dey 1358/ December 1979- January 1980.
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Therefore, the showras continued to act independently, and purged a number 
of high- ranking employees. On 16 December 1979, the central showra in the 
Abadan Refinery issued a statement announcing the dismissal of 25 employees 
accused of collaboration with the savak, and ordered the showra of the refin-
ery’s security guards to revoke their employee cards. The showra of the com-
munication workers was similarly ordered to cut off their telephone lines, and 
the showra of the accounting employees to stop their wages until the central 
showra determined the amount of the allowance they would be paid.73
By early 1980, barely a week would pass without one of the oil workers’ 
showras issuing a statement demanding that one or other manager should be 
purged.74 By 30 June 1980, the “purge committee” had given its verdict on 485 
of the 700 investigated employees, who were either sent into retirement or 
sacked.75 In early August 1980, the oil workers’ showras of Tabriz, Shiraz and 
Tehran issued a list of demands in relation to the purges, which included that 
the purge committee had to justify the dismissal of employees.76 These inter-
ventions illustrate the amount of control a showra could still exert in the ad-
ministrative activities of a refinery.
While these examples mainly concern the defensive actions taken by the 
showras, they were also able to develop an offensive approach to the issue of 
nationalization, making use of the political opportunity that emerged in No-
vember 1979. The demand for nationalization was mainly raised by the 4,370 
Iranian workers in foreign drilling companies. The strike committee of drilling 
workers that had emerged during the oil strikes in late 1978 opposed radical pro-
tests, but many of the workers – mostly those with leftist sympathies – wanted 
to establish a showra.77 The komitehs, which had been formed in some oil fields 
by Islamist oil workers and local activists, constituted a more serious obstacle 
to independent action, as they were cooperating with the state officials. After 
months of protests by oil workers, the komitehs in the drilling companies were 
dissolved and replaced by showras, which took over the firms after the for-
eign management had left and then formulated a number of demands: fight-
ing unemployment, the actual nationalization of all drilling companies and 
their subcontractors, and the establishment of a national drilling company. 
On 18 July 1979, the showras of the workers in the different drilling companies 
united in a common organization, the Association of the Showras of Drilling 
 73 Document 267890206, irdc archives, Tehran.
 74 Ettela‘at, 11 Farvardin 1358/ 31 March 1980.
 75 Ettela‘at, 9 Tir 1359/ 30 June 1980.
 76 Enqelab- e Islami, 20 Mordad 1359/ 11 August 1979.
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Companies and Services (Kanun- e Showraha- ye Haffari va Khadamat- e Janebi), 
and started coordinating their protests.78 These protests were not only driven 
by nationalist sentiments, but also by the fear of unemployment, as the foreign 
companies were planning to move their equipment out of Iran.
Encouraged by the occupation of the American Embassy on 4 November 1979, 
the Association of the Showras of Drilling Companies and Services issued a state-
ment calling for the nioc to directly employ the drilling staff and to pay their wag-
es during unemployment. They further asked for the drilling companies to be pre-
vented from moving their equipment out of Iran – which, the statement claimed 
“resulted from our [the workers] blood but has fallen into the hands of imperialist 
capitalists” – and the “immediate establishment of the national Iranian drilling 
company”. Taking the matter into their own hands, the showras of the SedIran 
and SedCo drilling companies issued a statement on 8 November 1979, announc-
ing the confiscation of these firms.79 Another month of protests continued before 
the government conceded and nationalized the drilling companies; establishing 
the National Iranian Drilling Company (nidc) on 22 December 1979, and mark-
ing the final step in bringing the oil industry under total Iranian ownership.
In addition to the foreign drilling companies, the Fluor Company – which was 
involved in the construction and maintenance of the refineries in Tehran, Shiraz, 
Tabriz and Isfahan – was also targeted for nationalization by its 3,000 workers, 
who had organized a showra.80 Having protested since February, this showra also 
seized on the opportunity provided by the anti- imperialist wave following the oc-
cupation of the American Embassy, and organized protests to demand national-
ization. These actions were supported by the showra of the Isfahan refinery, and 
intensified after Fluor announced the dismissal of 700 employees on 11 Decem-
ber 1979. When Fluor tried to transfer some of its property to the Bandar Abbas 
port, in order to ship it to the US, it was confiscated by a group of workers. Howev-
er, the government stepped in, sacked two members of the showra and asked for 
official permission from the Islamic court in Isfahan for the transfer to proceed.81
7 Losing the Fight: October 1980 to January 1982
The third and final period in the activity of the showras in the oil industry start-
ed with the Iran- Iraq War in September 1980 and ended with the outlawing of 
 78 Peykar, 1 Mordad 1358/ 23 July 1979.
 79 Ettela‘at, 22 Aban 1358/ 13 Novemer 1979.
 80 Ettela‘at, 22 Azar 1358/ 13 December 1979.
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the organizations in early 1982. Before the start of the war, the showras had 
been entrenched in a battle with the government and the management of the 
nioc over wages and working conditions, and more importantly, about the na-
ture and extent of their power. Despite the political divisions among the show-
ra members, especially between the leftist workers and the maktabis, there was 
a great deal of common ground among them. In many instances, the maktabi 
and other religious members of the showras had demanded workers’ partici-
pation in the management of production and administration, and had resisted 
pressure; first from the provisional government of Bazargan in 1979 and sub-
sequently from President Bani- Sadr in 1980. The war not only fundamentally 
shifted the balance of power between the showras and the state in favour of 
the latter, transforming their conflict into a battle for survival, but also shifted 
the balance between the leftist and the maktabi members of the showras in 
favour of the later. The war dramatically increased the proclivity of maktabis to 
equate independent action with “counter- revolution”, and made many workers 
receptive to nationalist and religious calls to fully support the state.
By the start of the war, the oil workers’ showras had lost much of their pow-
er in terms of their ability to interfere in management affairs. This loss was 
initially not total, however, as the following example illustrates. After the start 
of the war, the management of the Tehran Refinery ordered that petrol was to 
be refined at a lower quality than its usual octane number of 88, in order to 
reduce the production time. The showra members opposed this measure, how-
ever, arguing that it would be harmful to car engines. When the management 
refused to accept their argument, the showra instructed workers in the labora-
tories not to approve petrol samples if their octane rating was lower than 88, 
and to record a much lower number than the actual value in order to deceive 
the management, thereby tricking them into raising the octane number.82 In 
many cases, moreover, the management did not feel confident enough to act 
without the showras’ consent, and the showras continued to organize protests, 
such as the one on 13 April 1981 when about 600 workers in the Tehran Refinery 
gathered in its canteen to protest against housing problems. The protest ended 
with an open letter issued by the refinery’s showra to the Prime Minister:
If it is the right of every individual to compare himself with his neighbour, 
he will feel he is living in an unjust system if he observes [big differences 
in] housing, health, food and clothing conditions. If it is the right of every 
 82 Hazhir Pelaschi, “Dar Khoruskhan- e Khun Tabaram Mikhanam - Goftogu Ba Ali Pichgah 
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revolutionary worker to compare his conditions before and after the rev-
olution, he will say that there is continuity in the administrative system 
if he sees no changes in his conditions. In other words, the employees of 
the oil industry have been the victims of wrong and anti- revolutionary 
policies of officials such as Nazih and Mo‘infar.
The open letter reiterated that if oil workers had made an important contribu-
tion to the victory of the revolution, then they should have the right to be part 
of the government subsequently.83
Overall, however, the start of the war rang the death knell for the show-
ras. As illustrated above, the role of those that survived in the first year after 
the war became mainly limited to organizing protests and issuing statements 
about working and housing conditions. The decisive move against the showras 
in the oil industry was made on 30 January 1982, when the state disbanded the 
Showra of the Oil Industry Employees. About 140 of its members were arrested. 
Some of them were executed, and others were sentenced to long terms of im-
prisonment and were not allowed to return to work after their release. A num-
ber of factors contributed to the eventual demise of the oil workers’ showras. 
First, the war damaged many oil facilities, and displaced the population in the 
southwestern region – including many oil workers – causing the showras in the 
region to implode. At the same time, however, new showras emerged among 
oil workers who had fled the region, particularly Abadan, as they established 
the Showras of the War- torn Oil Industry Employees (Showra- ha- y- e Sarasari- 
ye Karkonan- e Jangzadeh- ye San‘at- e Naft) in the cities where they resettled. 
The name of these organizations reflected the communist orientation of their 
leaders, rather than their actual functioning, which was focused on campaign-
ing for their members’ most urgent needs: housing and employment. They had 
no involvement in the management of the oil industry.
Second, the war created the opportunity for the state to dramatically in-
crease the level of repression against the showras; arresting and later executing 
some of their members. In early 1981, for instance, three representatives of the 
Showras of the War- torn Oil Industry Employees were arrested in Tehran.84 In 
Shiraz, four Hezbollahi vigilantes attacked the general meeting of the “war- 
torn” oil workers on 27 May 1981. The irgc acted as the main repressive force, 
arresting showra members, but also the members of the leftist organizations 
 83 Kar (Minority), 2 Ordibehesht 1360/ 22 April 1981.
 84 Mohammad Mazra’ekar, “Etesab- e Kargaran- e Naft Dar Sal- e 57 va Zamineha- ye An. 
Bakhshe Dovvom [the Oil Workers’ Strike in 1978– 1979 and its Causes. Part Two]”, Kargar- 
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that supported them. Whilst the irgc operated from the outside, the Islam-
ic Labour Associations (Anjoman- ha- ye Islami- ye Kar) operated as the irp’s 
workers’ organizations inside the workplaces. In the first year after the insur-
rection, they opposed the “liberal” managers and leftist workers through the 
propagation of “Islamic values”.85 They became increasingly tools of surveil-
lance and state propaganda, however, as they reported dissident workers to the 
management, organized prayers and recruited workers for the war.
Third, the state and the nioc management purged dissident workers. On 
14 July 1980, before the war had begun, cir had already ratified a law allowing 
the establishment of “purge committees” (hey‘at- ha- ye paksazi), consisting of 
representatives of the provincial governor, the revolutionary prosecutor, the 
factory management, the ministry of labour and an elected employee.86 In 
the following two months, over 150 purge committees were established, sack-
ing not only managers and state officials, but also thousands of teachers and 
employees. This created an opportunity for upward mobility into manageri-
al positions for hundreds of Islamic activists.87 The purges, which had been 
advocated by the oil workers’ showras, were now used by the state to target 
dissident oil workers, especially those in the showras. As table 9.1 illustrates, 
the overwhelming majority of the nearly 5,000 employees purged from the oil 
industry by the end of 1983 had been targeted for “acts against the Islamic Re-
public” and “immoral behaviour”.
Fourth, the state introduced a legal framework that was meant to make the 
showras devoid of any meaningful autonomy, “Islamize” them and incorporate 
them into an authoritarian corporatist framework. On 30 June 1980, the cir 
approved a legal bill that defined the aims of the Islamic showras as “the cre-
ation of a spirit of cooperation and solidarity between all the employees and 
the management in order to improve and develop the affairs of each unit”.88 
This law aimed to turn the showras – now allowed to only function under the 
name of Islamic Labour Showras – into consultative bodies, and gave the min-
istry of labour a considerable amount of control over them through its right to 
appoint the members of the “supervision committee” (hey‘at- e nezarat). These 
committees consisted of two representatives of the regional Islamic show-
ras, two representatives of the regional managers and a representative of the 
 85 Bayat, Workers and Revolution in Iran, 102.
 86 Asef Bayat, “Workers’ Control after the Revolution”, MERIP Reports, no. 113 (March- April 
1983): 20, http:// rc.majlis.ir/ fa/ law/ show/ 99090 [13 November 2019].
 87 Said Amir Arjomand, The Turban for the Crown: The Islamic Revolution in Iran (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1988), 144.
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Ministry of Labour. Furthermore, membership of a showra was only open to 
those supporting the Islamic Republic, and all the employees of an enterprise, 
including workers and managers, could participate in the elections. The found-
ing of Islamic showras in large industries such as oil and steel also had to be 
approved by the government. This law was not ratified by the parliament until 
20 January 1985, due to the resistance from the maktabi members of the show-
ras, but it merely legalized the practices that had been established since 1982.
8 Conclusion
As I have argued in this chapter, the oil workers’ showras posed a serious chal-
lenge to pre- revolutionary labour relations in the Iranian oil industry, which 
combined “hegemonic” and “bureaucratic despotic” elements. In order to eval-
uate the success and failure of this challenge, it is useful to summarize here 
how the oil workers’ showras performed in the five areas of activity that work-
ers’ councils have developed over time, as explained at the beginning of this 
chapter.
The showras were relatively successful in terms of creating the structures 
and processes through which workers could participate in discussions and 
decision- making in their workplace. The structures and processes, organized 
through elections, were relatively democratic and contributed to the devel-
opment of a radical democratic ethos. This was, for example, reflected in the 
manner in which representatives of different ideological currents collaborat-
ed. In the second area, the showras also had some important attainments, as 
they managed to involve a significant number of oil workers in their strug-
gles. These struggles managed to achieve, initially at least, higher wages, better 
housing conditions, easier mortgages, a 40- hour working week with a two- day 
weekend and an improvement in the status of contract workers. Yet many of 
these measures were gradually revoked, especially after the Iran- Iraq War start-
ed in September 1980. The most concrete and important achievement of the 
showras’ struggles was the reduction of the material and social gap between 
white- collar and blue- collar workers, which had been a major source of griev-
ance among the latter.
The showras failed, however, in other areas. They were least successful in 
creating and maintaining control over production and administration. In the 
initial months after the fall of the monarchy, the showras managed to exert a 
considerable degree of control over production and administration, but this 
was gradually lost. Yet this loss was not total, as they continued to interfer-
ence or participate in the appointment of the management, and its policies 
 
- 978-90-04-44039-5
Downloaded from Brill.com10/09/2020 11:57:52AM
via free access
282 Jafari
regarding hiring and firing. Nevertheless, even this level of control was taken 
away by force during the increasing state repression and destruction following 
the start of the Iran- Iraq War. One reason for this was the lack of technological 
knowledge among oil workers, and hence their dependence on the technicians 
and managers to run the industry. This problem was not a fundamental ob-
stacle, however, as many among the white- collar employees – including engi-
neers and administrators – sympathized with the showras. The most decisive 
factor in the showras’ failure was the state, which used force and appointed 
technicians and administrators who opposed workers’ control.
Lack of coordination was another weak point of the showras, and in this re-
gard, subjective factors played a larger role. The intra- factory coordination was 
often well- arranged, but intra- industry coordination was often lacking. The 
General Showra of the Oil Industry Employees had been established, but it was 
centred around Tehran and functioned more on paper than in reality as a well- 
structured body. More importantly, there is little evidence that the oil workers’ 
showras coordinated their activities with the showras of other workers at the city 
or the national level. Although repression contributed to the situation, the lack 
of preparedness among the showras’ representatives and the divisions between 
the leftist organizations also played an important role. For similar reasons, the 
showras – unlike, for example, the workers’ councils during the Russian Revo-
lution – did not attempt to extend their activities by involving subaltern groups 
and establishing what Marx called, “a working class government”.89 The lack of 
a unified strategy among the showras, together with the repressive power of the 
post- revolutionary state, had made such a strategy unfeasible.
As a result of this negative balance sheet, the oil workers’ showras were not 
able to change the labour relations in their industry. They did seriously chal-
lenge the hegemonic- bureaucratic- despotic factory regime of the oil industry 
by challenging the authoritarian rules and structures, introducing workers’ 
self- management and democratic decision- making processes, and partly abol-
ishing the hierarchical divisions between white- collar and blue- collar workers. 
They also contributed to the redrafting of the labour law that, due to its many 
progressive elements, became opposed throughout the 1980s by the political 
factions that favoured the free market. However, the hegemonic- bureaucratic- 
despotic labour relations at the workplace level were re- established in the 
years following the revolution, within a larger framework of authoritarian, 
populist corporatism at the national level.
 89 Karl Marx, “The Civil War in France”, in Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, Collected Works 
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Thus the phenomenon that Marcel van der Linden has discussed as the 
“paradox of revolution” in the introduction to the current volume was repeat-
ed during the Iranian Revolution. Nevertheless, three important conclusions 
can be drawn from this experience. First, the showras demonstrated that work-
ers have the potential to create democratic organizations in an authoritarian 
context, and to establish some level of control over the production and ad-
ministration in their workplace. As in other historical cases, a revolutionary 
crisis allowed workers to take practical measures to realize this potential, even 
if only for a short time.
Second, the showras in Iran demonstrated that certain interpretations 
of Islam also provide ideological articulations for workers’ control, even 
though this articulation contained contradictions that surfaced in the show-
ras’ relations with the state; contradictions that were not that different from 
the ones apparent in communism at different historical moments.90 These 
contradictions led the Islamist, maktabi workers to support the state in its 
attempt to repress the non- Islamic currents, but at times this brought them 
into conflict with the Islamist state as well, when it tried to reduce the show-
ras to corporatist organizations under its control. These contradictions were 
buried under the economic and social ruins of the Iran- Iraq War, and the 
call for unity became louder than the protests against the state’s assault on 
the showras. This throws up an interesting “what if ” question that warrants 
more research into Islamist currents among labour activists during the Ira-
nian Revolution:  would the conflicts between these currents and the Isla-
mist state have developed into a serious clash, if the Iran- Iraq War had not 
started?
The third conclusion relates to the war itself. The experience of the Iranian 
Revolution demonstrates the historical co- occurrence of revolution, war and 
state building, and underlines the importance of its impact as an explanatory 
factor in the shifting balance between revolution and counter- revolution.
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 chapter 10
A “Negotiated Revolution”? Trade Unions and 
Companies in South Africa in the 1980s
Knud Andresen
Overcoming the racist and globally outlawed apartheid system in South Afri-
ca is often linked to the release of Nelson Mandela in February 1990 and the 
subsequent four- year transition phase that ended with the first free elections 
in April 1994. The occurrence at the same time as the collapse of the socialist 
countries suggests that the transition from apartheid to a democratic society 
was a result of the end of the Cold War between East and West. This is not com-
pletely wrong, as South Africa was a hotspot in the Cold War:  the apartheid 
regime was a strategic outpost of the West, despite all the criticism of racial 
discrimination made by Western states. The largest liberation organization, 
the African National Congress (anc), had a socialist approach and received 
logistical and ideological support from the Soviet Union and socialist coun-
tries. Because the South African Communist Party (sacp) was represented 
in the governing bodies of the anc, the apartheid regime’s anti- communist 
propaganda received support.1 Nevertheless, the transition process was not a 
direct reaction to the disintegration of the socialist state world, but instead to 
a longer process of change in South Africa itself; a process that began in the 
early 1980s and had a great deal to do with new strategic orientations of the 
South African parties in conflict, especially the anc and white elite circles. 
South Africa’s political transition is considered a “negotiated revolution”,2 and 
in the context of the current volume, this chapter examines the influence of 
industrial relations on strategic reorientations.
The term “revolution” for the South African transition involves systemat-
ic contradiction. Yet the political system changed fundamentally, so some 
 1 sacp cadres played an important role in the beginning of the armed struggle in 1961, and 
some authors still try to answer the question of whether or not Nelson Mandela was a mem-
ber of the party. Cf. Stephen Ellis, “The Genesis of the ANC’s armed struggle in South Africa 
1948– 1961”, Journal of Southern African Studies 37 (2011): 657– 676.
 2 Heribert Adam, The Negotiated Revolution: Society and Politics in Post- Apartheid South Africa 
(Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball Publishers, 1993).
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authors stick with the term.3 The transition phase was a negotiation process 
accompanied by civil war- like events. As a result, racial discrimination was lift-
ed in South Africa, and a constitution based on international human rights was 
adopted in 1996. However, capitalist rule was not overturned and no company 
was socialized. Instead, the anc in government pursued a relatively neoliber-
al oriented economic policy, sharply criticized by the radical left.4 Immense 
social inequality, closely linked to racial stereotypes, still characterizes South 
African society today. Despite the socialist rhetoric of the anc, it was not a so-
cialist revolution, but a transition to parliamentary democracy and the end of 
apartheid’s institutional violations of human rights. However, at no time was it 
the anc’s strategic plan to achieve a revolutionary takeover by military force. 
The formulated goal was the abolition of legally enshrined racial disenfran-
chisement and discrimination, and a democratic society for all South Africans, 
as proclaimed in the 1955 Freedom Charter. The aim was therefore always ne-
gotiation, with the armed struggle supporting this. The mass militancy of the 
1980s, which made South Africa almost ungovernable by the Boer regime, was 
not integrated into a long- term and revolutionary strategy. The transition can 
therefore also be understood as a “negotiated settlement”, in which all sides 
made compromises.5 Negotiations were decisive for the political solution of 
the conflict. Politically, it was a revolution in the sense that the previous polit-
ical institutions were abolished or democratized. However, it was not a social 
revolution. As argued below, industrial relations in the 1980s also contributed 
to this. In the theory of revolution, labour relations and revolutions are per-
haps more reminiscent of strikes and social struggles in companies. These 
played an important role in South Africa, but a brief glimpse at the strike waves 
in South Africa in the 1980s easily risks overlooking the fact that the growing 
black and non- racist trade union movement in the factories had established 
everyday practices of negotiation and compromise. In 1987, the South African 
sociologist Eddie Webster saw the trade unions as offering an opportunity for 
companies and a model for a necessary transition process: “they offer manage-
ment an opportunity to participate constructively in the process of negotiated 
 3 Christoph Marx, Südafrika:  Geschichte und Gegenwart (Stuttgart:  W. Kohlhammer GmbH, 
2012), 290.
 4 See Dale T. McKinley, South Africa’s Corporatised Liberation: A Critical Analysis of the ANC in 
Power (Black Point: Nova Scotia, 2017).
 5 Merle Lipton, Liberals, Marxists, and nationalists. Competing interpretations of South African 
history (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 1.
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change”.6 Nevertheless, not only for the companies, but also for the resistance 
movement, industrial relations offered spaces of experience that should have 
had a positive impact on the “negotiated settlement”. Before discussing the 
operational situation in the 1980s, the political development in South Africa 
should first be roughly outlined.
1 The Rise and Fall of Apartheid
With the election victory of the Boer National Party, Apartheid became the 
official government programme in 1948.7 The population was classified ac-
cording to racial criteria, and South Africa was only democratic for the white 
population who were entitled to vote. The black majority of the population, 
as well as Indian and coloured population groups, had considerably limited 
rights, which were gradually reduced further. The “grand apartheid” aimed for 
territorial division. The existing black settlement areas, already established as 
a type of reserve at the beginning of the twentieth century, were assigned to 
the various ethnic groups and were to lead to the establishment of formally 
independent homelands. All South Africans classified as black were assigned 
to an ethnic group – the largest were the Zulus, Sotho, Tswana and Xhosa – and 
a homeland, which deprived the vast majority in the “white” areas of all civil 
rights. This policy was never successful; only four of the ten homelands became 
formally independent from the 1970s onwards and they were not recognized 
internationally except by South Africa. However, it had considerable political 
and social disadvantages for the black majority of the population in the white 
areas. In the heydays of Apartheid in the 1960s and early 1970s, everyday life 
was marked by “petty apartheid”, under which public and private spaces were 
strictly segregated. A large number of laws separated the classified groups from 
each other; through the prohibition of marriages between ethnic groups, sepa-
rate benches and sports fields in public areas, and separate canteens and better 
jobs only available to whites in the factories. In addition, blacks were banned 
from buying land in “white” areas and constantly threatened with expulsion to 
the homelands. This institutionalized racism led to worldwide condemnation 
of the apartheid regime.
 6 Eddie Webster, “The Independent Black Trade Union Movement in South Africa. A Challenge 
to Management”, in A Question of Survival: Conversations with key South Africans, ed. Michel 
Albeldas and Alan Fischer (Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball Publishers, 1987), 21– 29.
 7 See in general, William Beinart, Twentieth Century South Africa (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2001); Marx, Südafrika.
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There had always been resistance against apartheid, and to the deprivation 
of rights for the black majority and the coloured groups. The African National 
Congress (anc), founded in 1912, had long been influenced by Christian social-
ized actors, and in 1955, it and other organizations in the “Charter of Freedom” 
made a non- racist, democratic society their goal.8 After the 1960 ban of the 
anc and the Pan- African Congress (pac), the anc took up an armed strug-
gle, but was soon considerably weakened by arrests and flight. The anc and 
the South African Trade Union Congress (sactu), which was close to it, in 
the end acted mainly from exile. They created international publicity and at 
the same time tried to reanimate the armed struggle in South Africa. Though 
the anc and the imprisoned Nelson Mandela were political reference points 
in South Africa, for a long time it was difficult to establish structures in the 
country because of the illegality this could involve. The “Black Consciousness 
Movement”, which began in 1968 with the charismatic Steve Biko (who was 
murdered in 1977) as its spokesman, was somewhat sceptical about the anc’s 
Congress Movement. After a wave of strikes in the textile industry in Durban 
in early 1973, black workers began to organize in independent trade unions, 
and after the massacres in Soweto in 1976, the militant struggle in South Africa 
itself increased.9
The anc remained the liberation organization that was supported by most 
black South Africans, but in the country, the anc could only organize itself 
clandestinely. Groups that were critical of apartheid could be found in church-
es, in liberal white circles and lastly in the newly emerging independent trade 
unions. In parallel with increasing resistance – which in the mid- 1980s led to 
the townships in particular becoming effectively ungovernable – the Boer gov-
ernment attempted to modernize apartheid through reforms; ultimately with-
out success. Pieter Botha, who was elected as prime minister in 1978, relaxed 
the apartheid regulations for some areas of society. This included new labour 
legislation in 1979 and the abolition of “petty apartheid”; that is, separation in 
everyday life. Independent unions could now also operate in companies and 
organize black workers who previously had no status as employees. However, 
the new labour legislation required people to register with state authorities, 
a requirement that was only dropped some years later. Independent unions 
that only organized black worker and came together in the Council Unions 
of South African (cusa) had fewer difficulties in the beginning than the 
non- racist unions, which – although mostly comprising black workers – had 
 8 See Sylvia Naeme, The Congress Movement: The Unfolding of the Congress Alliance 1912– 1961, 
3 vols. (Cape Town: hsrc Press, 2015).
 9 Saul Dubow, Apartheid 1948– 1994 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 171– 172.
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openness to all as a principle, and thus contradicted the ideals of apartheid. 
Political activities against apartheid were always part of the activities of in-
dependent trade unions, since they were also able to create articulation spac-
es for anti- apartheid interests. The Federation of South African Trade Unions 
(fosatu), founded in 1979, took care in the first years of its foundation not 
to put political goals in the foreground, but to build up grassroots democratic 
structures in companies and to fight for social progress. This “workerist” po-
sition began to relax somewhat after the founding of the United Democratic 
Front (udf) in 1983. In 1985, fosatu merged with others, notably the National 
Union of Mineworkers (num) – which had emerged from cusa – forming the 
Confederation of South African Trade Unions (cosatu). This confederation, 
in which the affiliated unions gained influence in companies, became one of 
the important forces in the udf, which developed into South Africa’s largest 
legal resistance alliance. cosatu and the udf followed the then banned anc, 
and in 1987, cosatu officially accepted the Freedom Charter of 1955.10
The reform of the labour market 1979 was linked to the “total strategy” 
proclaimed by Botha, with the aim of both the military defeat of black resis-
tance and of winning over moderate blacks.11 Although the economic easing 
brought articulation and higher wages for black workers, it was also intended 
to promote a black middle class that was regarded as less susceptible to leftist 
goals. Botha adhered to the idea of “grand apartheid”, and in 1983, established 
a three- chamber system of parliament representing white, coloured and Indi-
an population, but excluding the black majority. Thus, the principle of “One 
Man, One Vote” was intended to have been permanently prevented. However, 
the new constitution only increased the de- legitimation of the apartheid state, 
increasingly also among whites. After Botha announced claimed reforms in 
a speech in August 1985, but then stuck to his previous policy, the apartheid 
regime seemed no longer reformable, even in white circles – apart from Boer 
hardliners. Botha reigned increasingly through martial law – and with a state 
of emergency from 1985 – and maintained the goal of the military defeat of 
the black resistance through a covert war in Angola. Especially in parts of the 
secret service, but also in the Boer secret organization “Broederbond”, the view 
prevailed that the South African apartheid model would not survive for long 
and radical changes were needed. By contrast, the viewpoint that apartheid 
could survive by military strength remained strong among the military leader-
ship and the domestic secret service.
 10 Marx, Südafrika, 270– 272; Dubow, Apartheid, 206– 210.
 11 Beinart, Twentieth Century, 246.
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The anc armed struggle was never designed to be, or near to becoming a 
military victory. As South African forces were defeated 1988 in Angola, the mil-
itary wing of the anc was losing its bases there. In fact, the anc never saw an 
end to apartheid through armed struggle. The mass unrest in the 1980s was 
important to make some areas nearly ungovernable for the Boer regime and to 
mobilize the “street”, but had no strategic goals in terms of revolution.12 Talks 
had begun from 1985, partly between anc representatives and Boer intellec-
tuals and business elites, but also between government representatives and 
the imprisoned Nelson Mandela and the exiled leadership of the anc.13 These 
mostly secret talks helped to prepare for a phase of transition, since on the one 
hand they reduced Boer fears about a communist anc, and on the other, in-
creased the willingness in influential circles of the white population to divide 
power. However, it was only the replacement of the sick President Botha by 
Frederik De Klerk in the summer of 1989 that cleared the way for the release of 
Mandela and the re- admission of the anc and other organizations.
2 Labour Relations and the Decline of Apartheid in the 1980s
These rough outlines of political development still say little about the practices 
and developments in labour relations. The reform of labour legislation in 1979 
was not only a consequence of growing black resistance, but also of reform 
demands from the economic elite. With regard to the South African situation, 
it has to be considered that the industrial economic elite was strongly influ-
enced by South Africans of English origin, who kept a certain distance from the 
Boer National Party and its government. Beinart emphasizes that “Capitalists 
… lived with apartheid rather than advocated it”.14 The most prominent exam-
ple is Harry Oppenheimer (1908– 2000), ceo of the Anglo- American Corpora-
tion, South Africa’s largest investment trust and mining and diamond group. 
In the 1950s, Oppenheimer was a temporary member of parliament and later 
a financier of the white liberal opponents of apartheid. Liberal economic cir-
cles long followed the so- called “Oppenheimer thesis”, which suggested that 
apartheid would become superfluous with increasing prosperity.15 This liberal 
 12 See Lipton, Liberals, 81– 87.
 13 See, mostly based on interviews: Allister Sparks, Tomorrow is another country: The inside 
story of South Africa’s negotiated settlement (Johannesburg:  Jonathan Ball Publishers 
sa, 2003).
 14 Beinart, Twentieth Century, 252.
 15 With regard to Oppenheimer, see David Pallister, Sarah Stewart and Ian Lepper, South 
Africa Inc: The Oppenheimer Empire (Sandton:  Simon & Schuster, 1987); regarding 
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thesis proved unsuccessful, as social and legal discrimination could hardly be 
offset by a very slow rise in wages for black workers from the mid- 1970s. At the 
time, criticism of apartheid and the regime’s rigid policies was nevertheless 
growing in economic circles. In an internal position paper in 1977, the Midland 
Chamber of Industries stated “For far too long the political philosophy of the 
government has been based on a paralysing fear of the future under a govern-
ment with Blacks in it and the need now is urgent for education on the ideolog-
ical and business sides to bring about the changes which are essential”.16 It was 
also in the interests of companies to promote a black middle class and mod-
erate forces, in order to prevent radicalization through social improvements 
and to cushion full democratization through the protection of white privileges. 
In 1977, the “Urban Foundation” was launched, financed mainly by Harry Op-
penheimer and other wealthy industrialists. The aim was to improve the living 
conditions and training for the black population in urban areas, but within the 
framework of legal requirements. For most industries, there were also strong 
economic motives for reform pressure. Black employees were subject to a train-
ing ban, and various apartheid laws – supported by the white, racist unions – 
prescribed the so- called “job reservation”: a ban on black people working in 
the same wage group as white people. These regulations exacerbated the con-
stant shortage of skilled workers in South Africa, and as industry grew, so did 
the proportion of black employees.17 From the companies’ point of view, the 
growth in industrial employment and the increasing international isolation of 
South Africa therefore needed to be compensated for by skilled black work-
ers. Many companies, including Volkswagen and the Swedish skf, had already 
started imparting specialist knowledge to black employees in internal train-
ing courses around 1970. In 1974, a British automotive journalist wrote about 
Volkswagen of South Africa and the German ceo Rudolf Leiding: “He and the 
South African directors share a conviction that Volkswagen of South Africa 
can only progress by giving Bantu and Coloured workers the training to equip 
them for more skilled jobs and greater responsibility”.18 The contradiction with 
‘Oppenheimer- thesis’ see Norman Bromberger, “Economic Growth and Political Change 
in South Africa”, in South Africa: Economic Growth and Political Change. With Comparative 
Studies of Chile, Sri Lanka and Malaysia, ed. Adrian Leftwich (London: Allison and Busby, 
1974), 61– 123.
 16 Midland Chamber of Industries to All Members, (Discrimination on a racial basis), 2 
September 1977, in: Landsarkivet Göteborg, CO267 Svenska Kullager Fabriken, F19 A: 1.
 17 Jeremy Seekings and Nicoli Nattrass, Class, race, and inequality in South Africa (New 
Haven, London: Yale University Press, 2005), 99– 111.
 18 “Inside Volkswagen. Supplement der Zeitschrift Car”, March 1974, in: Unternehmensarchiv 
Volkswagen, 69/ 616/ 2.
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the apartheid government was not necessarily fundamental on the part of the 
companies, but was also due to the government’s sometimes volatile policies. 
Back in 1973, the then president of the government, Vorster, had publicly an-
nounced that blacks could also perform skilled labour, and in 1975, the South 
African army lifted the ban on blacks standing hierarchically above whites.19 
These signs of change, sometimes formulated only as hints, were understood 
by companies and often driven forward. This included, in particular, the ex-
pansion of company training programmes, which also qualified black workers 
for higher wage groups.
Apartheid proved economically dysfunctional for many industrial compa-
nies, as the deprivation of the majority of the population also made it more 
difficult for a black consumer class to emerge. This aspect was certainly more 
significant than political empathy with regard to explaining the slow change 
of attitude in South African industry. This applied to both domestic and for-
eign companies, although foreign companies were also being put under public 
pressure from anti- apartheid movements in their country of origin. In par-
ticular, many subsidiaries of multinational companies shaped industrial pro-
duction, such as the automotive and metal industries. About 50 per cent of 
industrial production was provided by foreign companies, with South African 
subsidiaries that were legally subject to South African corporate law and with 
management who mostly came from South Africa itself.20
The South African labour law reform of 1979, together with efforts to im-
prove working conditions, also raised expectations among black workers, who 
began to create their own interest groups with a new trade union movement. 
One of the centres of industrial production was in the city of Uitenhage, near 
Port Elisabeth. Many car manufacturers had located there, including Ford, 
General Motors and Volkswagen, as well as suppliers such as Continental and 
Hella, and other metal industries including the Swedish ball- bearing manu-
facturer skf. In 1976, skf was one of the first companies to hold talks with 
an independent union. In July 1977, some legal tricks enabled one union, the 
United Automobile Rubber & Allied Workers of South Africa (uaw), to engage 
in wage negotiations with the management. At Ford, a strike in 1979 ended suc-
cessfully for the workers, as the management accepted the unions as negotiat-
ing partners and even assumed responsibility for the loss of earnings during 
the strike. In June 1980, the region was hit by a new wave of strikes for higher 
 19 Merle Lipton, Capitalism and Apartheid. South Africa, 1910– 1984 (Aldershot:  Gower 
Publishing Ltd, 1985), 60.
 20 For the motor industry, see David Duncan, We are Motor Men. The Making of the South 
African Motor Industry (Caithness: Whittles Publishing, 1997), 63– 78.
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wages. While production continued at Ford, employees at Volkswagen went 
on strike for several weeks, work stopped at other plants, and around 70 per 
cent of the black and coloured employees in the region went on strike. Higher 
wages were supposed to lead to a decent standard of living; therefore a 90 per 
cent increase to 2 rand per hour was demanded. This sum was not introduced 
immediately, but in stages.21 The Johannesburg public relations agency, Errol 
Fyfe, was engaged by several companies22 and summarized its impressions of 
the strike in July 1980. Even if employers were not always happy about it, the 
black, non- racist unions were anchored in the workforce and therefore it was 
more reasonable to accept the militant unions as negotiating partners: “If em-
ployers accept that unions are essential to channel conflicts, their chief con-
cern should be the extent to which unions enjoy workers support. All other 
considerations are secondary”.23 The pr agency’s analysis did not necessarily 
reflect management sentiment, but is evidence of management voices seeking 
solutions beyond apartheid. After the wave of strikes in Uitenhage in 1980, the 
independent trade unions became more and more accepted by the compa-
nies as partners in discussions and negotiations. After lengthy disputes and 
delaying tactics until around 1984, the majority of industrial companies even-
tually had internal agreements with independent trade unions. In particular, 
the rapidly growing union membership of black workers increased the ability 
to strike.24
The process of recognition was controversial in the independent trade 
unions themselves, as the South African trade union movement has tradition-
ally been highly fragmented. In addition to the purely white and racist unions, 
the largest association in the Trade Union Council of South Africa (tucsa) – 
which had been equivocal in its rejection of apartheid and support for black 
workers – had excluded the last black unions in 1969, and a few years later, 
black workers reorganized into “parallel unions” under white or coloured 
leadership.25 Disappointments about the behaviour of the tucsa, which 
 21 Gottfried Wellmer, “Die nicht- rassistische Gewerkschaftsbewegung Südafrikas 1973– 1981”, 
in Metallgewerkschaften in Südafrika, ed. Eugen Loderer (Köln: Bund- Verlag, 1983), 59– 114, 
102– 104.
 22 For example bmw, see Annika Biss, Die Internationalisierung der Bayerischen Motoren 
Werke AG. Vom reinen Exportgeschäft zur Gründung eigener Tochtergesellschaften im 
Ausland 1945– 1981 (Berlin/ Boston: De Gruyter, 2017), 732.
 23 “Summing up. A look at important news events in South Africa produced for members 
of the Institute of Directors (Southern African Division), July 1980”, in:  Landsarkivet 
Göteborg, CO267 Svenska Kullager Fabriken F19 A:4.
 24 Duncan, Motor Men, 97– 98.
 25 Wellmer, Gewerkschaftsbewegung, 61.
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belonged to the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (icftu), 
and the growing self- confidence of black workers, led to organizational efforts 
for black and independent trade unions. It was not forbidden to organize at 
that time, but black workers could not become members of a union that was 
recognized by a company, and was therefore a negotiating partner, since they 
had no official employee status until the 1979 reform. Starting from local foun-
dations in the industrial centres around Durban, Port Elisabeth, Pretoria and 
Johannesburg – as well as in Cape Town – smaller trade union groups emerged 
that sought to network.26 The independent trade unions grew from 90,000 to 
over 320,000 members between 1979 and 1983, and the non- racist trade union 
movement united to form cosatu in December 1985, with some 400,000 
members. In addition, the cusa and the Azanian Congress of Trade Unions 
(azactu) existed as purely black organizations, influenced by the Black Con-
sciousness Movement and close to the pac. These three confederations had 
around 520,000 members in the mid- 1980s, and continued to focus on indus-
trial centres and companies. They were represented in over 3,000 workplaces, 
and 450 companies had signed recognition contracts. The operational basis 
was formed by around 12,000 shop stewards.27 Most of the unions were also 
represented in the Industrial Councils at the time, and the resulting negotiation 
routines contributed to mutual acceptance. The membership only amounted 
to around 10 per cent of all the black workers, and branches such as agriculture 
and domestic service – in which almost half of the five million black employ-
ees worked – remained largely unorganized. However, the independent trade 
unions showed themselves “as a disciplined and highly effective vanguard of 
resistance”.28 In addition, industrial production was a leading, economically 
important industry with a workforce of qualified and skilled employees. This 
leading function also applied to the trade unions, although the trade union 
movement was likewise divided by the racist segregation of the labour market.
The rise of the independent trade union movement was offset by the white 
trade unions’ loss of importance. The all- white South African Confederation 
of Labour Associations (sacla), a strong guarantor of white privileges and 
supporter of racist politics since the 1950s, lost its influence in the early 1980s. 
tucsa had been inconsistent towards black workers and more liberal in its 
basic orientation. After 1979 and the reform of the labour- market, tucsa con-
tinued to protect white interests, and the confederation lost its influence al-
most everywhere. In particular, the coloured and black members turned away 
 26 Beinart, Twentieth Century, 239– 242.
 27 Webster, Black Trade Union, 23– 24.
 28 Beinart, Twentieth Century, 250.
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from tucsa.29 In 1982, the International Metalworkers’ Federation (imf) also 
excluded two tucsa unions, as they continued to hold racist positions.30 The 
independent trade unions were on the other hand strongly supported by in-
ternational organizations such as the imf and icftu. In particular, the will-
ingness of the independent trade unions to strike and their strategy of enforc-
ing improvements through company agreements rather than through higher 
chambers brought them approval. Their willingness to fight also increased 
their popularity among the members. In 1979 there were 101 strikes, the num-
ber increased tenfold to over a thousand in 1987 and 1988.31 Although they 
could not reach all of those suffering from social and racial discrimination, in-
dustrial unions in particular were of great importance for the development of 
labour relations. Workers’ approval of non- racist trade unions also came from a 
grassroots democratic orientation. Before the strike at Volkswagen in 1980, for 
example, the families of vw were asked about their wage demand, rather than 
just being based on statistical calculations.32 In particular, however, a system 
of shop stewards as the democratic controlling body of trade union leaders 
was established and expanded. In the eyes of management, the militancy of 
the trade unions also lay in the fact that the results of negotiations were dis-
cussed and coordinated with their members. The shop stewards were increas-
ingly recognized as the backbone of the trade unions by the companies, with 
some of them exempted from their work by internal regulations.
Conflicts between the independent trade unions arose primarily over ques-
tions of registration (meaning state recognition), which was necessary in order 
to be represented in the industry’s own industry committees. This political de-
bate in the non- racist trade unions declined somewhat after 1981. The major-
ity of the unions in fosatu decided to register, especially as the government 
in return accepted its statutory commitment to be non- racist and thus to go 
against the basic principles of apartheid.33 Some other unions refused to regis-
ter, because their focus was on general political objectives in trade union work. 
A certain pattern had thus been established in South African industrial rela-
tions. The government repressed trade unions and political organization, but 
 29 Sonia Bendix, Industrial relations in South Africa, 9 (Lansdown: Juta and Co, 2007), 77– 80.
 30 Herman Rebhan and Werner Thönnessen, “Der IMB und die Metallgewerkschaften in 
Südafrika 1951 bis 1982”, in: Metallgewerkschaften, ed. Loderer, 115– 171, 168– 170.
 31 Bendix, Industrial relations, 78.
 32 Wellmer, Gewerkschaftsbewegung, 103.
 33 Beinart, Twentieth Century, 248– 255; Fred Sauls, “Reform oder Kontrolle? Die Befreiung 
der neuen südafrikanischen Arbeiterbewegung”, in Metallgewerkschaften, ed. Loderer, 
173– 182, 180– 181.
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increasingly accepted the establishment of relations between management 
and non- racist unions. The unions used the scope for social improvements 
through a relationship of strikes and negotiations, without giving up their goal 
of abolishing apartheid. The reference point of South African labour legisla-
tion, which employers had used for a long time, became increasingly fragile 
due to the dilatory behaviour of government agencies, and more room for ma-
noeuvre opened up in individual companies. This could be observed, for ex-
ample, in the acceptance of strikes for the purpose of political demonstrations. 
Surveys of industrial companies in the Johannesburg area in 1985 showed that 
with regard to one- day political strikes – for example on 1 May or the anniver-
sary of the Soweto uprising – over 90 per cent of management did not penalize 
participation.34 Due to the political situation, the management accepted when 
trade unions organized symbolic actions to protest against apartheid. Foreign 
companies in particular were under public pressure in their country of origin 
and tried to react to this in their operational processes. For example, on 1 Jan-
uary 1986, the Swedish skf company introduced a support fund for relatives 
of arrested black workers. This measure was also taken because white workers 
continued to receive wages for the period of their compulsory military service, 
which was publicly criticized in Sweden.35 In the summer of 1988, Volkswa-
gen’s human resources management department complained to trade union 
representatives that there had been many political actions and unscheduled 
meetings of employees during working hours. They asked to discuss reducing 
the number of incidents.36
Nevertheless, it was not only in the plants that the climate changed, as busi-
ness associations also started to publicly call for an end to apartheid. In Sep-
tember 1985, some 91 ceo s of South African companies published a newspa-
per advert under the heading “There is a better way”, calling on the government 
to abolish racial discrimination, negotiate with recognized black leaders about 
power sharing and introduce full citizenship for all in South Africa. The cam-
paign was eventually supported by over 1,000 ceo s and senior managers.37 
The political goal was to prevent further bloodshed, and negotiations with the 
 34 Webster, Black Trade Union, 25.
 35 Brochure “Verksamheten i Sydafrika”, Göteborg 1986, in Landsarkivet Göteborg, CO267 
Svenska Kullager Fabriken F19 A: 10.
 36 Memo from W.  B. Robinson, Human Resource Manager, to Messrs:  Gonomo, 
Hardt, Johnson, Liliah, Magidimesi, 12.7.1988, in:  Historical Paper, University of the 
Witwatersrand, AH2960 B1.4.
 37 D. A.  Buchana and A.  V. Pienaar to State President P.  W. Botha, 12 February 1986, 
in: Landsarkivet Göteborg, CO267 Svenska Kullager Fabriken F19 A: 10.
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representatives of the majority of the population were indispensable for this. 
On the other side were some conservative business leaders, who agreed with 
Botha’s martial law in 1985 to keep the situation calm. The advert in Septem-
ber 1985 was also a reaction by younger and liberal ceo s,38 who realized that 
trade unions had become an important force in the plants. In September 1985, 
there was also a meeting between some business leaders and anc representa-
tives in Lusaka, in which the former were told that a mixed economy would be 
possible under an anc government. Oliver Tambo, then president of the anc, 
declared in a speech at the end of the year that business leaders could be an 
“additional leverage” to overcome apartheid, even if they just wanted to pro-
tect their profits.39 In the second half of the 1980s, when the Soviet Union and 
the socialist countries began to change, anti- communism as a core political 
argument against apartheid became less convincing. With hints from the anc 
leadership in exile, it also became clear that an anc government would not 
mean nationalization and a planned economy.
However, the black trade unions had great reservations about the compa-
nies. For example, Cyril Ramaphosa, chair of the num, declared in 1987 that 
despite their claims about reform, the companies were “part of the govern-
ment, therefore they are part and parcel of the oppression that the majority 
of people are experiencing in this country”.40 Ramaphosa still emphasized 
the socialist perspective at the time – the working class should take over the 
means of production. However, the anc no longer pursued this goal, with all 
its attendant consequences, but indicated in talks at the end of the 1980s that 
the interests of industry were already being accepted. After 1990, cosatu pub-
licized a “relatively moderate social democratic programme of ‘growth through 
redistribution’, that prioritized higher government spending on training, wel-
fare, and infrastructure” instead of the nationalization of industries. Ramapho-
sa became chief negotiator with the anc in the transition phase.41
The politicization of management in the 1980s did not mean that compa-
nies became political supporters of the anc; rather, they sought connections 
with the Inkatha Freedom Party and its leader, Buthelezi. Inkatha, which was 
mainly formed from Zulu in Natal, rejected apartheid, but belonged to moder-
ate black political forces and remained an opponent of the anc. However, the 
companies also tried to assist the respective communities of their employees 
 38 Anthony Sampson, Weißes Geld und schwarzer Widerstand:  Apartheid und Big Business 
(Reinbek bei Hamburg: Rowohlt TB- V, 1987), 18.
 39 Sampson, Geld, 228.
 40 Cyril Ramaphosa, Interview, in Question, ed. Albeldas and Fischer, 284– 294, 290.
 41 Beinart, Twentieth Century, 275.
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through extended social programmes. In addition, during the period of mar-
tial law, some companies still offered facilities for meetings, which were al-
ready forbidden in public spaces at that time. A further step was taken in 1988 
with the 14 points developed by the German trade union ig Metall for Ger-
man subsidiaries. In this, the companies undertook to forego any benefits from 
apartheid, as well as regularly reporting to non- racist trade unions on company 
development and a comprehensive schedule for consultation by the stakehold-
ers.42 The automobile companies, for example, signed working agreements on 
this basis in the course of 1989.43 In fact, this step meant that management 
committed to introducing more or less German co- determination, and this 
was part of the declining influence of the apartheid regime on labour rela-
tions. German companies were also under public pressure, however, as their 
importance for the South African economy increased after the US Congress 
decided in 1986 to disinvest US companies in South Africa  – despite a veto 
by President Ronald Reagan. Accordingly, companies always promoted their 
supposedly positive influence on South Africa’s development. The 1986 disin-
vestment decision by the United States was nevertheless not tantamount to 
a deterioration in industrial relations at companies such as Ford or General 
Motors. The managers there, who came from South Africa anyway, usually took 
over the companies and continued the previous industrial relations policy. 
Since South Africa’s economic isolation was an essential demand of the global 
anti- apartheid movement, this also led to extensive sanctions by the European 
Community and the Scandinavian countries in 1986. The pressure for compa-
nies operating in South Africa to adopt a critical approach against apartheid 
was immense, and thus needed to be taken into account.
3 Conclusion
South African industrial relations were characterized by racial segregation and 
discrimination. Due to large deposits of raw materials, however, the South Af-
rican economy experienced an economic boom after the war, which had the 
potential to bring social advancement, at least for skilled workers. “Economic 
 42 Michael Kittner, “Arbeitsbeziehungen in Südafrika und die Forderung nach 
Mindeststandards in deutschen Tochterunternehmen”, Gewerkschaftliche Monatshefte 39 
(1988): 490– 500, 498.
 43 Minimum Standard of Labour Relation, Volkswagen of South Africa / National Union of 
Metalworkers of South Africa, 8 September 1989, in Historical Papers, University of the 
Witwatersrand, AH2960 B1.4.
- 978-90-04-44039-5
Downloaded from Brill.com10/09/2020 11:57:52AM
via free access
300 Andresen
Growth and technological change were motors of social change in the towns 
as well as in the countryside”, which were developments described by Jeremy 
Seekings and Nicoli Nattrass.44 The exclusion of black workers became an eco-
nomic problem in the 1970s, as racial segregation became an obstacle to the 
development of industrial productive forces.45 Accordingly, demands for re-
forms were made by larger companies, as well as foreign- owned ones and asso-
ciations. With the parallel rise of non- racist trade unions and black resistance, 
a strong negotiating position emerged, which increasingly shaped industrial 
relations in the 1980s through their membership base and anti- apartheid poli-
cies. The non- racist trade unions were also an important part of the resistance 
movement against apartheid, and they made political articulation spaces and 
negotiation routines possible. The apartheid regime became weaker and weak-
er regarding industrial relations, but it remained a threat for militants. Mem-
bers of the trade unions were in danger of being imprisoned or killed. John 
Gonomo and other shop stewards at Volkswagen in Uitenhage were arrested in 
August 1985 and the workers went on strike. The human resources officer from 
Volkswagen supported the intervention and helped to get the shop stewards 
released from police custody.46
The goal for the companies of forming a black middle class that would turn 
against revolutionary aspirations was not achieved. This should also be under-
stood as not only a classic anti- insurgency programme, as the apartheid gov-
ernment also pursued it. The opposition politician Mthato Motlana pointed 
out in 1984 that companies could contribute to the formation of a black mid-
dle class, and from history, it is known that “all great revolutions were carried 
by the middle class”.47 Historically, revolutions and changes are not expected 
to come from the most oppressed circles, but from social groups that rise so-
cially yet remain excluded from power. This also applied to the black workers 
and their union leaders. In the negotiations during the transition phase, which 
were accompanied by bloodshed and unrest, the experiences also proved to be 
helpful in building trust among all the parties involved.48 The “negotiated revo-
lution” was a surprising success, conducted by the political leadership on both 
 44 Seekings and Nattrass, Class, 99.
 45 Marx, Südafrika, 257.
 46 “Probleme in Südafrika”, in: Autogramm Nr. 9, 3.9.1985, 15. Jg. (vw- company- newspaper).
 47 German Embassy Pretoria to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 24.4.1984, in: Politisches Archiv 
des Auswärtigen Amtes, Bestand Pret.
 48 Cyril Ramaphosa from the National Union of Miners and Rolf Meyer from the National 
Party rapidly formed a close working relationship that was important in some times of 
crisis during the process, Sparks, Tomorrow, p. ix- x.
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sides. However, it was also based on trade union experience and the willing-
ness on the part of white management to compromise and change their racist 
attitude. The South African example also confirms the thesis that reforms can-
not sustain a genuinely criminal regime in the end, as politically strong groups 
emerge that can no longer be excluded from participation in power.
 Bibliography
Adam, Heribert, The Negotiated Revolution: Society and Politics in Post- Apartheid South 
Africa (Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball Publishers, 1993).
Beinart, William, Twentieth Century South Africa (Oxford:  Oxford University 
Press, 2001).
Bendix, Sonia, Industrial relations in South Africa, 9 (Lansdown: Juta and Co, 2007).
Biss, Annika, Die Internationalisierung der Bayerischen Motoren Werke AG. Vom rei nen 
Exportgeschäft zur Gründung eigener Tochtergesellschaften im Ausland 1945– 1981 
(Berlin/ Boston: De Gruyter, 2017).
Bromberger, Norman, “Economic Growth and Political Change in South Africa”, in South 
Africa: Economic Growth and Political Change. With Comparative Studies of Chile, Sri 
Lanka and Malaysia, ed. Adrian Leftwich (London: Allison and Busby, 1974), 61– 123.
Dubow, Saul, Apartheid 1948– 1994 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994).
Duncan, David, We are Motor Men. The Making of the South African Motor Industry 
(Caithness: Whittles Publishing, 1997).
Ellis, Stephen, “The Genesis of the ANC’s armed struggle in South Africa 1948– 1961”, 
Journal of Southern African Studies 37 (2011): 657– 676.
Kittner, Michael, “Arbeitsbeziehungen in Südafrika und die Forderung nach Mindest-
standards in deutschen Tochterunternehmen”, Gewerkschaftliche Monatshefte 39 
(1988): 490– 500.
Lipton, Merle, Capitalism and Apartheid. South Africa, 1910– 1984 (Aldershot:  Gower 
Publishing Ltd, 1985).
Lipton, Merle, Liberals, Marxists, and nationalists. Competing interpretations of South 
African history (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007).
Naeme, Sylvia, The Congress Movement:  The Unfolding of the Congress Alliance 1912– 
1961, 3 vols. (Cape Town: hsrc Press, 2015).
Marx, Christoph, Südafrika:  Geschichte und Gegenwart (Stuttgart:  W. Kohlhammer 
GmbH, 2012).
McKinley, Dale T., South Africa’s Corporatised Liberation: A Critical Analysis of the ANC 
in Power (Black Point: Nova Scotia, 2017).
Pallister, David, Sarah Stewart, and Ian Lepper, South Africa Inc: The Oppenheimer Em-
pire (Sandton: Simon & Schuster, 1987).
- 978-90-04-44039-5
Downloaded from Brill.com10/09/2020 11:57:52AM
via free access
302 Andresen
Ramaphosa, Cyril, Interview, in A Question of Survival:  Conversations with key South 
Africans, ed. Michel Albeldas and Alan Fischer (Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball Pub-
lishers, 1987), 284– 294.
Rebhan, Herman, and Werner Thönnessen, “Der IMB und die Metallgewerkschaften 
in Südafrika 1951 bis 1982”, in Metallgewerkschaften in Südafrika, ed. Eugen Loderer 
(Köln: Bund- Verlag, 1983), 115– 171.
Sampson, Anthony, Weißes Geld und schwarzer Widerstand: Apartheid und Big Business 
(Reinbek bei Hamburg: Rowohlt TB- V, 1987).
Seekings, Jeremy, and Nicoli Nattrass, Class, race, and inequality in South Africa (New 
Haven, London: Yale University Press, 2005).
Sparks, Allister, Tomorrow is another country: The inside story of South Africa’s negotiat-
ed settlement (Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball Publishers sa, 2003).
Sauls, Fred, “Reform oder Kontrolle? Die Befreiung der neuen südafrikanischen Arbei-
terbewegung”, in Metallgewerkschaften in Südafrika, ed. Eugen Loderer (Köln: Bund- 
Verlag, 1983), 173– 182.
Webster, Eddie, “The Independent Black Trade Union Movement in South Africa. 
A Challenge to Management”, in A Question of Survival: Conversations with key South 
Africans, ed. Michel Albeldas and Alan Fischer (Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball Pub-
lishers, 1987), 21– 29.
Wellmer, Gottfried, “Die nicht- rassistische Gewerkschaftsbewegung Südafrikas 1973– 
1981”, in Metallgewerkschaften in Südafrika, ed. Eugen Loderer (Köln: Bund- Verlag, 
1983), 59– 114.
- 978-90-04-44039-5
Downloaded from Brill.com10/09/2020 11:57:52AM
via free access
 chapter 11
“I Will Not Let the Experience Be Taken Away 
from Me”
Forms of Workers’ Self- Organization in the 1989– 1990 Revolutionary 
Transition in the gdr
Renate Hürtgen
One could suppose that especially within the field of the history of labour 
and labour movements, the interaction between revolutions and changes in 
labour relations would be a focus for research. There have certainly been im-
portant times when the study of revolutions has flourished, often connected 
with the study of mass movements as part of a historiography with a left- 
wing political orientation. At the same time, socio- historical research on la-
bour movements has also paid a great deal of attention to processes that took 
place inside factories. However, these two historiographical developments 
have remained somewhat separated from each other. Descriptions of the 
history of revolutions mostly discuss their topics as political events; dealing 
with political procedures and different phases of revolution, and examining 
the ideas of the protagonists.1 Taking a look at the 1917 Russian revolution al-
lows us to recognize this tendency, as discussions concerning labour relations 
during times of revolution have been made subordinate to discussions about 
political events.2 Of course, a Marxist historiography would “know” that it is 
not the thinkers and party or trade union leaders themselves who made the 
 1 A good example is the discussion about the role of the factory councils in the Russian Rev-
olution of 1917. These councils, founded after the February Revolution, are assumed to have 
opened up anti- capitalist perspectives within this form of labour representation. Such eval-
uations, however, are only based on programmes, statutes or statements from the revolu-
tionary councils, in which the protagonists explicitly formulate their intentions and goals. To 
determine the character of the workers’ councils either in Russia or other countries, it would 
be necessary to distinguish between the self- identification of the revolutionaries and their 
real practice, and to comprehend them as part of the revolutionary upheaval of old labour 
relations. Such analysis has not been carried out to date.
 2 For a criticism of this approach, see Renate Hürtgen, “Lesarten des roten Oktober”, http:// 
marx200.org/ blog/ perspektiven- auf- den- roten- oktober [19 May 2018].
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revolutions, yet they have nonetheless always remained the focus of inter-
est.3 Even if attention is paid to the demonstrating or striking revolutionary 
masses, they often appear as a mere abstraction, or are remembered as po-
litical participants, leaders of strikes or members of a revolutionary council. 
They are hardly ever described in their own living and working environment, 
where the whole contradictory character of their thoughts and actions first 
manifests itself.4
In a totally different way, while focusing on the everyday life of workers, 
their culture and their lifestyle, many sociological and cultural history ap-
proaches to labour history detach the research agenda from the question 
of the relationship between labour relations and revolution.5 Their field of 
interest is not limited to the revolutionary consciousness of workers, to the 
political parties they belong to and to their attitude in the class struggle; at-
tention is paid to the precise relations between the main protagonists within 
the company. However, in this approach, the importance of class struggle and 
of power disappear simultaneously. Labour relations are not described as re-
lations of rule, but are replaced by “persistent” reciprocal power relations.6 My 
analysis of the factory processes of the 1989 democratic revolution in the gdr 
that follows should be read as a passionate plea to unite these two directions 
of labour history:  not to consider the changes in political power separately 
from the fights against the ruling labour regime, and to put the changes in fac-
tory power relations, their causes, and the nature and goals of the protagonists 
into the overall context of social development. In other words, the aim should 
be to observe the developments in factories, the learning processes that work-
ers themselves went through, and their particular experiences and behaviour, 
without losing sight of the overall social context of power, class struggle and 
exploitation.
 3 This approach reduces the revolutionary changes of labour relations to legal contexts. Con-
trast this with the tendency apparent in some articles from the conference “Gewerkschaften 
in revolutionären Zeiten – Europa 1917 bis 1923” on 11– 12 October 2018, held in Berlin by the 
Friedrich- Ebert- Stiftung.
 4 Minutes of Russian meetings that recorded the exact work of these boards were recently 
published in German for the first time. Anita Friedetzky and Rainer Thomann, Aufstieg und 
Fall der Arbeitermacht in Russland (Berlin: Die Buchmacherei, 2017), 509– 634. This is manda-
tory reading for anyone examining the role of councils in the Russian revolution.
 5 Cf. Peter Hübner, Christoph Kleßmann and Klaus Tenfelde, ed., Arbeiter im Staatssozial-
ismus. Ideologischer Anspruch und soziale Wirklichkeit (Cologne, Weimar and Vienna: 
Böhlau, 2005).
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1 The Factory Movements of 1989: An Unknown Side of the 
Revolution
The memory of the democratic revolution in the German Democratic Repub-
lic (gdr) is a prime example of concentrating on political results and ignoring 
what happened in companies, in particular the grassroots democratic process-
es.7 The prevailing official interpretation reduces the revolution to the fall of 
the Honecker regime, the mass demonstrations and, first of all, to the fall of the 
Berlin Wall on 9 November 1989. The majority of the population – sometimes 
against their better knowledge – accepts this. As a result, 9 November is cele-
brated as the peak and the end of the revolution, which then brought about 
the unification of Germany. Although thousands of gdr citizens witnessed the 
boom of autonomous employees’ initiatives on a scale never seen before, their 
experience has been given limited space in the narrative of 1989– 1990. A large 
section of researchers investigating civil rights activists and opposition to the 
gdr regime have found the main topic for their analyses in the attack on the 
Ministry of State Security; the events in the factories of the gdr seem of little 
interest, even today. The same can be said about the flood of publications con-
cerning the history of the revolution in the gdr written by both East and West 
German historians, who since 1990 have preferred to deal with the old and the 
new elite, as well as the collapse of social structures, the role of the party, the 
state security apparatus and other institutions of power.
When grassroots actions are examined, this usually remains limited to the 
mass demonstrations in the streets and squares.8 That does not mean devel-
opments at the factory level that contributed to the fall of the gdr have re-
mained completely unstudied. In fact, economic and business historians have 
been very interested in the structural and personal changes in company man-
agement, and therefore have also dealt with events in the factories during 
the revolution. This strand of literature, however, does not regard labour re-
lations as relations of rule, and the perspective is very different from that of 
the workers who were destroying the prevailing structures. Consequently, this 
research did not and does not offer much towards an understanding of the 
 7 Bernd Gehrke and Renate Hürtgen, ed. Der betriebliche Aufbruch im Herbst 1989. Die unbekan-
nte Seite der DDR- Revolution (Berlin: Bildungswerk Berlin der Heinrich- Böll- Stiftung, 20012). 
This book presents texts by eye witnesses and more than 120 original documents about the 
transition in the factories. These form the main sources of information for the current chap-
ter. A second resource for original documents is http:// www.ddr89.de/ [5 June 2019].
 8 Jürgen Kädtler and Gisela Kottwitz, Betriebsräte zwischen Wende und Ende in der DDR (Ber-
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role of workers and employees in the events of 1989.9 Some economic histo-
rians from the former gdr have justifiably criticized the historically unique 
process of the destruction of the East German economy. However, their focus 
has been on the needs and concerns of the former managers of factories and 
industrial complexes, who saw themselves as being suppressed by the West-
ern elite. Since they consider the factory as a place of power only in the West, 
and therefore not in the gdr, no revolutionary meaning is attached to the 
initiatives of the workforce, which in the autumn of 1989 turned against the 
factory leadership, directors of industrial complexes and trade union execu-
tives in the gdr.10
Although for very different reasons, many leftists from the West – together 
with some German researchers of trade unions – have shared this somewhat 
distrustful view of the grassroots movements in the factories in the fall of the 
Berlin Wall. The former overlooked the anti- capitalist tendencies among the 
gdr workforce and did not examine the demands for radical change that went 
beyond immediate reforms. For the Western leftists who came into contact 
with the East German factory committees in the autumn of 1989, the gdr 
workers somehow resembled strangers, who were not expected to be revolu-
tionary at all. The election results of March 1990 seemed to confirm this atti-
tude. An evaluation of the gdr revolution as a revolution for “free time and 
consumption” that was widespread in early literature, contributed to losing 
sight of the sphere of production.11 No relevant revisions have been made to 
this evaluation. The trade unions in the West also mostly failed to consider 
the spontaneous movements in the factories in the gdr. They first showed 
interest in grassroots participation in the summer of 1990, when partners were 
needed for the first staff committees and factory council elections, as well as 
for trade union units to be set up.12 Not all the trade union representatives tried 
to find “unencumbered” people at the grassroots level; only those who did not 
 9 André Steiner, Von Plan zu Plan: Eine Wirtschaftsgeschichte der DDR (München: Deutsche 
Verlags- Anstalt, 2004). Cf. Karin Lohr, “Management und Belegschaft im wirtschaftlichen 
Wandel – Brüche und Kontinuitäten”, in Krisen, Kader, Kombinate. Kontinuität und Wan-
del in ostdeutschen Betrieben, ed. Martin Heidenreich (Berlin: Sigma, 1992), 159– 172.
 10 Jörg Roesler and Dagmar Semmelmann, Vom Kombinat zur Aktiengesellschaft. 
Ostdeutsche Energiewirtschaft im Umbruch in den 1980er und 1990er Jahren (Bonn:  Karl 
Dietz Verlag, 2005).
 11 Kädtler and Kottwitz, Betriebsräte.
 12 Rainer Weinert and Franz- Otto Gilles, Der Zusammenbruch des Freien Deutschen 
Gewerkschaftsbundes (FDGB). Zunehmender Entscheidungsdruck, institutionalisierte 
Handlungsschwächung und Zerfall der hierarchischen Organisationsstruktur (Wiesbaden: 
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want to return to recruiting from the old gdr leadership and functionary team 
(fdgb).
These attitudes rapidly reaffirmed the teleological notion that any demands 
for the direct participation of labourers in management made during the rev-
olution of 1989 had been destined to fail from the start.13 This “teleologic real-
ism” not only took hold among those dealing with the revolutionary upheavals 
in labour relations at the beginning of the 1990s, but very soon became extend-
ed to all attempts to take a slightly more social perspective on the future of the 
gdr, which were decried as utopian.14
As a result of this combination of different perspectives, the role of the 
workforce ended up as a marginal issue in study of the 1989 revolution. 
However, this seems to have been changing to some extent in recent times. 
Contemporary historians have rediscovered oppositional tendencies in the 
Eastern Germany of the early 1990s, and have started to show an interest in 
the resistance of workers against the Trust agency (Treuhandanstalt) and 
government policy.15 Trade unions have also started to look more critically at 
their history of unification and their less glamorous role in the construction 
of the new labour relations in East Germany.16 The foundational meeting of 
the “Initiative of the East German Staff Committees, Factory Councils and 
Shop Stewards” against the mass dismissals of the Trust agency in Berlin in 
1992 is one of the points of interest.17 The current chapter aims to contribute 
to this turn by examining events in the factories of the gdr between Septem-
ber 1989 and February 1990, especially with regard to the process of factories’ 
transition. It also looks at the main protagonists who allowed the old power 
structure in the factories to collapse, and at the demands for new forms of la-
bour relations that emerged in the process. The questions raised here include 
 13 Manfred Scharrer, Der Aufbau einer freien Gewerkschaft in der DDR 1989/ 90. ÖTV und 
FDGB- Gewerkschaften im deutschen Einigungsprozess (Berlin and New York: De Gruyter, 
2011), preface, 47– 50.
 14 Martin Jander, Formierung und Krise der DDR- Opposition: Die “Initiative für unabhängige 
Gewerkschaften”  – Dissidenten zwischen Demokratie und Romantik (Berlin:  Akademie 
Verlag, 1996).
 15 The Trust agency was established by the gdr government. Originally it should save work-
ers’ rights to the factories but after the elections in March it was used to privatize the East 
German enterprises.
 16 Detlev Brunner, Michaela Kuhnhenne and Hartmut Simon, ed., Gewerkschaften im 
deutschen Einheitsprozess:  Möglichkeiten und Grenzen in Zeiten der Transformation 
(Bielefeld: transcript, 2018).
 17 https:// geschichtevonuntenostwest.wordpress.com/ soziale- kaempfe- in- ostdeutschland- 
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who these workers were and what motivated their activities. The chapter also 
looks at interactions between the revolutionary events on the “street” and 
those in the factories, at the ideas that were current among the grassroots ac-
tivists and at the question of why this phase of the transformation only lasted 
for a few weeks. Lastly, it addresses the question of the connection between 
the revolution and the changes in labour relations that took place in the gdr 
after the Wende (the ‘turning point’, meaning the period between the Peaceful 
Revolution in autumn 1989 and the elections for a democratic parliament in 
March 1990).
2 The Crisis of the Political and Factory Power Structures
The pictures showing thousands of refugees from the gdr during the late sum-
mer of 1989 circulated around the world. Reports about the mass demonstra-
tions – not only in Leipzig, Dresden and Berlin, but also in numerous small 
towns – leading to the downfall of both the central and the local state party, ap-
peared in the mass media. The dissatisfaction with the regime (that had been 
building up for decades) was articulated in open protest. When the Hungari-
an government started to pull down the border fence to Austria in May 1989, 
many gdr citizens tried to leave the country via this route. During the sum-
mer, they used the embassies or consulates of the Federal Republic in Hungary, 
Prague, Warsaw and East Berlin for their flight. In the first half of the year, 
nearly 50,000 people left the gdr in this way. By the end of 1989, the numbers 
had risen to 230,000. One reason why the refugee movement continued during 
the winter was that many citizens feared the border would be closed again at 
some point. Even at the time of the elections in March 1990, many people were 
still afraid that the old power structure might be re- established. On the other 
hand, unlike the situation in June 1953, the protestors in 1989 were aware that 
the Soviet Army was not expected to supress the uprising. The developments 
in the Soviet Union under Gorbachev might have had a decisive influence on 
the protests by gdr citizens in the early spring of 1989. Ignoring the “hardlin-
ers” within their own government, and in spite of the unpredictable danger of 
a massive military blow against the demonstrators, the feeling grew that the 
risks were worth taking. Within the space of just a few weeks, the party and 
state structures fell apart. What looked like an implosion would never have 
been successful without the pressure from the mass movements, although the 
workers’ uprising in the autumn of 1989 was undoubtedly different from that in 
June 1953 in the gdr. As a rule, the workers from the local factories went onto 
the streets after closing time, demonstrating in their capacity as citizens. The 
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first demonstrations often took place in a semi- public room of a church and 
expanded from there into the city.
The developments of the 1970s can help us to understand the events at the 
factories in the gdr in 1989, in particular the situation there in the summer 
and autumn. Since the 1970s, the industrial landscape of the gdr was charac-
terized by huge factory units, with more than 200 industrial complexes, some 
of them with over 20,000 employees. It was only at this stage that the gdr 
assumed the form of a “workers’ society”. The factory was at the centre, where 
overall, some eight million “employees” worked nine hours a day, from Mon-
day to Friday. Following the unsuccessful decentralization of the economy, the 
power of middle management over the economy once again increased, in the 
process also strengthening the position of the one- party state in the spheres of 
production and distribution. This had complicated effects on the workforce. 
On the one hand, through Honecker’s “Unity of Economic and Social Policy”, 
the role of the factories became enhanced.18 On the other hand, the functions 
of the party – as well as of the state security apparatus – were reinforced. In 
fact, after the end of the 1960s, basically only the members of the Socialist 
Unity Party of Germany (sed) could hold positions in the factory leadership, 
including the post of foreman. This produced a factory management consis-
tently loyal to the state and subject to party discipline. It deeply influenced the 
atmosphere in the factory, and produced a gap between the “top” and “bottom”, 
called the “card line”, analogous to the “collar line”.19 The factory was among 
the most thoroughly controlled places in the gdr, through the factory combat 
groups; a paramilitary organization that had been set up following the workers’ 
uprising in 1953, with the aid of the local sed members in the factories and 
through state security.20
The industrial landscape of the gdr in its final decade was characterized 
by two contradictory developments, which in 1989 contributed significantly to 
the course of events. First, the misguided economic policy led to a situation of 
decline and disorganization. The complaints lodged with the party, the state 
 18 The concept of “Unity of Economic and Social Policy”, which ended with the sed’s eighth 
party congress in 1971, was related to the era of Erich Honecker as leader of the party and 
state president. He introduced a policy in which the consumer goods industry was meant 
to have a more significant role than before.
 19 The “collar line” distinguished blue- collar workers from the white- collar management. 
In the gdr, this distinction went together with belonging to the all- defining sed. People 
carrying a party membership card belonged to the “top”.
 20 In the 1960s, the state security paid attention to the economy and the factories, and orga-
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leadership and the fdgb show a disastrous picture of collapsed factory roofs, 
malfunctioning heating and broken furniture.21 A lack of tools together with 
irregularities in the supply of raw materials made it impossible to maintain 
continuity of the work flow. The machinery became outdated to the extent 
that the proportion of obsolete equipment that was still operating had risen to 
over 50 per cent in some sectors by 1988.22 It was not without good reason that 
employees claimed the ruling economic and labour regime was responsible for 
this misery. The maxim was to fulfil the plan at any costs, even through false 
figures and reports. The factory leadership, consisting of the secretary of the 
sed, the state commissioner and the leadership of the trade union, subordi-
nated the factory interests to party politics, and the employees had to bear the 
consequences of this mismanagement.
Notwithstanding the problems described above, the gdr nevertheless be-
came a modern industrialized country with a qualified workforce. As a result 
of an extensive qualification programme, particularly for women, the facto-
ries in the gdr had a higher proportion of skilled workers, technicians and 
engineers than comparable factories in the West.23 The number of people 
without qualifications was reduced to a negligibly low number, and while 
the title “skilled worker” could often not compete with the traditional de-
grees of engineers, the self- confidence of the gdr employees grew because 
of their qualifications. At the same time, the gap was growing between their 
knowledge and capabilities on the one hand, and on the other, the opportu-
nities to make use of them. In the gdr of the 1980s, this resulted in the com-
mon phenomenon of over- qualification in the workplace. Technicians and 
engineers complained that they were just “sitting around”, not being able to 
use their knowledge, and that they were excluded from factory decisions. 
One of the engineers explained in an interview that the head of the quality 
control department had sent her to the junkyard to check if she could find a 
missing spare part there: “It was then that I realized that it was all over with 
the gdr”, she recalled. Another employee with a mechanical engineering 
 21 Peter Becker and Alf Lüdtke, ed., Akten. Eingaben. Schaufenster. Die DDR und ihre Texte: 
Erkundungen zu Herrschaft und Alltag (Berlin, New York: De Gruyter, 2015).
 22 Renate Hürtgen, “Entwicklung in der Stagnation? Oder:  Was ist so spannend am 
Betriebsalltag der 1970er und 1980er Jahre in der DDR?” in Der Schein der Stabilität. 
DDR- Betriebsalltag in der Ära Honecker, ed. Renate Hürtgen and Thomas Reichel (Berlin: 
Metropolis, 2001), 28.
 23 Ingrid Drexel and Barbara Giessmann, ed., Berufsgruppen im Transformationsprozess. 
Ostdeutschlands Ingenieure, Meister, Techniker und Ökonomen zwischen Gestern und 
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qualification had sat around in his office without any work assignments for 
years.24
The gap between the increasing demands for high living and working stan-
dards, and the lack of the possibility to achieve them led to growing dissatisfac-
tion. Skilled workers suffered a loss of dignity due to the fact they were not able 
to do real work, and that their knowledge and ability remained unused, while 
the work they did do was not even adequately rewarded.25
3 Labour Relations as Power Relations
The eruption of protests in the gdr in 1989 was not only driven by the constant 
shortage of goods and services and the lack of freedom to travel. The flood of 
petitions and complaints beginning in the autumn of 1989 was soon joined by 
the creation of grassroots groups of employees putting forward their demands, 
which shows unmistakably that anger was also focussed on the prevailing 
power relations in the factories.26
In order to recognize the character of labour relations in the final days of the 
gdr, we have to take a brief look at the situation of the workers’ movement. 
After the East German mass strike and workers’ protests of 17 June 1953 had 
been subdued, no other similar actions took place for thirty- six years.27 The 
suppression of this workers’ uprising also marked the downfall of autonomous 
movements. From that time onwards, strikes, the right of association and oth-
er forms of organizing in the interests of workers were forbidden in practice. 
The right to go on strike finally disappeared from the new constitution of 
the gdr in 1968, whereas it had previously remained formally recognized.28 
The representation of the workers’ interests against the state (that is, against 
state companies) became the sole prerogative of state trade unions under the 
auspices of the fdgb. These trade unions did not fight for higher wages and 
 24 Renate Hürtgen, Angestellt im VEB. Loyalitäten, Machtressourcen und soziale Lagen der 
Industrieangestellten in der DDR (Münster: Westfälisches Dampfboot, 2009), 145– 147.
 25 Renate Hürtgen, “Von der Würde der Arbeiter im ´Arbeiterstaat` DDR oder Wo ist 
die Arbeiterbewegung geblieben?” in Solidarität im Wandel der Zeiten. 150 Jahre 
Gewerkschaften, ed. Willy Buschak (Essen: Klartext, 2016), 303– 330.
 26 Renate Hürtgen, Ausreise per Antrag:  Der lange Weg nach drüben. Eine Studie über 
Herrschaft und Alltag in der DDR- Provinz (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2014).
 27 Heidi Roth, Der 17. Juni 1953 in Sachsen (Köln: Ch. Links Verlag, 1999).
 28 Renate Hürtgen, “Vom Streik zur individuellen Arbeitsverweigerung”, in Zwischen 
Disziplinierung und Partizipation. Vertrauensleute des FDGB im DDR- Betrieb, ed. Renate 













Downloaded from Brill.com10/09/2020 11:57:52AM
via free access
312 Hürtgen
better working conditions; their main task was to make sure that economic 
plans were implemented and production was increased. Those who grew up 
in the gdr and started working in the 1960s therefore did not know any col-
lective demonstrations, strikes, meetings or open discussion forums without 
the participation of a representative of the state or a functionary of the party 
(sed). When the revolutionary transition in the gdr reached the first factories 
in the early autumn of 1989, the workers not only lacked any experience of an 
independent collective movement, but also the facilities and media to build 
up a counter- hegemonic public sphere. The attempt of the gdr workers and 
employees to build up an autonomous grassroots representation should be ap-
preciated even more in light of the long years of supressed organizing culture, 
and the lack of any personal experience in this regard.
The revolutionary initiatives in the factories started slightly later than the 
protests in the streets. The demonstrators did not generally carry banners with 
demands, and only in exceptional cases played a major role in the manifesta-
tions.29 One such exception was the speech by Heiner Müller at the Alexan-
derplatz in Berlin on 4 November 1989.30 Müller called for the formation of the 
Initiative for an Independent Trade Union Movement (iug). The speech began 
with a challenge to the fdgb for not siding with the workers. At the end of the 
speech, he called on those present not to wait for renewal from “the top down”, 
but to take matters into their own hands by organizing the representation of 
their own interests.31 This spirit of grassroots initiative embraced the whole of 
East German society in the autumn of 1989. However, while the speakers at the 
Alexanderplatz on 4 November focused on the unity of all the citizens, the call 
for the iug expressed an idea that seemed to have little place in the general 
euphoria of the transition. In fact, the call stressed that employees in the gdr 
would have to continue the fight for their rights after the downfall of the party 
state. It argued that the following years would be no “bed of roses”. Considering 
the desolate state of the economy, it was to be expected that the workers would 
bear the burden of the transition.
The speech by Heiner Müller was received without much enthusiasm by 
the functionaries of the fdgb, and with some surprise by most of the workers 
 29 Bernd Lindner, Die demokratische Revolution in der DDR 1989/ 90 (Bonn: Bundeszentrale 
für politische Bildung, 2001), 79, 87, 112– 113.
 30 Renate Hürtgen, “Wie Heiner Müller am 4.  November 1989 zu seiner Rede auf dem 
Berliner Alexanderplatz kam”, in Der betriebliche Aufbruch, ed. Gehrke and Hürtgen, 
165– 166.
 31 Aufruf der Initiative für unabhängige Gewerkschaften, http:// www.ddr89.de/ iug/ aufruf.
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and employees from the factories in Berlin. However, similar calls for the es-
tablishment of independent representation within the factories and trade 
unions were made very early, and not only in Berlin. On 16 October 1989, one 
appeal read:
Knowing that the Free German Trade Union League does not safeguard 
the interests of the majority of the employees of the gdr, and that in-
stead of them, it acknowledges the sed as allied partner, we, the workers 
of veb Geräte and Reglerwerke “Wilhelm Pieck” Teltow have decided to 
resign from the fdgb and to establish the Independent Factory Trade 
Union “Reform”.32
According to the meticulous records of the state security, similar activities and 
calls were made elsewhere that October, for example at the three state- owned 
factories (veb) in Erfurt.33 Only few of these calls were made at public demon-
strations. Speaking in front of the Church of the Cross in Dresden on 17 Octo-
ber 1989, a member of the group of young workers from the Radebeul shoe and 
leather factory introduced among other matters the proposal that “the facto-
ry leadership will be elected”.34 All of these initiatives took place without the 
participants knowing of each other’s existence, except for the few instances 
that reached West German radio or television. The media were still state – and 
therefore sed – owned and controlled at the time, which made communicat-
ing and disseminating information about grassroots actions in the factories ex-
tremely difficult. At the demonstrations, the question of factory organization 
remained a marginal topic. Demands for the freedom of assembly, freedom of 
the press and freedom to travel dominated the movement.
Of all the forms of resistance against the prevailing labour relations, the 
mass exits from the fdgb involved numerically the most people. The trade 
unions experienced a rapid decrease in their membership, as trade union 
members resigned individually or in groups, and formulated calls for with-
drawal to the factory trade union bodies. These calls were often connected 
with criticisms against the fdgb: “A trade union that allows such great social 
injustice in this state is not our trade union. As a young man, one already fears 
 32 Call by the independent trade union “Reform”, http:// www.ddr89.de/ betriebe/ GRW7.
html [9 July 2019].
 33 Reports about special actions in the district of Erfurt, sapmo BArch DY 34/ 13268, BV des 
fdgb, Abteilung Organisation.
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to become a pensioner. The pension increase is a joke”.35 In October 1989, nu-
merous “open letters” were sent to “Dear Colleague Harry Tisch” – the leader 
of the fdgb at the time – with requests to express his opinion about the sit-
uation in the country, and to finally start a dialogue with the members. The 
privileges given to functionaries of the fdgb (which became widely known in 
November 1989) led to a new wave of resignations, and on 2 November, Harry 
Tisch resigned. The national board of the fdgb refused to play any role in the 
transition from then on; remaining just as the leaders of the individual trade 
unions. The whole trade union apparatus was shocked, unable to operate with-
out orders coming “from the top”. The changes in labour relations that took 
place in 1989– 1990 were exclusively driven by protagonists within the factories. 
There was active participation by shop stewards, and in exceptional cases also 
by functionaries of the trade union branches and members of the sed. How-
ever, in general, key roles were played by workers and employees with no party 
affiliation and outside managerial positions.
4 The End of the Old Labour Relations
The transition in the gdr factories accelerated after the street protests had 
succeeded in destabilizing the political structure. On 5 November, only a day 
after the large demonstration in Berlin, the whole politburo of the sed re-
signed; a move that was mirrored by party and state functionaries in provincial 
towns.36 In the meantime, a social democratic party (sdp) and various civil 
rights organizations were formed, among them “New Forum”, and fought for 
official approval.37 The opening of the border on 9 November put an end to 
the demonstrators’ week- long fight to change the travel law. It was only the 
successful demonstrations in October 1989, the opening of the border on 9 No-
vember, and above all, the protection the new organizations and parties pro-
vided that encouraged the emergence of demands at the factory level. This 
delay was not without good cause. As described above, the factories in the gdr 
 35 “Notice of withdrawal”, in Der betriebliche Aufbruch, ed. Gehrke and Hürtgen, 331.
 36 Renate Hürtgen, “Das Wunder von Halberstadt. Die demokratische Revolution in der 
Provinz”, in Herbst 1989 in der DDR- Provinz. Fallbeispiele:  Pritzwalk, Halberstadt und 
Gotha, ed. Hele Panke e.V. (Berlin:  Helle Panke e.V.  – Rosa- Luxemburg- Stiftung Berlin, 
2015), 32– 49.
 37 Christel Degen, Politikvorstellung und Biografie:  Die Bürgerbewegung Neues Forum auf 
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were tightly controlled places. Those people who stood up to the factory man-
agement in public lacked the type of protection provided by the anonymity 
of the street. Significantly, the pioneers of the transition in the factories often 
included people who joined a new opposition group in October or November 
and then also attempted to found, for example, a “New Forum” group in their 
own factory. This provided them with political protection, made paper and the 
use of a copying machine accessible to them and enabled them to build up an 
alternative information structure that could be used for the factory actions.38
The lack of the means of communication and of public spaces in which to 
organize constituted further problems for those who wanted to transfer the 
“spirit of the street” into the factory. Different later accounts recall how activ-
ists had made use of the bulletin boards or the blackboards in factory corridors 
to post a piece of paper with their own message, often to be quickly removed 
by the party secretary.39 The “fight around the bulletin board” was symbolic of 
the fight for publicity within the factories during the autumn of 1989. The trade 
union meetings organized independently by members and union representa-
tives were also an example of this. The new, previously totally unknown feeling 
of power was expressed in demands to the factory management to publicly 
account for the state of the factory, and to introduce Glasnost and Perestroika 
in the workplaces.
The crucial demands, which directly questioned the prevailing power rela-
tions, were aimed at disbanding the factory combat teams and the sed struc-
tures, as well as their so- called mass organizations. The slogans were:  “Party 
and state security, out of the factories! Break the combat teams! Stop social-
ist competition!” The latter demand above all delegitimized the trade unions 
at the factories; the same unions that in the past had organized performance 
competitions in order to increase production. In some of the factories, workers 
or their representatives organized explicit votes to withdraw their trust from 
these bodies. The “explanation” sent early November 1989 by the employees 
of veb Rationalisierungsmittelbau Zwickau to the factory director and the 
 38 “Factory groups” were founded within the New Forum and United Left. With regard 
to the connection between the new civil rights movement and the factory activists in 
1989– 1990, see Wilfried Wilkens- Friedrich, Die Beziehungen zwischen Neuem Forum und 
Gewerkschaften am Beispiel Berlins. Eine Fallstudie zum Spannungsverhältnis von neuen 
und alten sozialen Bewegungen (Berlin:  Zentralinstitut für Sozialwissenschaftliche 
Forschung der Freien Universität Berlin, 1994); Bernd Gehrke, “Demokratiebewegung und 
Betrieb in der ‘Wende’ 1989. Plädoyer für einen längst fälligen Perspektivwechsel”, in Der 
betriebliche Aufbruch, ed. Gehrke and Hürtgen, 204– 246.
 39 “Also, die Hauptunruhen im Hauptwerk waren Wandzeitungen”, News from the TV- 
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management of the complex included a demand for the text to be published 
in the company newsletter, which at that time was still firmly controlled by the 
party. A group of co- workers set up a grassroots group of the “New Forum” in 
their factory and with great self- assurance made suggestions for production, 
and even made their demands complete with a precise schedule containing 
deadlines to be complied with. In the event of failure to comply, they threat-
ened a warning strike.40
However, neither the fall of Erich Honecker in October nor the resignation 
of his successor Egon Krenz in December 1989 could fully eliminate the old 
power relations, and by January 1990, the sed appeared even stronger. In many 
of the factories, the old managers continued their activities without interrup-
tion, and the Ministry of State Security was not disbanded, but instead turned 
into the Office for National Security by the Modrow government. A strike wave 
organized independently from the state- led trade unions swept the country 
between October 1989 and January 1990, in which the industrialized south of 
the gdr played a notable role.41 Employees partly returned to the old tradi-
tions of the workers’ movement, and partly used uncommon forms of action 
such as the occupation of factories, hunger strikes or road blockades. Demands 
for eliminating the old work regime and the existing political power structure 
went hand in hand.
Changes in the balance of power within the factories started to take place. 
The factory combat groups disintegrated, and the structures of the sed, the 
Free German Youth (fdj) and the German Soviet Friendship disappeared. 
Their former offices remained empty or were closed. In some of the facto-
ries, the workers’ representatives even dismissed the factory directors. Cadres, 
party secretaries and other members of the management left their positions; 
sometimes silently, sometimes under protest. For the workforce of the gdr, 
this process gave rise to forms of self- empowerment only typical at times of 
revolutions. When the protagonists of the factory transition met a decade af-
ter the autumn of 1989, they referred to that time – apart from the realistic 
evaluation that in the end they could not accomplish all their revolutionary 
objectives – as the time of “walking upright”, and as a determining moment in 
their lives. There was unfortunately not much time left for the gdr workers for 
this kind of experience, as Gerd S., at the time a turner at the company Ratio-
nalisierungsbau Karl- Marx- Stadt and a founding member of the Basisforum 
 40 “Statement of the New Forum at the Rationalisationsbau works, in manuscript, no date 
(early November 1989)”, in Der betriebliche Aufbruch, ed. Gehrke and Hürtgen, 358.
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Rationalisierungsbau of the New Forum, remembers: “That was a short time 
when we had relatively a lot, yes, a lot of power. Very different from today”.42
The newly founded workers’ organizations were surprised that the compa-
ny management often accepted negotiations with them so readily. One expla-
nation was that “this turmoil itself paralysed them in a way”.43 Nevertheless, 
there were old – as well as new – directors in a number of factories who seized 
the opportunities to adapt to market conditions. A  joint- venture agreement 
released by the Modrow government provided the legal basis for negotiations 
with Western companies, and the first wave of staff dismissals soon started. On 
22 December 1989, the director of the Elektroapparate Werke Treptow Com-
pany announced the closure of complete factory departments. An announce-
ment at the company veb Bergmann- Borsig highlighted the risky situation 
that new grassroots initiatives faced:
On 17 and 18 January there will be negotiations with Western partners 
about a joint venture, holding or other forms of cooperation. Chief ex-
ecutive D. and his deputy A. have stubbornly remained silent about their 
plans and intentions so far. We need to act immediately. It may happen 
that entire units of our factory will be closed down or liquidated.44
5 Towards New Representative Structures?
Only after new groups and initiatives had been established inside and outside 
the factories, and “round tables” had been set up everywhere, did a lively dis-
cussion erupt about the aims and strategy for the transition. For a few weeks, 
thousands of citizens were involved in considering a democratically constitut-
ed gdr, in the process advancing the most varied collection of approaches.45 
 42 “Minutes of the conference of the Bildungswerk Berlin of the Heinrich Böll Foundation, 
27 November 1999”, in Der betrieblicher Aufbruch, ed. Gehrke and Hürtgen, 52.
 43 “Minutes of the conference of the Bildungswerk Berlin of the Heinrich Böll Foundation, 
27 November 1999”, in Der betrieblicher Aufbruch, ed. Gehrke and Hürtgen, 48.
 44 “Proclamation to found a provisory factory council at the VEB Bergmann- Borsig”, in Der 
betriebliche Aufbruch, ed. Gehrke and Hürtgen, 420. Bold type and anonymization in the 
original.
 45 The draft of a new work constitution, which was presented in the last Volkskammer (peo-
ple’s chamber) of the gdr in February 1990, made an especially far- reaching contribution. 
Stiftung Haus der Demokratie und Menschenrechte, ed., “Verfassungsentwurf des Runden 
Tisches, 1990”: The result of the political self- determination in the GDR from the autumn of 
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A wider learning curve began, because “nobody had any idea about democra-
cy, not in the factory anyway”, as Ewald S. summed up the situation in retro-
spect.46 An active minority became engaged in changing the power relations 
in the factories, and only a segment of them became members of the new po-
litical, economic and trade union elites after the transitional period.47
In order to ensure their legitimacy, the mostly small groups of four or five 
colleagues who took the initiative to accept the challenge – and in order to be 
authorized to act – collected signatures for their petitions or called for elec-
tions. Others established themselves simply as a “workers’ council”, “factory 
council”, “institution council”, “independent trade union group”, “working com-
mittee” or “basis group”, in advance of the organization of proper elections. 
Terms such as “provisory factory council” describe the temporary nature of 
these boards. In addition, the founding of “round tables” in the factories tes-
tified to the existing power vacuum. As of December 1989, such round tables 
existed in Berlin, where delegates of the sed and other parties, the fdgb and 
the church could meet members of the newly founded civil rights groups.48
In addition to such initiatives, which were independent of the fdgb, new 
elections for the factory trade union organizations started at the end of No-
vember. In many cases, the chair of the union branch was removed; in some 
of the factories they resigned of their own volition. The initiators were often 
whole trade union groups and – surprisingly – the shop stewards. The latter 
is remarkable, because during the gdr era, shop stewards were not strongly 
connected with fighting for workers’ rights.49 The activity of the shop stewards, 
 46 “Minutes of the conference of the Bildungswerk Berlin of the Heinrich Böll Foundation, 
27 November 1999”, in Der betriebliche Aufbruch, ed. Gehrke and Hürtgen, 36.
 47 There is no extensive examination of who from the Eastern trade unions, and to what 
extent, took over any positions in the Western trade unions and if they were function-
aries in the fdgb. Some biographical reports show that former functionaries were pri-
marily involved, but less so the participants from the period of the grassroots upheaval. 
Cf. Detlev Brunner and Christian Hall, Revolution, Umbruch, Neuaufbau. Erinnerungen 
gewerkschaftlicher Zeitzeugen der DDR (Berlin- Brandeburg:  Bebra Verlag, 2014); Larissa 
Klinzing, “Zwischen Anpassung und Öffnung. Gewerkschaftsstrukturen im beigetre-
tenen Teil Deutschlands”, in Politische Strukturen im Umbruch, ed. Hiltrud Naßmacher 
et al. (Berlin, 1994), 155– 180; Joerg Roesler and Dagmar Semmelmann, Vom Kombinat zur 
Aktiengesellschaft:  Ostdeutsche Energiewirtschaft im Umbruch in den 1980er und 1990er 
Jahren (Bonn: Karl Dietz Verlag, 2005).
 48 Uwe Thaysen, Der Runde Tisch. Oder: Wo blieb das Volk? Der Weg der DDR in die Demokratie 
(Opladen: vs Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 1990).
 49 Renate Hürtgen, “Vertrauensleute des FDGB in den siebziger und achtziger Jahren. 
Funktionslos im großen Funktionärsstaat DDR?” in Vom Funktionieren der Funktionäre. 
Politische Interessenvertretung und gesellschaftliche Integration in Deutschland nach 1933, 
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without any orders from the fdgb or the individual trade union branch offi-
cials, should not be confused with the reform movements within the fdgb.
No research has been carried out to date that can give a more complete view 
of the profile of the main protagonists in the factory movement. According to 
my own impressions as an eyewitness, which are supported by the fragmented 
literature that exists, the key players were employees with technical or eco-
nomic qualifications, but who did not hold management positions. The docu-
ments also show the presence of skilled manual workers among the initiators. 
It seems that the latter were more strongly represented in the initiatives aimed 
at the renewal of trade unions, whereas the participation of the former group 
was greater in the foundation of factory councils.
It is almost impossible to find a common structure in the movement as it 
took shape in different factories. In some, a newly elected factory trade union 
leadership, a factory council and an independent trade union group operat-
ed side by side for a few weeks.50 However, by November 1989 it had already 
become clear that despite the differences in their names, many of these ini-
tiatives reflected similar demands for workers’ involvement in running the fac-
tories. For example, the announcement made by a trade union called “Reform” 
included the demand for “the participation of trade unions in factory manage-
ment”.51
A more far- reaching programme for changing the form of workers’ represen-
tation was put forward by the iug,52 which worked out a statute at the end of 
December.53 It left open the question of whether the independent trade union 
should be organized on a sectoral, company or professional basis. However, 
the draft statute clearly outlined the demand to remove the full- time trade 
union bureaucracy and to replace it with elected shop stewards. Ideas put for-
ward by the iug about reducing the number of full- time functionaries, direct 
election of workers’ representatives, transparency, the right to strike and the 
 50 “E.g. at the company Berliner Werk für Fernsehelektronik (wf)”, in Der betriebliche 
Aufbruch, ed. Gehrke and Hürtgen, 64.
 51 “Call for the Independent Trade Union ‘Reform’ in veb Geräte- und Reglerwerk (grw) 
Teltow for the Foundation of Independent Trade Unions, 16 October 1989”, in Der betrie-
bliche Aufbruch, ed. Gehrke and Hürtgen, 342.
 52 “Tasks and rights of works councils, basis for discussion of the content of a works con-
stitution law, on the occasion of the 1st works council conference of the gdr, 31 January 
1989”, in Der betriebliche Aufbruch, ed. Gehrke and Hürtgen, 518.
 53 “Statute draft (1990)”, in “Now there are initivative people and one should invite them all 
to the same table”, Die Initiative für unabhängige Gewerkschaften (IUG) 1989 bis 1990, 
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right of association were included in the programmes of other independent 
trade unions.54 The unpopularity of the old fdgb gave a decisive impetus for 
these initiatives, because nobody had any trust in its renewal, and the prepara-
tions for an extraordinary fdgb congress at the end of January were similarly 
viewed with mistrust.
6 Beyond 1989
By the beginning of 1990, much had changed for the grassroots movements in 
the factories. The trend to form new advocacy groups had been replaced by at-
tempts to build factory councils comparable with similar representative bodies 
in Western companies. Groups that had called themselves “independent trade 
unions” back in October and November 1989, changed their names to “proviso-
ry factory councils”. There were attempts to build inter- company networks out 
of the hundreds of grassroots initiatives in individual factories. On 31 January 
1990, a national meeting of Independent Trade Union Initiatives and – on the 
same day  – a meeting of factory councils took place, with over 80 factories 
represented in each of these meetings. In December 1989 there had already 
been a proposal to create a “Council of Employees”. None of these proposals 
were successful.55 It is true that even in January 1990, state security attempted 
to hinder such networking. However, this is not sufficient to explain the failure 
to build a national movement out of the individual factory initiatives.
For an explanation, it is necessary to look at the character of the revolu-
tionary transition in the gdr, which – as mentioned before – was neither a 
workers’ uprising nor something that started in the factories. The contribu-
tion of the factory movement remained focused on disrupting the party dic-
tatorship’s monopolistic structures in the factories themselves, and through 
this, the destruction of the old work regime. A  more ambitious programme 
was never on the agenda. The character of the new citizens’ movements of the 
autumn of 1989 also contributed to this. Factory or trade union issues were 
never a prime concern for the New Forum,56 which also never had the aim of 
 54 “Open letter of the brigade Maintenance- Tiefbau”, in Der betriebliche Aufbruch, ed. Gehrke 
and Hürtgen, 350– 354.
 55 A representative of the United Leftists (vl) summarized in 1999, that the demand for 
“workers’ control was not included in the agenda of the people concerned”, in Der betrie-
bliche Aufbruch, ed. Gehrke and Hürtgen, 110.
 56 This is confirmed by the absence of such issues in the founding call for New Forum, 
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uniting the demands of the factories and those of the “street” by means of a 
general strike.57 Lastly, the popularity of the West German model was also a 
reason to aim for more limited forms of factory representation. From the gdr 
employees’ point of view, West German labour relations provided a solid and 
extremely effective basis for the improvement of the quality of work and life.
Despite this, however, the factory grassroots initiatives did not simply prove 
to be replicas of the Work Constitutional Act that regulated workers’ repre-
sentation in West German factories. They demanded more far- reaching rights 
related to factory management, as can be established from the documents re-
lating to these initiatives. They included demands for co- determination “con-
cerning any issues of factory development”, “in any structural questions” and 
“in any ownership question”, as the programme of the factory council of Funk-
werk Köpenick stated.58 The Council of the Employees in Karl- Marx- Stadt 
demanded “involvement in every issue concerning cadre politics”, as well as 
“in the production planning, the execution of production, investment, sales, 
furthermore the fields of research and development”.59 Other boards claimed 
veto rights over personnel issues and matters of corporate strategy, or gave a 
future factory council far- reaching rights regarding the appointment of man-
agers.60 Even many groups that did not describe their prerogatives in similarly 
far- reaching terms took it for granted that factory councils should have a say in 
the organization of factory production and the distribution of profits. How in-
dignant they were when a few months later they learned what strict limits the 
Federal German Work Constitution Act would impose on the factory councils.
The focus on workers’ participation in management functions from the out-
set involved the risk that trying to work in the best interests of the employ-
ees could turn into an aspiration to become part of the management. Some of 
the demands for participation were indeed not based on the vision of a trade 
unionist, conflict- oriented type of representation of the employees in the lead-
ership of the enterprise. This was the case for instance with the “institute coun-
cil” at the centre of the scientific equipment engineering company (Zentrum 
 57 Bernd Gehrke, “Die ‘Wende’- Streiks: A first draft”, in Der betriebliche Aufbruch, ed. Gehrke 
and Hürtgen, 247– 270.
 58 “Work programme of the company veb Funkwerk Köpenick, factory unit Dubendorf, 
o. D. (January 1990)”, in Der betriebliche Aufbruch, ed. Gehrke and Hürtgen, 432– 433. See 
the annex.
 59 “Responsibilities and structures of the ‘Council of the Employees’ in Karl- Marx- Stadt, 22 
December 1989”, in Der betriebliche Aufbruch, 397, ed. Gehrke and Hürtgen, http:// www.
ddr89.de/ betriebe/ RDW3.html [10 July 2019].
 60 “First Factory in the GDR on the works council’s activites of VEB Schwertransport Leipzig, 
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für wissenschaftlichen Gerätebau, zwg) in Berlin. The activists involved there 
presented themselves in a self- confident manner as partners with equal rights, 
who could not be left out of the decision- making in the highest echelons of 
management.61 East German protagonists who identified with such an inter-
pretation of workers’ participation, and who considered it their prime respon-
sibility to foster the “well- being of the enterprise” resembled representatives of 
West German factory councils, and their thinking came close to the so- called 
Standortdenken; that is, the vision that the major task was to ensure the viabil-
ity of the enterprise in the given location and context.
West German trade unions sidestepped these grassroots initiatives, and 
made every effort to extend West German practices of workers’ representation 
to the gdr.62 They emphasized the elections of factory and staff committees, 
but not the election of shop stewards. The consequences of the uncritical rep-
lication of the West German factory council model would become clear by the 
early 1990s, when trade unions proved unable to fight the privatization wave 
that followed German unification.63
Many employees very quickly began to familiarize themselves with the West 
German industrial relations law (Betriebsverfassungsgesetz). Among them 
were some who for months – more or less gloomily – had been trying to build 
up a basis for independent representation in the factories, at the latest after 
the elections to the East German Parliament in March 1990. The functionar-
ies “flown in” from the West told them:  “Get rid of all of the stuff you have 
prepared here. It will not earn you anything. Get prepared for the Industrial 
Relations Law”.64 Gerd S. adds that they themselves did not want to accept this 
for a long time, but the situation was becoming more and more precarious.
 61 “The foundation of an institute council at the Centre of Scientific Instruments’ Work, 
AdW”, in Der betriebliche Aufbruch, ed. Gehrke and Hürtgen, 384– 386.
 62 Michael Fichter and Stefan Lutz, Gewerkschaftsaufbau in den neuen Bundesländern: Eine 
Chronik der Ereignisse 1989– 1991 (Berlin:  Zentralinstitut für Sozialwissenschaftliche 
Forschung der Freien Universität Berlin, 1991).
 63 Ulla Plenert, ed., Die Treuhand  – der Widerstand in den Betrieben der DDR  – die 
Gewerkschaften (1990– 1994) (Berlin: Nora, 2011).
 64 “Minutes of the conference of the Bildungswerk Berlin of the Heinrich Böll Foundation, 
27 November 1999”, in Der betriebliche Aufbruch, ed. Gehrke and Hürtgen, 57. Dieter W., at 
that time a member of the autonomously founded factory council at Stahl- und Walzwerk 
Hennigsdorf, says that the trade unions  – here the ig Metall  – did not ask what new 
forms of representations there were, or how they were organized. “Not at all. They came, 
took us over, and that was all, and they pushed through their structures”, Detlev Brunner 
and Christian Hall, Revolution, Umbruch, Neubeginn. Erinnerungen gewerkschaftlicher 
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As a matter of fact, the phenomenon described by contemporary witnesses 
as the “survival fight” of the companies had already begun in 1990. As there 
were no alternatives, the offer by the dgb trade unions to provide stable and 
powerful representation of interests in the factories appeared very attractive. 
Up to the beginning of 1991, almost all of the major enterprises had elected 
factory councils and staff committees, in which the trade unions were able 
to position “their own men”. The gdr employees went through their first real 
pay disputes and trade union- facilitated strikes. The numerous new ideas and 
grassroots impulses for the design of labour relations that had sprung up in the 
autumn of 1989 gave way to the preparation and facilitation of elections. The 
historical moment of the revolutionary transition was over, and the discussions 
about what the “real” representation of workers’ interests within companies 
should look like were replaced by the study of the Federal German Industrial 
Relations Law. For the time being, labour relations in East Germany acquired – 
with the East German workforce actively contributing to the process – their 
definite shape. The momentum aimed at the generation of a “somewhat more 
leftist trade union” that had developed back in autumn 1989 did not – as Karin 
K., an activist of the company transformation process, and later involved with 
the IG- Metall, put it – manage to inject itself into this process. Yet at the same 
time, Karin K. underlines that the experience of “walking upright” did live on, 
and continued to make a difference, which cannot be disputed:
However, I want to say something, again, about the major outcome for 
myself. The rock band R.E.M. has a good song with the title ‘Walk Un-
afraid’. Having learnt how to march fearlessly, this walking upright, to 
have learned this and to stick to it, this embodies the development of my 
political emancipation in those days, and I wish to retain it for myself.65
7 Conclusion
There was no workers’ uprising in the gdr in the autumn of 1989; instead, a 
democratic grassroots revolution took place against the ruling dictatorial re-
gime. The goals of the protagonists were somewhat like those of the political 
and social movements that had emerged in Western Europe after 1968. The 
movements that emerged in the factories resembled far more the factory 
 65 “Minutes of the conference of the Bildungswerk Berlin of the Heinrich Böll Foundation, 
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struggles of 1968 and the following years in Western Europe than the Russian 
revolution of 1917, the German revolution of November 1918 or even the work-
ers’ uprising that had taken place in the gdr in 1953. In 1989 and 1990, the fight 
of the workers and employees in the gdr was aimed at the improvement of 
working and living conditions, higher wages, less overtime and the acknowl-
edgement of qualifications, with high expectations of an economy not subor-
dinated to central party control. Workers were concerned with the recreation 
of an independent labour movement, and their historic contribution was to 
question and destroy the labour relations that had been dominant in gdr fac-
tories. The democratic transition in the autumn of 1989 was therefore also ex-
pressed in claims for labour participation in the management of and decision- 
making in the factories.
The revolution of 1989 started an exciting learning process about the content 
and structures of autonomous factory representation, and opened up a small 
historic “time window”, in which workers in the gdr were able to investigate 
their own forms of action after decades of repression. This period did not end 
immediately after the adoption of the Federal German regulation of labour 
relations. Completely ignored by the historiography – including that about the 
trade unions – East German employees started a struggle, unprecedented in 
the history of Germany, against the privatization and closing down of the gdr 
factories. This was accomplished mainly through the organization of the Trust 
agency, which entailed the elimination of more than half of all the industrial 
workplaces within four years. Between 1990 and 1994, East Germany saw the 
eruption of a wave of strikes and protests against the de- industrialization pol-
icy. Due to the lack of trade union leadership, the majority of these actions 
were organized and carried out autonomously by workers and factory councils. 
What did not happen in 1989, but did take place in 1993, was that the factory 
councils and staff committees united into a supra- regional alliance, and also 
organized protests directed against the government. As many as 200 protests, 
strikes, factory occupations or blockades were recorded during the period from 
1990 to 1994, many of them initiated by workers without the support of trade 
union leadership.66
Such labour disputes did not fit into the self- image of the Federal German 
trade unions, whose aim was to resign to the long- established methods in this 
historically unpreceded situation, and to continue their policy of establishing 
 66 Related research will soon be accessible on the page of the working group of the history 
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co- management structures. To question the prevailing Federal German labour 
relations, to politicize strikes and other disputes, to amend the regional eco-
nomic policy or to demand more rights for the trade union representatives was 
not included in their agenda. This is how they became part of an accelerating 
neoliberal development, which was not expected to comprise a challenge to 
the existing labour relations.
Annex: Two Examples of Factory Documents for the Movement of 1989– 1990
Colleagues,
What has the fdgb done for us during these 40 years?
Has it negotiated the reduction of working hours, our constant demand, with 
the factory management? Why has it failed to fight together with us for the 
40- hour week?
Has it made sure that our wages will be adjusted to creeping inflation? Why 
have they always failed to bargain about collective pay rises?
Where are the functionaries of the fdgb when new production standards are 
introduced in our factory?
Are they by our side? Do they block the standards until it is guaranteed that we 
will be paid accordingly?
How can the fdgb allow, as an alleged advocate, that we have on average 
10 days shorter holidays than our colleagues in the West?
Has the fdgb made any efforts to lower the retirement age?
Have we ever experienced that the leadership of the factory trade union re-
fused to accept the state plan in order to protect our interests? Have we ever 
experienced that the trade union took any actions for us at all in opposition to 
the state and the party?
40 years without representation of our own interests is enough!
We cannot let ourselves be organized any more, not even by the “new peo-
ple” – we must organize by ourselves. The years to come will be no cakewalk 
for us. The thumbscrews will be tightened. The prices will rise, but hardly the 
wages. When subsidies fail, that will hit us, above all. The state demands pro-
duction, soon it will threaten us with dismissals. We have to push the caravan 
from the mud!
If we do not want to let our living standards sink considerably, we will need our 
own representation.
– Call for general assemblies, and demand accountability from the leadership 
of the factory trade unions
– Appoint speakers from among our colleagues
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– Let these colleagues place your demands with the factory management
– If difficulties arise, stand by these colleagues
– Publish the results immediately as a protection against repression
– Try to contact colleagues from other factories
Go ahead with the foundation of independent trade unions!
Contact office:  “Initiative for Independent Trade Unions” in Club Conrad- 
Blenkle- Straße 1, Berlin 1055, Tel., from 15/ 11, Wednesday 17.00 - 19.00 and on 
Monday 19.00 -  21.00.
Source: Private archive of the author
To all the co- workers of ho Industry!
Call for Unity and the Establishment of Independent Trade Unions
What was and still is the fdgb?
Has it served as the representation of employees?
It has been and it remains a federation that wants to carry on fobbing us off 
with travel payments and makes ridiculous demands, such as for example only 
two extra days of paid vacation. Do not let them fool you with benefits not spec-
ified in the collective agreement. We want all HO- co- workers to be in a financial 
position that allows them to choose their holiday destination themselves, and 
pay for it head held high in a travel agency. It means among other things:
– Wage rises specified in the collective agreement with regard to the rising cost 
of living
– Modern and decent workplaces
– Reduction of the daily and weekly working hours as well as the retirement age
– Freedom from party constraints
– Unity of all co- workers of HO- Industry
We want to get these demands across to the management of the industrial 
complex as well as other state leaders.
We must take action now, before they take action against us!
There is no need to wait for gifts. We must take our future into our own hands. 
That is why you should join us!
Appoint speakers at the branches and departments to draw up a programme 
together with us.
Advise us of the names and addresses as well as the branch address of every-
body who wants to join us.
- 978-90-04-44039-5
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Send it to
Jens P. 1071 Berlin, Isländische Str. 13
Thomas E. 1142 Berlin, Brodower Ring 24
You can directly talk to us on the first and third Thursday every month at the 
address of Thomas E., from 19.30 till 21.00 in the club room (ground floor). The 
first dates are: 18 January and 1 February.
Do not forget: Nothing good ever happens unless you do it yourself!
Source: Private archive of the author
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